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Abstract 
The business literature has long heralded franchising as an economically 
efficient business strategy for sustainable job, wealth and value creation, economic 
transformation and small business development. However, opportunism, being the 
tendency of the parties involved in the franchise relationship to act in their self-
interest at each other’s expense resulting in misaligned incentives, may undermine 
the long-term efficacy of the franchising system. Such opportunism may be enacted 
at different times by either the franchisor or the franchisee. 
For the above reasons, this thesis focuses on the role of opportunism, a key 
aspect of Transactions Cost Economics theory, within the franchising system. 
Following an extensive review of the franchising, opportunism and related 
literatures, the thesis goes on to theorising and investigating a two-dimensional 
conceptualisation of opportunism, namely ‘opportunistic orientations’ and 
‘opportunistic actions’. Secondly, the thesis theorises and investigates various key 
antecedents and consequences of opportunistic orientations (OO) and opportunistic 
actions (OA) from the perspectives of both franchisors and franchisees. 
Ultimately, this thesis proposes an integrated model combining structural, 
contextual and strategic factors as antecedents affecting OO which, in turn, leads to 
OA. The model further proposes that OA impact the growth, competitiveness and 
survival of franchise systems. In order to test this model, this thesis used a mixed 
methods strategy to undertake empirical fieldwork conducted separately among 
x 
 
franchisors and franchisees. The franchisor study was based on questionnaire data 
gathered from 111 purposefully sampled franchisors analysed principally through 
multivariate correlational techniques including structural equation modelling and 
canonical correlations. The franchisee study involved gathering semi-structured 
interview data from a purposeful sample of 30 Johannesburg-based franchisees, 
analysed through content analysis.  
To a large extent, while the results of the empirical fieldwork supports the 
proposed model as outlined above, the results of the franchisor study produced 
some unexpected outcomes. These relate mainly to the findings that structural and 
strategic factors directly affected the competitiveness of franchise systems and that 
contextual and strategic factors also directly affected the growth and survival of 
franchise systems and not through the intervening variables, that is, OO and OA.  
These findings suggest that structural, contextual and strategic factors may 
create entrepreneurial orientations (EO) and not OO within franchise systems. 
Nevertheless, this thesis makes several important and unique contributions to the 
study of franchising in South Africa, possibly with broader applications elsewhere, 
which include the following: 
 
- extending the opportunism construct by conceptualising the OO notion which 
helps to increase understanding of the manifestation of opportunism as a 
central problem within franchise relationships;  
xi 
 
- examining the antecedents and consequences of OO and OA in the same model 
to test the opportunism-performance hypothesis probably as the first study to 
do so among franchisors and franchisees in general and particularly in this 
country and continent; 
- applying TCE and RET theories to explain OO and OA and strategies to curb 
or minimise it within franchise relationships; and 
- incorporating some aspects of the country’s marriage laws into the franchise 
relationship to provide for secured tenure among franchisees by expunging the 
expiry clauses from franchise contracts. 
 
Within the context of Relational Exchange Theory, this thesis mainly and 
uniquely suggests the use of: 
 
- psychological contracts between franchisors and franchisees to help align the 
incentives of these parties largely through mutually agreed norms of acceptable 
behaviour, role expectations and objectives;  
- independent and statutory bodies such as the Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA), law societies and medical or nursing 
councils as dispute resolution mechanisms to help mediate or resolve 
franchising disputes fairly, quickly and cheaply; and 
xii 
 
- “evergreen” franchise contracts which make no provision for expiry clauses to 
attenuate opportunism among franchisees through secured tenure. 
On the whole, this thesis recommends the use of the above interventions as 
governance mechanisms to help improve franchisor-franchisee relationships and the 
reputation of franchising in South Africa by aligning the incentives of the parties and 
creating an environment in which franchise relationships can flourish.  
Finally, the thesis also implores future researchers to investigate the impact of 
existing legislation such as the Consumer Protection Act and the measures suggested 
above on franchising in this country and the rest of the continent; and the 
relationship between EO and the growth, competitiveness and survival of franchise 
systems. 
Key words: 
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Franchisors 
Franchisees 
Opportunism 
Relational Exchange Theory 
Transaction Cost Economics 
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Chapter 1 Background to the study 
 Introduction 
This Chapter provides the theoretical, empirical and contextual background to 
the study. Following this introduction, section 1.2 focuses on the problem statement 
by discussing the study’s research questions, hypotheses and propositions and 
research design. Section 1.3 addresses the research purpose and importance. Section 
1.4 discusses the delimitations and limitations of the study. Section 1.5 presents the 
organisation of the thesis. 
 Statement of the problem 
Franchising, a concept defined and described more fully and formally in the 
next chapter, generally refers to a business arrangement in which the one party, that 
is, the franchisor, allows another party, that is, the franchisee, to operate outlet(s) 
under licence in terms of the franchisor’s successful business method in return for 
once-off and on-going payments by the franchisee to the franchisor over a pre-
determined period (Vaughn, 1979; Justus and Judd, 1989; Verbieren, Leuven, Cools, 
Nieuwstraat, and van den Abbeele, 2008). 
According to these authors, franchising is represented by highly visible and 
well-known units forming chains of branded outlets supplying a variety of 
consumer goods and services and operated nationally and globally by entrepreneurs 
and in the process, employ millions of people and contribute significantly to the 
2 
gross domestic product retail sales figures of most developed and developing 
countries, including South Africa. 
However, ostensibly due to its hybrid nature signified largely by the ownership 
of the business method by the franchisor and the outlet by the franchisee 
(Williamson, 1979, 1985, Hadfield, 1990; Shane, 1996), several contradictions and 
paradoxes concerning the franchise relationship (Shane and Hoy, 1996; Spinelli and 
Birley, 1996; Tuunanen and Hyrsky, 2001), the study’s unit of analysis, give rise to 
conflicting and intriguing issues underlying the franchising model under 
investigation in this thesis.  
For present purposes, the most pertinent of these contradictions and paradoxes 
is the efficiency argument which suggests that franchise relationships provide 
franchisors and franchisees in particular and societies generally with a suitable 
strategy or model for pursuing their business and societal goals and objectives 
(Hunt, 1972; Caves and Murphy, 1976; Mendelsohn, 2004).  
In this vein, franchising has been described as an effective method for raising 
capital (Caves and Murphy, 1976; Mathewson and Winter, 1985; Brickley and Dark, 
1987; Rubin, 1988), expanding operations (Oxenfeldt and Kelly, 1969; Oxenfeldt and 
Thompson, 1969; Hunt, 1972, Dant, 1992), and distributing standardised goods and 
services to mass customers (Castrogiovanni and Justis, 1998; Justis and Judd, 1989; 
Kaufmann and Eroglu, 1999) in vastly dispersed geographically areas, in a controlled 
and co-ordinated manner (Brickley and Dark, 1987; Castrogiovanni and Justis, 1998; 
Minkler, 1990). 
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Similarly, other scholars have lauded franchising as a means for promoting 
wealth, job, and value creation (Michael, 1993; Phan, Butler and Lee, 1996; Spinnelli 
and Birley 1996; Grünhagen and Dorsch, 2003; Srinivasan, 2006; Aliouche and 
Schlentrich, 2009), small business development (Pilling, 1991; Stanworth, Stanworth, 
Kirby and Watson, 1999; Watson, Purdy and Healeas, 2004) and economic 
transformation (van Niekerk, 2003; Parker and Illtschecko, 2007 and Woker, 2012). 
To a large extent, the nature of the franchise relationship presupposes or 
assumes that franchisors and franchisees will co-operate with each other in pursuit 
of mutually beneficial goals and objectives (Falbe and Dandridge, 1992; Baucus, 
Baucus, and Human, 1996; Shane and Hoy, 1996; Gassenheimer, Baucus and Baucus, 
1996). 
Yet, despite these co-operation pre-suppositions, abundant evidence suggests 
that franchisors and franchisees harbour and pursue conflicting economic or 
financial incentives especially during the existence of their franchise relationship 
(Brown, 1969; Burr, Burr and Bartlett, 1975; Mathews and Winter, 1985; Muris, 1986; 
Hadfield, 1990; Kalnins, 2004).  
Principally, conflict within franchised relationships appears to originate from its 
hybrid or dual ownership structure (Williamson, 1975; 1985; Mathewson and Winter, 
1985; Shane, 1996) in which franchisors own the intellectual assets, business methods 
and systems through which they control the activities of the outlets owned by their 
franchisees which use these assets (Williamson, 1975; Caves and Murphy, 1976; 
Brickely and Dark, 1987; Klein, 1993). 
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On the other hand, the franchised outlets consist mostly of physical and 
intellectual assets such as equipment, machinery and furniture (Williamson, 1979; 
1985; Dnes, 1993; Klein, 1993) and the individual franchisee’s knowledge of local 
market conditions of the outlets mostly located in vastly geographically dispersed 
areas (Oxenfeldt and Kelly, 1969; Brickley and Dark, 1987; Minkler, 1990; 1992; Dnes, 
1993). 
Apart from exercising control over the activities or operations of their 
franchisees such as recruiting and selecting franchisees, site selection, designating 
suppliers and determining operational, marketing, product and pricings policies and 
strategies (Vaughn, 1979; Curran and Stanworth, 1983; Justis and Judd, 1989), 
paradoxically franchisors also own and operate stores or brands that compete 
directly with their franchised outlets (Caves and Murphy, 1976; Brickely and Dark, 
1987; Klein, 1993; Bradach, 1997). 
Against this background, the question that begs an answer is: apart from the 
known financial, marketing, and operational benefits (Vaughn, 1979; Justis and Judd, 
1988; Elango and Fried, 1997) traditionally associated with operating the franchise 
business as propounded within the agency and resource scarcity theories of 
franchising explained in the next chapter, what factors predispose or render the 
franchise relationship vulnerable to opportunistic exploitation by the transacting 
parties?  
Put differently, considering the structural, contextual or strategic factors 
emanating from the micro, market or macro business environment in which 
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franchising occurs as proposed by Curran and Stanworth (1999), what aspects of the 
franchise relationship, if any, attract opportunistic operators into the business; and 
how do the actions of these operators affect the performance of franchise systems? 
Essentially, based on Williamson’s (1975) opportunism construct which he 
describes as “self-interest seeking with a guile” (p.47), the model under investigation 
in this thesis investigates whether influential structural, contextual and strategic 
factors obtaining within and outside the franchise relationship give rise to a 
phenomenon conceptualised and referred to as opportunistic orientations (hereafter 
referred to as “OO”) in this thesis. 
This construct, which is defined and described more fully in Chapter 4 and 
amounts to an extension of Williamson’s opportunism conceptualisation, can be 
construed as the tendency among franchisors and franchisees to exploit various 
aspects of the franchise relationship to derive undue financial benefits at each other’s 
expense. 
In addition, the model investigates whether OO inspire franchisors and 
franchisees to commit opportunistic actions against each other (hereafter referred to 
as “OA”) such as the premature termination of franchise contracts by franchisors 
and the failure among franchisees to maintain quality standards; and whether these 
OA affect the growth, competitiveness, and survival of franchise systems?  
Despite a few studies such as Dewantripont and Sekkat (1991); Dahlstrohm and 
Nygaard (1999); Chiharu (2007); Kidwell, Nygaard, and Silkoset (2007); El Akremi, 
Mignonac, and Perrigot (2010) conducted mostly outside the United States some 50 
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years after franchising began in that country, the above questions remain largely 
unanswered empirically (Hawkins, Wittman, and Beyerlein, 1995; Hawkins, Knipper 
and Strutton, 2009). 
Similarly, important questions on the role played by franchisees in the franchise 
relationship (Minkler, 1990; Elango and Fried, 1997; Bradach, 1997), the involvement 
of franchisors as opportunistic transactors (Hawkins et. al., 2009) and the testing of 
the impact of opportunism on franchise systems (Hawkins et. al., 2009; Combs et al., 
2011) have received little attention, if any, in the academic literature. 
In addition, as most of the franchising opportunism studies emanate from 
Northern Europe (Dant, 1995), these issues have yet to receive attention within the 
context of a developing country such as South Africa, the context of this study, 
where the franchising industry has entered the growth phase of its lifecycle (du Toit, 
2003) during which marketing theory suggests the industry should maximise its 
prospects (Kotler and Keller, 2008).  
These issues require scrutiny especially in this country in view of the United 
Nations-sponsored Millennium Development Goals (MDG) (United Nations 
website, 2013) adopted in this country together with the National Development Plan 
(NDP) (GCIS, 2013), the post-apartheid government new strategy for achieving 
social and economic transformation and development in this country largely 
through education and training, job creation and poverty alleviation.  
As alluded to above, the proponents of franchising in South Africa such as 
Makhubele (1996), van Niekerk (2003) and Parker and Illtschecko (2007) also 
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advocate franchising as a vehicle for delivering much needed socio-economic 
benefits such as job, wealth and value creation, small business development, and 
economic transformation opportunities to many people in this country. 
These views enjoy widespread support in light of the high levels of 
unemployment, poverty, and inequalities in the country (Zuma, 2012) particularly 
among its predominantly young and marginalised population, the victim of the 
country’s post-apartheid legacy of an unequal distribution and access to financial, 
educational and other skills and resources.  
For these reasons, it is necessary for society in general and franchising in 
particular in this country to address the issues which often lead to disputes between 
the dyadic parties involved in the franchise relationship to protect the reputation of 
the industry and to obviate the socio-economic hardships that flow from the 
disruption, disturbance or pre-mature termination or non-renewal of the franchise 
relationship mostly by franchisors.  
To that end, this thesis contributes to meeting the need for dialogue, research, 
training and other interventions at a policy or strategic level which should be 
embarked upon at public conferences, academic and industry workshops, seminars 
and institutions for dissemination through public educational and marketing 
programmes and the electronic and printed media.  
The objective of such exercises should be to build appropriate institutional and 
intellectual capacity necessary to design, adopt or adapt various appropriate 
governance mechanisms in use in the country’s other highly experienced economic 
8 
sectors such as mining, commerce and banking to protect the interests of the 
different stakeholders so as to ensure that franchising delivers its promise of socio-
economic benefits to its investors, entrepreneurs and their employees and society at 
large. 
To address the above issues, the next sub-section discusses the study’s research 
questions. 
1.2.1 Research questions 
Within the context of the issues raised in the preceding-sub-section, this study 
examines the following three research questions: 
 
Research question 1.  
 
Is there a relationship between structural, contextual, and strategic factors of the 
franchise relationship and opportunistic orientations among franchisors and 
franchisees? 
 
Research question 2. 
 
Do opportunistic orientations serve as an antecedent of opportunistic actions 
among franchisors and franchisees? and 
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Research question 3. 
 
What is the relationship between opportunistic actions that franchisors and 
franchisees commit against each other, and the growth, competitiveness and survival 
of franchise systems?  
 
The next sub-section briefly discusses the hypotheses tested in the quantitative 
study. 
1.2.2 Hypotheses tested in the quantitative study 
Against the backdrop of the research questions outlined in the preceding sub-
section, this sub-section presents the seven hypotheses examined in the quantitative 
part of this study, which will be developed and discussed in detail in Chapter 6.  
Briefly stated, the hypotheses tested the relationships between a number of 
constructs of interest, that is, structural, contextual and strategic factors, OO and OA, 
and growth, competitiveness and survival of franchise systems, relating to the 
examination of the research questions among a purposeful sample of 111 franchisors 
countrywide. 
Research question 1 
The first set of three hypotheses postulated that there is evidence of a positive 
relationship between structural, contextual, and strategic factors and OO among 
franchisors, as follows: 
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H1: Structural factors are positively related to OO  
 
H2:  Contextual factors are positively related to OO  
 
H3:  Strategic factors are positively related to OO 
 
Research question 2 
Secondly, hypothesis 4, which tested research question 2, postulated that there 
is evidence of a positive relationship between OO and OA among franchisors, as 
follows: 
 
H4:  Opportunistic orientations are positively related to OA  
 
Research question 3 
Thirdly, the last set of three hypotheses 5-7 tested research question 3, and 
postulated that there is evidence of a negative relationship between OA, the growth, 
competitiveness and survival of franchise systems, as follows: 
 
H5: Opportunistic actions are negatively related to growth of franchise systems 
 
H6: Opportunistic actions are negatively related to competitiveness of franchise 
systems 
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H7: Opportunistic actions are negatively related to survival of franchise systems 
 
The next sub-section discusses the propositions set for the qualitative part of the 
study among franchisees to examine the above research questions. 
1.2.3 Research propositions for the qualitative study 
Also based on a literature review and informal interviews with franchising 
experts, the qualitative part of this study developed and tested several propositions 
using interview data obtained from a purposeful sample of 30 Johannesburg-based 
franchisees to examine the above research questions.  
For reasons explained in greater detail in the next sub-section, the qualitative 
part of the study tested propositions and not hypothesis because of the relatively 
small sample of 30 Johannesburg-based franchisees who participated in the study.  
Research question 1 
Firstly, the pre-research literature review and expert interviews suggest 
evidence of a positive relationship between structural, contextual, and strategic 
factors and OO among franchisees; as follows: 
P1: Structural factors are positively related to opportunistic orientations  
 
P2: Contextual factors are positively related to opportunistic orientations  
 
P3: Strategic factors are positively related to opportunistic orientations  
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Research question 2 
Secondly, proposition 4, which seeks to test research question 2, postulates the 
existence of evidence of a positive relationship between OO and OA among 
franchisees, as follows: 
 
P4:  Opportunistic orientations are positively related to opportunistic actions  
 
Research question 3 
Thirdly, the last three propositions 5-7 seek to address research question 3, and 
postulate the existence of evidence indicating a negative relationship between OA 
and the growth, competitiveness and survival, as follows: 
 
P5: Opportunistic actions are negatively related to the growth of franchise systems 
 
P6: Opportunistic actions are negatively related to the competitiveness of franchise 
systems 
 
P7: Opportunistic actions are negatively related to the survival of franchise 
systems 
 
The next sub-section discusses the research design in the study. 
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1.2.4 Research design 
As discussed in the two preceding sub-sections, this study uses the concurrent 
mixed methods research strategy (Creswell, 2004) comprising different quantitative 
and qualitative methods to test seven hypotheses and propositions that examined 
the above three research questions among two respondent groups, that is, 
franchisors and franchisees, respectively. 
Similarly, as discussed throughout this study, the literature suggests that 
franchisors and franchisees held different perspectives, motivations and bargaining 
positions in the franchise relationship between them.  
More specifically, this South African study used quantitative and qualitative 
techniques, that is, correlational techniques such as structural equation modelling 
(SEM) and canonical correlation analysis and content analysis to analyse 
questionnaire and interview data obtained from a purposeful samples of 111 
franchisors and 30 Johannesburg-based franchisees, respectively.  
The use of the mixed methods invoking different research methods, procedures 
or instruments, data sources and data analysis and validation methods in this study 
aimed at dealing with particular theoretical and practical issues relating to the 
context of the study.  
For example, as alluded to in the preceding sub-section, franchisors own the 
intellectual capital, that is, trade-marks, brand-names and the business method 
through which they controlled the franchise businesses owned by franchisees (Caves 
and Murphy, 1976).  
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This control of the franchise relationship by franchisors give them the strong 
bargaining position that they enjoy (Klein, 1980; Dwyer et. al, 1981; Butaney and 
Wortzel, 1988; Michael, 2000) which in most cases allowed them to determine most 
aspects of the relationship such as whether to allow franchisees to participate in the 
study in terms of the confidentiality clauses found in most franchise contracts.  
For this reason, different methods had to be used for collecting and analysing 
data from the different respondent groups independently of the influence of the 
dominant group, that is, franchisors, to minimise sampling error due to selection 
bias (Ritchie and Lewis, 2005).  
As the reasons for the use of the mixed methods are discussed in Chapter 6 and 
8, suffice it to say at this stage that these methods not only addressed theoretical and 
methodological issues which confronted this study, but also offered pragmatic, 
practical and cost-effective solutions that aided its execution and triangulation which 
is the subject of the next sub-section. 
1.2.5 Triangulation 
Triangulation involves the use various data collection methods, data 
sources, analysts and perspectives to analyse the same phenomenon in the same 
study (Denzin, 1970). In this vein, Denzin states that the rationale behind 
triangulation is to silence the doubt that often surrounds singular methods, lone 
researchers, and single theoretical expositions.  
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However, Patton (2006) warns that triangulation does not necessarily 
produce the same results though it aims at testing for the consistency of the 
different methods, observers and data sources as these instruments tend to be 
sensitive to their use in their respective contexts to highlight real life nuances. 
The study uses various triangulation procedures to achieve specific objectives.  
In the main, this thesis used quantitative and qualitative methods to 
examine the research questions among franchisors and franchisees, respectively. 
The purpose was to enable the self-examination of OO and OA by the 
franchisors and franchisees to determine their views and perceptions on the 
research questions.  
This thesis uses mixed methods research as a triangulation strategy to 
address particular practical, methodological and theoretical considerations that 
have been dealt with in the previous section. To this end, the thesis examines the 
same phenomenon using two different research instruments and from different 
perspectives of two respondent groups, that is, franchisors and franchisees.  
In line with Ritchie and Lewis (2005), this approach enriched and deepened 
the study because the different instruments and the different perspectives of the 
respondent groups complemented each other. Logically, Ritchie and Lewis 
(2005) caution that the use of the mixed methods research strategy raises the 
question of how to read the findings of the study, and the extent to which such 
findings complement or contradict each other.  
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These issues form part of the bigger debate that is currently taking place in 
the methodological literature about triangulation and the use of mixed methods 
research in the same study. The provision of answers to these questions and the 
broader triangulation debate is beyond the scope of this research. However, 
mention needs to be made of the middle road or neutral approach adopted in 
this study.  
To that end, Ritchie and Lewis (2005) define triangulation as “the use of 
different methods to and sources to check or extend the integrity or inferences 
drawn from the data” (p43). Ritchie and Lewis (2005) regard triangulation as 
tools developed and adopted by qualitative researchers as a means of 
investigating the confluence between the data and the conclusions drawn from 
them and used as one of the critical methods of validating quantitative research 
evidence.  
Consequently, the use of two different research methods in this study aimed 
at triangulation. Ritchie and Lewis (2005) argue that there are different 
ontological and epistemological perspectives on the usefulness of triangulation 
as a validating mechanism. The ontological arguments suggested that as there is 
no single way of looking at the world that is, realism, materialism and idealism, 
using different sources of information amounts to a fruitless exercise. 
On the other hand, epistemological perspectives point to the fact that as 
different methods produce specific data such as positivism vs interpretivism and 
deductivism vs inductivism and so on, they are unlikely to yield the same 
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evidence. As a result of these discordant views, Ritchie and Lewis (2005) suggest 
that the value of triangulation lies in extending the understanding of the study 
phenomenon through the use of different or “multiple perspectives or different 
types of readings” (p44).  
This thesis adopted the latter approach in line with the pragmatism 
expounded by Ritchie and Lewis in terms of which the use of the two different 
research methods aimed at broadening and deepening the study of OO and OA 
within the franchise relationship by examining the research questions from the 
perspectives of both franchisors and franchisees.  
A review of the literature and discussions with franchising experts 
suggested that the phenomena of OO and OA were reciprocal problems with 
different motivating factors among franchisors and franchisees. Thus, given that 
a quantitative study conducted among franchisors and the qualitative study 
among franchisees on the same research questions, the two-stage approach used 
in this this amounted to the use of the mixed methods.  
Wengraf (2001) suggests that mixed methods are useful for the purposes of 
triangulation. Accordingly, mixed research methods used in this study intended 
to integrate the different sources and nature of data, theory, the different data 
analysis techniques to the study data and the findings and the reliability and 
validity of the study among franchisors and franchisees to improve and enhance 
the quality of the study.  
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Thus, mixed research methods used provided the flexibility that addressed 
multiple interests and needs in the same study. For instance, the study surveyed 
franchisors by means of a self-administered structured questionnaire in a less 
pressurised environment while conducting interviews among franchisees to 
obtain different and deeper perspectives on similarly sensitive issues.  
It was probably less stressful to use surveys among franchisors without 
placing them under the spotlight of interviews at a time of increased and 
unprecedented political pressure. For the first time ever in this country, 
franchisors appeared to be under immense political and legal pressures in wake 
of the implementation of the CPA. The Act requires them to make drastic 
changes to their franchise contracts at a huge financial cost to themselves.  
On the other hand, as the passing of the CPA aimed at levelling the 
franchising playing fields largely for the benefit of the franchisees, the interviews 
method seemed to provide of franchisees with an outlet to express their 
frustration and aspirations with the franchise relationship.  
Therefore, the mixed method approach primarily triangulated data sources 
and research designs methods used in order to enhance the quality of the study 
by integrating different data sources, analyses methods, and study results. This 
approach helped to enrich the findings of study by achieving breadth and depth 
in testing the research questions. 
The next section discusses the purpose and importance of the study. 
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 Research purpose and importance  
The purpose of this research is to build and test a model used to address the 
research questions by investigating the impact of OO and OA on franchise 
relationships, the unit of analysis of this thesis, with the help of seven hypotheses 
and propositions. 
In the process, the study fills a number of gaps in the franchising theory, 
practice, and policy spheres. In this regard, a literature review of various academic 
sources suggests that very few studies examined the opportunism-performance 
hypothesis (Hawkins et. al., 1995; Hawkins et. al., 2009; Combs, Ketchen Jr, Shook 
and Short, 2011). 
In addition, fewer studies combined economic and social theory as their 
theoretical framework (e.g. Achrol and Gundlach, 1999) for addressing an important 
but under-researched aspect of the franchise relationships. 
Within this context, this study makes an important contribution to knowledge 
largely by extending the opportunism construct and examining the OO and OA-
performance hypothesis within franchised relationship, which has not received 
much attention in the academic literature despite the wide acceptance in most social 
science and management disciplines of the seminal opportunism-performance 
hypothesis conceived mainly by Williamson (Hawkins et al., 1995; Hawkins et. al., 
2009).  
Most importantly, the study broadens the pool of the common and franchisor-
centred antecedents of opportunism such as dependence (Emerson, 1962; Anderson, 
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1988; Rokkan, Heide and Wathne, 2003), information asymmetry (Rubin, 1978; 
Gordon and Stockholm, 1994; Achrol and Gundlach, 1999), bargaining power 
(Dwyer and Walker Jr., 1981; Butaney and Wortel, 1988; Michael, 2000) used in 
previous studies which are of a structural nature. 
Probably for the first time in the academic literature, this study includes 
contextual and strategic factors such as the role of lack of franchise regulation or 
legislation (Brickley, Dark and Weisbach, 1991; Beales and Muris, 1995; Shane and 
Foo, 1999), independent franchisee associations (Dandridge and Falbe, 1995; 
Lawrence and Benjamin, 2010; 2011) and brand value (Kauffmann and Stanworth, 
1995; Gallini and Lutz, 1992; Combs and Ketchen, 2003) as franchisee-centred 
antecedents of OO and OA. 
Essentially, this study also examines the antecedents of a brand of opportunism 
referred to throughout this thesis as OO and OA from the point of view of 
franchisees using the above constructs which have hitherto been largely ignored in 
the academic literature (Minkler, 1990; Bradach, 1997; Elango and Fried, 1997).  
In addition, this study also examines the consequences of OO and OA in 
franchising by focusing on its effects on the growth, competitiveness and survival of 
the businesses of franchisors and franchisees in the same study which two recent 
and relevant studies in which the firstly a meta-analysis of opportunism studies by 
Hawkins et al., (2009) and secondly a synthesis of the antecedent and consequences 
of franchising by Combs et al., (2011) suggest very few studies, if any, have done to 
date.  
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In a nutshell, this study posits that an array of structural, contextual and 
strategic factors from within and outside the franchise relationship give rise to 
misaligned incentives between franchisors and franchisees which lead to conflicting 
financial interests between the parties, which in turn impact negatively on the 
growth, competitiveness, and survival of franchise systems and businesses.  
In this vein, this study conceptualised OO as an extension of the opportunism 
construct developed by Williamson (1975, 1985) to denote the tendency among 
franchisors and franchisees to exploit various governance mechanisms of the 
franchise relationship such as franchise contracts, brand value and the absence of 
legislation and regulations to their financial advantage which has given rise to a 
number of important studies on conflict in franchising such as Gaski (1984), Spinelli 
and Birley (1996) and Frazer, Giddings, Weaven and Wright (2007).  
Secondly, the study posits that OO led to OA (also referred to as opportunistic 
behaviour in this study) which, in turn, had negative effects on the growth, 
competitiveness and survival of franchise systems by creating unfair financial 
advantages for the one party at the expense of the innocent party through for 
example the premature termination of the franchise contract by franchisors. 
Such actions have the effect of denying franchisees the opportunity to realise 
the full benefit that should accrue to them because of market discovery (Bercovitz, 
2000) and local market knowledge (Caves and Murphy, 1976; Minkler, 1990; Dnes, 
1993) in the area where the franchised outlet is located.  
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Similarly, opportunistic or destructive acts (Hibbard, Kumar, and Stern, 2001) 
such as free riding on the franchisor’s brand by franchisees using cheaper 
ingredients are likely to damage the reputation of the franchise system (Brickley and 
Dark, 1987; Muris, 1980; Hadfield, 1990).  
Within the context of Transactions Cost Economics (TCE) theory, this study 
postulates that OO and OA are likely to increase the transaction costs of franchisors 
and franchisees such as the high information, bargaining and negotiation costs 
involved in entering into and maintaining the franchise relationship, securing or 
amending comprehensive and enforceable franchise contracts, searching for and 
screening suitable franchisors or franchisees and monitoring and enforcing 
performance and adjudicating or settling disputes fairly, quickly and cheaply 
(Williamson, 1975; 1985; Klein, 1993; Dnes, 1993). 
As a result, franchisors will opt for vertical integration if they believe that the 
transaction costs involved in recruiting and selecting suitable franchisees and 
monitoring their activities exceed the benefits realisable from operating employee-
managed company stores (Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978; Mathewson and 
Winter, 1985; Carney and Gedajlovic, 1991; Williamson, 1991).  
In addition, franchisors will refrain from franchising where franchise laws limit 
their power to terminate franchise relationships (Mathewson and Winter, 1985) 
while franchise systems characterised by opportunistic terminations will suffer 
reputational damage (Muris, 1980; Hadfield, 1990; Klein, 1995).  
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Similarly, existing franchisees may refrain from renewing or extending their 
franchise contracts (Muris, 1980; Brickley and Dark, 1987; Hadfield, 1990), seeking 
opportunities to acquire additional outlets (Kauffmann and Dant, 1996, Grunhugen 
and Mittelstaedt, 2005; Weaven and Frazer, 2007) and helping to recruit aspirant 
franchisees and independent retailers to buy into the franchise system (Litz and 
Stewart, 1998; Hoffmann and Prebble, 2003). 
Therefore, this thesis suggests various measures needed to curb or attenuate OO 
and OA to enable franchise systems to deliver their broader societal and business 
goals and objectives which include much-needed socio-economic benefits (Hunt, 
1972; 1977) such as job and wealth creation through small business and 
entrepreneurship development and the transformation of the South African 
economy (Makhubele, 1986; van Niekerk, 2003; Parker and Illtshescko, 2007).  
These initiatives are crucial for drawing into the mainstream economy the 
majority of the population who were both politically and economically marginalised 
prior to the dismantling of the oppressive and undemocratic government in 1994.  
In summing up, the study’s importance lies in that it contributes to theoretical 
knowledge by: 
 
- conceptualising the OO construct to explain the manifestation of opportunism 
among franchisors and franchisees to help enhance understanding of the 
opportunism phenomenon within franchised relationships;  
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- developing the franchising model presented and tested in Chapters 5 to 9 to 
examine the antecedents and consequences of OO and OA among franchisors 
and franchisees in the same study arguably being the first study to do so;  
- mainly applying economic and social theories, that is, TCE and RET as a 
theoretical framework for explaining OO and OA and suggesting strategies for 
its attenuation within franchise relationships with the aim of aligning the 
financial or economic incentives of franchisors and franchisees; and 
- being the first study to examine the opportunism–performance hypothesis 
within franchised relationships at least in this country and the continent as 
evidenced by the absence of such research on the National Research 
Foundation (NRF) database. 
 
At a practical level, the study contributes to knowledge by emphasising 
strategies for socialising franchisor-franchisee relationships by departing from the 
“cocked gun” approach that emphasises the use of traditional governance 
mechanisms to franchise contracting to the adoption of RET-based “live and let live” 
philosophy as alternative governance mechanism strategies (rooted mainly in the 
human rights culture of the country’s constitutional democratic system) such as the 
development and or usage of: 
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- mutually agreed norms and values of ethical behaviour which aim at 
establishing psychological contracts between franchisors and franchisees; 
- adoption of aspects of marital laws into franchising requiring removal of expiry 
clauses from franchise contracts to provide secured tenure to franchisees; 
- independent and statutory third party dispute resolution mechanisms such as 
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) established 
in terms of the Labour Relations Act of 1995, as amended and law society or 
medical council-type bodies to facilitate conciliation, mediation and arbitration 
of franchising disputes;  
- independent franchisee associations and democratically elected franchise 
advisory councils with Codes of Good Conduct jointly designed by franchisors 
and franchisees; and 
- the establishment of an independent and statutory office of the Franchise 
Ombudsperson to help resolve franchising disputes equitably, quickly and 
cheaply and to protect and improve the reputation and integrity of franchising 
as a successful business model going forward. 
 
From a policy point of view, the study contributes towards informing 
franchising debates and policy by advocating for measures such as: 
26 
- the passing of franchising-specific legislation and regulations to give effect to 
the prescripts of statutes such as the CPA, the Competition Act and the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa; 
- the alignment of franchise contracts with the applicable legislative and 
regulatory measures with the aim of setting norms and standards of acceptable 
and conscionable conduct within the industry;  
- aggressive promotion of BBBEE initiatives such as the Franchise Charter which 
spells out the industry’s transformation agenda to encourage the growth of 
franchising through the participation of more previously marginalised groups 
in the country; and 
- introducing the Charter of Franchisee Rights to provide the framework within 
which to promote the rights to freedom, dignity and equality which franchisees 
enjoy under the constitution; and 
- helping to align industry practices with best practice globally and the country’s 
constitutional imperatives and to ensure the long term sustainability and 
viability of the franchise system. 
The next section focuses on the delimitations and limitations of the study. 
 Delimitations and limitations of the study 
Several factors limited the focus and direction of the study without 
undermining its quality, relevance or importance. To mention a few, the study 
concentrated on franchisor and franchisee businesses which had been in existence 
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for least 3 years as this made it possible to measure the growth, competitiveness and 
survival or otherwise of such businesses in this country.  
On the other hand, as Price (2000) correctly lamented, the paucity of franchising 
research resulting in fewer studies being conducted generally and particularly in this 
country; and even fewer on franchisor opportunism (Muris, 1980) or on the 
consequence thereof on franchise systems (Hawkins et al., 1995; Hawkins et al., 2009; 
Combs et al., 2011). 
This contributed to the limited availability of measures or constructs that could 
be readily adapted or replicated in the design of the questionnaire and semi-
structured interview statements used this study. 
In addition, the country’s relatively small size of the franchising industry 
compared to developed countries such as the United States and United Kingdom 
and the lack of official information on franchising activities and its contribution to 
the economy in terms of sales, employment, or movement in these or any other 
figures required the treatment of the obtained or available information with caution 
as it could not be independently verified.  
Similarly, the lack of official statistics on the number of franchisors, franchisees, 
franchising complaints and disputes lodged or resolved, new or de-franchised 
franchisors and franchisees and the reasons for these movements resulted in the use 
of self-reported information which was difficult to verify independently. 
Furthermore, the unavailability of franchisee contact details resulted in a small 
sample of franchisees whose responses to the semi-structured interviews do not lend 
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themselves to rigorous statistical analysis on techniques such as regression or 
structural equation modelling used to analyse questionnaire data obtained from 
franchisors. 
Most importantly, the self-regulation of the industry under FASA (Woker, 2012) 
and its domination by franchisors was as unhelpful as is its status as an 
unrepresentative, voluntary and non-statutory organisation that has a limited record 
of meaningful participation in open and public roles such as teaching, research and 
education initiatives or as an amicus curiae or “friend of the court” in a number of 
franchising cases that have come before the country’s courts over 35 years of its 
existence.  
On the other hand, adjusting to the new and unfolding legislative and 
regulatory environment which seeks to reduce the domination of franchised 
relationships by franchisors seems to have made it difficult to secure their 
participation in this study in larger numbers than was anticipated even though the 
44 percent response rate obtained is acceptable as it is in line with other franchising 
studies (e.g. Skinner et al., 1992). 
Similarly, unlike in countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom 
where some level of regulation exists (Emerson, 1998), the lack of information on the 
industry made it impossible to obtain the financial information of franchisors and 
franchisees which could have been used to measure or assess the study’s dependent 
variables, that is, the performance of franchised businesses by using objective and 
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accurate criteria such as profitability, return on equity, and return on assets and so 
on.  
With only 29% of franchised businesses listed on the Johannesburg Securities 
Exchange (du Toit, 2003), private ownership of most of these businesses possibly had 
a negative effect on access to the financial information with the result that this study 
relied on non-financial information such as growth, competitiveness and survival as 
proxies to measure the relationship between the independent and dependant 
variables.  
Lastly, the obstacles involved or experienced in obtaining the contact details of 
franchisees affected the researcher’s ability to obtain a representative sample of 
respondents for their inclusion in the quantitative study with the result that, as in 
similar studies (e.g. Falbe, Dandridge and Kumar ,1998; Withane, 2000; Clarkin and 
Rosa, 2005), a qualitative study was conducted among franchisees. 
The next section focuses on the study’s approach to its ethical challenges. 
 Ethical considerations 
Given that the rules of the University of the Witwatersrand under which this 
study was conducted require research conducted on human beings as subjects to be 
sanctioned by the ethical committee, it was not necessary for the researcher to 
comply with this requirement. 
However, to avoid bias or lack of objectivity or competitor concerns, the 
researcher deliberately omitted franchise businesses he may be associated with in 
any form from the study.  
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In addition, the researcher disclosed his business interests in a particular 
franchise system upfront to enable potential respondents to decide whether to 
proceed or withdraw from participating in the study. 
Furthermore, a plagiarism software package run on the thesis did not reveal 
any issues which raised ethical concerns. 
The next section outlines the organisation of the thesis. 
 Summary - Organisation of the thesis 
Chapter 1. Background to the study. This Chapter outlines theoretical, empirical 
and contextual background to the study. It mainly states the research problem 
comprising the research questions, hypotheses, propositions and research design, 
the research purpose and importance and the delimitations and limitations of the 
study. 
Chapter 2. The scope and dynamics of franchising in South Africa. This chapter 
critically discusses the regulatory, legislative and political environment which laid 
the foundation for discussing the profiles and activities, role, challenges and 
prospects of franchising in South Africa. 
Chapter 3. The theoretical foundations of the franchise relationship. This chapter 
critically reviews definitions and explanation of franchising, the franchise 
relationship, franchise contracts or agreements and key franchising theories that seek 
to explain the philosophical foundations of the franchise relationship. 
Chapter 4. Opportunism as the central problem within franchise relationships. This 
chapter deals with the meaning, forms, and strategies for managing opportunism 
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within franchising relationships prior to introducing and explaining the study’s OO 
construct.  
Chapter 5. Model development for empirical work. This chapter focuses on the 
development of the franchising model under investigation in this study by 
identifying the constructs and sub-dimensions underlying the study’s independent, 
intervening and dependant variables, the proposed linkages between them and 
hypotheses and propositions used to examine the research questions among 
franchisors and franchisees in Chapters 6 and 7; and Chapters 8 and 9, respectively. 
Chapter 6. Research methodology - Quantitative study. This chapter focuses on the 
quantitative methods, that is, the questionnaire and various statistical techniques 
used to gather, analyse, validate, and evaluate data obtained from franchisors on the 
research questions.  
Chapter 7. Results and Discussion - Quantitative study. This chapter presents and 
discusses the results of the quantitative study conducted among franchisors. 
Chapter 8. Research methodology - Qualitative study. This chapter focuses on the 
qualitative methods such as interviews and content analysis used to conduct the 
study among franchisees which involved data gathering, analysis, validation, and 
evaluation. 
Chapter 9. Results and Discussion - Qualitative study. This chapter presents and 
discusses the results of the qualitative part of the study. 
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Chapter 10. Conclusion. This chapter concludes the study by highlighting its 
findings and implications, contributions to franchising theory, practice, and policy, 
and suggesting areas for further investigation.  
The next chapter provides an overview of the scope and dynamics of 
franchising in South Africa. 
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Chapter 2 Franchising in South Africa: 
an overview. 
 Introduction 
Chapter 1 discussed the conceptual, theoretical and contextual foundations of 
the study of the franchise relationship, the study’s unit of analysis. This chapter 
outlines the scope and dynamics of franchising in South Africa, the site of this study. 
After this introduction, section 2.2 briefly outlines the regulatory, legislative and 
political environment in which franchising occurs in South Africa.  
Section 2.3 provides a profile of franchising activities in South Africa. Section 2.4 
focuses on the role of franchising in pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDG) and the National Development Plan (NDP). Section 2.5 deals with the 
challenges and opportunities facing franchising in South Africa. Section 2.6 
summarises the chapter.  
 The regulatory, legislative and political environment of franchising in 
South Africa 
Given the suggested need and significance of franchising in the creation of jobs, 
wealth and value, small business development and economic transformation in 
South Africa and the misalignment of incentives between franchisors and franchisees 
as highlighted in the previous chapter, it is important to briefly review the legal, 
regulatory and political environment which continues to shape the development and 
occurrence of franchising in this country.  
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This is necessary to lay the foundation for the understanding of the 
development, challenges and prospects of the franchising industry in this country 
regarding its envisaged role in social and economic transformation and development 
which has also been slowed down by the imposition of economic sanctions by 
Western countries (Woker, 2012) due to South Africa’s political dispensation which 
prevailed prior to 1994.  
Having said that, like in many countries in the Americas, Europe and 
Australasia whose franchise associations are affiliated to the International Franchise 
Association (IFA), this country’s franchising industry is self-regulating under the 
aegis of FASA, a voluntary, non-profit organisation (Woker, 2012) dominated and 
sponsored by franchisors.  
As some franchisors and service providers such as bankers, lawyers and 
consultants most of whom have vested interests in in the industry appoint the board 
and executive management of FASA in closed meetings or conferences, most of 
FASA’s officials comprise current or retired franchisors or their employees or 
representatives which clearly affects the organisation’s credibility, objectivity and 
legitimacy in the public generally and the investor community in particular.  
Perhaps this may also explain the reluctance of the authorities to recognise 
FASA as the industry’s mouthpiece and the failure of some franchisors and most 
franchisees to join it or to solicit its help as a dispute resolution mechanism. 
In addition, FASA’s complicated, confusing and user-unfriendly Code of Good 
Business Ethics which has no clear guidelines and timelines for helping franchisees 
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to lay complaints against their franchisors compounds the lack simplified processes, 
procedures or record of the application of this Code in resolving any disputes in the 
organisation’s 35 year history.  
Unlike other self-regulating bodies such as the Bar Councils of advocates, law 
societies of attorneys or even the estate agents’ board, there is no public record or 
evidence of FASA having taken legal action against any of its errant members which 
raises serious doubts about FASA’s lack of intention, ability or commitment to 
resolving franchising disputes fairly in this country.  
Similarly, there is no record of FASA appearing in court proceedings to provide 
expert and independent evidence as an amicus curiae or “friend of the court” to assist 
the court in determining a dispute between franchisors and franchisees more than 60 
important franchising cases listed on the South African court cases website 
www.saflii.org.za.  
As it is not compulsory for franchisors or franchisees to become members of the 
FASA (Woker, 2012), it is not possible for this body to keep or produce proper, 
accurate and official records of the players and their activities in such a massive 
sector that contributes R250 billion or 12% of retail sales to the economy and 
employs 50 000 people (Gordon, 2012).  
This has led to a dearth of official statistics and secondary data on the 
franchising industry in this country which hinders academic and other important 
research activities and state bodies such as the Competition Commission, National 
Consumer Commission, and Statistics South Africa (SSA) to monitor and assess the 
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activities of this important economic sector which generates billions of rand in sales 
to a large number of customers through the activities of many workers, 
entrepreneurs, lenders and other stakeholders in this country. 
Similarly, it is inexplicable that the Department of Trade and Industry only 
introduced and implemented the Consumer Protection Act of 2008 which deals with 
some aspects of the franchisor-franchisee relationships more than a decade after the 
onset of the new constitutional dispensation.  
It is equally uncomforting that the Department of Economic Development has 
not deemed it fit to scrutinise franchising practices and franchise contracts such as 
the resale price maintenance, which the Competition Commission found to violate 
the Competition Act of 1999 in Cancun Trading No 24 CC vs Seven-Eleven Corp SA 
(Pty) Ltd (Competition Tribunal, 2000).  
Perhaps these delayed political and legislative interventions explain the lack of 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) or Affirmative Action (AA) initiatives or the 
aggressive promotion and marketing of the Franchising Charter that spells out the 
industry’s transformation agenda and the target set and achieved from time to time 
in line with similar efforts by other sectors such as the financial services, mining and 
building construction. 
Similarly, there is no Franchisees Rights Charter which spells out the 
franchisee’s rights and how these are protected under the law and the constitution in 
view of the unequal distribution of bargaining power which favour franchisors 
country in which equality is a fundamental constitutional value.  
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This regulatory and legislative inertia appears to have aided the information 
vacuum which does not only make it difficult to conduct important policy and 
academic research of this nature, but also obstructs efforts to undertake a credible, 
independent and objective assessment of the contribution that franchising makes to 
the South African economy.  
Furthermore, the lack of official and credible information on franchised 
businesses makes it difficult to determine and confront the problems that may 
surface in the wake of the growth or decline of franchising in South Africa.  
Most importantly, the dearth of information also make it difficult to determine 
the extent of the conflicts and disputes that have mushroomed within this self-
regulatory environment that threaten to tarnish the reputation of the franchising 
industry and undermine or minimise its importance and potential role in the 
economy of a young and developing country such as South Africa.  
Some commentators such as Parker and Illetscheko (2007) allude to the 
enormous socio-economic benefits that franchising can play in addressing the 
country’s high unemployment, crime and poverty levels that are exacerbated by the 
lack of financial and educational skills and resources for which franchising is 
reportedly suited.  
However, it remains debatable whether the industry can be able to fulfil its 
potential role partly because of the self-regulatory environment within which it 
currently operates under FASA as it lacks independence, objectivity and the force of 
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the law in the form of regulatory and legislative powers to be an effective 
organisation.  
Consequently, it is clear that FASA is unable to play any meaningful role in the 
formulation and implementation of franchising policies and decisions aimed at 
protecting and promoting the interests of its stakeholders in the same manner that 
oversight and regulatory bodies such as the Competition Commission, Estate 
Agency Affairs Board or the various law societies do in this country.  
Furthermore, as a voluntary body dominated by some franchisors and their 
service providers such as attorneys and consultants, FASA cannot lay claim to being 
an impartial, authoritative, or fully representative structure with a comprehensive 
membership of the relevant key role players over whom it exercises control or 
discipline.  
For these reasons, it is not hard to speculate that the franchising industry is 
unlikely to realise its growth potential by attracting people from the majority of the 
country’s population into the sector as franchisees and franchisors and other 
potential and existing franchisees may not be inclined to enter or increase their 
investments in a sector in which franchisors clearly pay such a dominant and 
controlling role.  
Against this background, some 20 years after the scrapping of apartheid, 
statistics published by FASA (FASA, 2013) shows that white men still dominate the 
industry as franchisors, franchisees, and service providers and this is unlikely to 
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change in the near future because of the absence of efforts to transformation of the 
organisation in meaningful manner. 
Unlike other industries such as the banking, construction and mining, FASA has 
no programmes to aggressively promote its Franchising Charter or other initiatives 
spelling out a programme of action to redress past economic imbalances or promote 
the participation of the majority of the population in the industry and its reliance on 
privately funded and unofficial sources of information and data seems to harm the 
industry’s image and credibility in the eyes of that majority.  
As most franchisors sponsor or fund publications such as the bi-annual 
Standard Bank Franchise Factor Survey conducted and published by Gordon (2012), 
the South African Franchise Warehouse (2013) and whichfranchise, potential 
franchisees can hardly regard the information and data aimed at recruiting them 
contained in these publications as objective and neutral in presenting a fair and 
unbiased picture of franchising in South Africa.  
This may possibly also explains the slow uptake of franchising among the 
majority of the population who represents the industry’s source of potential future 
growth and expansion as operators and customers.  
Consequently, given the criticism in the media (e.g. Zungu, 2011), it is not 
surprising that FASA seems to experience some difficulties inspiring confidence 
especially among existing franchisees and entrepreneurs such as the researcher that 
it is capable of dealing with franchising conflicts and disputes in an even-handed 
manner.  
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Thus, unlike in many developed countries such as the UK, Europe, and some 
states in the US where growing franchising complaints and disputes resulted in 
some famous cases such as the Chicken Delight case and passing of the so-called 
“good cause” or “good faith” legislation, the lack of franchising-specific legislation 
and regulations in this country does not help the growth of franchising through 
capacity building aimed at improved franchisor-franchisee relationships.  
The laws requiring franchisors to show good cause or good faith before 
terminating or failing to renew franchise contracts with franchisees such as the 
Robinson-Patman Act and the anti-termination laws passed by several states in the 
US (Scher and Proger, 1991) suggests the need for legislation to regulate the 
franchise relationships (Woker, 2009; 2012) as they enter the growth and maturity of 
their life cycles.  
This is especially the case in this country where there is a noticeable increase in 
complaints and disputes between franchisors and franchisees arising from violation 
or termination of franchise contracts mostly by franchisors as exemplified by the 
Woolworths case wildly reported in this country’s media (Crotty, 2010).  
However, the lack of objective and credible information and body with 
statutory powers hinder the publication and availability of more similar cases, the 
nature of disputes and remedies to cure the ills of the industry in this country.  
According to Woker (2009; 2012), the recently passed CPA seeks to protect 
consumer rights including franchisees and therefore cannot address most of the 
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specific issues affecting the industry as only a small section of a chapter is devoted to 
the franchising industry.  
In a nutshell, Woker advocates the passing of specific franchise legislation and 
regulations to consolidate all the intricate issues of the industry currently dealt with 
by different pieces of legislation and contract law in a coherent manner.  
For example, the Competition Act deals with the resale price maintenance 
forbidding franchise systems from imposing prices of goods franchisees sell at their 
outlets, as this amounted to anti-competitive practices and also prohibits “close 
shop” arrangements in terms of which franchise systems prevent franchisees from 
sourcing raw materials and other consumables suppliers other than the franchisor-
designated suppliers.  
In addition, while the CPA makes provision for National Consumer 
Commission and the National Consumer Tribunals to hear and adjudicate on a wide 
range of consumer-related matters, including franchising disputes, most disputes 
litigated in the courts are not properly addressed under common law given the 
nature and complexity of the franchise relationship which requires specialist 
knowledge and expertise (Woker, 2009; 2012).  
Therefore, the lack of a consolidated piece of franchise-specific legislation and 
regulation of the franchising industry is highly problematic and is likely to hinder its 
expected growth in South Africa. 
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 Franchising activities in South Africa 
Franchising in South Africa has developed its life cycle and character over the 
past 25 to 30 years (du Toit, 2003) which was shaped by the country’s closed and 
undemocratic political system which possibly hindered its development which also 
cannot be properly accounted for because of the absence of official information and 
statistics and research on the industry largely due to self-regulation and private 
ownership.  
As Du Toit points out, with only 29% of her debatable estimate of South Africa’s 
550 franchise systems listed at the Johannesburg Securities Exchange and 30 000 
franchised outlets (whichfranchise, 2013), the vast majority of home-grown franchise 
systems are in private hands with the Famous Brands group dominating the fast 
food and restaurant sector of publicly owned franchise systems.  
Through acquisitions and organic growth, the Famous Brands Limited, which 
until recently was wholly family-owned, has expanded massively from an unlisted 
entity worth a few million rand into a market leader in the fast food and restaurant 
segment of the franchise sector, with a huge market capitalisation in excess of R9 
billion rand, more than 20 well-known brands and 2 163 outlets and 10 000 
employees in this country, the neighbouring states, the Middle East, India and the 
United Kingdom (Famous Brands Ltd annual report, 2013).  
The success of this group suggests that consolidation of businesses in the sector 
provides sustainable growth opportunities for them through the generation of 
pooled and centralised resources and skills even though such a strategy may be 
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short-lived given the relatively small size of the market and the anti-competition 
challenges that may arise from the Competition Commission. 
As to the unlisted businesses in private hands, these entities remain 
unaccountable to the authorities and the investing public as they have no public 
reporting duties with the result that their financial and other business information is 
inaccessible to the public in general for academic, policymaking or other purposes 
(Woker, 2012). 
In addition, Woker observes that unlike in countries such the United States and 
the United Kingdom, there is no statutory body with official recognition and status 
that allow it to exercise authoritative control and command over franchising 
activities in this country; and neither is there a requirement for new franchisors to 
issue Uniform Franchise Offering Circular (UFOC) in respect of new franchise 
opportunities.  
As a result, several private organisations and unofficial sources such as FASA, 
South African Franchise Warehouse and whichfranchise have taken the initiative to 
gather limited and insufficient data among willing parties for electronic publication 
on their respective websites, namely, www.fasa.co.za, www.safw.co.za, and 
www.whichfranchise.co.za.  
Furthermore, despite FASA’s annual directory that contains topical articles on 
legal, marketing, or strategic issues and profiles of their member franchisors, the lack 
of official statistics and information creates serious problems for conducting a 
thorough and deep investigation of franchising in South Africa. 
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As a result, it is difficult to produce a comprehensive demographic profile of 
franchisors and franchisees in terms of age, gender, race, educational qualifications, 
franchising experience and so on which has been found to have a bearing on 
franchising decisions (e.g. Morrison, 1996).  
However, the descriptive statistics of the franchisees interviewed shown on 
Table 6.2 indicates no significant differences between the profile of overseas 
franchisees and their local counterparts other than that the profile of local 
franchisees reflects the exclusion of the majority of the population largely for 
historical and political reasons which, unfortunately, is receiving very little attention 
from FASA or the authorities.  
For example, the franchising sector has yet to embark upon such a drive some 
20 years into the new political and constitutional dispensation which seeks to 
eradicate past imbalances and inequalities in all strata of social, economic and 
political spheres where most sectors of the economy have developed transformation 
programmes with clear targets and timelines aimed at increasing the participation of 
the majority population in their different respective industries.  
Nevertheless, though Table 2.1 shows that the franchise systems in this country 
comprise the fast food, restaurant and groceries, automative products, personal, 
business, and homecare services categories as do their overseas counterparts, the 
information on which it is based was provided by the unofficial sources referred to 
above and appears not to be completely reliable as it shows vast discrepancies. 
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For example, Benedetta Gordon who has since 1994 published a Standard Bank-
sponsored bi-annual franchise survey which highlights franchising trends in this 
country, suggesting that there are 530 franchise systems in South Africa (Gordon, 
2010), while whichfranchise (2013) and SA Franchise Warehouse (SAFW) puts the 
number at 550 and 746, respectively.  
The SA Franchise Warehouse also profiles South African franchise systems 
published on its website www.safw.co.za and magazine distributed monthly to its 
subscribers is somewhat detailed, diverse, and usually runs special features on 
different franchises systems and listings of existing franchises on sale, available new 
franchising sites, franchising finance, legal, ethical, and marketing issues and so on. 
An issue related to the lack of official information and statistics is the dearth of 
franchising research in this country which unlike its overseas counterparts, makes it 
difficult to assess a number of key factors which determine or underlie franchising 
decisions and strategies in this country such as the reasons for entrepreneurs to take 
up or leave franchising, franchisor and franchisee selection strategies, and the 
number and reasons for franchisor and franchisee exits or discontinuance.  
These issues need attention in order to elevate franchising to higher trajectory 
levels required for the delivery of socio-economic benefits such as job, wealth and 
value creation and economic transformation that some observers suggest franchised 
businesses can provide in South Africa.  
Based on these publications, some key aspects of South Africa’s franchise 
systems are profiled on Table 2-1 below, as follows:   
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Table 2-1: A profile of South African franchising systems 
 
 
Sector 
 
 
No 
 
% of  
total 
 
Set up cost 
Own funds 
% 
Royalty 
fees 
FASA 
member 
Min Max Min Max Min  Max Yes No 
Automative 61 8.18 R78K R2,5m 30 50 4 10 6 55 
Beauty and 
wellness 
36 4.83 R25K R1.4m 30 50 3 10 7 29 
Business & 
Financial 
Services 
44 5.8 R30K R1.3m 25 50 3 10 2 42 
Computer, 
Internet & 
Cellular 
19 2.55 R95K R1.4m 30 50 2 9 2 17 
Construction-
related services 
58 7.77 R25K R2m 50 50 2 9 11 47 
Education & 
training 
52 6.97 R6K R350k 50 50 2 10 9 43 
FMCG Retail 27 3.62 R55K R350k 60 50 1.5 7.50 8 19 
House, Home & 
Office Services 
53 7.1 R5K R1.R, 50 50 5 15 6 47 
Leisure & 
Entertainment 
31 4.16 R5K R2.5m 50 50 3 10 3 28 
Personal & 
Professional 
Services 
23 3.08 R8K R.5m 50 50 3 10 3 20 
Print & 
Communication 
23 13.27 R200K R1.5m 50 50 3 10 5 18 
Quick Service 
Restaurant 
99 13.27 R150k R5m 50 50 3 10 30 69 
Real Estate & 
Property 
26 3.49 R50K R2.5m 50 50 3 10 4 22 
Restaurant 84 11.26 R300K R7m 50 50 3 10 20 64 
Retail Speciality 76 3.49 R120K R4.5m 50 50 3 10 16 60 
Security 5 .67 R20K R2.5m 50 50 3 10 1 4 
Sport & 
Recreation 
18 2.41 R10K R2.5m 50 50 3 10 3 15 
Travel & tourism 11 1.47 R50K R2.5m 50 50 3 10 3 8 
Total 746 100       139 607 
Source: South African Franchise Warehouse 
 
This profile suggests that like its counterparts in the developed countries such 
as the United States, United Kingdom, and Europe and Australasia, the South 
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African franchise market provides a broad range of home-made products and 
services at a wide range of prices and similar royalty rates.  
However, it appears that South Africa’s existing 550 or so franchise systems for 
its population of 50 million people compares unfavourable to those of the stated 
developed countries such as the United Kingdom which has two thousand franchise 
systems for its population of almost 50 million people (BFA, 2013).  
This reflects the effects of not only the differences between the two countries ‘ 
level of socio-economic development, but also of South Africa past discriminatory 
policies which hampered the economic participation of the majority of its population 
through lack of access to educational and economic opportunities and resources.  
Therefore, with appropriate educational, financial, and marketing programmes 
aimed at redressing these past imbalances and a fair, cheaper and equitable 
legal/regulatory framework, it should be anticipated that franchising will grow 
exponentially in the next ten years or so.  
This could happen if the majority of the population take up franchising as 
franchisees and franchisors and expand their operations countrywide and beyond 
which suggests the need to alter current franchising practices in this country which 
have thus far excluded the products and services that are likely to emerge from the 
innovation and creativity of the majority of the population that meet specific needs 
of the hitherto marginalised communities especially in the far-flung town and 
villages of the country. 
48 
 The role of franchising within the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDG) and National Development Plan (NDP) 
Broadly speaking, both the United Nations’ MDG (United Nations, website, 
2013) and the South African government’s NDP represents the global and South 
Africa’s post-apartheid's political strategies for achieving economic and social 
transformation and development to fight the triple scourge of poverty, inequality 
and unemployment which besiege the developing world and the South African 
society alike.  
Unlike its predecessors such as the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP), Growth, Equality and redistribution (GEAR) and the Growth 
Path Plan, which also aimed at reversing the pain and damage caused by apartheid 
policies of segregation and oppression which collapsed at the 1994 negotiated 
political settlement, the NDP is different in a number of respects.  
First, despite being spear-headed and sponsored by government under the 
Ministry of Planning located within the Presidency, like the MDG, the NDP 
embodies multi-faceted efforts and aspirations of various private and public sectors 
of the developing world and the South African society including all spheres of the 
State and government departments, all political parties, business, labour, various 
interest groups and communities at large (Government Communication and 
Information Service, 2013).  
Both the MDG and the NDP aim at achieving broad and specific objectives and 
targets of economic growth, social stability and efficient public administration 
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through the creation of sustainable business and job opportunities, increases in 
productivity and competitiveness, poverty alleviation and reduction of crime and 
corruption and so forth.  
From these lofty objectives, it is clear that the NDP sees to harness the co-
operation and participation of the country as a whole in the fight against poverty, 
inequality, and injustice within the next 30 years and to drive the country towards 
achieving the goals set globally under global initiatives such as the MDG which also 
seek to eliminate poverty, inequality and injustice over the next few years or so.  
Therefore, the question is not whether franchising has a role to play in this 
arena but how it should do so as there can be little doubt that franchising is ideally 
suited for playing an important role in the drive towards achieving the NDP goals, 
that is, poverty alleviation through job creation and education and training.  
However, despite the adoption of the NDP by the ruling party as its policy at its 
last national conference, the government has yet to formally adopt the NDP as its 
policy or law and to build capacity to ensure its co-ordinated implementation by 
various private and public sector bodies in the same way as the disgraced apartheid 
policies it seeks to replace were executed.  
For example, franchises are labour intensive businesses that can provide 
training and employment to large numbers of people with minimum education in 
vastly dispersed geographical areas in a relatively short time and at wages levels 
negotiated and agreed upon at the central bargaining chambers  of the various 
economic sectors.  
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In addition, as potential key drivers of business development in South Africa, 
franchises involve minimal risk in terms of setting up, operational, marketing, 
purchasing, training, financial and management control in respect of which the 
franchisor is contractually-bound to provide assistance and guidance to their 
franchisees.  
Similarly, through centralised and bulk purchasing of goods and services such 
as ingredients, raw materials and other consumables, advertising, accounting 
systems, franchises can provide franchisees with a competitive advantage over 
independent businesses. 
These conditions present franchising with an opportunity to achieve its growth 
potential in this country following many years of the exclusion of the vast majority 
of the population from meaningful participation in the mainstream of the economy.  
This is likely to change through the provision of training and financial resources 
and support to many unemployed and under-employed young people in South 
Africa's sprawling townships and villages to generate vast pools of skilled and 
productive persons and aspirant entrepreneurs who can be trained and financed into 
becoming franchisors and franchisees.  
Thus, an increase in the number of franchisors and franchisees can have many 
socio-economic benefits at the heart of the NDP that include job, wealth and value 
creation, economic transformation and small business development that can 
contribute to the reduction in poverty, inequality, unemployment and increase the 
tax base through taxes and levies. 
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 Franchising challenges and opportunities in South Africa 
The preceding two sections suggests that the history and development 
franchising in South Africa reflects South Africa’s politico-legal and socio-economic 
dynamics as the vast majority of key role players in the industry come from the 
privileged segment of the community.  
For instance, perusal of franchise publications such as FASA, whichfranchise 
and SA Franchise Warehouse websites and Gordon (2012) shows that 99% of the 
franchisors, franchise directors and consultants and up to 80% of franchisees are 
white males which has possibly placed enormous strain on the development of 
franchising in this country considering that white males have had to cater for the 
needs of the majority of the population.  
According to the World Franchise Council (WFC), most franchise systems are of 
domestic origin (World Franchise Council website, 2013) which entails that 
franchising requires the ingenuity, creativity, and innovativeness of a country’s 
citizens to develop products and systems that meet local demands and tastes before 
exporting them to other countries abroad.  
Clearly, this country’s past discriminatory laws and practices have delayed the 
growth of franchising by denying the majority of the population opportunities to 
acquire educational, financial, and managerial skills and resources needed to 
participate and contribute meaningfully in the development of the economy in 
general and franchising in particular.  
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For instance, whichfranchise, a South African franchise consultancy estimates 
the number of franchisors in South Africa at 550 with 30% of whom operate in the 
fast food market and 40% of whom are based in the Gauteng province, unarguably 
South Africa’s economic hub, employing 30 000 people in South Africa 
(whichfranchise, 2013) despite a population of some 49 million people (Statistics 
South Africa, 2012).  
This compares unfavourably with some developed countries such as Australia, 
France and Ireland, which have triple the numbers of franchise systems with less 
than half the population of South Africa (World Franchise Council, 2013).  
Similarly, the imposition of economic sanctions on the country by Western 
countries in the 1980’s has not helped matters as mostly oil and petroleum products 
companies were bold and crafty enough to enter the South African franchising 
market.  
Therefore, as discussed in section 2.3 and 2.4 above, the past challenges have 
slowed down franchising’s development over the past 30 years which it can now 
reverse through the MDG and the NDP which seek to address socio-political issues 
which may allow franchising to achieve its growth potential by increasing the 
number of franchisors, franchisees, and product range by tapping into the hitherto 
marginalised and majority of South Africa’s population.  
However, such initiatives will require extensive efforts to provide franchising 
education and training, marketing and promotion, financing and entrepreneurship 
programmes to target the vast of the majority of the population at various levels of 
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the social and economic strata such as school leavers, workers, and professionals, 
retired and retrenched workers in different parts of South Africa.  
To this end, both public and private sector bodies such as government and 
semi-government institutions such as the Departments of Trade and Industry (Dti) 
and of Economic Development and their subsidiaries, universities; financial 
institutions such as banks, insurance and pension fund houses should play their part 
in this venture.  
The same applies to non-governmental organisations and interest groups such 
as the Black Management Forum (BMF), National Federation of African Chamber of 
Commerce (NAFCOC) and Federation of African Business Councils (FABCOS) who 
should join hands with FASA to provide education, training and promotion on the 
pros and cons of franchising to their members.  
On the other hand, recent initiatives to encourage and facilitate black 
individuals and entrepreneurs to enter the formal economy in general and the 
franchise sector in particular through government-sponsored measures such as BEE 
seems slow in making an impact because of lack of institutional capacity, access to 
funding and information.  
For example, very few black individuals and entrepreneurs are enticed into a 
labour-intensive and low skill sector such as franchising in the absence of an 
organisation with educational, marketing and financial resources dedicated to 
encouraging the growth of franchising through their increased awareness and 
participation.  
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In addition, reasons ranging from bureaucratic procedures to steep collateral 
requirements imposed on potential franchisees by financial and development 
institutions such as banks, the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) and the 
National Empowerment Fund (NEF) and franchise systems are equally detrimental.  
These institutions usually take months to approve process loan applications and 
demand up to 50% in equity contributions with negative reports in the media about 
the unfulfilled promises and shattered dreams of some black franchisees (Zungu, 
2011) are not helpful, as does the lack of efforts to provide entrepreneurial education 
and information in the country’s public spaces such as the media, universities, 
colleges for further education and schools.  
On the other hand, the passing of the CPA is poised to help avoid some past 
pitfalls and to create an atmosphere which fosters cordial franchisor-franchisee 
relationships which requires considerable efforts among all the parties to embrace its 
challenge to develop and sustain a less adversarial climate in which to conduct 
business to boost the growth and development of franchising in this country.  
 Summary 
Chapter 2 discussed the scope and dynamics of franchising in South Africa 
whilst briefly comparing these activities to those of the developed countries. The 
discussion suggests that the development of franchising in this country has followed 
its history and socio-political events which have arguably not made it possible for it 
to achieve its full potential growth and success over than 50 and more years.  
55 
To this end in pursuit of global and local initiatives such as the MDG and the 
NDP, the chapter highlighted the need for statutory interventions to establish 
regulations and institutions to co-ordinate franchising activities, generate objective 
and credible industry information, and attract the majority of the population into the 
sector as franchisors and franchisees to promote its development in the country.  
The discussion also suggests the need for private and public sector bodies to 
develop training, financing, legal, ethical, and marketing programmes to promote 
and increase equitable participation in the sector by all the country’s inhabitants. 
The next chapter discusses the theoretical foundations of franchising. 
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Chapter 3 Theoretical foundations of the 
franchise relationship 
 Introduction 
Chapter 2 provided the contextual background to this study. This chapter 
provides the theoretical foundations of the franchise relationship. Following this 
introductory section, section 3.2 critically reviews some of the definitions of 
franchising commonly used in the literature, the franchise relationship, the unit of 
analysis for this study; and franchise contracts or agreements.  
Section 3.3 critically reviews theoretical perspectives that inform most 
franchising research, that is, agency, resource scarcity and TCE theories. Section 3.4 
discusses RET as the bulwark against opportunism. Section 3.5 explains the 
combination of TCE and RET as the theoretical framework for the study. Section 3.6 
summarises the chapter. 
 Definitional issues on franchising, the franchise relationship and 
franchise contracts or agreements 
Curran and Stanworth (1983) advocate the need to propose a clear definition of 
a phenomenon prior to undertaking its theoretical discussion which is not possible 
in franchising mainly because it is a relatively new business concept and academic 
endeavour; franchising has yet to establish itself as a stand-alone field of study or 
discipline in the mould of disciplines such as sociology, psychology, law, economics 
and so on.  
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Consequently, it has been difficult for researchers and scholars to develop and 
synchronise theoretical approaches, methods and thoughts from the different 
perspectives such as organisation theory, economics and strategy used to analyse the 
concept of franchising (Stanworth and Curran, 1999; Combs et al., 2004). 
In addition, franchising has yet to develop into a formal field of study with the 
result that a world wide web search shows very few, if any, academic institutions 
globally and in this country, that offer any academic programmes or courses in 
franchising despite its growing importance and contribution to the global and this 
country’s economy as a creator of wealth and job opportunities and consumer of 
goods and services as discussed in Chapter 1 above.  
As a result, efforts to define the concept remain murky and reflect the different 
theoretical backgrounds of most franchising researchers and scholars who come 
from such diverse disciplines such as accounting, marketing, organisation theory, 
strategic management, economics, law and so on, and the publications in which their 
dated works appear. 
This thesis does not aim to provide a detailed or principled answer or solution 
to the academic debate pertaining to the definitional aspects of franchising except to 
highlight some of the broad range of views and the difficulties involved in 
conceptualising and developing a generally accepted or all-encompassing definition 
or description of the concept, discipline or field.  
For instance, Garg (2005) classifies franchised businesses into trade name or 
product and business-format franchising where trade name or product franchises 
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consist of franchisees operating as distributors or retailers of products manufactured 
by the franchisor such as petrol stations and business format franchising alludes to a 
packaged business method provided by franchisors to franchisees that comprises a 
trademarked set of procedures, designs, management approaches, and services such 
as fast food outlets.  
Business format franchises are the most popular and visible franchised 
businesses (Garg, 2005). For this reason, this study confined itself to business format 
franchising and for simplicity’s sake; it uses the word “franchising” to refer to this 
type of businesses.  
A review by Curran and Stanworth (1983) shows the use of condescending 
terms towards franchisees to express the definitions of franchising and the 
contractual nature of the relationship. In the main, these scholars point out that the 
nature of business arrangements in general and where quasi- or semi-forms are 
common make it difficult to categorise such business arrangements as franchising.  
To illustrate these points, the study reviews a few of the mostly cited definitions 
analysed by Curran and Stanworth, provides a working definition by these scholars 
and an appropriate conceptualisation formally adopted for use in this study. To start 
with, Vaughn (1979) defines franchising as: 
 
“A form of marketing or distribution in that a parent company 
customarily grants an individual or a relatively small company the 
right, or privilege, to do business in a prescribed manner over a 
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certain period in a specified place. The parent company is termed the 
franchisor; the receiver of the privilege, the franchisee; and the right 
or privilege itself, the franchise” (p1-2). 
Though this definition encompasses the essence of the concept behind 
franchising, according to Curran and Stanworth, it falls short on two premises. First, 
that franchising has developed into a total business package or business format and 
not merely a right or privilege, and secondly that franchising involves the economic 
motivations of both parties, and not only of the owner of the business concept, to 
enter into a business relationship.  
It must be added that Vaughn’s definition does not explicitly allude to the 
underlying legal or contractual relationship that comes into existence when the two 
parties come together to form the relationship and the financial, managerial, or 
informational resources that received knowledge (e.g. Caves and Murphy, 1976) 
suggests that franchisees bring into the franchise relationship.  
In other words, this definition puts franchisors in the position of the “haves” 
and franchisees the “have-nots” that is problematic given the superiority complex 
that franchisors tend to display when negotiating and concluding franchise contracts 
with franchisees.  
For example, Hunt (1977) states that franchise contracts are “sold, and not 
negotiated, like insurance policies, to franchisees on a take-it-or-leave-it-basis” (p74) 
by franchisors while Hunt’s own definition highlights the following aspects of the 
franchise relationship, that: 
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“A contract exists that delineates the responsibilities and obligations 
of both parties; a strong continuing co-operative relationship exist 
between them; and the franchisee operates the business substantially 
under the trade name and marketing plan of the franchisor” (p33). 
 
Curran and Stanworth (1983) quite correctly point out that only the third 
feature of this definition distinguishes franchises from other business relationships 
and that the widely recognized legal nature of the relationship (Brickely and Dark, 
1978; Rubin, 1978) with separate its legal personality, duties and responsibilities 
towards the authorities, staff, suppliers and so on, is downplayed or ignored.  
The inclusion of a clause in terms of which the franchisee indemnifies the 
franchisor from all its legal and other liabilities (Udel, 1972), underlines the 
importance of separate legal entities underlined in most franchise contracts by most 
scholars.  
Third, Caves and Murphy (1976) define a franchise agreement as: 
 
“One lasting for a definite or indefinite period of time in that the 
owner of a protected trade-mark grants to another person or form, for 
some consideration, the right to operate under this trade mark for the 
purpose of producing or distributing a product or service” (p572). 
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This definition appears to embody most of the essential legal and economic 
aspects of the franchise relationship, but Curran and Stanworth (1983) suggest that it 
over-simplifies the franchise relationship because it highlights the importance of the 
trademark to the exclusion of the total business package including the operational 
procedures, business method, and organisational blue print contained in the 
technical specifications in respect of the physical and intellectual infrastructure, 
equipment, and processes used within the franchise system. 
Rubin’s (1978) seminal article defines the franchise agreement as: 
 
“A contract between two (legal) firms: the franchisor and the 
franchisee. The franchisor is a parent company that has developed 
some product or service for sale; the franchisee is a firm that is set up 
to market this product or service in a particular location. The 
franchisee pays a certain sum of money for the right to market this 
product” (p224). 
 
Rubin’s definition fails to acknowledge the legal independence of the 
franchisors and franchisees as it subordinates it to the economic interdependence 
between the parties (Curran and Stanworth, 1983) where the notion of franchisors 
being a parent company is a misnomer and very problematic as it incorrectly 
suggests that franchisees are the subsidiaries of the franchisors.  
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As indicated above, Udel (1972) found that most franchise contracts make it 
abundantly clear that franchisees are not the subsidiaries of franchisors and 
franchisees are separate legal entities with full and independent contractual rights 
and obligations with the result that most franchise contracts include an exclusion of 
liabilities clause in terms of which franchisees exonerate or indemnify their 
franchisors against any third party claims.  
As a result, until the recently enacted CPA in 2008 it was highly unlikely that an 
employee of a franchisee could succeed in a lawsuit jointly and severally against 
both the franchisee and the franchisor in respect of damages for unfair dismissal or 
for customers to sue both the franchisors and the franchisee in respect of deficient 
customer service or defective goods supplied by the franchisee (Woker, 2012).  
Curran and Stanworth (1983) define franchising as: 
 
“A business form essentially consisting of an organization (the 
franchisor) with a market-tested business package centred on a 
product or service, entering into a continuing contractual 
relationship with franchisees, typically self-financed and 
independently owner-managed small firms, operating under the 
franchisor’s trade name to produce and/or market goods or services 
according to format specified by the franchisor” (p11). 
 
63 
Though this definition encompasses most of the relevant issues involved in a 
franchise relationship, it is strange that this definition omits two critically important 
issues, that is, the time and the consideration or royalties, payable to franchisors by 
franchisees, found in most franchise contracts.  
Udel (1972) observes that most franchise contracts include expiry date and 
renewal or non-renewal clauses beyond that the franchise relationship cannot 
survive as these clauses are problematic because the franchise relationship involves 
sunk costs which the study considers similar to the investments that married couples 
in most jurisdictions presumably make into the marital relationship.  
Put differently, as the researcher argues that it would be contra bonos mores, that 
is, against good public morals in most part of the democratic world for a marriage to 
have an expiry date.  
Similarly, it is morally questionable whether franchise contracts can have an 
expiry date or renewal clauses given the huge personal and emotional sacrifices such 
as switching careers, relocating and investing life-long or even inherited assets that 
franchisees make into the franchise business.  
This is because franchisees invest money and effort in the franchise relationship 
with the hope and expectation not only of earning a living and providing for their 
families in the short-term, but to be able to generate wealth in the franchised 
business which most franchisees desire to recoup through a sale to a third party, 
transfer or bequeath to their loved ones without any onerous restrictions (Hadfield, 
1990).  
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Given the similarities between the franchise and the marital relationship, it 
seems morally unfair and improper for a bride who invests her time, effort and 
energy in a marriage to leave with nothing at the end of her marriage. However, 
unlike the franchise relationship, the Marriage Act of 1979 in this country makes 
provision for the division of the marital estate between the spouses or financial and 
material support of the one spouse by the other at the end of a marriage either 
through death or divorce as compensation for the investment in the defunct marital 
relationship. 
The other issue missing in the Curran and Stanworth (1983) definition concerns 
the omission of the payment of royalties to franchisors by franchisees which is more 
straightforward than the expiry date or renewal clause matter, in the sense that non-
payment thereof constitutes an obvious breach of the franchise contract that most 
courts are unlikely to condone; and around that, the literature shows few legal 
disputes revolve. 
Closer to home, according to Parker and Illetscheko (2007), FASA defines a 
franchise as: 
 
“A grant by the franchisor to the franchisee, entitling the latter to the 
use of a complete business package containing all the elements to 
establish a previously untrained person in the franchised business and 
enable him or her to operate it on an on-going basis, according to the 
guidelines supplied, efficiently and profitably” (p15). 
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Like most of the definitions reviewed thus far, while this definition appears to 
capture the spirit and purpose of franchising, it also falls short because of its 
condescending attitude towards franchisees and failure to recognize both the legal 
personalities of the entities involved and the resources franchisees bring into the 
franchise relationship.  
On the other hand, despite referring to the franchise relationship as the 
franchise agreement which this researcher considers to be misnomer, underplaying 
the role of franchisees and its legalistic nature, the definition contained in section 7 of 
the CPA appears to address most of the shortcomings found in the definitions 
reviewed above.  
The Act defines the franchise agreement as: 
 
“An agreement between two parties, being the franchisor and the 
franchisee, respectively, in which, for a consideration paid, or to be 
paid, by the franchisee to the franchisor, the franchisor grants the 
franchisee the right to carry on the business within all or on a specific 
part of the Republic under a system or marketing plan substantially 
determined or controlled by the franchisor or an associate of the 
franchisor; under that the operation of the business of the franchisee 
will be substantially or materially associated with advertising 
schemes or programmes or one or more trademarks, commercial 
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symbols or logos or any similar marketing, branding, labelling or 
devices, or any combination of such schemes, programmes or devices, 
that are conducted, owned, used or licensed by the franchisor or an 
associate of the franchisor; and that governs the business relationship 
between the franchisor and the franchisee, including the relationship 
between them with respect to the goods or services to be supplied to 
the franchisee by or at the direction of the franchisor or an associate of 
the franchisor” (p20). 
 
The silence of the CPA on the duration of the franchise relationship between the 
parties seems to address an important issue which is at the heart of this research; 
that is, the lack of security of tenure especially among franchisees given that most 
franchise contracts have an expiry date and renewal or extension clauses that are 
exercisable at the discretion of the franchisor (Udel, 1972). 
As argued in this section, given the personal and family sacrifices that 
franchisees are required to invest in idiosyncratic assets; that is, site, physical and 
human assets which are assets of a life-long nature that are highly specific to a 
franchise system in the sense that they can only be gainfully deployed within a 
particular franchise relationship, subjecting the franchise relationship to a relatively 
short term period determined by the franchisor is clearly unfair and unreasonable.  
As this study sought to demonstrate the need to realign the tenure requirements 
of both franchisors and franchisees given their respective pre-contractual and post-
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contractual investments, the study suggests the need for the adoption of the relevant 
marriage principles for use within franchise relationships.  
As most democratic jurisdictions would oppose an expiry clause in marital 
contracts, on the grounds such a clause is contra bonos mores, that is, against good 
public morals, the researcher questions the inclusion of expiry clause in franchise 
contracts.  
As briefly discussed above, like brides, franchisees make huge personal, 
financial, and social sacrifices to invest lifetime savings into a franchise system, 
change careers and relocate their families to operate the outlets with the result that it 
seems grossly unfair to build a “divorce” into the franchise contract which allows 
the stronger party, the franchisor, to keep its assets while the weaker party, that is, 
the franchisee, is expected to leave the franchise relationship virtually empty handed 
despite having made a significant contribution into the franchise relationship. 
According to Williamson (1979) and Dnes (1993), franchisors require franchisees 
to invest in the so-called transactions specific assets (TSA’s) or idiosyncratic assets 
belonging to a particular franchise system which are long-life physical assets such as 
machinery, equipment, and furniture; and staff and managerial training and market 
knowledge, which are of little value outside of a particular franchise system.  
Williamson points out that an investment in these assets is aimed securing the 
commitment of franchisees to the franchise system; and that franchisees risk 
appropriation of these assets upon defaulting or committing breaches of the 
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franchise contract, that is, free riding among franchisees which TSA’s aims at 
curbing.  
However, even in the absence of non-compliance with the franchise contract, 
the investment in the long-life assets in return for a fixed term franchise contract 
amounts to a mismatch of incentives where franchise systems allow franchisors to 
reap the fruits of its investment in its idiosyncratic assets such as the intellectual 
property, trademarks, and brand names.  
Furthermore, the expiry clause unfairly limits the ability of franchisees to 
benefit from investing in the franchise system to the fixed term whilst granting or 
protecting the commercial rights of franchisors to perpetually derive financial 
benefits from the franchise system. In line with the foregoing, the omission of the 
duration of the franchise relationship from the CPA’s definition of the franchise 
contract appears to be a step in the right direction.  
The other pertinent issue the literature is silent on is the question of whether to 
refer to the franchise relationship as the “franchise agreement” or the “franchise 
contract” where it is not clear from the literature why the words “franchise 
agreement” are preferred, though it would seem to be politically correct, convenient 
or “user-friendly” to refer to the franchise relationship as a “franchise agreement” in 
order to “soften the blow” that comes with the stringent terms and conditions that 
are found in most franchise contracts.  
Nevertheless, both in truth and legalistically, the words “franchise contract” 
seem more appropriate as the relationship between franchisors and franchisees is 
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indeed contractual considering the onerous terms and conditions expressed in legal 
terminology contained in those documents.  
As franchise contracts are usually the subject of costly and lengthy litigation 
(Porter and Rentworth, 1978), they are not mere “gentleman’s agreements” that can 
be disregarded with impunity with the result that the phrase franchise agreement 
appears to be a misnomer. 
As Hunt (1977) points out, franchise contracts, “are sold, and not negotiated, to 
franchisees, like insurance policies, on a “take-it-or-leave-it basis” (p74) by 
franchisors who usually ask their attorneys write the franchise contracts with the 
result that the contracts are standard documents or “one-size-fits-all” contracts 
which in some cases even bear the franchisor’s insignia or logo (Muris, 1980).  
Therefore, it appears to be an oxymoron to describe the relationship between 
franchisors and franchisees as “an agreement” given that very little agreement is 
involved in the negotiation and conclusion of the franchise contract. 
Furthermore, most scholars (e.g. Muris, 1980; Hadfield, 1990; Klein, 1993) refer 
to franchise contracts as “contracts of adhesion” because of the requirement for 
franchisees to “adhere” to mostly restrictive and prescriptive clauses found in those 
contracts.  
Thus, given all the definitional issues raised above relating to franchising, the 
franchise relationship, and franchise agreement/contract, for the purposes of this 
study, the researcher proposes to define a franchise as: 
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“A written contract between franchisors and franchisees in terms of 
which franchisors allow franchisees to use their intellectual property 
e.g. trade-marks, brand names and business method; to deploy their 
financial, managerial and informational resources and skills; to 
produce or distribute certain products and services in a particular 
area for their own benefit in return for payment of up-front and on-
going royalty fees to franchisors; and on-going franchisor support 
services and compliance with certain operational and quality 
standards by franchisees” (my own). 
 
Within the context of this definition, the franchise contract and not franchise 
agreement, was be construed to refer to the rights and obligations of the franchisors 
and franchisees vis-à-vis each other where the franchise relationship refers to the 
day-to-day interactions between franchisors and franchisees in pursuit of the goals 
and objectives of the parties are usually contained in the (preamble) franchise 
contract.  
Furthermore, the general approach adopted in the study, was one that regards 
both franchisors and franchisees as having an equal potential to be important players 
in the franchise relationship because of the contributions highlighted in Chapter 1 
above which the literature suggests each party made or was capable of making 
towards the success or otherwise of the franchise system. 
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 A critical overview of the philosophical and theoretical foundations of 
the franchise relationship 
Apart from addressing franchising issues mostly from the perspective of 
franchisors (Fried and Elango, 1979; Minkler, 1990), other issues affecting each of the 
three widely used franchising theories, namely, agency, resource-based and TCE 
theories, to a greater or lesser extent, have not received much critical scrutiny in the 
literature.  
This section embodies the main argument of this study, which seeks to show 
that as hybrid organisational forms or dual ownership structures, contrary to the 
views of most academic and franchising practitioners franchises are not necessarily 
or usually economically efficient because of the misalignment of incentives between 
franchisors and franchisees which breeds OO and OA, and hence the need to 
introduce other governance mechanisms to safeguard the interests of all 
stakeholders.  
3.3.1 Agency Theory 
The agency theory explains franchising by successful and financially endowed 
franchisors as a means to realign the divergent interests of principals and agents 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Einsenbhardt, 1989); that is, franchisors, and their 
employee-managers of company owned stores.  
This theory seeks to deal with the problem resulting from under-performance 
among these employees (Caves and Murphy, 1976; Rubin, 1978; Mathewson and 
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Winter, 1985; Williamson, 1985; Brickley and Dark, 1987; Norton, 1988a) which 
presents itself as the so-called moral hazard to franchisors in the form of 
misrepresentation of skills (adverse selection) and shirking (reducing effort) by 
employee-managers of company-owned stores that increase operating costs through 
the need for monitoring (Shane, 1996).  
Because of these problems, the agency theory postulates the use of franchisees 
in managing outlets that the franchisor is unable to manage particularly in areas 
lying outside the franchisor’s preferred trading areas (Brickley and Dark, 1987).  
In addition, research suggests that franchised outlets provide franchisees with 
the incentive to apply more effort than company does employees (Michael, 2002); are 
more profitable than company-owned stores (Shelton, 1967); and have lower payroll 
costs (Krueger, 1991). 
On the other hand, the literature suggests that franchisors prefer to operate 
outlets that are located near the head-office in order to facilitate monitoring of 
employee-managers and to franchise those in located far from its head-office 
(Brickely and Dark, 1987), in foreign countries (Fladmoe-Lindquist, 1996) or rural 
locations (Norton, 1988). 
Other reasons are that these company-owned stores play a major role in the 
research and development of the franchise system which serve as training centres for 
new franchisees and their staff and as laboratory for the franchisors to test new 
product, promotions, or distribution ideas (Minkler, 1990; Bradach, 1997; Sorenson 
and Sorenson, 2001).  
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Generally, the common trend among most franchisors is to franchise most if not 
all outlets that lie outside of their preferred trading zone arising from the 
franchisors’ unfamiliarity with local market conditions in some areas (Brickley and 
Dark, 1987) and their concomitant risk-averseness in those markets (Grimes, 1976).  
However, distance does not seem to deter some franchisors from buying back 
profitable outlets (Oxenfeldt and Kelly, 1969) outside their preferred trading areas or 
to encroach onto the territories (du Toit, 2003; Kalnins, 2004) of successful 
franchisees once the brand has generated sufficient goodwill in such areas.  
Bercovitz (2000) refer to these opportunistic malpractice as “cream-skimming” 
as they result in the franchisor capitalising and expropriating the franchisee’s market 
discovery or “fruit of labour” arising from his investment and development of the 
franchisor’s brand in an area where the franchisor was not prepared to risk its 
money and effort.  
This practice highlights the role of franchisees in developing local markets for 
the franchise system in geographically dispersed territories or far-flung areas 
(Castrogiovanni and Justis, 1998) which boosts the rapid growth of the franchise 
system (Hoffmann and Prebble, 1991; Shane, 1996) in new markets in which the 
franchisors would ordinarily not have had the courage, interest or knowledge to 
penetrate (Rubin, 1976).  
The question begging for an answer is the reason why aspirant franchisees are 
prepared to take the risk, which the franchisor is not prepared to do, and establish 
outlets in certain areas, regions, or countries in the face of the additional risk of the 
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franchisor opportunistic actions such as adding competing outlets owned by other 
franchisees in the same area and thereby reducing the sales and profitability of 
existing outlets.  
First, there are several agency-based theoretical answers to this question often 
ignored in the literature such as franchisees appearing ready to assume the risk 
involved, particularly in areas in which they have local market knowledge of 
prevailing conditions (Oxenfeldt and Kelly, 1969; Brickley and Dark, 1987; Minkler, 
1990; 1992; Dnes, 1993).  
Second, because franchisees invest their money, time, and effort in operating the 
outlets, and unlike salaried employee-managers, franchisees lack the incentive to 
misapply themselves at their outlets (Caves and Murphy, 1976; Shane, 1996) because 
as franchisees are owners of the outlets, they are “claimants to the residual,” that is, 
franchisees have a claim on the share of the profits after meeting all the overheads of 
the business (Brickely and Dark, 1987; Eisenhardt, 1989; Lafontaine, 1992).  
Another factor supporting the agency theory to franchising is the oversupply of 
entrepreneurs who want to buy into well-known and popular franchise systems 
such as KFC, Kodak, and McDonalds (Lafontaine and Kaufmann, 1992). 
These scholars point out that buying into these franchise systems present 
entrepreneurs with the efficiencies inherent in the franchisor’s tried and tested 
business method with wide market appeal, well known trademarks and brand 
names, cheaper input goods.  
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On the other hand, in line with the efficiency argument, franchisors gain access 
to a vast pool of potential franchisees with considerable financial, motivational, and 
informational resources (Caves and Murphy, 1976; Brickely and Dark, 1987) from 
which to select among the best candidates to own franchise outlets.  
This strategy reduces not only the selection costs associated with the search for 
suitable franchisees, but also helps to reduce the adverse selection and moral hazard 
risks associated with employee-managers and the monitoring costs involved in 
policing these employee-managers (Bradach, 1997).  
However, these considerations seem to assume a lack of the profit maximisation 
motive among franchisees which may predispose some of them to opportunistic 
behaviour that involves free-riding on the franchisor’s brand reputation (Brickely 
and Dark, 1987), failing to implement promotions (Bradach, 1997) and jeopardising 
quality standards by over-emphasising cost reductions (Michael, 2000).  
In addition, franchising increases the cost of distributing complex knowledge 
system wide because franchisors cannot compel franchisees to under-go additional 
training, must be “sold” on any operational changes and are under no obligation to 
share any competitive wisdom they may generate (Dant, Kaufmann, and Paswan, 
1992; Bradach, 1997; Dant and Nasr, 1998; Combs et al., 2005).  
These structural issues raise the question of the efficiency of franchise systems 
where most franchise contracts require franchised outlets to maintain certain 
hygiene conditions and standards despite the difficulty involved in spelling out 
clearly and unambiguously the meaning of hygiene conditions in explicit and 
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exhaustive terms which makes it almost impossible for franchisors to punish 
offending franchisees (Muris, 1980).  
Muris points to many such vague or ambiguous clauses found in the franchise 
contract that are open to exploitation by greedy franchisees to extract financial 
benefits for themselves at the expense of their fellow franchisees and the franchise 
system.  
These include failure by franchisees to comply with the following: 
- maintaining quality standards; 
- sourcing supplies from approved suppliers; 
- properly appoint, train and remunerate staff; 
- carrying out local advertising; 
- paying full or correct royalties; 
- maintaining resale prices; 
- maintaining adequate stock levels; and 
- maintaining buildings, equipment, and machinery in excellent working 
conditions. 
Faced with these difficulties, Hadfield (1990) suggests that franchisors often 
resort to invoking the termination clause in order to terminate the franchise 
relationship abruptly.  
However, this drastic measure is itself open to abuse where the franchisor 
terminates the franchise relationship under false pretences in pursuit of 
opportunistic goals often resulting in negative consequences amounting to high and 
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sometimes irrecoverable transactions costs such as financial and reputational losses 
due to lost sales and litigation expenses to both parties. 
In addition, there are other effects on the industry and society as a whole 
including suppliers, lenders, employees, and customers and so on reflected by 
noticeable increase in franchising disputes complains and conflicts have been the 
subject of numerous newspaper and journal articles in this country (Crotty, 2008 and 
2010; Zungu 2011).  
Similarly, a number of court cases have also reported instances of strife and 
disputes between franchisors and franchisees (PNA Stationeries (Pty) Ltd v River 
Stationeries CC, 2010; Mozart Ice Cream Classic Franchises (Pty) Ltd v Davidoff, 
2008; Hot Dog Cafe (Pty) Ltd v Daksesh Rowen Sizzling Dogs CC and Another, 
2011) which demonstrate the need for an investigation into some aspects of the 
franchisor-franchisee relationship in this country.  
In addition, these issues also highlight the need to focus attention on the 
motivations for franchisees to take up franchising in order to align their incentives to 
those of the franchisors as misaligned incentives between the parties can threaten the 
stability and integrity of the franchise system through various forms of opportunistic 
actions the parties may embark upon at each other’s expense. 
3.3.2 Resource Scarcity Theory 
Also addressing the franchising question largely from a franchisor-perspective, 
the resource scarcity theory posits that franchising exists to provide financial, 
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managerial, and local market knowledge resources to franchisors for rapid 
expansion (Oxenfeldt and Kelly, 1969; Oxenfeldt and Thompson, 1969; Hunt, 1972, 
Dant, 1992).  
This paradigm rests on the belief that franchisors who have developed proven 
business methods may seek to grow their businesses by moving into new markets in 
other areas, regions, or countries which may need additional financial, human, and 
local market knowledge resources to exploit those opportunities (Minkler, 1990; 
1992).  
By increasing their physical footprint, franchisors desire not only to increase 
their revenues through up-front franchise and royalty fees, but also to build the 
critical mass of franchisees needed to generate the economies of scale benefits 
normally associated with franchising (Lillis et al., 1976; Piling, 1991; Litz and 
Stewart, 1998).  
These include bulk and central purchases of raw materials, ingredients and 
equipment, advertising, fittings and so on, enabling the franchise system to be 
competitive by offering quality products and services at reduced prices from reliable 
suppliers at shorter lead times to franchisees (Dant, 1995).  
However, the incentive to franchise among franchisors may be traced back not 
only to the need to expand their operations rapidly through obtaining cheaper 
financial and human resources from franchisees, but to do so with other 
entrepreneurs in order to share risk (Rubin, 1978).  
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Rubin opines that this research question surfaced when it became clear that 
franchisors who had achieved the necessary critical mass in terms of higher numbers 
of franchisees and had built up sufficient reserves and other resources to be able to 
fund future growth themselves continued to franchise outlets.  
Despite Oxenfeldt and Kelly’s (1969) prediction that franchisors would buy 
back franchised stores once they are financially able to do so, this failed to happen 
on a scale that could be regarded as granting support to the store buy-back 
argument inasmuch as the resource scarcity theory does not explain the reasons why 
the other segment of the franchise relationship namely franchisees buy into franchise 
systems.  
Therefore, while the resource scarcity theory has provided answers to some 
franchising questions, other questions such as whether that resource scarcity 
explains the franchising of outlets in order to gain first mover advantage in certain 
markets (Michael, 2003) remained that still require explanations.  
In addition, other scholars (e.g. Combs and Ketchen, 1996b; Dant and Paswan, 
1998; Kaufmann and Dant, 1996; Shane, 1996) have tried to separate the resource 
scarcities in an endeavour to isolate the motivation for franchising among the need 
for financial, managerial and informational resources.  
For example, Lafontaine (1992) has argued that the capital scarcity argument 
does not explain the motivation for franchisors as shareholders and bondholders in a 
franchise system; could not be assured of the ability of company managers to 
properly look after their best interests as opposed to franchisees.  
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There is clearly no unanimity as to whether any of the three main resources can 
independently provide an explanation for among franchisors especially in 
circumstances where they have not even made an attempt to explain the motivation 
among franchisees to take up franchising.  
It may occur that like franchisors, franchisees enter franchising for opportunistic 
reasons, masqueraded as the economic efficiency argument, to pursue their own 
selfish interests at the expense of the franchise system which is the subject of this 
investigation.  
In other words, the parties could be entering the franchise relationship with 
“hidden agendas” or “cocked guns” aimed at abusing the franchise relationship to 
some nefarious end, which is an aspect of the franchise relationship that has not 
received much attention in the literature. 
The nature of the franchise relationship could be such that the parties’ 
motives remain misaligned or divergent with the result that unless a new paradigm 
emerges, as this study advocates, the franchise relationship is as a business strategy 
is more often than not doomed to end acrimoniously.  
This is because of the OA of the one or both parties such as the failure to meet 
quality standards, termination for minor breaches and the franchisor’s encroachment 
onto the territory of the franchisee while the resource scarcity theory also seems to 
ignore the motivation for franchisees to take up franchising and the desire for profit 
maximisation motives among franchisees.  
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3.3.3 Transactions Cost Economics (TCE) theory 
Given the failure of the agency and resource scarcity theories to explain 
franchising from the perspectives of both franchisors and franchisees, and to account 
for the increasing levels of conflict between the parties, the TCE theory presents this 
study an interesting framework for analysing the franchise relationship and 
addressing the key issue underlying the research questions, that is, opportunism.  
TCE is an offshoot of the institutional economics school of thought founded in 
the 1930’s by the 1991 Nobel Economics laureate, Thomas Coarse to focus on the 
transaction, that is, the franchise relationship as the unit of analysis and the goal of 
organisation as the “minimization of transaction costs in a discriminating way” 
(Williamson, 1975, p47).  
Within this theory, the moral hazard associated with the risk of lack of 
performance by a transactor is commonly referred to as opportunism may be 
regarded as the incentive to engage in behaviours or acts such as cheating, free 
riding and shirking by one party at the expense of the other in the franchise 
relationship. 
TCE suggests the need for the developer and owner of the franchise system; 
namely, the franchisor, to select the most appropriate governance structure between 
the firm and market; that is, the “make” or “buy” decision as the best way for 
containing opportunism (Williamson, 1985).  
In addition, such a mechanism needs to minimise on the transactions costs of 
running the franchise systems mostly revolve around negotiating and bargaining 
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cost involved in drafting the franchise contract and monitoring cost (Williamson, 
1979; Muris, 1980; Hadfield, 1990). 
In other words, if the franchisor can distribute his products and services at a 
cost below the premium paid to franchisees in the form of profits, then the TCE logic 
dictates that the franchisor should embark upon vertical integration (Klein et al, 
1978) by taking back or internalising the distribution of its goods and services, that 
is, operate company stores instead of relying on franchised outlets.  
On the other hand, as an incentive to perform this function with the intention of 
containing the problem of free riding or shirking by its own store managers, the 
franchisor may franchise the outlets.  
Similarly, rather than starting their own independent businesses and incurring 
high transactions costs involved in concept, market and product development, store 
layout design and so on, potential franchisees will buy into the franchise system.  
Such an investment will hinge on the assumption that the aspirant franchisee 
will realise quasi-rents (Klein, 1995) or share of the profits in the form of revenue 
streams from operating the franchised outlet; and that the franchisor will continue to 
monitor quality standards and maintain the reputation of his brand. 
In such a situation, then the potential franchisee will be prepared to invest 
money, time, and effort to acquire highly specific assets required to operate the 
franchise business (Klein et al., 1978). 
Despite Williamson (1985)’s argument that TCE is applicable in any relationship 
situation, surprisingly very few studies exist on any TCE constructs such as 
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opportunism within the franchising context despite franchising being generally 
regarded as an ideal context within that a number of theoretical constructs from the 
social and natural sciences have been successfully tested and applied because of its 
inter-organisational, contractual, and long-term orientation.  
Secondly, in the relatively fewer available studies, for some obscure, un-
researched and unsubstantiated reasons the assumption, suggestion or even 
conclusion appears to be that franchisees are more prone to behaving 
opportunistically than their counterparts.  
It would seem franchisors and franchisees regard franchising as a means to 
achieving “cheaper” access to production and marketing of good and services 
because of opportunistic actions, which generate higher returns through lower 
transactions costs.  
This is because the opportunistic transactor receives the full benefit of his 
cheating whilst bearing the least cost which TCE regards as opportunism or the 
moral hazard associated with the risk of lack of performance by a transactor.  
Williamson (1975), himself a 2009 Nobel Economics prize winner for his work 
on economic governance, developed the concept of opportunism that he defines as 
“pursuit of self-interest with a guile”(p6) and includes “withholding or distorting 
information to mislead, distort, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse” (Williamson, 1985, 
p47).  
According to Williamson, opportunism results from man’s human nature to 
serve his self-interests at all costs by economising on transactions costs involved in 
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the negotiating, bargaining, and monitoring costs involved in running a business, in 
a calculating way.  
However, as stated by Williamson (1975), for the reason that acting 
opportunistically is human nature particularly where doing so is rewarding and 
remains undetected, franchisors and franchisees should be prepared to contend with 
the possibility of the other party acting opportunistically at some point in the 
relationship.  
As discussed more fully in Chapters 4 and 5, this usually involves cheating or 
dishonesty in one way or another for as long this yields quasi-rents or incentives and 
the behaviour remains profitable and undetected which tends to have a negative 
effect on the transactions cost of the innocent party.  
Theoretically, the increase in transactions costs arises from the need to take 
preventative and corrective measures aimed at safeguarding and restoring the 
efficiency or equilibrium within the franchise relationship.  
However, as a negative externality, opportunism presents a serious challenge to 
the TCE theory as it represents the weakest link in the explanation of the efficient 
functioning the franchise system and the misalignment of incentives between 
franchisors and franchisees.  
 Relational Exchange Theory (RET) 
Though TCE provides useful tools such as the transactions cost framework for 
explaining the existence of the franchise relationships and opportunism arguably 
from the perspective of both franchisors and franchisees, its critics have attacked its 
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de-socialisation stance or lack of social conscious by arguing that it lacked the 
“human touch” (Williamson, 1993; Granovettor, 1985; Maitland, Bryson, and van de 
ven, 1985; Hodgson, 2004).  
In a nutshell, TCE was criticised for being too mechanistic in the sense that it 
propagated the formation or use of structures or mechanisms such as contracts that 
focused on delivering economic transactions at the lowest possible cost for the one 
party in the franchise relationship, that is, franchisors, at the expense of the other 
party, that is, franchisees.  
For this reason, this paradigm attracted criticism for promoting opportunism 
among the transactors and failing to take into account the social interactions or 
context within which the franchise relationship was embedded (Granovettor, 1985; 
Williamson, 1993). 
This criticism possibly laid the foundation for the development of the RET 
philosophy as a governance mechanism alongside franchise contracts and TSA’s to 
mention but a few.  
Building on the work of Macneil (1974, 1980), RET seeks to inculcate the 
enhanced usage of relational norms and values within franchise relationships which 
it argues differ from discreet transactions characterising buyers and sellers on the 
spot market in which buyers and sellers meet to transact without developing any 
relationship beyond that transaction (Dwyer et al., 1987).  
According these scholars, the RET paradigm suits long term relationships such 
as franchise relationships in which implicit and explicit expectations of cooperation 
86 
or collaboration between the exchange partners and complex, personal and 
noneconomic satisfactions and social exchanges necessitate the crafting of 
mechanisms such as franchise contracts for resolving future disputes and conflicts 
by third parties.  
Dwyer, Kaufmann, Laczniak and Robin (1993) cite Macneil’s (1980) 12-point 
dimensional characterisation of discreet and relational exchanges archetypes 
illustrated on Table 3.1 below which demonstrates the usefulness of RET in dealing 
with opportunism within franchise relationships.  
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Table 3-1 Macneil’s (1980) Comparisons between discrete and relational exchange 
transactions 
 
Contractual elements Discrete transactions 
Example: buyer-seller 
relationships 
Relational exchange 
Example: franchisor-franchisee  
relationships 
Timing 
Distinct beginning, short 
duration, sharp ending 
performance 
Longer in duration reflecting 
on-going process 
 
Number of parties Two parties Usually more than two parties 
 
 
Obligations of parties 
Based on offer to purchase and 
sell 
Based on the franchise 
contract 
 
Expectations for 
relations 
Little or no future conflict is 
expected 
Anticipated conflict of interest 
abounds 
 
Primary personal 
relations 
Minimum personal 
relationships 
Extensive interpersonal 
relationships  
 
Contractual 
solidarity 
Governed by social norms, 
rules, etiquette Legal and self-regulation 
 
 
 
Transferability of 
rights and obligations 
Complete transferability: 
It matters not who fulfils 
contractual obligations 
Limited transferability: 
exchange is heavily 
dependent on the identity of 
the parties 
 
Cooperation and 
coordination of 
activities Joint efforts 
Joint efforts related to both 
performance and planning 
over time 
Planning  
Primary focus is on substance 
of exchange: no future is 
anticipated 
Focus on detailed planning of 
future of exchange to satisfy 
changing goals and needs 
 
 
Measurement 
performance 
Little attention to performance 
specifications and 
measurement 
Significant attention to 
specifying and measuring 
performance 
 
 
Power-dependence 
relationship 
Power may be exercised when 
promises are made until 
promises are executed 
Increased interdependence 
requires judicious exercise of 
power 
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Division of burdens 
and benefits 
Sharp division of benefits and 
burdens into parcels 
Likely to include some 
sharing and adjustment to 
shared parcels of benefits and 
burdens over time 
Source: Adapted from Macneil (1980) 
In addition, Macneil (1974) lists the norms for managing opportunism in 
franchise relationships which take into account the dynamics and complexities of 
long term relationships as outlined in Table 3-1. 
These norms include the norms of solidarity, mutuality, flexibility, and 
information exchange.  
Solidarity. According to Macneil, solidarity is the important contracting norm 
focusing on the preservation of the franchise relationship to the completion of the 
franchise contract term and beyond, which promotes mutual support and 
cooperation to sustain the mutually beneficial relationship. 
Mutuality. The norm of mutuality is similar to that of solidarity which 
emphasises shared or mutually inclusive goals such as the growth, competitiveness, 
and survival pursued within the franchise relationship. 
Flexibility. This norm requires that parties jointly adapt their strategies to face 
changing market conditions that ensures that the franchise relationship relies on 
good faith principles (Heide and John, 1992). 
Information exchange. This norm requires that franchisors and franchisees should 
exchange critical information to enable either party to take appropriate steps in good 
time. 
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 Justification for combining TCE and RET as the study’s theoretical 
framework  
Against the backdrop of the preceding sections, to the best of the researcher’s 
knowledge, this thesis is the first academic work to use both the TCE and RET 
theories as its theoretical framework as they provide the intellectual and 
philosophical tools and vocabulary used to explain important aspects of the 
franchising model under investigation and to address some of the gaps arising from 
prior research.  
To begin with, Klein (1985) and Dnes (1993) describe franchise contracts as 
providing “credible commitments” or “hostage-posting (by the giver) and hostage 
taking” (by the receiver) that both contracting and transacting parties, that is, 
franchisor and franchisee, make towards one another, which are explained in 
Chapter 5.  
The importance of this exchange of hostages lies in that it explains the 
commitment of the contracting parties to the franchise relationship which refers to 
the importance of creating a bonding effect between the investing and receiving 
transactors (Rokkan et al., 2003).  
However, both Klein and Dnes argue that posted hostages present a huge risk 
because the TSA’s involved are vulnerable to expropriation through the 
opportunistic acts of the receiving transactors.  
Therefore, while on the one hand the TSA’s represent TCE’s primary answer to 
opportunism in terms of their bonding effect (Rokkan et al., 2003), TCE also 
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recognises the potential and propensity of specific assets to give rise to reciprocal 
opportunism by way of hostage expropriation on the other. 
As an illustration, a franchisee who has invested in lifetime savings in 
purchasing equipment and undertaken building improvements he needs in his 
franchised outlet runs the risk of losing this investment when the franchisor 
terminates the franchise contract abruptly for opportunistic reasons.  
On the one hand, specific investments made by franchisors include investments 
in the developing the business method, trademarks and brand names and operating 
standards and procedures in areas such as accounting, procurement, training and 
building the brand and monitoring systems (Klein, 1978).  
As stated above, franchisees’ specific investments include purchases of highly 
specialised equipment, making improvements on leased premises and undergoing 
training under the auspices of the franchisor which are of little or no value outside a 
particular franchise system.  
Williamson (1985) refers to the TSA’s as “ugly princess” because a king will 
only sacrifice his ugly daughters as hostages with the hope that TSA’s are not ex-
appropriated by their captors owing to the princess’ unattractiveness.  
Though this theoretical exposition of the opportunism problem has found 
substantial practical support in a number of marketing, law, economics and 
organisation theory studies, a number of gaps still exist in the franchising literature. 
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For example, Klein (1987) opines that reputational risk disincentives franchisors 
from acting or behaving opportunistically so that it can continue to attract suitable 
franchisees and investors.  
Hadfield (1990) denounces this averment by arguing that new franchisors that 
had no reputation to be concerned with who have engaged in opportunistic 
behaviour from the start and went out of business soon thereafter. 
However, considering that, new franchisors are at any one time a small fraction 
or an addition to an existing pool of established franchisors such as Holiday Inns, 
McDonalds, and KFC with a global footprint, there can be little doubt that 
reputational risk is still a major concern among franchisors.  
Despite scholars such as Williamson (1993) and Dnes (2003) emphasising that 
opportunism is reciprocal and the ubiquity of anecdotal and other evidence pointing 
to franchisor malpractice and dishonesty, references made to opportunism in the 
extant literature largely allude to cheating, free riding and shirking by franchisees 
(Elango and Fried, 1979).  
As stated above, Williamson (1993) suggests that the literature ignores or 
downplays “downward opportunism,” that is opportunism by franchisors 
ostensibly because as Klein (2003) suggests, franchisors have no incentive to cheat as 
they have a reputation to protect.  
In contrast, Hadfield (1990) rejects the notion of reputational risk as a deterrent 
because new franchisors who were still trying to build their reputations have 
engaged in opportunism.  
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On the other hand, considering the contribution that franchising makes to the 
global economy which run into billions of rand in this country alone, the relatively 
handful number of studies that have examined franchisor opportunism such as 
Dewantripont and Sekkat (1991), Dahlstrohm and Nygaard (1999), Kalnins (2004) 
indicate the paucity of research in this area which this study sought to address.  
These studies found that franchisors use a number of contractual clauses such 
as behaviour include terminating franchise contracts prematurely, establishing 
competing outlets owned by the franchisor or other franchisees closer to existing 
outlets, and restricting the sale or transfer of outlets by franchisees that allow them 
to carry out opportunistic behaviour against their franchisees.  
In addition, both the academic and legal literature contain very few 
investigations of courts cases of alleged franchisors opportunism brought by 
franchisees especially in the United States, Europe, and Australia, which have 
established legal regimes and thriving franchise businesses. 
Such investigations would shed more light on the manifestation and execution 
of franchisor opportunistic behaviour and its effects on the growth, competitiveness 
and survival of franchise systems as this study partly seeks to do.  
For example, Oxenfeldt and Kelly’s (1969) seminal paper formed the basis of the 
buy-back clauses found in most franchise contracts which allow franchisors to 
engage in opportunistic behaviour by buying back profitable outlets from 
franchisees which the franchising literature has overlooked and thus contributing to 
the dearth of franchisor opportunism research.  
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In the words of Williamson (1993), the literature ignores or downplays 
“downward opportunism,” that is opportunism by franchisors ostensibly because, 
as Klein (2003) surprisingly suggests, franchisors have no incentive to cheat, as they 
have a reputation to protect.  
This franchisor-sided view of opportunism suggests that the major threat to the 
efficacy of the franchise system that is, opportunism, resides among franchisees 
almost exclusively despite increasing levels of unease and complaints reported in the 
press, trade journals, and the legal literature about allegations and cases of 
franchisor opportunism.  
A number of highly publicised cases such as Chicken Delight and the Kodak in 
the United States which attracted a great deal of attention among legal and 
marketing scholars and lawmakers alike in the USA and led to the passing of a 
number of the anti-trust laws in most states are prime examples of highly levels of 
conflict troubling global brands 
In this country, the recent passing of the CPA appears to be a step in the 
direction of offering protection to franchisees in wake growing instances of 
franchisor opportunistic behaviour or acts.  
Within this debate, reconciling accusations of OB or OA made against 
franchisors and counter-claims of legitimate conduct made by franchisors in self-
defence is a major cause of disagreement (Hadfield, 1990).  
In addressing this conundrum, Hadfield introduced the notion of “subtle 
opportunism” to describe franchisor opportunistic behaviour as conduct that, while 
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it may be in line with the franchise contract, it may be against the reasonable 
expectations or the understanding that a franchisee attaches to the relevant clause in 
the contract.  
In support of this view, both Muris (1980) and Williamson (1993) describes OB 
as conduct that respects the letter but not the spirit of the law to which the 
supporters and advocates of the use of contracts as governance mechanisms of 
exchange have responded positively adopted the RET thinking that advocates the 
incorporation of social relations issues such as norms and values in the 
interpretation of franchise contracts. 
This is in line with the views of sociologists such as Ouchi (1980) and 
Granovettor (1985) who argued that relationships between contracting parties such 
as franchisors and franchisees are embedded in social relations or clans and that they 
should be interpreted within the context of enhancing the franchise relationship. 
Possibly, the pursuit of RET principles led to the passing of the CPA in South 
Africa with the aim of protecting franchisees in the same manner that the Robinson-
Patman Act and the Sherman Act in the USA does.  
These and similar franchising laws found in some states with termination laws 
in the USA require that franchisors must show good cause such as material breach 
before terminating or not renewing the franchise contract (Muris, 1980).  
As most franchised relationships are contract-based, they present difficulties 
better explained in TCE terms such as governance mechanisms that include the use 
of TSA’s and franchise contracts.  
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For example, in franchised relationships franchisees own the physical assets 
whilst franchisors own the non-tangible asset, that is, brand names and trademarks 
enabling franchisors to control significant aspects of the franchisee’s business (Cavis 
and Murphy, 1976).  
In an archival study of 30 franchise contracts, Lebleci and Shalley (1996) found 
that franchise contracts that were relational often included several dispute resolution 
mechanisms.  
Michael (2000) found that franchisors relied on factors such as selecting 
inexperienced franchisees, granting long-term contracts and exclusive territories to 
increase their bargaining power and franchisees compliance with franchisor 
standards and decrease litigation. 
Dnes (2003) found that franchise contracts created mini-hostages that related to 
certain forms of contractual discipline. 
Brickley, Misra, and van Horn (2006) found that larger and more experienced 
franchisors offered longer-term contracts while a recent study extolling the virtues of 
RET, El Akremi, Mignonac, and Perrigot (2010) found that social cohesion among 
franchisees could reduce opportunism among them because of the development of 
social bonds.  
Despite the merit of the use of social cohesion as a governance mechanism, the 
misuse or misapplication of this mechanism, especially among franchisors, is 
problematic.  
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In this regard, El Akremi et al did not investigate the role of the franchisors in 
encouraging or discouraging social cohesion among their franchisees where 
evidence provided by Lawrence and Benjamin (2011) suggest support for the use of 
independent franchisee associations to promote social cohesion which can help curb 
opportunism within franchise systems.  
Similarly, despite some franchisors arguing that they are duty bound to take 
disciplinary measures against their delinquent franchisees to protect the interests of 
the rest of the committed franchisees (Brickley and Dark, 1987), there is usually little 
evidence of any franchisees supporting their franchisors in such court battles.  
Other studies using TCE to explain various aspects of the franchise relationship 
include brand value (Gallini and Lutz, 1992), royalty fees (Lafontaine, 1999), number 
of franchisor-owned outlets (Shane, 1998) as examples of sunk investments made by 
franchisors to signal their commitment to the franchise system. 
Consequently, as part of the foundation of the study, unlike the agency and 
resource scarcity theories discussed above, TCE takes a more balanced and 
egalitarian view of franchise relationship in its endeavour to explain the motives of 
either party in the franchise relationship to reduce its transaction costs or conversely, 
increase its profitability.  
Thus, TCE represents the efficiency argument that advocates the reduction of 
transaction costs of operating the either party’s business which range from the pre-
contractual information costs relating to bargaining and negotiating around the 
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franchise contract to post-contractual monitoring and enforcement costs facing both 
parties aimed at safeguarding performance.  
Therefore, at least from the franchisor’s point of view, the decision whether or 
not to franchise is unlikely to primarily depend on its financial and managerial 
constraints as the extant literature argues but rather on the costs involved in 
recruiting suitable franchisees, negotiating drafting a franchise contract, monitoring 
the performance of franchisees and enforcing the contract when the need arises and 
so forth. 
In other words, even if the franchisor has access to funding from sources other 
than franchisees, on the one hand TCE suggest that it will not franchise until and 
unless it is satisfied that the transactions costs associated with franchising will yield 
a good return on investment and that franchisees will not necessarily take up 
franchising because of the benefits the system offers in terms of well-marketed brand 
names and the tried and tested business method on the other.  
Similarly, TCE postulates that franchisees will enter franchising on the strength 
of the reduced transactions costs involved in negotiating and enforcing the franchise 
contract and operating the business which entails that despite the benefits that 
franchising may offer, potential franchisees will shun it if they believe that the costs 
involved in negotiating and enforcing the franchise contract underlying the franchise 
relationship are prohibitively expensive.  
Therefore, from a TCE perspective, the key issues involved in establishing and 
maintaining the franchise relationship involve not only containing the burdens of the 
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franchise relationship, that is, single or double-moral hazard and the adverse 
selection issues, but striving to achieve its benefits represented by efficiency gains 
deriving from reduced transaction costs.  
According TCE critics such as Maitland et al., (1985) and Hodgson (2004), its 
inherent weakness in the study of the franchise relationship is the problem of 
reciprocal opportunism which potentially arises where franchisors seek to reduce 
transactions at the expense of the franchisees and vice versa, which can happen 
before, during, and after the existence of the franchise relationship by invoking any 
of a number of clauses in the franchise contract such the termination at will, buy 
back or resale restriction clauses or other aspects of the franchise relationship. 
For instance, at the initiation of the franchise relationship, franchisors may 
behave opportunistically by misrepresenting the success of their business method to 
ignorant potential franchisees or fail to provide the promised back-up service such 
as advertising to franchisees. 
To cover up its initial misdemeanour, such a franchisor may try to terminate the 
contract for a minor breach and take back the outlet or sell it to another franchisee 
without any compensation to the original franchisee or without profit guarantees 
(Muris, 1980). 
To this end, Williamson (1979) and Hadfield (1990) support and advocate the 
use of franchise contracts as governance mechanisms of exchange to dispel criticisms 
levelled against both classical contract law and TCE theorists by suggesting the 
incorporation of social relations issues such as norms and values of acceptably 
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behaviour such as co-operation, trust and teamwork in the interpretation of 
franchise contracts. 
As outlined in the previous section, such an approach is in line with the views 
of sociologists such as Ouchi (1980), Schein (1980; 1982) and Granovettor (1985) who 
suggested that relationships between contracting parties such as franchisors and 
franchisees are embedded in social relations or clans and that they should be 
interpreted within that context. 
In a nutshell, the objective of the theoretical framework adopted in this study is 
to explain the use of the franchise relationship as providing economic efficiency to 
franchisors and franchisees in a two-pronged manner. 
First, through pursuit of reduced transactions costs in terms of TCE, which 
tends to breed opportunism; and second, by seeking to contain to opportunism 
through the establishment and maintenance of psychological contracts and mutually 
agreed norms of acceptable behaviour such as mutuality, information sharing and 
exchange, trust in terms of RET.  
 Summary 
Chapter 3 critically reviewed definitions of franchising, the franchise 
relationship, franchise agreements – contracts; and the key foundational aspects of 
some of the foremost explanations or theories of franchising, that is, agency, resource 
scarcity and TCE; and the opportunism problem that these explanations raise which 
RET seems to address. 
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The chapter provided the reasons for the choice and use of TCE and RET as this 
study’s theoretical framework mainly because of its the potential use to achieve 
economic efficiency within franchised relationships by curbing opportunism largely 
through the use of relational, social and legal norms to align the incentives of 
franchisors and franchisees.  
The next chapter discusses opportunism as the central problem in franchised 
relationships. 
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Chapter 4 Opportunism as the central 
problem in franchised relationships 
 Introduction 
Chapter 3 discussed the theoretical foundations of the franchise relationship 
focusing mainly on a critical review of the agency, resource scarcity and transactions 
cost economics theories. This Chapter focuses on the key concept of opportunism as 
the central problem in franchised relationships, the focal point of this study. After 
this introduction, sections 4.2 to 4.5 defines and explains various forms, outcomes, 
and strategies for managing opportunism within the franchising context.  
Section 4.6 highlights the salient differences between a number of constructs 
which are usually conflated or associated with opportunism. Section 4.7 introduces 
and discusses the importance and relevance of the study’s OO construct which it 
posits to be a derivative of the broader opportunism which is central to this thesis as 
it underscores OA and their negative effects on the growth, competitiveness and 
survival of franchise systems. Section 4.8 concludes the chapter. 
 Definition and forms of opportunism 
As opportunism forms an integral part of the TCE theory and the epicentre of 
this study which has not been the subject of much investigation in the academic 
literature, it is crucially important to critically discuss its origins, various forms, 
outcomes, and strategies used to manage it within the franchising context in general 
and this study in particular.  
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Williamson (1985) regards opportunism as the incentive of one party for 
example a franchisor, to engage in behaviours or acts such as cheating, dishonesty, 
or untruthfulness towards the other, namely, the franchisee. 
In addition, opportunism may take the form of franchisors misallocating the 
advertising fund for administrative purposes such as salaries, rental, or motor 
vehicles expenses (Muris, 1980).  
Similarly, franchisees may procure and utilise cheaper ingredients to produce 
goods at their outlets and may be able to conceal their indiscretions from each other 
and from their customers to realise some cost savings because of the difficulties 
involved in tracing such opportunistic actions (Brickley and Dark, 1987).  
Given these difficulties, it is hard to estimate the extent or magnitude of 
opportunistic actions within franchise relationships with the result that it is possible 
that cheating takes place at such a scale as to explain the motivation of franchisors 
and franchisees to enter into the relationship because the undeclared benefits may 
exceed the normal ones realisable over the duration of the franchise contract.  
Williamson (1975) conceptualised the concept of opportunism as “pursuit of 
self-interest with guile” (p6) and includes “withholding or distorting information to 
mislead, distort, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse” (p47).  
According to Williamson, opportunism results from man’s human nature to 
serve his self-interest, bounded rationality; that is, limited cognitive ability to deal 
with all pertinent issues in one’s life endeavours and uncertainty which aims at 
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economising on transactions costs namely, the negotiating, bargaining, and 
monitoring costs involved in running a business, in a discriminating way.  
Williamson’s authoritative definition of opportunism has found wide 
acceptance in most disciplines, as did his explanation of the various forms of 
opportunism. 
Ex ante and ex post opportunism. Williamson distinguishes between simple and 
serious opportunism; active and passive opportunism, ex ante; that is, pre-
contractual and ex post; that is, post-contractual opportunism and buyer and 
managerial opportunism.  
Briefly, according to Williamson, simple differs from serious opportunism in 
that the latter involves a transfer of wealth or money from the victim to the 
perpetrators and this is the form of opportunism with which scholarship such as the 
present one is ceased. 
Active and passive opportunism. Active opportunism occurs when the franchisor 
infringes on an explicit term of the franchise contract such as establishing an outlet 
operated by him or another franchisee within the pre-stated geographically 
restricted territory of an existing franchisee’s outlet.  
On the other hand, passive opportunism results from the violation of an implicit 
contract stipulations such as when misallocates advertising revenue to 
administrative expenses, or when a franchisee employs fewer staff than his business 
warrants. 
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Both these misdemeanours are very difficult to detect with the result that the 
extent of their occurrence, and the huge benefits and losses accruing to the offending 
and innocent party, may serve as an incentive for the parties to enter franchising.  
Similarly, ex ante or pre-contractual opportunism occurs because of adverse 
selection by franchisees misrepresenting their skills to the franchisors in terms of 
personality and psychological attributes which screening tests may fail to detect.  
On the other hand, franchisors can also deceive their franchisees by 
misrepresenting the reputational capital or “pulling power” their trademarks and 
brand names (Hadfield, 1990).  
These forms of misrepresentation present a serious challenge to the innocent 
parties, as they may be hard to prove in court with the result that the parties may 
have no option but to remain with each other until the expiry of the franchise 
contract.  
Ex Post opportunism is a function of the moral hazard represented by an 
inability of the franchisor to render various services such as monitoring of quality 
and operations of franchised stores, or the failure of franchisees to declare all sales 
transactions determining the franchisor’s royalty.  
These opportunistic actions have the effect of denying customers the level of 
service that the brand names promise to deliver or the products and service 
customers may be accustomed to, and the revenue to which the franchisor may be 
entitled. 
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Buyer and supplier opportunism. Furthermore, Williamson also distinguishes 
between buyer and supplier opportunism, indicating the source of opportunistic 
activity where within the franchise relationship, the buyer is likely to be the 
franchisee and the franchisor, the supplier.  
Interestingly, the CPA which seeks to level the franchising playing field because 
of the enormous bargaining power disparity that exists between franchisors and 
franchisees, uses this designation to afford the weaker party in the relationship, 
namely franchisees, the rights and obligations of consumers, and the stronger party, 
that is franchisors, the rights and obligations of suppliers. 
Using French and Raven’s (1959) power model, franchisors exercise expert and 
legal power because of their expertise as owners and developers of the intellectual 
property behind the franchise system.  
In addition, franchisors exercise considerable legal power because of the control 
they have over the negotiating and writing of the franchise contract (Porter and 
Renworth, 1978; Muris, 1980; Emerson, 1998).  
On the other hand, Minkler (1990; 1992) suggests that franchisees also possess 
market knowledge power, which franchisors leverage by appointing franchisees in 
the relevant areas which enable them to derive this power from their knowledge of 
consumer habits and tastes in the areas in which they live, most of which are located 
far from the franchisor’s head-office. 
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By appointing franchisees located far away from its head-office, the franchisor 
runs the risk of franchisees free riding on the brand or engaging in opportunistic 
actions.  
However, as franchisors usually appoint fieldworkers who travel to the 
outlying area or regions, and sometimes franchisors establish regional offices in the 
smaller cities and towns, the disincentive to cheat among franchisees still exists 
because of the threat of termination for breaches (Brickley and Dark, 1987).  
Having said that, the efficacy of this disincentive is doubtful because of the 
noticeable deterioration in the service and maintenance of franchise outlets the 
further away one goes from a big city such as Johannesburg where most franchisors 
have their head offices. 
 Opportunism as an hazard in franchising 
As the TCE suggests, the franchise relationship requires both franchisors and 
franchisees to invest in transaction specific assets (TSA’s) or idiosyncratic 
investments which include site, physical and human assets such as machinery, 
equipment, and fittings in which franchisees invest; and intellectual property such as 
brand names, trademarks, and the business method developed and owned by 
franchisors that are highly specific to the franchise relationship with the result that 
they are of little value outside that relationship (Williamson (1975). 
Williamson points out that because TSA’s are vulnerable to opportunistic 
expropriation by the franchisors and franchisees, they present safeguarding, 
maladaptation and performance hazards to the parties such that the nature and 
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effects of these hazards and the measures the parties may take to protect their 
interests form the central theme of this study. 
Safeguarding hazards. These hazards arise from the need to protect the 
idiosyncratic investments of the both franchisors and franchisees against the risk of 
OB by the other party and these raise the issue of information and monitoring costs.  
This happens in two stages: First, prior to the commencement of the 
relationship, the parties need to expend considerable resources screening and 
negotiating with each other prior to agreeing on the terms of the franchise contract 
with the aim at securing the interests of the respective parties against opportunism 
by the other party in the franchise relationship.  
Thereafter, the parties have to expend additional resources putting in place 
monitoring mechanisms to ensure that each side keeps to its word and fully execute 
its obligations in terms of the franchise contract; which TCE theory suggests is not 
always possible because of human nature to pursue self-interest with guile 
(Williamson, 1975; 1985).  
For example, franchisors and the entire franchise system is exposed to the risk 
of free riding on the brand name by some of the franchisees especially those who are 
not dependent on repeat or transient customers such as those located on freeways 
(Brickely and Dark, 1987).  
Such franchisees can afford to compromise on the quality of the franchise 
system by rendering a substandard service such as offering poor quality service, 
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unclean and unhygienic premises, using cheaper ingredients and so on without 
bearing the full cost of their shirking.  
At least, theoretically and in the short term; that is, until this behaviour is 
detected by the franchisor, such franchisees are able to pass off their inferior 
products or service as genuine.  
This happens on the back of the good image and reputation that customers have 
come to associate with a particular franchise system and pocketing whatever cost 
savings they are able to generate out of cutting corners. 
According to Brickely and Dark (1987), this partially explains the reasons why 
franchisors prefer to franchise outlets are located in remote areas where they believe 
repeat customers will discourage free riding by franchisees.  
Franchisors seem to believe that this will help safeguard their interests and 
reduce their monitoring costs are needed to ensure compliance with quality 
standards that are embodied in franchise rules, procedures and processes.  
Similarly, franchisees hope that their written franchise contract with the 
franchisors will protect their right to trade undisturbed under the franchisor’s 
intellectual property, comprise the use of the franchisor’s brand names, trademarks, 
tried, and tested business methods and so on, over the pre-agreed period, and in the 
pre-agreed territory.  
Franchisees hope to generate the revenue streams and profits from operating 
the franchise outlet which the franchise contracts cannot guarantee primarily 
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because of the termination clause which allows the franchisor can invoke in order to 
expropriate the rents or profits of the outlet (Klein et., al 1998). 
Maladaptation hazards. According to Williamson (1979) and Rubin (1990), the 
second hazard that faces franchisors and franchisees involved in a franchise 
relationship concerns the issue on adapting to changed market conditions owing to 
changes in customer preferences, competition, and technology.  
These challenges arise from the difficulties presented by the unpredictability of 
the market forces leading the parties to the entering into incomplete franchise 
contracts because of the market uncertainty and bounded rationality, that is, limited 
human cognition which TCE suggests makes it not possible to spell out all future 
contingencies a priori in the franchise contract (Williamson, 1979).  
According to Williamson, it is not even possible for the parties to agree on the 
timeframe for reviewing the franchise relationship with the result that franchisors 
are able to use the period prior to the renewal of the franchise contract as the time for 
making adjustments to the franchise contract as a sine qua non for entering into a new 
deal.  
The problem with this approach is that it exposes franchises to opportunism 
because franchisors are able to take advantage of the opportunity to try to extract 
concessions from franchisees that were never in the original franchise contract 
(Withane and Heidi, 2001).  
For instance, most franchisors use the renewal period to demand that 
franchisees renovate the franchise outlet as a condition for the renewal in 
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circumstances where this may not be justifiable in terms of a return on investment or 
prospects of profitability. 
Evaluation hazards. The last hazard facing franchisors and franchisees is the 
question of evaluating compliance with the franchise contract, which arises because 
of behavioural uncertainty (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997).  
Because of the difficulties involved in drafting a fully comprehensive franchise 
agreement that spells out the performance yardstick in detail mainly because of the 
cost involved and bounded rationality that relates to limited cognitive abilities 
(Williamson, 1975; 1979), it becomes very difficult to ascertain the extent of 
compliance with the franchise contract.  
Williamson has argued that the complexity of the franchise relationship makes 
it extremely difficult for human beings to comprehend and spell out all the issues 
requiring full explanation and compliance within the franchise relationship.  
Alternatively, Williamson points out that it would be extremely expensive to 
draft a comprehensive franchise contract that encompasses all future contingencies 
and spells out clear and detailed compliance requirements.  
For example, as Hadfield (1990) argues, it is not possible to define cleanliness in 
the franchise contract in any more detail than a mere mention of the word which 
creates gaps or opportunities for the parties to behave in an opportunistic manner 
with the result that incomplete contracting is one of the structural factors that that 
this studies examined as an antecedent to both franchisor and franchisee 
opportunism.  
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Rindfelisch and Heide (1997) provide a summary of the three hazards discussed 
above, the nature transaction costs and opportunity costs they may generate for 
franchisors and franchisees. Table 4.1 presents this summary below, as follows: 
  
112 
Table 4-1: Rindfleisch and Heide's (1997) typology: transaction and opportunity costs 
Costs Asset 
specificity 
Environmental 
Uncertainty 
Behavioural 
Uncertainty 
Source of transaction costs Safeguarding Adaptation Performance evaluation 
 
Type of transactions costs 
o Direct costs 
 
o Opportunity 
costs 
 
Costs of 
crafting 
safeguards 
 
Communication, 
negotiation, and 
coordination 
costs 
 
 
Screening and selection 
costs (ex-ante) 
Measurement costs (ex 
post) 
Failure to 
invest in 
productive 
assets 
Maladaptation: 
Failure to adapt 
Failure to identify 
appropriate partners 
(ex-ante) 
Productivity losses 
through effort 
adjustment (ex post) 
Source: Adapted from Rindefleisch and Heide (1997) 
 Forms and outcomes of opportunism within franchise systems 
Building on the earlier and foundational work of scholars such as Williamson 
(1985) and others, Withane and Heide (2001) developed a neat but insightful 
synopsis of the various forms of opportunism and their short- and long-term effects 
on the cost and revenues structures of both the perpetrators and victims of 
opportunism. Table 4.2 depicts these factors below, as follows: 
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Table 4-2: Withane and Heide's (2001) typology of forms and outcomes of opportunism 
Behaviour 
Circumstances 
 
 
 
 
Passive 
 
Existing New 
1 
EVASION 
 
 
Cost effect: 
Decrease for O  
(short term) 
Increase for E 
(long term) 
 
Revenue effect: 
Decrease for E, S  
(long term) 
 
2 
REFUSAL  
TO ADAPT 
 
Cost effect: 
Minimal 
 
Revenue effect: 
Increase for O 
(short term) 
 
Decrease for E and O 
(long term, forgone 
revenues due to 
maladaptation) 
Active 
3 
VIOLATION 
 
 
Cost effect: 
Increase for E 
(long term) 
 
Revenue effect: 
Increase for O 
(short term) 
Decrease for E, S  
(long term) 
 
4 
FORCED 
RENEGOTIATION 
 
Cost effect: 
Increase for E (haggling, 
concessions)  
(short term) 
 
Revenue effect: 
Increase for O 
Short term, from 
concessions) 
 
Decrease for E and O (long-
term, forgone revenues due 
to maladaptation) 
Source: Withane and Heide (2001) 
Briefly, the Withane and Heide (2001) typology firstly divides opportunistic acts 
or behaviours into two forms found in franchise relationships; that is, active and 
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passive opportunism, and then into two circumstances under which to observe them; 
namely, existing or new circumstances.  
Depending on a combination of these factors, Table 4.2 shows various 
opportunistic stances or behaviours adopted by the perpetrator; namely, 1 Evasion, 2 
Refusal to adapt, 3 Violation and 4 Re-negotiation strategies. 
In addition, the above Table also shows the short- and long-term effects of these 
strategies on the cost and revenue structures of both perpetrators and victims party 
(that is,  the franchisor or franchisee depending on who the perpetrator is within the 
franchise relationship) that are represented by the 4 quadrants. 
Quadrant 1: Passive opportunism under exiting circumstances (Evasion). According 
to Withane and Heide, this scenario represents a failure or refusal by either the 
franchisor or the franchisee to observe its obligations under a franchise contract with 
the aim of extracting cost savings at least in the short term.  
For example, a franchisee may shirk on quality standards by using cheaper 
ingredients in the preparation of goods it produces or supplies. In the long term, the 
effect of the shirking franchisee will have a negative effect on the revenues of both 
the franchisor and other franchisees. 
Quadrant 2: Passive opportunism under new circumstances (Refusal to adapt). Under 
this scenario, a franchisor or franchisee may display some inflexibility by refusing to 
adapt to changed market conditions. 
TCE reckons that that challenge faces franchise systems because of the difficulty 
involved in predicting all future contingencies ex ante.  
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As a result, a party may derive cost savings in the short term, by acting in full 
compliance with its contractual obligations while refusing to invest money in 
adapting to the required change. In the long term, however, there may be revenue 
losses for both the franchisor and the franchisee because of maladaptation costs such 
as lack of competitiveness. 
Quadrant 3: Active opportunism under existing circumstances (Violation). This form 
of opportunistic behaviour involves a blatant violation of an explicit or implicit 
clause in the franchise contract such as when a franchisor encroaches on the territory 
of an existing franchisee by establishing a competing outlet operated by the 
franchisor or another franchisee in close proximity to that belonging to an existing 
franchisee’s outlet (Hadfield, 1990).  
Such an encroachment increases the long-term costs of the affected franchisee 
while decreasing its long-term revenues because of the unwanted intra-brand 
competition. In the short-term, the opportunistic franchisor derives some financial 
benefits while the franchise system as a whole endures long-term financial losses 
because of the reputational damages it suffers due to existing franchisees leaving 
and potential franchisees shunning the franchise system. 
Quadrant 4: Active opportunism under new circumstances (Forced renegotiation). In 
this case, a franchisor may impose new demands on a franchisee such as the 
renovation of an outlet at the time of the renewal of the franchise contract when such 
an issue was neither in the original franchise contract nor justifiable in terms of 
profitability prospects or a return on investment (Hadfield, 1990).  
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Franchisors engage in this type of opportunism even at the commencement of 
the franchise relationship as franchise contract are “not negotiated with franchisees, 
but are sold like insurance policies on a take-it-or live-it basis” (Hunt, 1977, p74).  
This phase of the relationship may result in short-term gains for the franchisor 
due to kickbacks they may obtain from the suppliers appointed to renovate the 
outlet which may increase the transactions costs of the franchisee for entering or re-
entering into the franchise relationship due to the haggling and the concessions it is 
usually required to make.  
These various forms of opportunism present different safeguarding and 
enforcing challenges because though the franchise contract and legal action can 
address active opportunism, passive opportunism can only be attenuated with the 
use of norms of behaviour such as trust, cooperation, solidarity and so on that 
characterise the franchise relationship (Brown et al., 2000).  
Other scholars of the RET school of thought have suggested the use of 
governance mechanism such as clans (Ouchi, 1980), pledges (Anderson and Weitz, 
1992), incentives (Brickley, 1999; Shane, 2001; Scott and Frazer, 2006) to control 
opportunism.  
On the other hand, Achrol and Gundlach (1999) and Cannon (2000) have 
suggested the use of a combination of the various mechanisms, which seems 
sensible, given the criticism levelled at TCE for being “under-socialised” 
(Granovetter, 1985). 
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 Strategies for managing opportunism 
As a point of departure, Withane and Heide (2001) suggest the need to tailor the 
strategy for combating opportunism to the relevant form of opportunism and the 
pairing of the anti-opportunism strategy to the underlying factors giving rise to the 
disconcerting behaviours such as information asymmetry and lock-in devices as 
depicted in Table 4.2 above.  
Monitoring. According to Withane and Heide, monitoring is required where 
information asymmetry exists as the basis of opportunism and franchisors must 
monitor the activities of their franchisees to ensure that they comply with quality 
standards and operational procedures.  
This is because franchised outlets are usually located far away from the 
franchisor’s head office, and this exposes the franchise system to free riding or non-
compliance with franchise rules and procedures by some unscrupulous franchisees.  
As a result, the purpose of monitoring is two-fold: firstly, to discourage 
opportunism by placing social or peer-pressure on franchisee where this is the case 
and secondly, as a basis for taking action against the offender. 
Monitoring also produces second-order effects such as self-selection which may 
result in potential franchisees from avoiding franchise systems in which they are 
aware the franchisor actively monitors the activities of their franchisees with the 
result that monitoring forces self-selection among potential franchisees and this 
helps reduce the problem of adverse selection.  
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In the process, the franchise system is able to reduce the transactions costs that 
could otherwise have arisen from unnecessary disputes with incompetent 
franchisees. 
Incentives. This is the “carrot and stick” approach that can be used in franchising 
to align the interests of franchisors and their franchisees by offering incentives that 
are intended to make the short term gains derived from OA unattractive compared 
to the long-term gains that can be demonstrated to emanate from cooperative 
behaviour.  
In TCE terms, this involves turning franchise contracts into the so-called self-
enforcing agreements (Kaufmann and Lafontaine, 1994). In this regard, TCE scholars 
such as Rubin (1978) and Williamson (1993) have argued about the use of “hostages” 
by franchisors that normally require franchisees to invest in the so-called 
idiosyncratic assets referred to above.  
The rationale behind this practice is to discourage franchisees from engaging in 
OA through the pre-mature termination of the franchise relationship by franchisors 
with the result that the franchisee will have no use forfeit its sunk costs in the 
idiosyncratic assets.  
The use of incentives also has second-order effects such as quality assurance to 
the customers and cost reduction and high revenues for the franchisee because of 
their durability and reliability. 
Selection. This involves subjecting potential franchisors or franchisees to 
screening prior to establishing a relationship with either party where franchisors 
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usually subject their potential franchisees to various screening tests such as 
psychological, personality and credit checks (Shane, 1998b) in order to try to 
determine the extent to that the candidate franchisees may be opportunistically 
inclined.  
Nonetheless, adverse selection poses a serious threat to most selection or 
screening devices because franchisees, like ordinary human beings, are capable of 
misrepresenting their skills to potential franchisors for opportunistic reasons (Shane, 
1996).  
On the other hand, Petersen and Dant (1990) suggest that aspirant franchisees 
usually search for information about different franchise systems before deciding on 
entering into a relationship with any one of them by talking to existing franchisees to 
ask for information about a particular franchise system in that they may be 
interested.  
Furthermore, the reputation of a franchise system (Kumar, Scheer and 
Steenkamp, 1995) may serve as a screening lens through which franchisees may be 
able to select a particular franchise system.  
However, according to Williamson (1979), it may be difficult to assess the 
reputation of a particular franchise system regarding to its termination record 
because of the unavailability of objective information on the exact reasons for the 
store closures or termination of a franchise contract.  
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Hadfield (1990) also cautions that a franchisee who was selling its business is 
unlikely to disclose the OB of the franchisor he may be involved with in a 
relationship. 
Socialisation. Organisation theorists such as Ouchi (1980) and Granovettor (1985) 
have criticised TCE as ignoring the social context in which the franchise relationship 
is embedded which has resulted in franchise systems recognising the need to 
develop social cohesion (El Akremi et. al., 2010) by nurturing the pursuit of 
objectives such as goal congruence, goal clarity, information exchange, trust, and 
cooperation. 
Within the socialisation paradigm, Schein (1980; 1982) propounds the fostering 
of psychological contracts between franchisors and franchisees as vehicles for 
striving towards setting and achieving mutually agreed norms of acceptable 
behaviour and role expectations regarding the contribution of the parties towards 
achieving these goals.  
According to Schein (1980), the existence of psychological contracts among 
franchisors and franchisees depends on two measures: 
 
1. The degree to which their own expectations of what the 
organisation will provide to them and what they owe the 
organisation in return matches what the organization’s 
expectations are of what it will give and get in return 
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2. The nature of what is actually to be exchanged assuming there is 
some agreement – money in exchange time and work, social needs 
satisfaction and security in exchange for hard work and loyalty; 
opportunities for self-actualisation and challenging work in 
exchange for high productivity, high quality work, creative effort in 
the service of organisational goals or various combinations of these 
and other things (p.99).  
 
Similarly, Ouchi (1980) alludes to “clans” as the socially determined rules of 
engagement within franchise relationship, which develop over time to regulate the 
relationship between the parties to reinforce franchise contract (market) and 
regulations introduced by the authorities (bureaucracies).  
Socialisation may also have second-effect benefits such as serving a signalling 
purpose by espousing values desired by a particular customer base and may also 
serve as a selection device by attracting potential franchisees with values and goals 
acceptable to a particular franchise system but can also be of limited use where 
franchisors and franchisees do not share the same norms and values (Dywer et al., 
1997). 
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 Differences between opportunistic behaviour and unethical behaviour 
It is also important to highlight the difference between opportunistic behaviour 
and unethical behaviour in order to demonstrate the seriousness and importance of 
OB within the franchise relationship.  
On the one hand, unethical behaviour represents ordinary socially and morally 
unacceptable franchisor or franchisee behaviour such as gossip or back-biting or 
staff poaching between the parties, OA allude to conduct aimed at deriving financial 
reward at the expense of another party in an exchange relationship such as the 
franchisor-franchisee relationship in a discreet manner on the other.  
Therefore, while it is apparent that opportunistic behaviour is some kind of 
unethical behaviour, the reverse cannot be true as logically, not all forms of unethical 
behaviour have financial motives or effects.  
Williamson (1981) observes that as human agents franchisors will engage in OA 
at one time or another because of an inherent possibility that given the opportunity, 
that is, the presence of a financial reward and the absence of detection and sanctions, 
a franchisor is likely to behave in an opportunistic manner as a rule rather than an 
exception; and this symbolises or denotes OO, the subject of the remainder of this 
Chapter. 
 Introducing the researcher’s OO construct 
Within the context of the TCE part of the theoretical framework outlined in the 
foregoing sections, arguably the OO construct is a brand new construct the study is 
introducing into the franchising literature and nomenclature to denote tendencies 
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which underlie the behaviour or actions of franchisors and franchisees to extract 
undeserved financial benefits from each other.  
Firstly, as evidence of the newness or originality of this construct, a world-wide-
web search of various engines such as Google, Amazon, and Yahoo and various 
social sciences, business, economics, legal or management electronic databases could 
not find the construct.  
These databases searched include popular ones such as Proquest, Ebsco, 
Emerald, Science Direct, Jstor, Hein-on-line, ISI Web science, and ABI/Inform which 
collectively housed approximately 2000 peer-reviewed and high impact publications, 
books, journals and periodicals with more than 20 000 scholarly works has not 
returned any article, book or dissertation / thesis bearing the two words together in 
the same title.  
Thus, there is no record from any of the above important sources of any attempt 
to define or conceptualise the construct in any form or shape as was done in this 
study, this suggests the originality of the conceptualisation of the OO construct as it 
may apply to franchisors and franchisees. 
Arguably, this represents an important part of this study’s contribution to 
knowledge, as this construct is likely to inform or improve the actions and decisions 
of franchisors, franchisees and other interested parties such as lenders, investors, 
and policymakers.  
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4.7.1 The origin, meaning and philosophical underpinnings of OO 
The building blocks of the OO construct arise from the work of scholars such as 
Williamson (1975, 1979, 1985; Muris, 1980; Hadfield, 1990; Klein, 1997; Dnes, 2003) 
following the guidelines suggested by Churchill (1979) and using Williamson’s 
(1975) widely accepted definition of opportunism as self-interest seeking with guile” 
(p6). 
Accordingly, this researcher conceptualised the OO construct as the deep seated 
but contrived tendency or inclination among franchisors and franchisees to seek or 
identify opportunities for acting or behaving opportunistically as a rule rather than 
an exception.  
In other words, as in the case of Williamson’s opportunism construct, this 
study’s conceptualisation of the OO suggests that opportunistic behaviour is an 
inherently latent and ubiquitous trait among both franchisors and franchisees.  
As a point of departure or reference, the conceptualisation of OO suggests that 
it owes its philosophical roots among franchisors and franchisees to different sets of 
circumstances or motivations inherent in the franchise relationship.  
For example, the origin of the construct among franchisors owes its origin to the 
theoretical argument positing the life cycle of franchise systems (Oxenfeldt and 
Kelly, 1969) which suggested that as the franchise system evolved, franchisors 
would be inclined to buy or take back franchised outlets from franchisees.  
To this end, this study argues that most troublesome clauses found in most 
franchise contracts by Udel (1972) and Dnes (1973) such as the buy-back clause 
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amount to an expression or demonstration of OO among franchisors. Support for 
this argument can be found in the franchising literature (Hunt, 1977) who decried 
the one-sided nature of franchise contracts by observing that most franchise 
contracts are “sold to franchisees like an insurance policy, on a take-it-or-leave-it 
basis” (p74).  
As evidence, most scholars (e.g. Williamson, 1975; Muris, 1980, Hadfield, 1990) 
point to the large number of complaints, disputes and judicial and legislative 
hearings instituted and investigated against franchisors and copious pieces of anti-
franchisor opportunism legislation and regulations passed in most parts of the 
developed and developing world.  
These include South Africa where the CPA that was recently passed to deal 
with this problem which as the above scholars argue, OB is clandestine or subtle in 
nature with the result that it is difficult to detect or observe, otherwise it would not 
be rewarding to the offending party; that is, franchisors, to behave in an 
opportunistic fashion.  
However, this study sought to overcome this difficulty by pre-empting OO 
among franchisors, through examining certain aspects of franchise contracts that 
have been identified in the literature as one-sided in the favour of franchisors (Klein, 
1980, 1995, 2000, Muris, 1980); Klein and Saft, 1985); Dnes, 1993, 1996, 2003; Elango 
and Fried, 1979).  
Franchise contracts have been at the centre of allegations and complaints 
against franchisors or have the potential to inspire opportunistic behaviour among 
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franchisors. Stated metaphorically, while OA was considered to be tantamount to 
“pulling the trigger”; the construct of OO was construed as a “the cocking of the 
franchising gun” exercise which merits more attention in this thesis than its more 
visible and easily recognisable twin construct, that is, opportunistic actions.  
Furthermore, like opportunism, the conceptualisation OO contends that 
franchisors or franchisees execute it in a discreet manner which explains the secrecy 
behind signing and keeping of franchise contracts in most countries generally 
regarded as confidential despite the fact that the similarity of the structure and 
content of most franchise contracts (Dnes, 1993).  
This study contends that other than for reasons of concealing OO especially 
among franchisors, no bona fide reasons exists for not making signed franchise 
contracts available for public or investor inspection or information in the interest of 
openness and transparency.  
This is in light of the fact that important contracts with pecuniary or commercial 
value such as ante-nuptial contracts and mortgage contracts are by law public 
documents are filed with the Magistrates Court and the Deeds Office.  
Therefore, this study makes a case for the authorities at least in this country, to 
require the filing of franchise contracts with the newly created National Consumer 
Commission (NCC) established in terms of the CPA as only members of FASA are 
required to file copies of the disclosure document and franchise contracts with the 
association which does not make records available for public access or usage.  
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However, as indicated in Chapter 3, FASA is a voluntary association that only 
keeps copies of disclosure documents of its members that forms part of the 
application for membership by such members (FASA website). 
Thus, filing copies of signed franchise contracts with the NCC will greatly 
enhance the availability of information that can enable aspirant franchisees and 
other investors to make informed decisions in assessing OO of the franchise systems 
in which they may be interested.  
This study argues that the disclosure document does not serve any useful 
purpose as it amounts to no more than a watered down version of the franchise 
contract because it provides no more than the elementary information such as the 
credit, profitability and financial history of the franchisor, number of existing outlets, 
contact details and so on, that most franchisors already publish on their websites 
which makes it difficult to detect undesirable or suspicious inclinations.  
Some franchisors require payment of a certain sum of money before making 
their disclosure document available to an interested party which can prove to be a 
costly hindrance to some potential franchisees who may be considering a number of 
different franchise systems with the objective of choosing one from them.  
Similarly, the recently introduced 10-day “cooling off” period under the CPA 
within that a new franchisee can withdraw from a franchise contract (Woker, 2012) is 
a formality that serves very little purpose as it amounts to no more than closing the 
stable door after the proverbial franchising horse has bolted. 
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Generally, the “cooling off” period is usually preceded by huge financial and 
emotional commitments and investments into the franchise system that new 
franchisees make early in their franchise buying decision process with the result that 
the argument that franchise contracts contain confidential information and should 
therefore kept secret appears aimed at concealing the OO of franchise systems. 
4.7.2 Differences between entrepreneurial orientation and OO 
In conceptualising the OO construct, it was important to distinguish between 
normal opportunity seeking, identifying, and exploiting, that is, entrepreneurial 
orientation (Stevenson and Jarillo, 1990; Lumpkin and Dess, 1996; Rauch, Wiklund, 
Lumpkin and Frese, 2009) which is a positive-oriented and key value-creating 
characteristic among entrepreneurs.  
It is necessary to juxtapose this construct against the negative-oriented, value-
destroying, and unscrupulous opportunistic inclinations that is, OO others may 
harbour or display when the opportunity arises, on the other.  
Interestingly, a vast number of studies have specifically identified and 
recognised the successful entrepreneurial role of franchisors as developers, 
maintainers and owners of franchise systems (Withane, 1991; Castrogiavanni, 1995; 
Strutton, Petton, and Lumpkin, 1995; Phan, Butler, and Lee., 1996; Shane, 1996; 
Tuunanen, 2001; Clarkin and Rosa, 2005).  
These studies have focused on the part played by franchisors as classical 
entrepreneurs or opportunity seekers who have allocated considerable amounts of 
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effort, money, and time to identify a gap or an opportunity in the market and to 
develop a product or service offering to satisfy or take advantage of that business 
opportunity.  
Others studies have lent support to the entrepreneurial orientation hypothesis 
among franchisors has propelled them into developing, sustaining and expanding 
their franchise systems by exploiting the opportunity or niche they have identified in 
the market using the intellectual capital or property they possess.  
In pursuit of their entrepreneurial goals, some over-zealous franchisors may 
plan or prepare to indulge in opportunistic behaviour with the intention of deriving 
undeserved financial rewards from their own franchisees.  
Such franchisors may engage in pre-contractual opportunism and rig the 
franchise contract that is, the “cock the franchising gun” in a manner that will allow 
them in due course to terminate the franchise contract or refuse to renew it where 
they may be not be legitimate or sound business reasons for doing so.  
It is probably inconceivable to view this conduct, as a demonstration of 
entrepreneurship as most observers, but a clear case of OO among the affected 
franchisors underlines it.  
Stevenson and Jarillo (1989) regard entrepreneurship as “a process by those 
individuals–either on their own or inside organizations-pursues opportunities 
without regard to the resources they currently control” (p43).  
This definition places emphasis on seeking opportunities and resources in the 
marketplace and by normal commercial means which entails that within the 
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franchise relationship, the “opportunity” for franchisors does not reside within the 
franchise system and similarly, “resources” do not translate into taking unfair 
advantage of their relationship with franchisees.  
Therefore, this study regards entrepreneurial orientation among franchisors as 
displayed by their role associated with the development and maintenance of the 
franchise system while OO represent the antithesis of entrepreneurial orientation as 
it has the potential to generate the opposite of the desirable outcomes of 
entrepreneurial orientation.  
OO produce negative and destructive conflict that increases transactions costs 
through litigation and negative publicity that it attracts and thus weakens the 
efficiency of the franchise relationship as a mode of business. 
4.7.3 Differences between positive and negative OO 
Up to this point, OO have been conceptualised as having negative implications 
that flow from the conduct of franchisors and franchisees towards each other.  
However, it is important to point out that there may be some opportunistic acts 
or behaviours of franchisors which may yield some financial, marketing, or other 
benefits which may emanate from the entrepreneurial efforts of franchisors for 
instance in negotiating favourable discounts with suppliers at the expense of its 
competitors in the marketplace (Muris, 1980). 
As franchisees may reap the financial benefits from these kinds of initiatives, 
positive OO need to be distinguished from its negative counterpart because the latter 
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can destabilise the dyadic franchise relationship by precipitating financial conflict 
between the parties.  
The franchise relationship presumed to be a co-operative and symbiotic 
relationship aims at pursuing and achieving common goals and objectives for the 
parties involved in the relationship (Clarkin and Rosa, 1995).  
The same does not exist between franchisors and their competitors with whom 
a “dog eats dog” type of relationship appears to exist or prevail.  
On the other hand, there may be differences in the justifications that franchisors 
and franchisees can provide for committing opportunistic actions towards each 
other.  
Typically, franchisors may justify their actions as efforts aimed at protecting 
and enhancing the reputation of the franchise system on which the growth, 
competitiveness, and survival of the system may be dependent.  
For instance, given the general belief in franchising that the franchise chain is 
‘‘as strong as its weakest link”, by terminating or failing to renew a particular 
franchisee’s franchise contract, a franchisor may claim that it was merely acting to 
remove a weak, incompetent or uncommitted franchisee from the system.  
Such a franchisee may not able to run its business profitably and competitively 
with the result that this researcher argues that such a franchisee tarnishes the 
reputation of the franchise system and that this has far-reaching and unfavourable 
long-term implications for the growth, competitiveness, and survival of the system.  
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Similarly, in an “eye-to-eye” or tit-for-tat” argument, some franchisees may feel 
justified in acting opportunistically because the franchisor acts in a similar manner. 
This may be the case where the franchisor may not be performing the supportive 
role it may have promised such as its failure to advertise or provide training and 
new product offerings.  
By acting opportunistically, such franchisees may be hoping to produce positive 
outcomes by forcing the offending franchisors to perform or face going out of 
business which highlights the reciprocal nature of opportunism (Brown et al., 2000) 
suggests that OO by the one party begets the same by the other or “fighting fire with 
fire”; and that the long-term effect of this practice can be mutual destruction or 
extermination.  
This may be the case particularly in a highly competitive environment where 
profit margins are on the decline or when the franchise system has entered the 
decline phase of its life cycle or when control of the franchise system changes hands. 
4.7.4 Differences between franchisor and franchisee OO 
The conceptualisation of OO in this study suggests that both parties involved in 
the franchise relationship are equally capable or inclined to act in an opportunistic 
manner with the result that OO are likely to surface where the incentive to act in this 
manner exists which Williamson described as the attractiveness of financial benefits 
and the absence of sanctions.  
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This is where the similarities between the parties to a franchise relationship end 
from that point different mechanisms and strategies emerge that each party employs 
towards achieving its opportunistic goals where for instance, a franchisor may desire 
to own a particular profitable franchised outlet it has failed to buy back from a 
successful franchisee through normal above board negotiations or bargaining.  
Such a franchisor may then decide to establish and own another outlet in close 
proximity to an existing outlet with the intention of competing directly with an 
existing franchisee.  
Though such a franchisor may be perfectly entitled to do in terms of the 
franchise contract that may have been strategically designed to limit the franchisee’s 
right to a particular geographical area, this may be in violation of the norms and 
values of franchise relationships.  
Despite the allocation of restricted territories, it is common practice for 
franchisors to grant their existing franchisees the so-called right of first refusal before 
establishing a new competing or sister outlet close to an existing one.  
Such a franchisor may wish to capitalise on the goodwill that the franchisee has 
developed in the area that it was neither aware of nor prepared to risk investing its 
money and effort.  
Similarly, a franchisee may not to buy the required ingredients or may replace 
these with inferior and cheaper substitutes it believes the franchisor or its customers 
are unlikely to detect.  
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Such a free riding franchisee hopes to benefit through cost savings from the 
reputation of the franchise system built on the franchisors’ successful business 
method, brand names, and trademarks that its customers may associate with that 
particular franchise system. 
Once again, the problem here is that the franchisee in question may seek to 
derive undue financial benefits from cheating on the franchise system by taking 
unfair advantage of the fact that it may be difficult for the franchisor to detect its 
misconduct and apply any appropriate sanctions such as a reprimand or 
termination. 
4.7.5 Reasons for focusing on franchisor and franchisee OO 
Almost by definition, this study revolves on negative effects of OO and OA 
because of their overwhelming and far-reaching socio-economic consequences as 
outlined throughout this study.  
However, unlike most other studies, this study also focuses on the inclination, 
culpability, or susceptibility of franchisors to the OO problem that almost by 
conventional wisdom, most studies and commentators largely attribute to 
franchisees.  
There is abundant anecdotal and some academic evidence suggesting that 
franchisors also engage in OA (Muris, 1980) as reflected by franchisees being the 
complainants in most of franchising disputes or court cases against their franchisors.  
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In addition, most articles in the media and academic journals especially legal 
and strategy journals deal with issues and practices adopted by franchisors in 
carrying out various opportunistic acts.  
On the contrary, as pointed above, very few marketing studies have focused on 
franchisor opportunism ostensibly because most scholars seem to believe that 
opportunism is a franchisee problem, which this study seeks to address.  
As pointed out by Hadfield (1990), these scholars seem to believe that as owners 
and developers of the franchise system, franchisors have no incentive to cheat for 
fear of reputational risk.  
This is despite the fact that in most cases new franchisors with limited or no 
reputation whatsoever have been found wanting upon establishing “fly-by-night” 
businesses that collected massive franchisees fees by opening a large number of 
outlets, and then disappearing after failing to provide the promised support and 
back-up services.  
Such franchisors have no reputational risk to worry about, as their focus is 
short-term in an industry with no industry, legislative or regulatory barriers that 
prevent them from entering the market or ensuring that operators in the industry 
meet certain minimum requirements or standards of any nature.  
However, the quick “in and out” and “hit and run” actions of these franchisors 
have immense potential to cause reputational damage not only to the franchising 
sector as whole, but also threaten the normal functioning of the economic system 
that relies on protection from exploitation, fair and just trading.  
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The actions of these operators usually results in negative publicity devolving 
from financial losses and litigation costs suffered by franchisees at the hands of 
unscrupulous franchisors, in its entirety that is also the reason for the approach 
adopted in this study.  
By comparison, franchisors have elaborate means at their disposal such as 
financial, psychographic, and educational criteria that they can use to assess 
potential franchisees.  
In addition, as stated by Williamson (1985), franchisors take “hostages” from 
franchisees by requiring them to pay up front franchise fees and investing in 
equipment and training that is specific-designed to that franchise system with the 
result that any franchisee guilty of misconduct runs the risk of losing.  
On the other hand, even reputable franchisors have strategies for countering 
any negative publicity such as pointing to the increase in the number of new outlets 
while playing down closed outlets by manipulating statistics and facts such as 
disguising store closures and terminations of franchise contracts as non-renewals 
and taking over or reselling failed stores. 
The aim is to maintain equilibrium by trying to keep the interest in the franchise 
system high to continue to retain existing franchisees and to attract new ones into 
the franchise system particularly when others could be silently exiting the system 
due to franchisor opportunistic practices. 
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4.7.6 The importance and relevance of OO 
OO as a multi-dimensional construct. From the forgoing discussion, it clear that 
OO represents a multi-faceted construct that permeates the franchise system.  
As this study suggests, the construct derives from various sources and 
influences within the micro, market and macro franchise environment. 
For instance, a number of studies have found that the lack of legislation and 
regulation of the franchise industry contributes to an increase in franchisee 
complaints and disputes with franchisors.  
Other distinguishing features of the construct are that it affects various aspects 
of the franchise relationship, assumes various forms, and occurs at different stages of 
the franchise relationship.  
For instance, Grimes (1986) has raised the issue of information asymmetry at the 
initiation of the franchise relationship manifests itself in terms of the information 
advantage that franchisors have over franchising in concluding the franchise 
contract.  
Cochet and Garg (2008) found that having gained invaluable knowledge, 
experience and expertise gained over many years, franchisors often adapt certain 
clauses of their franchise contracts to meet their changing needs over time.  
This is a luxury potential and experienced franchisees do not have as in most 
cases franchisors present the franchise contract to franchisees for signature in the 
franchisor’s offices, as a fait accompli. 
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One way of minimising this problem is for aspirant franchisees to consult a 
franchise attorney before signing the franchise contract (Porter and Renworth, 1978).  
In addition, the newly enacted CPA provides for a 10-day “cooling off period” 
during that a potential franchisee can withdraw from a franchise contract without 
incurring any financial penalties (Woker, 2012).  
However, as indicated above, there are emotional and social attachments, that 
develop among newly, signed up franchisees and their families upon signing the 
franchise contract and establishing what in most cases is the individual’s first 
business venture and new career.  
It must be a very difficult and painful decision for some budding entrepreneurs 
having to withdraw from a business deal on the 11th hour due to legal technicalities 
after resigning or retiring from one’s job or profession to buy the franchise. 
OO as dynamic phenomena. As indicated above, studies have found that 
franchisors adjust their franchise contracts to meet changing market situations.  
In fact, Williamson (1975, 1988, 1989) suggested that due to human being’s 
bounded rationality; that is, limited cognitive ability and the complexity of the 
franchise relationship, it is not possible provide for all aspects of the franchise 
relationship.  
Williamson referred to this situation as incomplete contracting that suggests 
that franchise contracts are incomplete and that this warrants the use of social norms 
and values that develop over time to support the franchise contract in carrying out 
the franchise relationship.  
139 
This is likely to happen particularly in wake of the passing of franchising laws 
aimed at dealing with franchisor opportunism in different countries including South 
Africa.  
Thus, opportunistic oriented franchisors study the legal and political 
environment in which they are operating to find ways and means of overcoming 
obstacles before making strategic decisions.  
Mathewson and Winter (1985) found that states that passed franchising laws 
restricting opportunistic terminations of franchise contracts by franchisors in the US 
experienced an increase in company stores and a decline in franchised stores.  
This trend shows that OO represents dynamic phenomena that undergoes 
regular metamorphosis to ensure its continued existence in one form or another over 
time.  
Once again, these adaptive mutations indicate support for the Williamson’s 
(1975) view of an inherent human tendency to cheat which is the target of legislation 
such as the Competition Act and the CPA which requires franchisors to make 
changes to their franchise contracts to address the prescripts of these new pieces of 
legislation.  
However, neither the legal profession nor the authorities have attempted to 
educate franchisees about their legal rights which shows that franchisees are isolated 
in the middle of the significant changes in the legal and regulatory environment, 
which have a major effect in their business lives.  
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Hence, franchisees join peer organisations such as franchisee associations and 
councils, which serve their interests. 
OO as strategic intervention. Despite the negative connotations of OO, it is 
important to consider some views expressed by franchisors and franchisees in their 
own self-defence.  
Scholars such as Muris (1980), Grimes (1986) and Hadfiled (1990) have posited 
that some franchisors may justify their opportunistic actions such as premature 
terminations of franchise contracts as necessary strategic interventions aimed at 
protecting the brand reputation of the franchise system against failure to meet 
quality standards and free riding by franchisees.  
In other words, franchisors accused of acting in an opportunistic manner are 
likely to argue that their efforts are intended to counter OB that may be practiced by 
franchisees that may threaten the investments of their fellow franchisees and the 
continued existence of the franchise system as a whole.  
This conceptualisation ordinarily suggests that franchisors anticipate OA from 
some franchisees and seek to prevent or protect their interests and those of innocent 
franchisees by adopting OO themselves by adopting a “fighting fire with fire” 
strategy.  
Similarly, some franchisees seem to regard certain factors as creating 
opportunities for them free ride on the franchisor’s strong brand which may include 
the physical distance between the franchisor and franchisees in distant and remote 
areas that may render monitoring difficult or expensive for the franchisor.  
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Another possible factor is the problem of incomplete contracting that may result 
in grey areas in the franchise contract may create loopholes or incentives for OB 
among franchisees.  
For instance, Brickley and Dark (1987) suggest that it may be cumbersome to 
define the required level of cleanliness or hygienic conditions in the franchise 
contract in detail; or to anticipate market changes that may require a strategic change 
in the marketing or operations of the franchise system (Muris, 1980).  
For these reasons, it would seem that franchisors and franchisees adopt OO as 
an insurance against each other. This may be the case especially where the parties 
may have difficulty curbing through the intervention of the courts or other third 
party mechanisms.  
OO as the epitome of signalling. One of the objectives of this study is to profile 
some of the behavioural patterns characterising opportunistically oriented 
franchisors and franchisees.  
The OO construct lies in the predictive value it imbues as a “screening device” 
or an “early warning system” that can enable franchisors, potential franchisees and 
other interested parties such as franchise practitioners, lenders and law makers to 
make informed decisions when selecting or evaluating a franchise system for a 
variety of reasons.  
These include appointing potential franchisees by franchisors, selecting a 
franchise system by potential franchisees and their advisors, considering loan 
142 
funding for acquiring a franchise by a bank and deciding on whether to initiate or 
support public policy aimed at regulating the industry.  
As an illustration, Shane and Spell (1988) point out that franchisees generally 
prefer a franchise contract has a longer term so that they can be able to realize the 
benefit of their investment in the franchised business.  
Lenders will also be inclined to shun a shorter-term contract or a fixed term 
contract offering a potential franchisee limited future prospects of success or one that 
they believe is too restrictive as this exposes them to increase legal and financial 
risks. 
Similarly, an understanding of the construct will sensitise franchise lawyers and 
consultants often called upon to give advice to franchisors and franchisees for the 
purposes of drafting and negotiating a franchise contract. 
OO as the antithesis of symbiotic franchise relationships. Various scholars have 
described the franchise relationship as cooperative, requiring joint strife between 
franchisors and franchisees in pursuit of common goals and objectives.  
Within the dyadic relationship, each party has certain a role it must perform in 
order to justify the rewards it derives from the relationship as for instance, 
franchisors invest their money, time, and effort in developing, maintaining and 
monitoring a successful business method or formula they retail to franchisees in 
return for franchise fees and royalties.  
The business method comprise various products and services such as sources of 
cheaper supplies and ingredients, store décor and image, advertising, bookkeeping, 
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product menu and so on, that enable the franchisee to operate a successful business 
in an area allocated to him.  
On the other hand, the franchisee also undertakes to invest money, time, and 
effort in establishing a running the franchise business in a manner that upholds set 
quality standards and procedures and to pay royalties at regular intervals to the 
franchisor.  
This scenario represents a symbiotic relationship needs to exist in order to 
maintain sound relations between the parties.  
However, OO introduce parasitism in the relationship as franchisors and 
franchisees allocate to themselves certain rights and privileges that enable them to 
act in a manner that unfairly transfers wealth from each other. 
This result in one party receiving more financial rewards from its counterpart 
than it may be entitled to in terms of the franchise contract and the norms of the 
franchise relationship such as mutuality, information sharing, and solidarity 
developed between them over time. 
OO as threats to entrepreneurship and SME development. As this study describes 
OO negative phenomena in a preceding section, there can be little doubt that where 
it is found in a franchise system to exist that it is likely have a negative effect on 
entrepreneurship and SME development.  
This is because of the fact that new entrepreneurs may not consider franchising 
as a mode of business where OO are norms that encourage franchisors to load the 
proverbial dice against franchisees.  
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As a result, some franchisees may be disinclined to enter into a business 
relationship because of the omnipresent termination threat for minor violations of 
the franchise contract or the establishment of a competing outlet operated by another 
franchisee in close proximity to an existing outlet and similar practices. 
For the same reasons, existing franchisees are unlikely advise potential 
franchisees to buy franchises as they themselves may be unwilling to seek 
opportunities to expand their operations by acquiring additional units within the 
franchise system seek the renewal of their franchise contracts when they expire.  
Similarly, OO among franchisees may lead to a decline in franchising with the 
result that, faced with this problem, franchisors are unlikely to expose their brands 
for exploitation by unscrupulous franchisees and may opt for vertical integration to 
own company stores.  
In the long-run, OO of either kind will result in a decline in entrepreneurship 
and SME development that have been described as vital tools in the creation of 
sustainable employment, wealth and enterprise ownership opportunities 
particularly for new entrants into the formal economy in a country such as South 
Africa with its history of socio-economic divisions and inequalities. 
 Summary 
Chapter 4 discussed opportunism as a central problem in franchised 
relationships ostensibly resulting from their hybrid nature that seem to yield 
misaligned incentives or conflicting financial interests between franchisors and 
franchisees (Williamson, 1975; 1985).  
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The chapter discussed the meaning, patterns, and strategies for managing 
opportunism as they applied within the context of franchised relationships.  
The chapter also presented the origin, meaning, and importance of the 
researcher’s OO construct, which apart from extending the opportunism construct, 
this thesis also describes OO as the foundation for OA that the franchising model 
under investigation posits to have a negative effect on the growth, competitiveness 
and survival of franchise systems.  
The next chapter discusses the development of the model for the empirical 
studies. 
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Chapter 5 Model development for 
empirical work 
 Introduction 
Chapter 4 discussed opportunism as the central problem in franchised 
relationships. Building on the previous chapter, this chapter presents the 
development of the theoretical model underlying the two fieldwork undertaken in 
this thesis which involved quantitative and qualitative methods. However, the 
empirical work among franchisors and franchisees share the same underlying model 
which examines the impact of OO and OA on franchising systems. 
To this end, this thesis involves examining the research questions among 
franchisors and franchisees using the same constructs but different measures and 
their sub-dimensions which the literature suggests mostly pertain to each 
respondent group, this chapter is divided into four sections.  
After this introductory section, section 5.2 focuses on the development of the 
study model among franchisors and section 5.3 on the development of the study 
model among franchisees. Section 5.4 integrates the two parts of the model to 
demonstrate the functioning of the franchise system as a single unit that comprises 
two interdependent components. Section 5.5 concludes the chapter. 
 Model development for studying franchisors 
The following sub-sections first describe and build the constructs to be studied 
in the quantitative part of the study of franchisors which, as discussed previously, 
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were developed from both the literature and informal interviews conducted prior to 
the main study with some franchising experts.  
The constructs, which comprise the model’s dependent, intervening and 
independent variables, also involve sub-dimensions discussed below in the light of 
literature. 
5.2.1 Dependent constructs in the franchising system 
The quantitative part of the study employed the following constructs as 
dependent variables in the model under investigation. 
A. Growth of the franchise systems  
Within franchising theory, system growth or expansion is often seen as a critical 
and desirable outcome especially for early stage operations. The following 
paragraphs discuss aspects of growth that formed the dimensions of the 
subsequently developed survey measurement instrument. 
i). New franchisees entering into the system.  
The resource scarcity explanation of franchising posits that franchisors use 
franchised outlets primarily as a means to achieving rapid expansion of their brand 
through the managerial skills, financial resources and the local market knowledge 
that franchisees bring to the franchising table (Castrogiovanni et. al, 2006).  
Expansion by way of new franchisees as proxy for growth is important to 
franchisors largely for efficiency reasons that arise mainly from the strength of the 
economies of scale that comes from the centralized purchasing power of the 
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franchise system that facilitates cheaper sourcing of ingredients, advertising, 
equipment, and so on (Oxenfeldt and Kelly, 1968; Castrogiovanni et al., 1993; 
Dandrige and Falbe, 1995; Kauffmann and Dant, 1996).  
ii). Renewal of franchise contracts by existing franchisees.  
The desire among existing franchisees to seek renewal of their expiring 
franchise contracts suggests their decision to remain within the franchise system 
(Muris, 1980; Hadfield, 1990). 
iii). Franchisees seeking multi-unit ownership opportunities.  
From the franchisor’s perspective, Kaufmann and Dant (1996) found that 
franchise systems that encouraged multi-unit ownership attained faster overall 
growth than those that did not.  
However, the decision to seek additional units within a franchise system is a 
function of the franchisee’s desire to extend his or her relationship with the 
franchisor which suggests that franchisors have an important role in determine 
whether franchisees will seek to acquire additional units. 
On the other hand, Grünhagen and Marko (2005) found that multi-unit 
ownership provided franchisees with opportunities to pursue entrepreneurial goals, 
that is, personal growth. 
iv). Conversion of independent stores into franchised outlets.  
Another growth path for franchise systems is the conversion of independent, 
stand-alone, businesses into franchised outlets, which owners of such outlets may 
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allow to gain competitive advantage from franchise branding (Hoffmann and Preble, 
2003).  
This is because of the benefits that franchisees enjoy such as centralised 
advertising, purchasing, training, use of the franchisor’s well-known trademarks, 
brand names, operating standards and business method that provide various forms 
of economies of scale to franchisees.  
In addition, these scholars found that franchisors target their brand advertising 
to independent retailers for reasons such as tapping into their entrepreneurial zeal 
and demonstrated experience that lowers the franchisor’s adverse selection problem.  
B. Competitiveness 
Franchise systems need to be competitive in order to attract new franchisees 
and to retain existing ones.  
For this reason, Porter (1985) reckons that firms should leverage their 
competitive advantage so as to outperform their rivals on three competitive 
strategies: cost leadership, product differentiation, and focus. 
i). Cost leadership via lower operating costs.  
Generally, it is believed that franchise systems strive to lower the operating 
costs for their chains through efficient sourcing and bulk purchasing of production 
raw materials and equipment and services such as advertising, accounting, 
information systems and training (Lillis et al, 1976; Porter, 1985; Pilling, 1991).  
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Such franchise systems are able to pass these benefits of economies of scale to 
their franchisees through lower franchise and royalty fees and cheaper production 
and operational costs to boosts the profitability and sustainability of their 
franchisees.  
ii). Differentiation through innovation and renewal.  
Porter’s second competitive strategy; that is, product differentiation, suggests 
the need for franchise systems to develop and sustain their unique features that 
distinguish them from their competitors which involves devoting considerable time 
and money on research and development and innovation strategies with the aim of 
introducing new products, designing attractive adverting campaigns and better store 
layouts, décor and so on.  
In order to generate a pool of ideas that would enable franchisors to come up 
with the necessary innovative and creative ideas to carry out these tasks, franchisors 
need to have a good communication system with his franchisees (Drucker, 1985; 
Kanter, 1985).  
Chiou, Hsieh and Young (2004) found that satisfaction with the franchisor’s 
communication strategy among franchisees reinforced their desire to remain within 
the franchise system which suggests that it was important for franchisors to be 
transparent and to have regular meetings and discussions with his franchisees on 
matters such as advertising, menu development, training budget and so on.  
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Kauffmann and Benjamin (2010) suggest that franchisors with good and open 
communication systems with their franchisees will establish a franchisee association 
and encourage their franchisees to join and participate actively in the matters of the 
association.  
Therefore, franchisors who are known to act or behave opportunistically 
towards their franchisees and do not have good communication with them may not 
be in a position to tap into the innovativeness and creativity of their experienced 
pool of franchisees who interact daily with the customers of the franchise system 
and watch competitors closely (Bradach, 1997).  
iii). Focus on core business.  
Porter (1985)’s third and last competitive strategy; that is, focus requires 
franchisors to devote their attention to the implementation of either their cost 
leadership or differentiation strategies or competencies or both the implementation 
of which will be compromised when franchisors elect to act or behave 
opportunistically towards their franchisees by encroaching on their territories or 
misallocating advertising fees to administration expenses.  
C. Survival 
Survival is an important construct in the study of franchised and non-franchised 
businesses in marketing and strategy research which can be seen from a number of 
studies which have focused on various aspects of the construct.  
For instance, Bates (1988; 1995) examined the survival patterns of small 
businesses the failure rate among the franchised businesses, respectively while 
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Shane (1996) examined the implications of hybrid organizations on firm growth and 
survival.  
Shane and Spell (1998) examined factors for new franchise success and Shane 
and Foo (1999) studied the survival of new franchisors suggest the impact of 
franchisee retention on the survival of franchise systems. 
Undoubtedly, the importance of the survival of a franchise system stems from 
the need for continuity to preserve the TSA’s of the franchisors and franchisees so as 
to ensure that these parties achieve a return on their investments. 
Therefore, the following discussion focuses on issues which may have a 
negative impact on the survival of franchise systems. 
i). Existing franchisees exiting the system.  
An important task challenge facing franchise systems is not only to attract 
suitable potential franchisees to grow their chains, but to minimise franchisee 
attrition to prevent the “revolving door” syndrome from happening as franchisees 
are the lifeblood of the franchise system (Elango and Fried, 1997).  
Morrison (1997) found that job satisfaction played an important role in ensuring 
that franchisees remained within the franchise system while Chiou et al., (2004) 
suggest that the existence of communications channels such as franchisee 
associations help promote franchisee retention. 
ii). Closing down of existing stores.  
Stanworth (1983) and Hoy (1994) state that the failure rate among franchisees is 
very hard to determine as most failing stores are taken over by franchisors before 
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they collapse so as to protect the reputation of the franchise system. However, store 
closures still occur mostly where there are disputes between franchisors and 
franchisees that may manifest in the non-renewal or premature termination of the 
franchise contract and the subsequent closure of the store.  
iii). Disruption of business activities.  
Conflict within the franchise relationship often results from various factors 
relating to the implementation of the franchise contract by the franchisor. This often 
leads to tensions and legal action that may take time to resolve. Frazer and Winzar 
(2005) found that conflict between franchisors and franchisees led to intermittent 
disruptions of business activities that resulted from constant disagreements and 
tensions between the parties over an array of issues.  
Dnes (1993) suggests that franchisors face disruption costs when franchisees 
leave the franchise system such as lost royalties, relocation, training and promotional 
costs which prompt franchisors take various steps such as requiring franchisees to 
find replacements within a short time after announcing their decision to exit, 
reserving the right to withhold transfer of the outlet to a third party and taking a 
right of first refusal.  
For these reasons, Ozanne and Hunt (1971) suggest that these measures make it 
possible for franchisors to act opportunistically by withholding approval of a 
potential purchaser in order to force a new franchise contract.  
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On the other hand, Muris (1980) opines that disruptions are symptomatic of the 
so-called “last period” scenario which is typically the period preceding the lapse of a 
franchise contract which can be tumultuous following a difficult relationship 
between the parties can damage the reputation of the franchise system.  
iv). Buying back of profitable stores by franchisors. 
There is a noticeable trend among certain franchise systems involving the taking 
back of franchised stores by franchisors which often leads to speculation as to the 
reason for this action. 
Hunt (1977) states that this trend was quite rife in the late 1970 that led to 
Oxenfeldt and Kelly’s (1969) prediction franchisors will buy back successful outlets 
in a strategic move which within the context of this study can be described as being 
opportunistic in the same manner. 
Muris (1980) suggests that the buying back of stores by franchisors can be seen 
as disciplinary measures taken against difficult or recalcitrant franchisees.  
v). Depletion of resources and goodwill through litigation.  
Litigation often results from the failure of the franchise system to resolve a 
dispute internally (Williamson, 1983) which may be part of the franchisor’s strategy 
for resolving disputes through the exclusion of an arbitration clause from the 
franchise contract which may force the parties to settle their disputes by means of 
protracted court action that favour the franchisors because of costly legal fees and 
wasted time and effort that franchisees cannot sustain.  
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Thus, it would appear that some franchisors may avoid arbitration which as 
Drahozal and Hylton (2003) argue, is more reconciliatory than litigation and aims at 
the restoration of the franchise relationship which the franchisor may be unwilling to 
do with a franchisee it may consider to be defiant or bellicose. 
Having defined the constructs that allude to the dependent variables in the 
study, the next section describes intermediate opportunism constructs that signify 
acts which may harm the growth, competitiveness and survival of franchise system. 
5.2.2 Intermediary opportunism constructs 
In Chapter 3, opportunism was defined as the pursuit of self-interest with guile 
(Williamson, 1979; 1985). As explained in that chapter, for analytical and 
philosophical reasons this study sub-divides opportunism into opportunistic 
orientations and opportunistic actions and their sub-dimensions, with the first being 
predicted to be positively associated to the second and the sub-dimensions. 
A. Opportunistic orientations 
Hadfield (1990) lists a detailed number of behaviours, practices, or acts of 
franchisors, which tend to result from OO among some franchisors in terms of the 
“cocked gun” conceptualisation suggested in this study.  
As stated in Chapter 1, most of these acts or behaviours have found expression 
as explicit terms in most franchise contracts found to be problematic especially by 
Udel (1972) in a comprehensive study of franchise contracts in the United States.  
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These clauses form the basis of the concepts, practices, or constructs used as 
proxies to measure OO among franchisors in this study where their preponderance 
indicates high levels of OO among the franchise system concerned. 
i). Resale Price Maintenance.  
As some 28% of franchisors surveyed by Udel (1972) controlled the prices that 
franchisees must charge for goods sold at their outlets which allows franchisors tend 
to build their profit margins into the prices they set in terms of the so-called Resale 
Price Maintenance (RPM), there are complaints that some franchisees are unable to 
make a profit from their businesses because franchisors RPM set at a level that may 
comprise the profitability and competitiveness of franchised outlets.  
These critics point out that the RPM is unilaterally determined by the 
franchisors and often does not take into account differences in economic conditions 
and cost structures of the different areas, regions and even countries in which the 
franchised stores may be located.  
This is largely because the outlets of most franchise systems spread over a wide 
geographic area, with some even transcending country and continental borders with 
the result that some cultural, economic, and legal/political issues may have a direct 
bearing on the RPM which may potentially create or widen differences in the 
overhead costs of all affected franchisees that cannot be easily standardised in line 
with the RPM.  
The net effect of this practice is that as the RPM favours company stores on 
which franchisors model the RPM. These stores are located close to the franchisor’s 
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head-office with the result that franchised outlets in effect subsidise company stores. 
Most importantly, Udel’s finding that only 0.6% or franchisors gave guarantees that 
sales will reach a certain level at the resale prices further illustrates the problem with 
RPM.  
ii). Tying agreements.  
The so-called “tying agreements,” as they commonly referred to in the 
franchising literature, are the most serious legal problem in franchising as they allow 
franchisors to restrict franchisees from sourcing supplies or purchases from third 
parties other than those they designate (Hunt and Nevin, 1975).  
For example, Udel (1972) found that 50 % of franchise contracts require 
franchisees to source operating supplies and from franchisor-approved vendors and 
54.2% require purchases or leases of signs from the franchisor itself. 
Hunt and Nevin (1975) point out that the seriousness of this problem has led to 
the intervention of trade association, federal and state legislatures and the Federal 
Trade Commission in the United States. In this country, the Competition Act of 1998 
and the newly enacted CPA also targets this problem among others.  
Most franchisors justify the necessity of tying agreements on benefits of bulk 
buying and the need to ensure quality control, critics maintain that franchisors 
charge prices that are far above those of the competitive market for supplies that 
franchisees are required to buy from these suppliers. 
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Therefore, critics of the RPM policy aver that tying agreements are 
uncompetitive as they deny franchisees the opportunity to source supplies at the 
lowest prices and on the best available terms on the open market. Tying agreements 
appear to allow the franchisor to interfere with the normal operation of the market 
place (Hunt and Nevin, 1975).  
In addition, Udel (1972) found evidence of kickbacks that franchisors received 
from suppliers from whom franchisees are required to purchase certain supplies and 
that franchisees that were required to purchase a significant proportion of their 
supplies from franchisors were less satisfied with the franchise relationship and their 
businesses were less profitable than those who purchase a small portion of their 
supplies from franchisors.  
iii). Non - exclusive territories.  
Up to 59.3% of franchise contracts examined by Udel (1972) provide for 
exclusive territories within which a particular franchisee may trade without the 
franchisors establishing a rival outlet to protect a franchisee against a practice known 
as “territorial encroachment” (du Toit, 2003; Kalnins, 2004) which amounts to unfair 
competition from within the franchise system.  
However, some franchisors try to by-pass this principle by establishing other 
brands or distribution methods in the same territory as an existing franchisee 
(Hadfield, 1990) which can have a negative effect on the sales and profitability of the 
affected franchisee that are not felt by the franchisor whose income remains constant 
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or increases as a result of the introduction of the new outlet from that it also earns 
royalties and other fees.  
Azoulay and Shane (2001) found that franchisors who grant exclusive territories 
to their franchisees ensure the survival of their franchise systems as franchisees that 
enjoy exclusive territories are able to maximize their return on the investment they 
made into acquiring local knowledge of the market and developing goodwill in the 
area in that their businesses are situated.  
Udel found that only 6% of franchise contracts protected franchisees against 
territorial encroachment which suggests that most franchisors want to establish 
more outlets in territories belonging to existing franchisees to increase their revenue 
at the expense of the profitability of these franchisees without giving them the right 
of first refusal (Kalnins, 2004).  
iv). Short term fixed contracts.  
Most franchise contracts run for an initial 10-year period with an option to 
renew for a further 10-year period against payment of a new franchise fee (Udel, 
1972) which tends to be attractive to most franchisees (Brickley, 2006).  
Similarly, in an experimental exercise Shane and Spell (1998) also found that 
along with other factors such as a strong brand name, lengthy franchising 
experience, capital requirements and so on franchise contracts that have a 7-year 
lifespan served as a criterion for running a successful franchise business.  
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According to Shane and Spell, a longer-term contract therefore signals quality of 
the franchise system to potential franchisees; that the franchisor is not a “fly-by-
night” or “get-rich-quick” scheme, and that the franchisor appreciates the need to 
build or grow a business in a particular area over a longer period. 
B. Opportunistic actions 
This study proposes that opportunistic orientations lead franchisors into 
committing various opportunistic action. 
i). Buying back of profitable outlets.  
One of the most contentious matters found in most franchise contracts is the so-
called buy back clause that allows the franchisor the right of to acquire an existing 
profitable franchised outlet.  
Apparently, this clause owes its origin to Oxenfeldt and Kelly’s (1969) 
hypothesis predicted that franchisors would ultimately own all successful outlets 
once they have overcome their initial resource scarcity issues.  
According to Burr et al., (1975), the buy-back clause allows the franchisor to 
purchase a targeted outlet at rock-bottom prices which may aggrieve the affected 
franchisees.  
Though Udel (1972) did not directly include this item in his study, it appears 
that the franchisor’s right of first refusal, which arises from a franchisee’s decision to 
sell his franchised outlet in respect of which Udel found that 32.4% of franchise 
contracts had the buy-back clause, serves as a proxy for the buy-back clause.  
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In addition, Udel also found that 26.2% of franchise contracts require 
franchisees to exclude any goodwill from the sale price of an outlet which, together 
with clause allocating outlet goodwill to the franchisor, seem aimed at facilitating 
buy back of profitable outlets at rock bottom prices.  
On the other hand, Dnes (1993) suggests that it is common for franchisors to 
buy out any franchisee they may consider “unsuitable” to operate an outlet where 
the definition of “unsuitable” is often unclear, but speculation suggests this to be the 
result of franchisor opportunism. 
ii). Restricted resale or transfer of franchised outlets.  
Closely related to the “ominous” buy-back clause is the restricted resale or 
transfer clause that Udel found to exist in 32.4% of franchise contracts in terms of 
that the franchisor has first right of refusal in the event of a franchisee deciding to 
sell its outlet which requires the franchisee intending to sell his business to inform 
the franchisor first of its intentions, and to give the franchisor the opportunity to 
decide whether it wishes to take over the business.  
Once again, this clause places the franchisor in a seemingly unfair 
advantageous position where it can circumvent the normal operations of the market 
by offering the lowest price that the franchisee may be compelled to accept.  
The rationale for this practice appears to be the principle that the goodwill of 
the business resides in the franchisor as the registered owner of the trademarks and 
brand names.  
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Similarly, this clause also restricts the franchisee from transferring the outlet to 
anyone including an heir without the approval of the franchisors under a number of 
conditions which may render any such contemplated transfer well - nigh impossible.  
This may leave the franchisees with a financial dilemma as it cannot sell the 
business freely in an open market if at all and this translates into financial losses 
often accompanied by a restraint of trade imposed on the franchisee.  
iii). Termination of franchise contracts “at will.”  
The termination at will clause refers to a clause in most franchise contract that 
allows franchisors to terminate the contract “willy-nilly” or without “principles” 
(Dnes, 2003), a right which franchisees do not enjoy under the contract.  
The termination clause exists in 98.4% of franchise contracts, and in almost all 
cases is only available to franchisors (Udel, 1972), and has become a common feature 
amongst nearly all franchise disputes with its devastative financial consequences for 
franchisees, suppliers, lenders, customers and employees following the disruption or 
closure of an existing outlet.  
This is yet another thorny issue some franchisees cite to illustrate the bias of 
franchise contracts against them because as stated above, most franchise contracts 
make no provision for them to cancel the contract in the event of violation of the 
contract by the franchisor.  
Most franchise litigations are about terminations of franchise contracts by 
franchisors where franchisees allege unlawfulness (Emerson, 1998). This usually 
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follows the failure on the part of the franchisor to meet the good cause, good faith, 
fair dealing, conscionability or reasonable expectations test. 
iv). Imposition of the restraint of trade on franchisees. 
Udel (1972) found that franchise contracts he examined contain a restraint of 
trade clause that debars a franchisee from becoming involved in the same sector 
(56.4%) for a period up to two years and within a stated geographical area (48%) 
after the termination or expiry of the contract.  
Generally, franchisors believe that this clause protects their businesses against 
unfair competition from their ex-franchisees who may use to their disadvantage 
knowledge or information such as trade secrets and client or supplier databases may 
have gained during the existence of the franchise relationship (Frazer, Merrilees, and 
Wright, 2007).  
On the other hand, terminated franchisees may argue against the restraint of 
trade as being unconstitutional, unfair, and anticompetitive business practices. 
Because of the so-called “double tragedy” used in legal parlance, the argument de-
franchised franchisees strengthens the view that the termination could have led to 
their economic deprivation and impoverishment. 
Similarly, the imposition of the restraint of trade took away their constitutional 
right to earn a living for themselves and their families. This is because of the 
restraint of trade prevents franchisees from realising the fruit of their idiosyncratic 
investments that is, the applying their skills, experience and knowledge they may 
have gained by operating a franchise outlet in the past.  
164 
In addition, ex-franchisees can also point out that unlike in other relationships 
such as the employer-employee relationship, they receive no financial compensation 
in respect of the restraint of trade in the event of the termination or cancellation of 
the franchise contract.  
Furthermore, a restraint of trade may infringe on the ex-franchisee’s right to 
practice a trade or profession of his choice that is a right enshrined in the 
Constitution; and may offend the Competition Act.  
Having defined the constructs to do with opportunism, the next section 
describes independent constructs that may act to encourage or inhibit opportunism. 
5.2.3 Independent variable constructs 
The study proposes three sets of independent variable constructs which may 
promote or hinder opportunism among franchisors. 
A. Structural factors as antecedents of opportunism 
Several factors linked to the structure or nature of the franchise relationship 
seem to create opportunism among franchisors to behave in an opportunistic 
manner towards each other. These include: 
i). Transaction specific assets (TSA’s).  
TCE theory regards TSA’s as assets invested in the business that are difficult to 
redeploy or switch over to another venture without incurring a huge cost 
(Williamson, 1983). For franchisors, TSA’s include investments such as the business 
method, trademarks, and brand names, operating standards and procedures used in 
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the franchise system, which serve the proverbial “hen that lays the golden egg. 
TSA’s invested by franchisees into the franchise system include money, effort and 
time invested in acquiring and running the franchise business.  
According to TCE theorists, the TSA’s need to be safeguarded against the 
opportunism of the weaker party in the exchange namely, franchisees (Williamson, 
1985) or shirking (Shane, 1988) that allegedly increases the transactions costs of 
operating the franchise system.  
These theorists posit the need to bring opportunism and shirking under control 
before it spreads among all franchisees to avoid causing systemic damage to the 
entire franchise system due to contract violations. 
However, despite evidence of increasing levels of complaints and litigation 
initiated by franchisees against their franchisors, the franchising literature is not so 
vociferous about allegations of opportunism on the stronger party in franchise 
relationship that is contained in most franchise contracts (Hawkins et al., 2009).  
Therefore, it appears that in line with TCE theorists, franchisors use franchise 
contracts to safeguard the TSA’s against franchisee opportunism; issues of franchisor 
opportunism escape scrutiny in a manner that seemingly reinforces the suspicions 
levelled against franchisors.  
ii). Posting of “hostages” or bonds.  
One of the hallmarks of franchise relationships is the use of franchise contracts 
as the basis of the relationship between franchisors and franchisees which prescribe 
the “credible commitments” or “hostage-posting (by the giver, that is, franchisees) 
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and hostage taking” (by the receiver, that is, franchisors) that both transacting 
parties make towards one another in respect of guaranteeing the required level of 
performance (Williamson, 1983; Klein, 1995; and Dnes, 2003). 
Hostages differ from idiosyncratic investments or specific assets in that unlike 
sunk costs, they represent future-based incentives such as future royalty or revenue 
stream, and the lower operating cost advantage that franchised outlets provide 
(Williamson, 1983; Klein, 1995). 
In addition, hostages have the effect of inducing franchisors to remain 
committed to the franchise system as they are specific to the franchise relationship 
and as such are of little value elsewhere with the result that they have a bonding 
effect on both the investing and receiving transactors.  
On the one hand specific assets are TCE’s primary answer to opportunism in 
terms of their bonding effect, the TCE theory also recognizes the potential and 
propensity of specific assets to give rise to opportunism by way of hostage 
expropriation.  
As an illustration, a franchisee who has invested in lifetime savings in making 
building improvements on property leased to him by the franchisor runs the risk of 
losing this investment when the franchisor terminates the franchise to run the outlet 
himself or sell it to someone else (Klein, 1980; Dnes, 1993). This is the huge risk that 
posting “hostages” presents to the hostage giver as they are vulnerable to 
expropriation or hold-up through the opportunistic acts of the receiving transactors; 
that is, franchisors.  
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iii). Incomplete contracts.  
Under classical contract law, Macneil (1973) opines that the franchise contract 
should deal fully with all future contingencies that might arise between franchisors 
and franchisees that include opportunism in that they bring about a higher degree of 
certainty, discreetness and presentiation (that is, to cause the future to be observed 
now) to the franchise relationship as they represent a “sharp in by clear agreement 
and sharp out by clear performance” arrangement in terms of which the letter of the 
franchise contract provides clear and unambiguous relief.  
But according to Williamson (1985), Klein (1980, 1995) and Dnes (1993) and 
Hadfield (1990), this is not possible as the franchise relationship is characterised by a 
great deal of uncertainty and complexity occasioned mostly by market forces such as 
changing consumer, legislative or competitive demands that invariably lead to 
incomplete contracting.  
Thus, under incomplete contracting, it is not possible to spell out every detail of 
expected performance in the franchise contract. Williamson (1985) suggests that it 
would be very costly to do so ex ante, such as when a franchisee needs to revamp a 
store or the frequency, media and budget of advertising the franchisor needs to 
embark upon.  
As expressed in TCE terms, the transactions costs involved in drafting a 
complete contract would be prohibitively expensive because of the complexity of 
market conditions worsens as gaps arising from incomplete contracting may create 
room for franchisors to act or behave opportunistically against their franchisees in 
168 
terms of the so-called “hold up” process, which represents the taking advantage of 
unenforceable provisions of the contract. 
iv). Information asymmetry.  
Gordon and Storholm (1994) found that the nature of some clauses in most 
franchise contracts mostly drawn up by franchisors often lead to opportunistic 
behaviour among franchisors because of some restrictive and unfair demands that 
such contracts tend to make upon franchisees. 
According to Hunt (1972), franchisors do not negotiate franchise contracts with 
franchisees, but are “sold like an insurance policy on a take it or leave it basis” (p74). 
Clarkin and Rosa (2005) make similar remarks by observing that franchise contracts 
“are crafted by the franchisor and contain both prescriptive and restrictive 
provisions and leave little or no room for entrepreneurial creativity by franchisees” 
p8).  
Similarly, Rubin (1978) emphasises this point when he describes franchise 
contracts as containing unilateral specifications of standard operating procedures, 
incentive systems, monitoring mechanisms, and termination clauses.  
It appears that in most cases the franchise contract is a standard document; that 
is, a “one size fits all” that every new franchisee signs “chapter and verse” (Burr et. 
al, 1975); Hadfield, (1990) which indicates that very little room exists for exchange of 
information through deliberations, negotiations, and bargaining around the matter.  
On the other hand, Baucus and Baucus (1998) who found that communication 
between franchisors and franchisees mediated opportunism. Withane and Heide 
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(2001) suggest that information asymmetry between franchisors and franchisees 
often produce OO.  
v). Bargaining power.  
By virtue of their market power as owners and developers of franchise systems, 
Hunt (1977) observes that franchisors have built the “capricious” termination “at 
will” clause built into their franchise contracts allowing them to cancel their 
agreement with franchisees virtually at their whims.  
The justification for the existence of the “at will” termination clause depends on 
the need to protect the idiosyncratic specific investments of the franchisor; that is, 
brand name and trademarks, business method and operating procedures and so on.  
Similarly, the literature suggests the need for franchisors to protect the TSA of 
their well-behaving franchisees; that is, sunk costs invested in equipment, buildings 
and training against the opportunism of opportunistic franchisees.  
TCE theorists (Williamson, 1979; Klein, 1980, 1987; Dnes, 2003) regard 
idiosyncratic investments as physical, financial and human resources invested in 
specific relationships outside of which they have zero salvageable value which gives 
franchisors disproportionately enormous bargaining power over franchisees on the 
exercise of its right franchisors to terminate the relationship at will.  
Given the theoretical explanation of the human tendencies to act 
opportunistically whenever the occasion arises and the rewards provides as 
explained by Williamson (1985), it is not hard to see the ever-present threat and 
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danger that franchisees face that may result in them losing their hard-earned 
livelihoods and lifelong savings and investments at the whims of the franchisors.  
vi). Dependence.  
Dependency arises when one firm exercises control over the strategic activities 
of another (Emerson, 1962) in terms of which franchising provides a classic case of 
dependence because the franchisee owns the business while the franchisor controls 
the outlet by virtue of its ownership of its intellectual capital; that is, trademarks, 
brand names and the business method.  
This is in respect of all key aspects of the business such the design of the 
premises, décor and ambiance, product menu, staff uniforms, sources of supplies 
and so on which render franchisees dependent on franchisors in terms of the control 
franchisors exercise on franchised outlets through franchise contracts and the 
operations manual.  
B. Contextual factors as antecedents of opportunism 
Apart from the structural factors discussed in the preceding section, a number 
of contextual factors which relate to the legislative or regulatory environment within 
which the franchising takes place also seem to create opportunism franchisors.  
i). Lack of regulation of the franchising industry. 
In most countries including South Africa, the franchising industry is self-
regulating with the result that franchisors and franchisees relate to one another 
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because of the franchise contract they enter into at the commencement of their 
relationship.  
In nearly all cases, as franchisors write the franchise contract, there is an 
asymmetrical distribution of power in favour of franchisors (Storholm and Scheuing, 
1994) which invariably enables them to act or behave in opportunistic manner 
particularly when it comes to termination or non-renewal of the franchise 
relationship.  
ii). Lack of legislation.  
The absence of franchising-specific legislation to control franchising in this and 
other countries has left franchisees at the mercy of their powerful franchisors whose 
malpractices may begin prior to the actual commencement of the franchise 
relationship through the sale of the franchises to potential franchisees based on 
deceptive information or after the signing of the franchise contracts that often 
contain restrictive clauses (Hunt, 1972). 
iii). Competitive pressures. 
In the “Franchising and the ominous buy-back,” Burr et al. (1975) capture the 
essence of some franchisors’ propensity to compete with their franchisees for 
lucrative sites in terms of their strategy to buy back successful or promising outlets.  
In addition, the life cycle hypothesis mooted by Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1969) 
suggest that franchisors would buy back all franchised stores once they are in a 
strong financial position to do so.  
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Despite lack of widespread support for this hypothesis, major franchisors such 
as McDonalds and KFC in the 1970’s embarked upon aggressive drives to invoke the 
buy-buy clause in the franchise contracts and attempts by others to embark on 
underhand strategies aimed at capturing back successful stores from their 
franchisees caused a great of consternation among franchisees (Burr et al. (1975).  
However, this practice mutated over the years and has manifested in various 
forms where for example a successful film distribution franchisee who bought the 
franchise at an early stage in the development of the franchise only to face the 
competitive wrath of the franchisor whose own company-owned stores were not as 
successful (Hadfield, 1990).  
The franchisor in question started setting up competing outlets close to the 
successful franchisees outlet, and reneged on supplying contractually agreed 
services which reduced the sales of existing outlet in half so that the franchisor could 
buy back the outlets at a reduced price.  
Interestingly, most franchise contracts grant the franchisor the right of first 
refusal whenever a franchisee decides to dispose of his outlet which .incentivises 
franchisors to exert unwarranted pressure on a successful franchisee to drive him 
out of the system so that he could take the store back and operate it himself or sell it 
to someone else at a premium (Hadfield, 1990).  
C. Strategic factors as antecedents of opportunism 
In addition to structural and contextual factors, strategic factors arise from the 
help that franchisors usually provide to their franchisees also seem to lead to OO 
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within franchise systems and include the provision of financial or contractual 
assistance to franchisees as they tend to grant franchisors strategic control of 
franchise relationship. 
i). Joint ventures.  
It is common for franchisors to offer joint venture opportunities or other similar 
arrangements to potential franchisees to establish outlets in some areas, region, or 
countries and between franchisors and some of their soon-to-be-ex-employees or 
store managers who after serving the franchisor in one capacity or another, may seek 
to broaden their horizon by becoming franchisees (Mendelsohn, 2004).  
In some cases, the arrangement is between the franchisor and a sub-franchisor 
in a master franchising arrangement that gives the sub-franchisor the right to 
appoint and control franchised outlets in a foreign country into which the global 
franchisor may be expanding its operations (Justis and Judd, 1989). 
In both cases, the parties enter into an ordinary franchise contract that confers 
rights to them in the usual fashion and where such aspirant franchisees may lack the 
financial ability to acquire the franchise in their own right, some franchisors offer to 
pay for the establishment of the outlet on the understanding that the new franchised 
business will reimburse them their capital outlay plus interest and dividends until 
the full repayment of the loan (Dnes, 1993).  
Often the parties enter into a loan agreement in terms of which failure by the 
franchised business to meet its financial obligations towards the franchisor results in 
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conversion of the loan capital into share capital. In addition, the franchisee ceases to 
be a part owner of the business and its franchise contract falls away. 
In this situation, the franchisor-franchisee relationship carries the burdens of the 
business on his own and does not have the opportunity to bring in an outside 
partner or help. On the other hand, the franchisor enjoys the benefits but not the 
burdens of the business. In the event of a dispute between the parties, the franchisor 
can terminate the franchise contract between itself and the other party and either 
take over control of the business or sell the business at a profit to a new franchisee.  
ii). Financial assistance.  
As in the case of joint ventures, in a quest to establish outlets in certain areas or 
regions of the country where funding may be a problem to certain potential 
franchisees, franchisors have a propensity to provide financial assistance to such 
franchisees through arranging loans for their franchisees with their own bankers 
(Stern and Stanworth, 1993; Clarklin, 2002). 
In a study using the signalling theory, Shane et al (2006) found that franchisors 
applied strategic decisions such as financing their franchisees in order to attract 
franchisees and to increase system size where the new franchisee signs a loan 
agreement in addition to the franchise contract in terms of which the franchisee 
agrees to surrender the business to the franchisor should the business fail to meet its 
financial obligations to the franchisor.  
Despite funding an outlet, the franchisor does not become a shareholder in the 
business and is therefore not entitled to a share of the profits but both the loan 
175 
agreement and franchise contract allows the franchisor to take over the business in 
the event of a default on the loan repayments as the franchisee may be debarred to 
selling the business to a third party.  
iii). Lease control.  
Franchisors often insist on signing the main lease with property owners and 
then enter into a separate sub-lease agreement with franchisees (Klein, 1980, 1990; 
Dnes, 1993) where the site in question may be a prime siting on which the franchisor 
may wish to exercise control even after a particular franchisee’s contract has expired.  
According to Dnes, in other cases property owners particularly of main street 
shopping centres demand that the franchisor should sign the main lease in the hope 
that the franchisor will not default on rentals given his better financial position and 
greater reputational risk.  
In such cases, a default on the rentals or any explicit contract violation by the 
franchisee allows the franchisor to abscond with the hostage, that is, evict the 
franchisee, and terminate both the franchise and lease contracts.  
In addition, Dnes observes that control of the lease gives the franchisor an 
additional source of revenue by levying an administrative charge to the property 
rent.  
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iv). Poor social relations.  
Sociologists such as Ouchi (1980) and Granovetter (1985) criticised the TCE 
conceptualisation of the relationship between franchisors and franchisees as being 
“under-socialised.”  
These scholars argued for the recognition of the embeddedness of the franchise 
relationship in social norms and values which gave rise to the notion of relational 
contracting that is based on the principles of RET that was supported by legal 
scholars such as Macaulay (1963) and Macneil (1974) who raised the need for 
interpreting contracts in an implicit manner.  
In the main the principles of RET postulated that when interpreting contracts, 
emphasis should be given no so much to the explicit terms, but to the understanding 
that the parties sought to achieve.  
Chapter 4 discussed Macneil (1980)’s list of norms used for managing 
opportunism in exchange relationships, namely the norms of solidarity, mutuality, 
flexibility, and information exchange. 
The next section discusses the development of the hypotheses. 
5.2.4 Hypotheses in model 
Based on the discussion on the quantitative study measures and constructs in 
the preceding sub-sections, this sub-section presents the hypotheses that examine the 
linkages between its dependent, intermediate and dependent variables in the 
franchising model under investigation.  
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A. Links between opportunistic actions and dependent variables 
Based on franchising and signalling theories, the first set of three hypotheses 
discussed in this sub-section suggest that opportunistic actions among franchisors 
will harm the important outcome or dependent variables in the franchise system, 
namely, the growth, competitiveness and survival of franchise systems.  
i). Opportunism and growth. 
Franchising theory discussed in the Chapter 3 and 4 suggest that opportunistic 
actions among franchisors may have negative associations with growth (Oxenfeldt 
and Kelly, 1969; Castogiovanni et el., 1993 and Shane, 1996).  
Sub-section 5.1.2 above discussed the forms and nature of opportunistic actions 
that franchisors may embark upon which include the imposition of restrictions on 
the sale of franchise businesses, the termination of franchise contracts at will and the 
buying back of franchised outlets on their own terms (Muris, 1980; Hadfield, 1990).  
On the other hand, opportunism theory as fully discussed in 0 also suggests 
that franchise systems that are characterised by higher levels of opportunistic actions 
or behaviours will experience a decline in franchising (Muris, 1980, Hadfield, 1990).  
Opportunism theory suggests that opportunism by franchisors may harm the 
growth of franchise systems through damaging its reputation which may make it 
difficult for them to attract new franchisees as existing franchisees are unlikely to 
encourage potential franchisees to buy into the business (Hadfield, 1990; Dnes, 1993).  
In addition, existing franchisees are unlikely to seek or accept opportunities to 
acquire additional units or renew their franchise contracts within franchise systems 
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(Kauffman and Dant, 1996). Similarly, independent retailers will avoid converting 
their business into franchises (Hoffman and Prebble, 1993). Therefore: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Opportunistic actions are negatively associated with the 
growth of franchise systems. 
 
There is one conceptual issue with the opportunism-growth association. It may 
be possible that non recursively exists, i.e. that instead of opportunism affecting 
growth that growth – or the lack thereof, i.e. decline – may affect the franchisor’s 
tendency towards opportunism. This possibility is discussed in the methodology 
and results sections.  
The next section discusses the possibly impact of opportunistic actions on the 
competitiveness of franchise systems. 
ii). Opportunism and competitiveness.  
Section 5.1.1 discussed the possible negative associations between opportunism 
and the competitiveness of franchise systems through imposing resale restrictions of 
franchisees, terminate franchise contracts for minor infringements and without due 
process and buy back profitable outlets from their franchisees are likely to be less 
competitive in the market place.  
As opportunism theory suggests, opportunism begets opportunism (Brown 
(2000) which entails that opportunistic franchisors may inculcate a culture of 
opportunistic behaviour within their franchise systems with the result that 
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franchisees may act opportunistically themselves in retaliation to opportunistic 
behaviour which franchisor may mete out to them.  
Within Porter (1985) competitiveness strategy framework which is based on cost 
leadership, differentiation and focus, opportunism may lead to increases in 
operating and marketing costs because of the need for franchisors to invest 
considerable sums of money and time monitoring the activities of their franchisees 
and marketing their businesses to doubtful aspirant franchisees.  
Such franchise systems may also lose focus on their core business by devoting 
inordinate time and resources on monitoring their franchisees instead of 
concentrating on brand development and promotion, pricing strategies and human 
resource development.  
In addition, franchisees within opportunistic franchise systems may be 
unwilling to contribute ideas and suggestions which franchisors need to innovate 
and improve their businesses (Minkler, 1990). Therefore: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Opportunistic actions are negatively associated with 
competitiveness of franchise systems. 
 
The next section discusses the relationship between opportunism and the 
survival of franchise systems. 
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iii). Opportunism and the survival of franchise systems.  
Using signalling theory, a number of scholars (e.g. Castrogiovanni et. al 1993; 
Hoy, 1994, Michael and Combs, 2008) have devoted their attention to the survival of 
franchise systems which suggest that for their survival, franchise systems need to 
avoid engaging in opportunistic actions such as the unnecessary termination of 
franchise contracts as these could signal lack of secure tenure which may lead to the 
departure of existing franchisees and failure to attract new ones, store closures, 
disruptions and buy backs and expensive and unnecessary litigation.  
According to Muris (1980), such events may attract negative publicity and 
reputational damage for the franchise system which may discourage aspirant 
franchisees, investors and lenders from entering or remaining within the franchise 
system. 
Other unintended effects of opportunistic franchisors could be expensive and 
time-consuming litigation and political and legislative interventions which may 
discourage potential local and foreign franchisors from entering the sector. 
Therefore:  
 
Hypothesis 3: Opportunistic actions are negatively associated with the 
survival of franchise systems. 
 
The next section discusses hypothetical links to be modelled between 
opportunistic orientations and opportunistic actions. 
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B. Links between the intermediary variables (Hypothesis 4) 
The second set of hypothesised linkages suggest that opportunistic orientations 
will be positively associated with opportunistic actions among franchisors. 
i). Opportunistic orientations and opportunistic actions.  
As discussed in sub-section 5.1.2 above, this linkage proposes that opportunistic 
orientations may lead to opportunistic actions which may be premised on various 
behavioural theories such as the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1985), which 
proposes that behavioural intentions usually precede actions.  
Opportunistic orientations as defined here suggests positioning by franchisors 
in a manner that enables or allows them to act opportunistically in the future 
presumably by designing franchise systems with that goal in mind. 
Hence, the concept of opportunistic orientations which posits some franchisors 
are likely to behave in an opportunistic fashion at some point in time through having 
signed the head lease for a franchised outlet which can make it possible for the 
franchisors to buy back the outlet if it proves to be lucrative in future (as 
Woolworths group did in this country and Nigeria recently). 
Should the franchisor decide to buy back the franchised outlet, it could 
terminate or refuse to renew the outlet’s franchise contract or refuse to process the 
sale or transfer of the franchised outlet in question.  
As stated above, most franchise contracts grant franchisors the right to purchase 
the outlets or equipment from departing franchisees at prices unilaterally 
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determined by the franchisor’s auditor for own use at company stores or resale to 
new franchisees at inflated prices (Udell, 1972). Therefore: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Opportunistic orientations are positively related to 
opportunistic actions among franchisors. 
 
The last part of this section focuses on the hypothesised linkages between 
independent variables and opportunistic orientations. 
C. Links between the independent variables and opportunistic 
orientations 
What may cause opportunistic orientations among franchisors? As discussed in 
sub-section 5.2.3 above, this thesis proposes structural, contextual and strategic 
aspects of franchising systems that may act as antecedents of opportunism which 
form the basis of the last set of three hypotheses positing the linkages between the 
independent variables and opportunistic orientations among franchisors. 
i). Structural factors and opportunistic orientations.  
As stated in sub-section 5.1.3 above, in line with TCE theory (Williamson, 1979), 
structural factors including aspects such as the transactions specific assets, that is, 
the equipment, future profits of the franchised outlet and market discovery into 
which franchisees invest their money and time when they buy franchises will give 
rise to opportunistic orientations among franchisors in the sense that franchisors 
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know that they can acquire these resources from franchisees at a fraction of the 
original cost at some future date.  
This principle encapsulates the metaphorical “cocked gun” which represents 
the danger that awaits franchisees at some point in time where for example the 
franchise contracts which franchisors draft and design to serve as the basis of the 
franchise relationship with their franchisees, allows franchisors to impoverish or 
dispossess the franchisee off their assets through expropriation for the benefit of the 
franchisor at some time in future. Therefore: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Structural factors will be positively related to opportunistic 
orientations among franchisors. 
 
The next sub-section consider the relationship between opportunistic 
orientations and contextual factors. 
ii). Contextual factors and opportunistic orientations.  
Sub-section 5.1.3 described the contextual or market factors which have a 
bearing on the conduct of the franchise relationship which include the lack of 
legislation and lack of regulation (Brickley et., al, 1991; Beales and Muris, 1995; 
Shane and Foo, 1999), and competitive pressures (Williamson, 1979) which afflicts 
the franchising industry.  
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According to these TCE scholars, the lack of franchise-specific legislation and 
regulations make it difficult for franchisors, franchisees and other role players to 
resolve disputes between them.  
Franchising theory suggests that the complex ownership and control structure 
of the franchised outlets in terms of which the franchisor owns the trade-marks, 
brand-names and business method used in the outlet which the franchisee owns 
(Dnes, 1993; Dant and Gundlach, 1999).  
Accordingly, the franchisor may seek to protect its commercial interests by 
imposing a plethora of operational standards and procedures which may be at odds 
with the commercial interests of the franchisee.  
Therefore, the absence of legislation and regulations may give rise to 
opportunistic orientations among franchisors by granting them financial and 
commercial advantages over their franchisees through writing one-sided franchise 
contracts (Hunt, 1972, Muris, 1980 and Hadfield, 1990). 
According to these scholars, such contracts granted franchisors the power to 
offer restricted trading territories, no arbitration to franchisees and forced them to 
purchases of supplies from authorised suppliers and allowed franchisors to buy 
back or terminate non-performing franchised outlets at drastically reduced prices 
and to add new outlets close to the territories of existing franchisees increase the 
profit of franchisors at the expense of their franchisees. Therefore: 
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Hypothesis 6: Contextual factors will be positively related to opportunistic 
orientations. 
 
The last sub-section deals with the hypothesised relationship between strategic 
factors and opportunistic orientations. 
iii). Strategic factors and opportunistic orientations.  
As discussed in sub-section 5.1.3 above, TCE theory alludes to strategic factors 
or initiatives such as franchisors helping aspirant franchisees to establish franchised 
outlets by providing them with financial assistance and entering into joint venture 
ownership structures with them and signing the lease with the landlord to secure 
well-located premises (Dnes, 1993). 
However, over time this practice may prove disadvantageous to the franchisee 
as the franchisor also becomes the franchisee’s lender and landlord which limits the 
franchisee’s options in times of distress. 
This may result in the franchisor opportunistically terminating the franchise 
contract so that it can take over the business from the franchisee at a reduced price in 
a forced sale and operate it or re-sell it at a higher price to another franchisee in the 
event of the franchisee failing to make rental or loan repayments to the franchisor on 
time.  
This is unlikely to happen where the franchisor is neither the lender nor the 
landlord as the franchisee may re-arrange his financial affairs with the third party 
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lender or landlord without the opportunistic interference of the franchisor. 
Therefore: 
 
Hypothesis 7: Strategic factors will be positively related to 
opportunistic orientations. 
 
Given the foregoing discussion in this section, the various aspects of the 
franchisor model indicating the proposed theoretical linkages between the various 
latent constructs of the quantitative study that form its conceptual model may be 
diagrammatically presented as shown on Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: Conceptual model for the quantitative study 
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Based on Figure 1, the next section discusses the extension of the study’s model among 
franchisees using the same key theoretical constructs marked as H1 to H7 but different 
sub-dimensions which the literature suggests pertain specifically to franchisees. 
 Model development for studying franchisees  
This section focuses on the extension of the study model depicted on Figure 1 
above to the study of the effects of opportunism on franchise systems from the 
perspective of franchisees. 
Essentially, since franchising is a dyadic relationship, the examination of the 
study model among franchisors in the preceding section should have a reflective 
analogue in the actions and reactions of franchisees.  
As such the franchising model under investigation outlined in the preceding 
sub-section can be seen as representing two sides of the same coin in that it 
addresses the research problem discussed in section 1.2 above among franchisors 
and franchisees with the necessary adjustment to the construct sub-dimensions 
which highlight the different nuances of the issues that apply to each study group.  
Accordingly, this extension of the model to franchisees suggests that structural, 
contextual and strategic factors for a particular franchise system may give rise to 
opportunistic orientations and actions by the franchisees under its wings which, in 
turn, may affect the growth, competitiveness and survival of the franchised business 
which may ultimately have a direct bearing on the growth, competitiveness and 
survival entire franchise system.  
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Therefore, this and the next sections highlight the franchisee-specific constructs 
and sub-dimensions and how the links between them would fit into the model 
developed in the previous section and inform the propositions addressing the 
study’s research questions discussed in sub-section 1.2.1 above.  
5.3.1 Possible effects of opportunistic actions among franchisees on franchise 
systems  
As in the case of franchisors, opportunistic actions among franchisees such as 
non-compliance with the operating standards, procedures and policies of franchise 
systems discussed in the foregoing sub-section may pose a threat to the growth, 
competitiveness, and survival of franchise systems in the market place.  
A. Growth of the franchise system 
Franchise systems need to grow in order to generate the economies of scale 
that arise from bulk and centralised purchasing of resources such as equipment, 
ingredients and services (Castrogiovanni et al., 1993; Kauffmann and Dant, 1996; 
Shane, 1996).  
Usually, the growth of the franchise system is usually measured by a net 
increase in the number of franchised outlets or new franchisees over a period of time 
(Dandridge and Falbe, 1995). 
i). New franchisees entering into the system.  
The resource scarcity explanation of franchising posits that franchisors use 
franchised outlets primarily as a means to achieving rapid expansion of their brand 
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through the managerial skills, financial resources and the local market knowledge 
that franchisees bring to the franchising table (Castrogiovanni et. al, 2006).  
According to these scholars, expansion by way of new franchisees is proxy for 
growth is important to franchise systems largely for efficiency reasons that arise 
from the centralised and bulk purchasing power of the franchise system that 
facilitates cheaper sourcing of ingredients, advertising, equipment, and so on.  
However, an increase in opportunistic actions among franchisees within a 
franchise chain may hamper the growth of the franchise systems by encouraging 
vertical integration, that is, company ownership of outlets by franchisors (Klein et al 
1978).  
In other words, opportunistic franchisees are likely to discourage franchisors 
from seeking new franchisees so as to save on the monitoring and litigation expenses 
that are required to detect and punish offensive behaviour.  
ii). Renewal of franchise contracts by existing franchisees.  
The renewal of franchise contract by existing franchisees signals the 
robustness of the franchise system as non-renewals will reduce the number of 
franchised outlets because of the preponderance of opportunistic actions among 
franchisors.  
In other words, franchisors should encourage franchisees to renew their 
expiring franchise contracts by offering favourable contract terms such as longer 
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terms and dispute resolution mechanisms so as to maintain the base of existing 
franchisees on which to grow its franchise system. 
iii). Multi-unit ownership.  
Grünhagen and Marko (2005) found that multi-unit ownership provided 
franchisees with opportunities to further their entrepreneurial goals; that is, growth 
or expansion of their businesses. 
Indeed, from a franchisee perspective, it seem that the opportunity to own 
several units within the franchise system presents a growth prospects akin to the 
growth desired by the franchisor or any growth-oriented business.  
Similarly, Kaufmann and Dant (1996) suggest that franchise systems that 
encouraged multi-unit ownership attained faster growth than those that did not, and 
that there was a negative relationship between the establishments of new franchised 
outlets by franchisors and multi-unit ownership of outlets by franchisees.  
However, the decision to seek or grant additional units within a franchise 
system is a function of the satisfaction between the franchisee and franchisor with 
their relationship with the result that an increase in opportunistic behaviour with 
discourage either party from seeking or granting additional units resulting in the 
stunted growth of the franchise system.  
iv). Conversion of independent stores into franchised outlets.  
Hoffmann and Preble (2003) found that independent retailers tended to 
convert their stand-alone, street corner businesses into franchised outlets to gain 
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competitive advantage through operating franchised outlets because of the benefits 
that may accrue to franchisees from the use of the franchisor’s well-known trade-
marks, brand-names, business method and through centralised purchasing of 
supplies, advertising, training and so on that provide various forms of economies of 
scale to the franchisees.  
In addition, these scholars found that franchisors target their brand 
advertising to independent retailers for reasons such as tapping into their 
entrepreneurial zeal and demonstrated experience that lowers the franchisor’s 
adverse selection problem. 
Shane (1996) defines the adverse selection as the problem created by potential 
franchisees that misrepresent their abilities, skills, and experience to franchisors with 
the unfavourable result that such franchisees lack the qualities or abilities to operate 
franchised outlets.  
On the other hand, it is inconceivable that franchisors with a bad reputation 
involving opportunistic behaviour will succeed in attract independent retailers into 
their chains and similarly, converted independent retailer who engage in 
opportunistic behaviour may discourage franchisors from targeting that sector of the 
market as potential franchisees in future. 
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B. Competitiveness of the franchise system  
Porter (1985) reckons that firms leveraging on their competitive advantage 
can out-perform their rivals by leveraging on three competitive strategies: cost 
leadership, product differentiation and focus.  
i). Cost leadership via lower operating costs. 
In pursuing a strategy of cost leadership strategy, franchisees can become 
low-cost producers or suppliers of services by acting opportunistically and under-
spend or direct financial resources away from essential services such as training, 
advertising and promotions.  
Such franchised outlets will not be able to compete with their rivals in the 
market place as it they will deliberately allocate less money for marketing or 
promotional, training and administrative purposes.  
ii). Differentiation through innovation and renewal.  
On Porter’s second competitive strategy; that is, product differentiation, for 
the franchised outlet to develop and sustain its unique features that should 
distinguish it from its competitors, the franchisee needs to devote considerable time 
and money designing attractive local advertising campaigns and offering better 
service levels clean and hygienic facilities to their customer than their competitors.  
In addition, franchisees can play a major role in generating a pool of ideas 
that would enable franchisors to introduce innovative and creative products 
(Minkler, 1990, Bradach, 1997). 
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However, franchisees who act or behave opportunistically towards their 
franchisors may not be keen to foster good communication ties with their franchisors 
(Bradach, 1997; Chiou et al., 2004).  
Such franchisees may deprive their franchise systems invaluable insight on 
local market conditions by withholding information which may frustrate the efforts 
to franchisors to strive for innovativeness and creativity and hamper its 
competitiveness in the market place. 
iii). Focus on core business.  
Similarly, Porter’s (1985) last competitive strategy; that is, focus, requires 
franchisees to devote their attention to the maintenance of quality standards and the 
generation of creative ideas to boost cost leadership and product differentiation of 
the franchise system.  
However, franchisees who act or behave opportunistically towards their 
fellow-franchisees by failing to meet quality standards, under-investing in local 
advertising fees or staff recruitment and training may damage the reputation of the 
franchise system in their territories.  
C. Survival of franchise systems 
As this sub-section shows, survival is an important construct in the study of 
franchised and non-franchised businesses in marketing and strategy research. Some 
scholars usually juxtapose survival studies against studies aiming at determining the 
failure rate among the franchised businesses. Thus, by definition, businesses that 
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have survived have a low failure rate. The importance of the survival of a franchise 
system stems from the need for continuity required to ensure the realisation of the 
return on investment made into to the franchised business by both franchisors and 
franchisees.  
i). New franchisees entering and remaining within the franchise system. 
A number of studies that have examined issues relating to the survival of 
franchised businesses include those that found a higher survival rate franchised 
businesses compared to independent retailers (Bates, (1995), identified factors for 
new franchise success which include longer contract terms and membership of 
franchise associations (Shane and Spell, 1998) and studied the survival of new 
franchisors (Shane and Foo, 1999). 
From these and other survival studies, their findings indicate the importance 
of attracting and retaining good quality franchisees who do not engage in 
opportunistic behaviour as a strategy for ensuring the survival of the franchise 
system. 
ii). Closing down of stores.  
Stanworth (1983) and Hoy (1994) state that the failure rate among franchisees 
is very hard to determine as most failing stores are taken over by franchisors before 
they collapse so as to protect the reputation of the franchise system.  
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However, store closures still occur mostly where franchisee misconduct leads 
to the non-renewal or premature termination of franchise contracts and the 
subsequent closure of stores which precedes the demise of the franchise systems. 
iii). Disruption of business activities. 
Frazer and Winzar (2005) found that conflict between franchisors and 
franchisees led to intermittent disruptions of business activities that resulted from 
constant disagreements and tensions between the parties over an array of issues. 
On the other hand, Dnes (1993) suggests that franchisors face disruption costs 
when franchisees leave the franchise system such as lost royalties, relocation, 
training and promotional costs.  
To attenuate the effects of disruptions, Dnes states that franchisors take 
various steps such as requiring franchisees to find replacements within a short time 
after announcing their decision to exit, reserving the right to withhold transfer of the 
outlet to a third party and taking a right of first refusal.  
For these reasons, Ozanne and Hunt (1971) suggest that these measures make 
it possible for franchisors to act opportunistically by withholding approval of a 
potential purchaser in order to force a new franchise contract.  
Muris (1980) opines that disruptions are symptomatic of the so-called “last 
period” scenario which is typically the period preceding the lapse of a franchise 
contract because of uncooperative franchisees. 
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An increase in systemic disruptions caused by opportunistic franchisees will 
damage the survival of the franchise system.  
iv). Buying back of profitable stores by franchisors. 
Oxenfeldt and Kelly’s (1969) predicted that franchisors would buy back 
profitable outlets from franchisees. However, franchisors seem to take or buy back 
stores as disciplinary measure taken against difficult or recalcitrant franchisees 
(Muris, 1980; Hadfield, 1990).  
This reduces the number of franchised outlets and therefore threatens the 
survival of the franchise system which is premised on the existence of a large 
number of similar independently-owned outlets operating and enjoying the benefits 
of being part of a franchise chain. 
v). Depletion of resources and goodwill through litigation. 
Litigation often results from the failure of the franchise system to resolve a 
dispute internally (Williamson, 1983). This may result from the absence of an 
arbitration clause in franchise contracts that would force the parties to settle the 
matter without protracted court action that can be costly because of legal fees and 
wasted time and effort.  
In some cases, it would appear that some franchisors avoid arbitration because it 
is more reconciliatory than litigation, and aims at the restoration of the franchise 
relationship (Drahozal and Hylton, 2003). This is because litigation tends to harm 
franchise relationships, especially where franchisees have disobeyed franchise rules 
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and regulations. This often results in negative publicity, which damages the 
reputation of franchise systems, and makes them unattractive to potential investors 
or entrepreneurs. 
The next sub-section discusses some of the common opportunistic actions 
among franchisors. 
5.3.2 Some common opportunistic actions among franchisees  
Hadfield (1990) lists a number of ways in which franchisees can engage in 
undesirable behaviour at one time or another with the aim of increasing their wealth 
at the expense of the franchise system or their fellow-franchisees mainly by 
withholding or distorting information and effort. 
A. Withholding or distorting information  
Opportunism theorists (e.g. Muris, 1980; Rubin, 1988; Hadfield, 1990) suggests 
that franchisees may withhold or distort information relating to sales and expenses 
of their outlets from their franchisors which may hamper the ability of the 
franchisors to determine the overall performance of the outlet. 
i). Failure to account for sales.  
Udel (1972) suggests that most franchise contracts entitle franchisors to earn 
royalties and advertising fees based on a percentage of sales in respect of the 
franchisor's brand names and trademarks that entitle franchisees to trade under the 
franchisor’s licence.  
199 
In return, franchisors need compensation for on-going support services such as 
training, research and development and advertising that they render to franchisees 
so as to ensure their competitiveness and survival in the market. For these reasons, 
franchisors often design, install, and monitor computerised cash registers and 
software used in the franchised outlets to control the sales they generate to 
determine royalties and advertising fees payable to the franchisor by such outlets.  
However, an unscrupulous franchisee can install and operate a parallel cash 
register system that it may surreptitiously use at night or on weekends when it does 
not expect inspection visits by the franchisor's representative to conceal some sale 
transactions it wishes not to disclose or declare franchisor at the end of the reporting 
period for the purpose of determine the royalties and advertising fees payable to the 
franchisor. 
Some franchisors may not have the financial resources needed to instal proper 
intelligence systems that may enable them to detect cheating with the result that they 
may incur immense financial losses due to undeclared sales and revenue.  
ii). Failure to pay full or correct royalties. 
Moll (1986) suggests that royalties are payable in respect of the use of the 
franchise license and the on-going support services such as research and 
development, training, information technology provided by franchisors to the 
franchisees. Generally, the payment of royalties should be a straight forward matter 
as the royalties payable are easy to determine and formula for doing so is normally 
spelt out quite clearly in the franchise contract. 
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However, this has also become a contentious issue because some franchisees 
use different ways and means to avoid paying royalties due to their franchisors and 
others even question the rationale for paying royalties once they think they no 
longer require franchisor’s support services because of their experience and 
knowledge of operating the franchise business with no help from the franchisor.  
Some franchisees refuse to pay royalties for a myriad of reasons most of which 
are not provided for in the franchise contracts. For example, most franchise contracts 
exclude setting-off of royalties against any monies that may be owed to the 
franchisee by the franchisor.  
B. Withholding or distorting effort 
Hadfiled (1990) also discusses several forms of opportunistic behaviour 
franchisees may engage in to increase their profitability and wealth such as failing to 
maintain quality standards, employ and pay trained staff and sourcing supplies 
from authorised suppliers.  
i). Failure to maintain quality standards.  
Franchise systems lay down uniform procedures, processes and practices that 
all franchisees must adhere to in order to leverage on the franchisors tried and tested 
business method, its well-known trademarks and brand names and so on. These 
activities relate to the ambiance and decor of the store, menus, and staff uniforms 
and so on, aimed at ensuring common experiences for customers at different outlets 
belonging to a particular franchise system.  
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Uniformity is widely regarded as the hallmark of most franchise systems and is 
at the root of the economies of scale derived from the marketing and advertising of 
the franchisor's brand. To this end, franchisees are required to spend money to meet 
the set quality standards relating to the ingredients, packaging, cleanliness, local 
advertising and so on.  
In this vein, Brickley and Dark (1987) aver that some highway-based franchisees 
or those that serve transient customers, that is, non-resident customers tend to 
believe that they can use cheaper or inferior ingredients or other forms of poor 
service delivery with impunity.  
Their suggestion is premised on the belief that travelling customers are not 
inclined to complain as they do not live in the area from that they received an 
unpleasant service experience and are unlikely to return there in the near future. 
Thus, such franchisees believe they are unlikely to suffer the close of customers, as 
they will continue to free ride on the brand name of the franchise system.  
ii). Failure to source supplies from approved suppliers.  
Most franchise contracts require franchisees to source supplies of equipment, 
machinery, and ingredients from certain approved suppliers. There are several 
reasons for this type of “closed-shop” arrangement. First, reasons for uniformity and 
the maintenance of standards throughout the franchising system appear to reside in 
the argument that as franchised outlets must offer the same customer experience 
irrespective of their location in all the areas, regions and countries in that the 
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franchise system is found, a need exist to standardise operating procedures, menus, 
appearances and so on (Kauffmann and Eroglu, 198).  
The overall objective is to ensure enhanced brand value and equity in the 
marketplace by offering the same quality of products and services at the same prices 
and distribution points. Critics of this practice present different arguments. Some 
researchers are of the view that franchisors favour the closed shop purchases 
because of kickbacks they receive from the approved suppliers.  
Muris (1980) and Hadfield (1990) point out that such an arrangement serves a 
control function by enabling franchisors to monitor the purchases of franchisee with 
the view to determining almost by stealth, the sales that take place at the franchised 
outlets.  
To the extent that this may be so, it highlights the degree of mistrust between 
franchisors and franchisees. However, most franchisors in this country insist on the 
closed shop purchases despite the recent promulgation of Competition Act that 
allows franchisees to source supplies in the open market for as long as they can 
prove that such goods are of the same quality as those supplied by the official 
suppliers raises suspicion.  
The Act aims at increasing the profitability of franchised outlets by allowing 
them to source supplies in the open market where they can get competitive prices. 
However, this point is hard to believe given the cost savings that bulk purchases 
deliver to franchise systems through discounts, search, negotiations, and transport 
costs and so on. 
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iii). Failure to appoint, train, and remunerate staff adequately.  
The quality and uniformity themes seem to run through the entire being of most 
franchise systems. Employees of franchised outlets receive training and 
remuneration that has been determined by the franchisor. This practice aims at 
protecting the employees of franchised outlets from exploitation by franchisees. In 
certain cases, some franchisors approve the appointment of store managers.  
The objective is of this practice appears to be aimed at further discouraging 
employees of franchised outlets from franchise-hopping as most franchise systems 
forbid the employment of staff from sister outlets. This practice may be violating the 
constitutional rights of workers to freedom of movement and choice. 
Franchisees that may be hard-pressed by competitive and other adverse market 
challenges may be tempted to underpay or employ fewer staff than may be 
necessary to conduct the franchised outlet optimally as may be determined by the 
franchisor from time to time or in line with the growth needs of the business.  
Similarly, some franchisees may try to save new staff training costs that in most 
cases may include travel, accommodation, and uniform costs especially for 
franchisees located far away from the head office-based training centres. Therefore 
iv). Failure to carry out local advertising.  
Most franchise contracts require franchisees to spend a certain percentage of 
their sales, usually 1%, on local advertising per month. This is in addition to the 
monthly advertising fee usually calculated at 5% of gross sales that most franchisees 
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are required to pay to the franchisor towards the national or regional advertising 
budget of then franchise system.  
The local advertising requirement hopes to supplement the national or regional 
campaign and may take such forms as sponsoring a local school, sport club or sport 
person. The rationale behind local advertising is to foster and develop closer ties 
between the outlet and its immediate or surrounding communities.  
In addition, local advertising also serve other purposes such as performing a 
public relations role that enables the outlet to be seen as a socially caring and 
responsible community participant. As this spend is at the discretion of the 
franchisees, in bad economic times such as the present the possibility of franchisees 
not complying with this request or properly account for it cannot be excluded.  
Ordinarily, it can be easy for the franchisor to verify local advertising 
expenditure but in certain cases this may not be possible especially where 
franchisees can claim that they have made cash or kind donations to needy 
individuals, families or communities or unregistered charities.  
Some franchisees may intend mirroring the practice of most franchisors in 
handling the advertising levies received from franchisors in respect of which most of 
them are not accountable to anyone. Thus, the cash flow difficulties that confront 
most franchisees can also lead franchisors into diverting advertising fees towards 
meeting their administrative expenses with impunity. 
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Most franchisees complain about the misuse of advertising funds by their 
franchisors. Michael (2000) deals with this issue in an article aptly entitled: "Do 
franchises advertise enough?" 
The next section discusses the predictors of opportunistic orientations among 
franchisees.  
5.3.3 Predictors of opportunistic orientations among franchisees  
The literature and informal discussions with franchising experts suggest that 
the motivating factors for OO among franchisees may also be categorised into 
structural, contextual, and strategic factors in respect of which three statements were 
used to measure the perceptions of the franchisees on the sub-dimensions of each 
construct of the model. 
A. Structural factors as antecedents of OO among franchisees 
The structural factors involved include head office staff per franchisee ratio 
(Shane and Spell, 1988; Carney and Gedajlovic, 1991; Lafontaine, 1992), incomplete 
franchise contracts (Williamson, 1979; Mathewson and Winter, 1985; Hadfield, 1990; 
Klein, 1995; Dnes, 2002), and multi-unit ownership of outlets by franchisees 
(Kauffman and Dant, 1996; Dant and Gundlach, 1999; Shane 2001).  
Three statements were used to represent each one of these sub-dimensions of 
the structural factors construct and its association with the sub-dimensions 
opportunistic orientations among franchisees (discussed in section 5.2.2 below). 
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i). Head office staff per franchisee ratio and OO.  
According to Shane and Spell (1988), the ratio between the number staff at the 
head office of the franchisor and the number of franchised outlets determines the 
ability of the franchisor to monitor the activities of its franchisees to ensure 
compliance with its operating standards.  
Shane and Spell suggest that the higher the number of head office staff, the 
more the franchisor is able to deploy sufficient numbers of field staff in different 
areas for monitoring the activities of the franchisees to ensure that compliance with 
franchise rules, procedures and quality standards which have a bearing on the brand 
capital or values of the franchise system.  
However, when there are fewer head office staff to conduct regular or 
frequent store visits during which thorough inspections can be conducted, 
franchisees located in faraway places will experience fewer and less frequent or 
regular of these visits with the result that deviations from set standards and 
procedures are likely to become the norm rather the exception.  
The actions tend to have a negative effect of the brand value of the franchise 
systems because of the failure of franchisees to procure the right quality of 
ingredients and other supplies, to provide staff training and to maintain building 
and equipment in a good condition in order to save costs and increase the 
profitability of their outlets at the expense of the franchisors and fellow-franchisees 
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who must bear the full cost of maintaining the image and reputation of the franchise 
systems (Brickley and Dark, 1987). 
ii). Incomplete contracts and OO.  
Leblebici and Shalley (1996) suggest that the major task facing franchisors and 
franchisees is the regulation of those aspects of their relationship that are not stated 
or spelt out in the franchise contract which by definition, are incomplete contracts.  
As indicated in the section 4.3, many such undefined or unspecified issues in 
the franchise contract make the franchise relationship even more complicated. The 
incompleteness of franchise contracts presents difficulties relating particularly to the 
enforcement of ambiguous clauses and resolving disputes that arise from such 
clauses (Muris, 1980; Williamson, 1985; Hadfield, 1990). 
For instance, most franchise contracts require their franchisees to maintain the 
premises of the franchised outlets in hygienic conditions but no details exists 
regarding the meaning or required level of hygienic conditions that must be 
maintained.  
However, given the level of ambiguity and complexity involved in franchise 
relationships, resolving most such matters by the courts could be costly and dilatory 
with the possibility of the stalemate outliving the remaining franchise contract 
period.  
As opportunism theory posits, the gaps in the franchise contracts may tempt 
franchisees to take advantage of some loopholes and under-invest or under-
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capitalise some aspects of the business band utilise cheaper ingredients, hold back 
on promoting certain products or bringing in-house cleaning or other services with 
the aim of saving on costs to increase their profitability. 
iii). Multiple-unit ownership of outlets and OO 
A common trend that has developed in franchising is the granting of serial 
ownership of units by franchisors to individuals to create area or territorial 
franchisees (Kauffman and Dant, 1996; Dant and Gundlach, 1999; Shane 2001). 
Though research done in this area is inconclusive, it provides several explanations 
for this trend from the perspectives of both franchisors and franchisees.  
In the main, it appears that franchisors grant additional units to franchisees 
who have proven themselves as single unit franchisees (Kauffman and Dant, 1996). 
This strategy seems to reward franchisees who have successfully demonstrated their 
capabilities to operate single outlets in their areas.  
In addition, there is support for the hypothesis that franchisors employ 
multiple unit ownership as a cost effective and cheaper source of franchisee 
recruitment and selection. However, this approach may not be immune to criticism 
that it lacks transparency and objectivity particularly among franchisees who may 
feel overlooked for such a role. The cause of disenchantment or disapproval of this 
practice seems to stem from the non-disclosure of the criteria used to appoint multi-
unit franchisees.  
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Such a practice may draw accusations of favouritism and cronyism that 
franchisors use the multiple unit ownership system which provide the benefit of the 
growth of the franchisee’s business through acquiring the additional outlets as a 
weapon to punish "troublesome" and to reward “blue-eyed” franchisees. 
Thus, the clamour for additional outlets cannot be regarded as ill-founded or 
insignificant because of the accompanying financial benefits and that most franchise 
contracts prohibit their franchisees from owning other businesses or competing 
brands even for up to three years after the expiry of the franchise contracts in terms 
of restraints of trade (Udel, 1972).  
As a backlash, franchisees who are not so rewarded with additional outlets 
may feel unwanted and decide to apply underhand tactics with the aim of retaliating 
against the franchisor for denying them what most would consider being internal 
growth opportunities.  
This may result in such disgruntled franchisees seeking alternative methods 
of supplementing the revenues and profitability of their businesses by engaging in 
corner cutting tactics and other opportunistic actions described in section 5.2.2 
below.  
B. Contextual factors as antecedents of OO among franchisees  
The study identified the membership of franchisee associations (Dandridge 
and Falbe, 1995); Lawrence and Kaufmann, 2010 and 2011), lack of regulation and 
legislation (Brickley et al, 1991; Beale and Muris, 1995; Shane and Foo, 1999), and the 
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last years of the franchise contract (Muris, 1980; Klein, 1995, Blut et. al, 2010) as the 
contextual factors predisposing franchisees to opportunistic behaviour.  
i). Membership of Franchisee Associations.  
Though not much research exists on the purpose or operation of franchisee 
associations (Lawrence and Kaufmann, 2011), Dandridge and Falbe (1995) suggest 
that franchisees belonging to a particular franchise system or sector usually formed 
franchisee associations to represents their interests in their interactions with their 
franchisors.  
However, it is not clear how franchisee associations are intended to perform 
this task in general and particularly where there are allegations that some 
franchisors disallow their franchisees to belong to a franchisee association or accord 
no recognition to such bodies. 
It would appear that franchisee associations serve the same purpose and role 
as trade unions in representing and articulating the concerns and grievances of 
franchisees to their franchisors.  
There is, however, neither a record of collective bargaining between 
franchisors and franchisees nor that of the recognition of these bodies by franchisors 
in the literature or the media (Emerson, 1988). 
On the other hand, Lawrence and Kaufmann (2011) distinguish between 
franchisee associations and advisory councils by pointing out that while franchisors 
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play no role in establishing franchisee associations, they often appoint and sponsor 
advisory councils in which they serve with their hand-picked franchisees. 
Possibly for this reason, Lawrence and Kaufmann suggest that most 
franchisors formally or informally discourage the formation or affiliation of their 
franchisees to franchisee associations which have democratically elected office 
bearers, mandate and constitution.  
On the other hand, prohibiting franchisees to form and belong to a franchisee 
association by franchisors could be unlawful as it may infringe on the constitutional 
right of franchises to freedom of association or assembly under section 18 of the 
country’s constitution.  
As a possible result of this negative disposition that franchisors appear to 
have towards franchisee associations, most of the bodies appear to exist in name 
only or functioning as secret or underground organisations with no formal structure 
or purpose. 
Despite this confused state of affairs, Lawrence and Kaufmann suggest that 
franchisee associations can help reduce the tension that exists between cooperation 
and conflict in franchise relationships; and that the failure of franchise systems to 
recognise franchisee associations has the potential to create a number of counter-
productive outcomes.  
For example, the lack of a communication mechanism within the franchise 
system could result in rumour-mongering and dysfunctional relationships between 
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the parties. Dandridge and Falbe (1995) support this point of view by suggesting that 
the existence of formalised communication structure within franchise system helped 
improved relationships. These scholars found that such mechanisms could serve as 
think tanks for generating innovative ideas and sharing information.  
This input can be useful in designing, informing and implementing the 
business strategy of the franchise system in areas such as completion, product 
development, pricing and so on. Therefore, franchise associations can be useful to 
strengthen the relationships between franchisors and franchisees (Lawrence and 
Benjamin, 2010; 2011).  
This could also help fill the gaps that franchise contracts are not able to 
because of the need to adapt to market changes at short notice, particularly in 
respect of issues that arise during the currency of existing franchise contracts 
(Williamson, 1975, 1979 and 1985; Klein, 1993; Dnes, 2003).  
According to these scholars, it is usually cumbersome, expensive and most 
probably undesirable to change contracts mid-term because of negotiating and 
bargaining costs and the time it may take before consensus is reached could result in 
financial difficulties vowing to lost opportunities. 
However, Dandridge and Falbe (1995) suggest that for one reason or another, 
some franchisee associations may play an antagonistic and destructive role within 
the franchise system by encouraging their members to engage in opportunistic 
behaviour such as withholding royalty fees, legally withdrawing from the system 
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and sourcing supplies from non-approved suppliers and so on. These scholars 
suggest that such behaviour may have a negative effect on the growth of franchise 
systems.  
Scholars such as Shane and Spleen (1988); Dandridge and Falbe (1995); 
Leblebici and Shalley (1996); Combs et al., (2005) recommend the use franchisee 
associations as a communication channel between the franchisors and their 
franchisees which can be used to discuss matters of mutual interest between the 
parties such new product and advertising ideas or concepts.  
Baucus et al., (1996) found that better communication between franchisors 
and franchisees improved cooperation between the parties and reduced motivations 
for opportunistic behaviour.  
Similarly, Chiou et al., (2004) found that job satisfaction and the intention to 
remain within the franchise system to be high among franchisees within franchise 
systems with established channels of communication such as franchise associations. 
Cochet and Ehrmann (2007) and Lawrance and Kauffmann (2010) found that 
franchisees are likely to establish franchise associations to protect their mutual 
interest when franchisors make more decisions about the franchise system.  
On the other hand, Kidwell et al. (2007) found that increased centralisation of 
decision-making among franchisors encouraged free riding among franchisees 
which may involve the misuse of franchisee associations. 
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Thus, the desire among franchisees to achieve lower transactions costs 
(Cochet and Ehrmann, 2007) indicates the benefits of better communication and 
decentralisation of decision-making through the use of the franchisee associations 
that can play a significant role in reducing opportunistic behaviour. 
ii). Lack of franchise regulation and legislation.  
As in most countries such as the US, Europe and Australasia, the franchising 
industry is self-regulated in this country. As stated in Chapter 2, FASA, which 
purports to represent the interests of franchisors and franchisees in this country, is a 
voluntary non-statutory organisation (Woker, 2012) that is not endowed with the 
legal power to build administrative and intellectual capacity to hear, preside and 
adjudicate fairly, informatively and judiciously over franchising disputes.  
Therefore, unlike the law, medical and nursing councils, FASA is unable to 
make legally binding and enforceable decisions to enforce discipline or good ethical 
or governance conduct on franchising players in this country.  
Worse still, unlike in some states in the US, there are no franchising-specific 
laws in this country that are needed to regulate or govern the franchise relationship 
that has been described by various scholars (e.g. Brickley et al, 1991; Beale and 
Muris, 1995; Shane and Foo, 1999) as complex and intricate.  
There is also lack of adequate peer review mechanism and specialist 
knowledge to address franchising disputes and to close most loopholes found in the 
incomplete franchise contracts referred to in this section. 
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As in most countries such as the US, Europe and Australasia, the franchising 
industry is self-regulated in this country. As indicated above, FASA, which purports 
to represent the interests of franchisors and franchisees in this country, is a voluntary 
non-statutory organization that is not endowed with the legal power to build 
specialist legal and administrative capacity.  
As such, FASA is unable to hear, preside, and adjudicate fairly, informatively, 
and authoritatively over all franchising disputes and to make legally binding and 
enforceable decisions on all franchising players in this country. Worse still, unlike in 
some states in the US, there are no franchising-specific laws in this country that are 
needed to regulate or govern the franchise relationship that has been described by 
various scholars as complex and intricate.  
Scholars such as Emerson (1978), Brickley (1991), and Storholm and 
Scheuding (1994) suggest the use of franchise-specific legislation and regulation to 
address franchising disputes and to close most loopholes that franchisors and 
franchisees exploit to generate undeserved financial gain because of the lack of peer 
review mechanism and specialist knowledge in the courts. 
On the other hand, Dant, Perrigot and Cliquet (2008) found high company-
ownership of outlets by Brazilian franchisors to avoid the effects of the dilatory and 
costly legal system in disciplining errant franchisees. 
Similarly, section 5.2.2 below discusses how franchisees bent on lowering 
their transactions costs by for example withholding information and efforts to 
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increase the profitability of their outlets at the expense of the franchise system 
exploit these gaps.  
iii). Last years of the Franchise Contract. 
Blut, Backhaus, Heussler, Woisetschläger, Evanschitzky (2010) use a 4-stage 
U-curve to describe the life cycle of franchise a relationship: the honeymoon, routine, 
crossroads and stabilisation phases. During each phase, there are cooperation, 
dependence, and relationship variables that prevail. Blut et al’s model suggest that 
the cooperation, dependence and relationship variable are high during the honey 
and stabilisation stages, and reach low levels during the crossroads phase.  
According to these scholars, the crossroad stage is characterised by low levels 
of satisfaction, trust, commitment, loyalty, and outcomes. Clearly, the crossroad 
stage, which is similar to the last days of the franchise contract stage discussed in 
this study, is the most difficult period for the franchise relationship for both parties. 
Firstly, from the perspective of franchisees, franchisors in this phase could create a 
myriad of problems for by for example cutting back on support services such as 
training, advertising, product development and so on.  
Similarly, franchisors on the last days of a franchise contract with a franchisee 
they intend not renewing or whose contract is expiring could expect havoc especially 
from a franchisee with whom they had a stormy relationship.  
During this period, as a result of possibly unpleasant experiences and 
unfulfilled financial and other expectations or dreams, disgruntled franchises could 
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have already made their minds that they are leaving the franchise system by either 
cancelling the franchise contract or not seeking or accepting a renewal.  
It can reasonably be anticipated that during this period, such franchisees may 
“try to make as much money and cause as much trouble as possible" on their way 
out of the franchise system. Such a mind-set will clearly be at odds with the 
behaviour of these franchisees at the time of their joining the franchise system, as 
any new franchisees at the honeymoon phase seem inclined to comply with 
franchise rules and regulations.  
This can have drastic implications for the franchise relationship as franchisees 
in the crossroad phase are unlikely to observe and honour the rules of the franchise 
system, and this requires a change of management strategy by the franchisor.  
C. Strategic factors as antecedents of opportunistic orientations 
among franchisees. 
The study identified strategic factors as external and internal factors to the 
franchise relationship which may predispose franchisees towards opportunistic 
behaviour. These include brand value (Caves and Murphy, 1976; Mathewson and 
Winter, 1985; Brickley and Dark, 1987; Rubin, 1988), geographic dispersion (Rubin, 
1978; Brickley and Dark, 1987; Norton, 1988), and local market knowledge (Minkler, 
1990; Carney and Gedajlovic, 1991, Bradach, 1997).  
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i). Brand value.  
The single most important asset that franchisors possess that they are able to 
market to investors is the brand that represents the value embedded in their 
franchise system that attracts capital and other resources into the franchise system 
(Caves and Murphy, 1976; Mathewson and Winter, 1985; Brickley and Dark, 1987; 
Rubin, 1988).  
According to these scholars, franchisors inevitably expose their brand value 
or equity represented by its trade-mark, brand-names, insignia, logos, business 
methods and so on to the vagaries of the market by entering into franchise contracts 
with some unscrupulous franchisees attracted to the franchise system by its strong 
brand which they may seek to exploit for their own benefit in their areas through 
under-spending and under-investment in their outlets.  
On the other hand, McNeil (1974) suggests that franchise contracts protect the 
franchisor’s brand equity by providing for the sanctions such as the termination of 
the franchise relationship. However, scholars such as Muris (1980) and Hadfield 
(1990) suggest that it is not possible for franchise contracts to provide for all 
contingencies in a constantly changing business environment because of their 
incompleteness.  
For this reason, it may not be possible for franchisors to provide 100% cover 
or protection for their brands in the franchise contract because the difficulties 
franchisors may experience in spelling out in clear and unambiguous terms issues 
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such as adequate stock levels or hygienic conditions to be maintained in franchised 
outlets with the aim of protecting the franchisor’s brand against opportunistic 
behaviour that can withstand the rigorous scrutiny of the courts.  
Therefore, by entering into franchise contracts, franchisors run the risk of 
exposing their brand to erosion or devaluation by the unscrupulous acts of certain 
franchisees (described more fully in section 5.2.2 below) through the use of inferior 
products, untrained staff providing sub-standards service to customers and un-kept 
premises in the franchised outlets with the nefarious intention to increase their 
profitability at the expense of the franchise system.  
ii). Geographic dispersion.  
According to several scholars (Brickley and Dark, 1987; Norton, 1988; Carney 
and Gedajlovic, 1991; Fladmoe-Lindquist and Jacque, 1995; Kaufmann and Dant; 
1998; Shane, 1998), the strength franchise system lies in its ability to grow and 
expand beyond its home market into new markets regionally, nationally, and even 
globally.  
According these scholars, the aim of achieving outlet growth is to give the 
brand closer and maximum exposure to bigger and diversified markets which is 
supplementary to the raison d’etre for franchising to achieve rapid growth by 
expanding into new and unfamiliar territories.  
This may present serious challenges to the franchise system because of 
cultural, legal, and economic-political shocks found in different markets it may 
220 
enter. For example, there are huge differences in franchising laws in different states 
in the United States with the result that it may be difficult or a certain franchise 
systems to straddle jurisdictions.  
This may have a negative impact on its business strategy to leverage on the 
economies of scale that the franchise system is supposed to generate through bulk 
purchases of goods and services supplies such as ingredients, equipment, legal 
services, advertising, training and so on.  
Similarly, the above scholars suggests that the distance between the 
franchisor’s head office and franchised outlets that are located in far-away towns 
and cities, regions or countries exposes franchise systems to franchisee opportunistic 
behaviour. This is because the monitoring of franchisees forms an important part of 
ensuring compliance with franchise standard operating procedures and process.  
Brickley and Dark (1987) found that franchisees located near the franchisor's 
head office are more compliant than those located in remote areas, and it is easier 
and cheaper for the franchisor's representatives to monitor the activities of local 
franchisees. A perception exists among franchisees that distant franchisees receive 
infrequent or less visits from by the franchisor’s representatives, and that this creates 
room for complacency and misdemeanour.  
iii). Local market knowledge.  
As explained above, researchers have traditionally offered two theories that 
sought to explain the existence of franchising as a business model: resource scarcity 
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and agency theories. Briefly, the resource scarcity theory posits that new franchisors 
seeking rapid expansion will franchise their businesses in order to obtain scarce 
resources; that is, financial informational and human resources (Dant, 1998) from 
entrepreneurs.  
On the other hand, agency theorists postulate that franchisors are not able to 
rely on salaried-managers to run outlets that belong to the company (Brickley and 
Dark, 1987). These theorists argue that store managers lack the incentive to apply 
themselves in the same manner, as a local entrepreneur who has invested his money 
in the business is able to because of the residual or share of the profits he is able to 
claim.  
For this reason, owners of franchise systems will grant franchises to 
entrepreneurs whom they believe will have the motivation and local market 
knowledge (Caves and Murphy, 1976; Norton, 1988; Minkler, 1990; Dnes, 1993) to 
make a success out of the franchised outlet. This disposition is not without 
difficulties as one of the problems that researchers have identified is the tension and 
conflict that is often occurs between franchisors and franchisees due to differences in 
the strategy to serve the market in the franchisee's territory.  
Generally, franchisees are inclined to believe that because they live and work 
in the area where the outlet is located, they have a better market knowledge hand 
than the franchisor, and that they should have a say in the overall business strategy 
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such as advertising, pricing, products and so on, of meeting customer needs in their 
respective areas.  
Most franchisors are unlikely to relinquish control of this important aspect 
because of their ownership and custodianship of the brand and their desire to 
leverage off the brand's power regionally, nationally or internationally. It is 
inconceivable that franchisors will allow franchisees to tamper with any aspect of the 
brand strategy to meet local conditions in a particular outlet.  
Usually, franchisors offer their mass-based customers and compete with the 
same product at the same price, from similar outlets and using the same advertising 
message (Brickley and Dark, 1987). Thus, any adaptations that a franchisee may be 
tempted to make to the overall business strategy is likely to harm the brand.  
The next sub-section discusses the manifestations of opportunistic actions among 
franchisees. 
5.3.4 Propositions in model 
As in the case of the discussion on the study model among franchisors 
presented in the previous section and based on the foregoing discussion in this 
section, the literature and informal discussions with franchising experts informed 
the propositions developed on the linkages between the different components of the 
study’s model to examine the research questions among franchisees. 
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5.3.5 Links between opportunistic actions among franchisees and the 
performance of franchise systems  
As in the case of the study among franchisors, the propositions served as the 
foundation for addressing the research questions in the study that focussed on the 
relationship between opportunistic actions and the growth, competitiveness and 
survival of franchise systems. 
A. Proposition 1  
As discussed in section 5.3.2 above, opportunism (Muris, 1980; Williamson, 
1985; Hadfield, 1990) and agency (Caves and Murphy, 1976; Rubin, 1988) theorists 
suggest that opportunistic actions among franchisees revolving around withholding 
or distorting of information and efforts such as the failure to account for sales and 
royalties, maintain quality standards, source supplies from authorised supplies and 
so on may be negatively related to the growth of franchise systems. 
As discussed in section 5.1 above, franchisors experiencing high levels of 
opportunistic behaviour from their franchisees may be forced to embark upon 
vertical integration (Mathewson and Winter, 1985) and abandon franchising in 
favour of operating company-owned stores run by salaried managers with the 
intention to reduce or minimise the transactions costs involved in monitoring non-
performing franchisees.  
Such franchisors may cease recruiting new franchisees (Dandridge and Falbe, 
1995) or independent retailers into the franchise system (Hoffman and Preble, 2003), 
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not renewing expiring franchise contracts (Dnes, 1992) and not granting additional 
units to existing franchisees (Kauffmann and Dant, 1996). Therefore: 
 
Proposition 1: Opportunistic actions are negatively associated with the 
growth of franchise systems. 
 
B. Proposition 2  
Against the backdrop of the discussion in sections 5.3.2 above, opportunistic 
actions such as the withholding or distortion of information and efforts by 
franchisees such as the failure to account properly for sales and royalties, maintain 
quality standards and maintain equipment and premises in good conditions raised 
by opportunism (Muris, 1980; Williamson, 1985; Hadfield, 1990) and agency (Caves 
and Murphy, 1976; Rubin, 1988) theorists may lead to a weakening of the 
competitiveness of the franchise systems. 
Within the context of Porter (1985)’s competitive strategy framework, 
opportunistic actions among franchisees could result in the increase in the 
operational and marketing costs of franchise systems because of the need to invest in 
monitoring, litigation and publicity costs required to detect, punish and defend 
actions they may have taken against offending franchisees to protect the image and 
reputation of the franchise system. 
Similarly, franchise systems confronting opportunistic behaviour among 
franchisees may lose focus on the core functions of their businesses such as 
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developing competitive products, pricing, distribution and marketing strategies 
because of the need to devote considerable amounts of time and energy on detecting 
and punishing opportunistic franchisees.  
On the other hand, franchisors may disinclined to seek or utilise the ideas and 
inputs of opportunistic franchisees who because of their local market knowledge are 
presumed to be well-placed to provide franchisors with invaluable information on 
the changing needs, tastes and habits needed to generate innovative and creative 
products needed to differentiate the franchise system from its competitors (Bradach, 
1990). Therefore: 
 
Proposition 2 posited that opportunistic actions among franchisees were 
negatively associated with the competiveness of franchise systems. 
 
C. Proposition 3 
By virtue of the discussion in section 5.3.2 above, opportunistic actions among 
franchisees such as the withholding or distortion of information and effort referred 
to in the previous two sub-sections could threaten the survival of franchise systems. 
Franchise systems experiencing rampant non-compliance with quality 
standards such as cleanliness, customer care and staff training; non-disclosure of 
sales and royalties and failure to maintain premises in good and working conditions 
may be forced to curtail their operations. 
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This may involve taking measures such as closing down franchised stores 
(Tuusnanen and Torrikka, 1989; Bates, 1995; Stanworth, 1995), dealing with 
intermittent disruptions (Muris, 1980; Frazer, 2001), buying back stores (Oxenfeldt 
and Kelly, 1969; Hunt, 1972; Burr et. al, 1975) and depleting the goodwill and 
resources of their businesses because of litigation and reputational damage 
(Emerson, 1989, Gundlach and Murphy, 1993; Leblebici and Shalley, 1996). 
Therefore: 
 
Proposition 3: Opportunistic actions are negatively linked to the survival of 
franchise systems. 
The next sub-section focuses on the links between OO and OA among 
franchisees 
5.3.6 Links between opportunistic orientations and opportunistic actions 
Proposition 4 suggested that factors predisposing franchisees opportunistic 
orientations, that is, structural, contextual and strategic factors discussed in section 
5.3.1 above could lead to a preponderance of opportunistic actions among 
franchisees discussed in section 5.3.2 above. 
A. Proposition 4 
Opportunism theorists such as Muris (1980) and Hadfield (1990) suggest that 
opportunistic franchisees may be inclined to take advantage of the incompleteness of 
franchise contracts that are unable to spell out offensive behaviour such as 
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cleanliness in specific terms and use sub-standard and cheaper products in their 
outlets in order to by-pass franchise rules and regulations that require adherence to 
quality standards in order to protect the brand value of the franchise system. 
Therefore: 
 
Proposition 4: Opportunistic orientations are positively related to 
opportunistic actions 
The next sub-section deals with the links between the structural, contextual 
and strategic factors and OA. 
5.3.7 Links between the structural, contextual and strategic factors and 
opportunistic orientations  
The study postulated that structural, contextual and strategic factors discussed 
in section 5.3.1 could lead opportunistic orientations among franchisees.  
A. Proposition 5 
Proposition 5 suggested that structural factors were positively related to 
opportunistic orientations among franchisees. Franchise systems with lower 
headoffice staff to franchisee ratio may experience staff shortages which can result in 
overworked headoffice field staff only being able to conduct infrequent store visits 
or spending less time in the stores during their visits.  
This may result in franchisees developing opportunistic tendencies of non-
compliance with quality standards with impunity. Therefore: 
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Proposition 5: Structural factors are positively related to opportunistic 
orientations among franchisees. 
 
B. Proposition 6 
Proposition 6 posited that contextual factors were positively related with 
opportunistic orientations among franchisees. The literature referred to in this 
section suggests that membership of franchise associations, lack of legislation and 
lack of regulation may create an atmosphere in which franchisees can become 
difficult to manage and control with the result that it may be costly to operate the 
franchise system because of the resources requires to monitor performance and 
enforcement of rules and regulations. Therefore: 
 
Proposition 6: Contextual factors were positively related to opportunistic 
orientations among franchisees. 
 
C. Proposition 7 
Proposition 7 posited that strategic factors were positively related with 
opportunistic orientations among franchisees.  
On the basis of the literature reviewed in this section, strong brand, outlets 
located far from the franchisor’s headoffice may lead to some franchisees into using 
inferior and cheaper ingredients and offering sub-standard service levels at their 
outlets to enrich themselves at the expense of the franchise system. Therefore: 
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Proposition 7: Strategic factors were positively related with opportunistic 
orientations among franchisees. 
 
Based on the foregoing discussion, Figure 2 below depicts the conceptual model 
of the qualitative study among franchisees. 
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Figure 2: Conceptual model for the qualitative study 
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The next section briefly summarises the discussions in sections 5.2 and 5.3 
above and seeks to highlight the integration of the quantitative and qualitative parts 
the study model depicted on Figures 1 and 2 above. 
 Integrated model 
As discussed in sections 5.2 and 5.3 and depicted on Figures 1 and 2 above, the 
under investigation in this study proposes to examine the inter-linkages between 
predictor (structural, contextual and strategic factors), intervening (opportunistic 
orientations and opportunistic actions) and dependent variables (growth, 
competitiveness and survival) among franchisors and franchisees, respectively.  
In addition, this model proposed to examine the research questions among 
franchisors and franchisees stated in section 1.2 with the help of quantitative and 
qualitative methods used to gather, test and validate survey and interview data 
using several hypotheses and propositions, respectively.  
Based on the literature and informal discussions with franchising experts, it was 
important to split the model into two different sets of constructs and their sub-
dimensions in order to conduct the study among franchisors and franchisees 
separately but concurrently in line with the adopted mixed methods research 
strategy discussed in section 1.2 above. 
Overall, the study used the integrated model depicted on Figure 3 below with 
the hypothesised and proposed directions of the franchisor and franchisee constructs 
depicted on Figures 1 and 2 above and their different underlying sub-dimensions 
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(omitted for the sake of simplicity) used to examine the research questions in this 
thesis as its conceptual model.  
Figure 3: Integrated model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Developed for the study 
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study seeks to illustrate and signify that although a franchise system comprises has 
two different but inter-dependent components represented by franchisors and 
franchisees, it functions as a single unit and should be viewed and understood as 
such. 
 Summary 
This chapter discussed the development of the model used to examine the 
study’s research questions among franchisors and franchisees with the help of 
quantitative and qualitative methods.  
It focused on identifying and explaining the constructs and sub-dimensions 
which comprised the different components of the model, that is, predictor, 
intervening and outcome variables. 
The chapter also developed the hypotheses and propositions used to examine 
the research questions among franchisors and franchisees, respectively.  
The next chapter discusses the research methodology used to conduct the 
quantitative study among franchisors. 
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Chapter 6 Research methodology - 
Quantitative study 
 Introduction 
Chapter 5 presented the theoretical model used to examine the study’s research 
questions among franchisors and franchisees. Chapter 6 discusses the research 
methodology of the quantitative part of the study conducted among franchisors, 
whereas Chapter 7 presents and discusses the results of that component of the study.  
Chapters 8 and 9 then present and discuss the research methodology and 
results of the qualitative part of the study conducted among franchisees, 
respectively. The entire methodology and results of each part of the study are 
presented separately because, although the two parts are related, they adopted very 
different approaches for reasons primarily explained in section 1.2.4 above.  
In this light, section 6.2 below describes and justifies the methods used in the 
quantitative part of the study of franchisors. Section 6.3 discusses the population and 
sampling of the quantitative component. Section 6.4 examines the measures and 
hypotheses used to address the research questions, based on the more general 
hypotheses developed in the literature and model development chapters. Section 6.5 
deals with the data collection methods used. Section 6.6 presents data analysis 
methods. Section 6.7 discusses the pre-testing of the questionnaire. Section 6.8 
concludes the chapter. 
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 The quantitative research design 
The quantitative research design follows a survey-based data collection 
approach, with a traditional correlational approach to quantitative data analysis.  
Accordingly, this approach follows a positivist-realist research philosophy 
which primarily assumes that knowledge resides in the objective and real world 
constituted by the experiences and aspirations of the respondents (Ritchie and 
Lewis, 2005). 
The use of quantitative designs is common in marketing studies (Deshpande, 
1983; Peter and Olson, 1983), which incorporate franchising as part of the 
distribution or ‘place’ in the 4 pillars of marketing (Kotler and Keller, 2008). 
This predominance of quantitative methods in marketing studies such as this 
one is demonstrated in highly rated journals such as those published by the 
American Marketing Association, a professional body of established marketing 
practitioners, academics, and scholars.  
In explaining the dominance of the quantitative design in marketing studies, 
Peter (1982) opines that marketing borrows theory construction and research 
methods from older disciplines such as psychology and economics that mostly 
employ quantitative research methods.  
The following methodology sections expand on the hypothesis development 
which follows the broader principles of the literature review, survey design and 
measures, the population and sample, the data analytic techniques, and 
methodological limitations. Thereafter, section 6.7 presents the results of the study. 
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 Population and sampling: issues and strategies 
The following sections discuss the population and sampling issues and 
strategies for the quantitative part of the study. 
6.3.1 Population 
Due to lack of official information and records mainly because of the self-
regulation of the franchising industry or sector in South Africa, the study population 
consisted of all foreign and domestic franchisors estimated on unofficial but 
important sources such as www.fasa.co.za, www.whichfranchise.co.za and 
www.safw.co.za to number between 550 and 750 that operate in some or all of South 
Africa’s nine provinces in various categories such as the food, restaurant and 
groceries, automative, personal, business and home care services.  
6.3.2 Sampling frame 
The sampling frame used in this study is a reduced subset of the South African 
franchisor population, since it is not possible to authoritatively define and list the 
entire set.  
As indicated in Chapter 3, the franchising industry in South Africa is self-
regulating under the aegis of FASA, with the result that no official or definitive 
database exists that provides detailed information and records on important matters 
such as the profile and the activities of current and past franchisors and franchisees. 
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Although confidential databases are held by the South African Revenue 
Services (SARS), the Company and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC) and 
Stats South Africa, these are not open to common access (Dnes, 1993).  
As a result, this study attempted to consolidate and use data lists obtained from 
the websites of franchising service providers or consultancies such as the 
www.fasa.co.za, www.whichfranchise.co.za and www.safw.co.za as its sampling 
frame.  
In total, approximately 250 franchisors who had been in existence for a period 
exceeding three years were drawn from the above combined databases over the time 
of this research, which by estimates of the population (FASA, 2013; whichfranchise, 
2013; SAFW, 2013) is approximately 43% of all franchisors in South Africa. 
6.3.3 Sampling method 
Using the sampling frame consisting of lists of franchise systems found on the 
websites of the above franchising service providers, this study used a purposive 
sampling method.  
This involved contacting every franchisor in the sample frame that met the 
required condition: namely, selecting for inclusion only franchise systems which 
have been in existence for at least three years from all various categories of products 
and services.  
This three-year cut-off point aimed at ensuring the assessment of two of the 
three dependent variables, namely growth and survival evaluated over time. 
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The next section deals with the franchisor constructs used in the model. 
 Franchisor constructs and measures in the model 
Based on the literature and model development from prior chapters, as well as 
informal interviews with franchising experts such as academics, lawyers and 
consultants, the study developed or adapted a number of constructs, associated 
measures and hypotheses used to examine the research questions.  
This section describes the constructs and measures of the model pertaining to 
quantitative part of the study which are divided into broader constructs – which 
focusses on the important concepts being measured and possible sub-dimensions of 
these, followed by a second sub-section describing the actual operationalisation of 
these construct sub-dimensions used in the study. 
6.4.1 Constructs in the franchisor model 
This sub-section discusses the constructs used to compose the franchising 
model under investigation shown on Figure 1. 
The sub-section comprises three levels or sets of interlinking variables each with 
at least three sub-dimensions, that is, dependent, intervening and independent 
variables used in the quantitative part of the study which focused on franchisors. 
Table 6-1 summarises these constructs and their sub-dimensions and labels. 
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Table 6-1: Constructs and sub-dimensions of the franchising model 
Level Construct Sub-dimension 
Dependent variables Survival (H7) Disruptions 
  Exits 
  Closures 
  Buy backs 
  Litigation 
   
 Competitiveness (H6) Cost leadership 
  Differentiation 
  Focus 
  Innovation 
   
 Growth (H5) New franchisees 
Renewal of contracts 
Multi-unit ownership 
Conversions 
   
Intervening variables Opportunistic orientations 
(H4) 
Non-exclusive territories 
No arbitration clause 
Resale price maintenance 
Tying agreements 
 
Opportunistic actions (H4) 
 
Shorter contract terms 
Fixed term contracts 
Store buy or take back  
Resale restrictions 
Termination at will 
  Restraint of trade 
Independent variables Structural factors (H1) Transactions specific assets  
Hostages  
 Incomplete contracting  
Information asymmetry   
 Bargaining power 
Dependence 
 
Contextual factors (H2) 
 
 
 
Strategic factors (H3) 
 
 
Lack of regulation 
Lack of legislation 
Competitive pressures 
 
Joint ventures 
Financial assistance 
  Lease control 
Source: Developed for the study 
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Having summarised the broad constructs used in this study, the next sections 
describes the formal operationalisation of the measures for these constructs.  
6.4.2 Measures of constructs in the survey instrument 
The measurement of the dependent variables in the survey involved the 
following scales. Unless otherwise mentioned, the survey assesses all items through 
a 7-point Likert scale. 
A. Measurement of the dependent variables 
The following discussion focuses on the measures for the study’s three 
independent variable, that is, growth, competitiveness and survival and their sub-
dimensions. 
i). Growth 
The construct of growth is measured by five items, measuring those sub-
dimensions of growth discussed above in section 5.2.1 above, incorporating new 
franchisees, renewal of expiring contracts, multi-unit ownership and conversions.  
A sample item states: “Because of franchising benefits, most independent 
retailers are inclined to convert their businesses into franchised outlets”.  
ii). Competitiveness 
The construct of competitiveness is measured by four survey items, namely, 
cost leadership, differentiation, focus and Innovation, each of which reflect one sub-
dimension of the construct as discussed in section 5.2.1 above.  
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A sample item thus: “A franchise contract granting favourable terms to 
franchisees is unlikely to provide a competitive advantage to the franchise system”. 
iii). Survival 
The construct of survival is measured by five survey items, that is, disruptions, 
exits, closures, buy backs and litigation. Each of these items reflect one sub-
dimension of the construct as discussed in the previous section 5.2.1 above.  
A sample item states thus: “It is uncommon for franchisors to take back failing 
and non-performing outlets to operate them or for re-sale”. 
The next paragraphs describe measures for the opportunism constructs. 
B. Measurement of the intermediary variables 
As discussed in section 5.2.2 above, two sub-constructs, namely opportunistic 
orientations and opportunistic actions constituted opportunism. These sub-
constructs were measured as follows: 
i). Opportunistic orientations  
The sub-construct of opportunistic orientations is measured by five survey 
items: non-exclusive territories; no arbitration clause; resale price maintenance; tying 
agreements; shorter contract terms. Each of these items reflect one sub-dimension of 
the sub-construct as discussed in the previous section 5.2.2 above. A sample item 
states thus: “Granting non-exclusive trading areas to franchisees allows franchisors 
the flexibility to add new outlets in particular areas”.  
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ii). Opportunistic actions 
The sub-construct of opportunistic actions is measured by four survey items: 
store buy or take back; resale restrictions; termination at will and restraint of trade. 
Each of these items reflect one sub-dimension of the sub-construct as discussed in 
the previous section 5.2.2 above.  
A sample item states thus: “Franchise contracts are terminated even in the event 
of franchisees committing minor breaches”.  
The ensuing paragraphs focus on the measures of the independent variables. 
C. Measurement of the independent variables 
As discussed in section 5.2.3 above, three sets of constructs described the 
study’s independent variables. This section describes the measures of the constructs. 
i). Structural factors 
The construct of structural factors is measured by six survey items: transactions 
specific assets; hostages; incomplete contracting; information asymmetry; bargaining 
power and dependence. Each of these items reflect one sub-dimension of the sub-
construct as discussed in the previous section 5.2.3 above.  
ii). Contextual factors 
The construct of contextual factors is measured by three survey items: lack of 
regulation; lack of legislation and competitive pressures. Each of these items reflect 
one dimension of the construct as discussed in the previous section 5.2.3 above.  
A sample item states thus: “The government should not regulate the franchising 
industry”. 
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iii). Strategic factors 
The construct of strategic factors is measured by three survey items: joint 
ventures; financial assistance and lease control. Each of these items reflect one sub-
dimension of the sub-construct as discussed in the previous section 5.2.3 above.  
A sample item states thus: “It is usually desirable for franchisors to enter into 
joint ventures with franchisees”.  
The next paragraph discuss the data collection methods. 
 Data collection 
The design of the survey, expanded on below, involved conducting an extensive 
literature review and expert interviews with franchising experts such as academics, 
lawyers and consultants to obtain constructs used to develop and adapt a 7-point 
Likert scale questionnaire ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. 
6.5.1 The survey method 
Using a web-based self-administered questionnaire, this study surveyed 250 
locally and foreign-owned franchisors comprising business format and trade name 
franchise systems operating in nearly all sectors of franchising. At least two weeks in 
advance, the researcher emailed a letter of introduction sanctioned by the university 
(Annexure A) to all potential respondents to introduce him and the purpose of the 
contemplated study.  
The questionnaire was prepared, pre-tested and then posted on 
www.surveymonkey.com, a password secured web-based survey product that 
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allowed the respondents access to the questionnaire via an emailed or faxed link for 
its completion and return to the researcher by the same means.  
6.5.2 The survey instrument 
Based on constructs drawn from the franchising literature and interviews with 
franchising experts that underlay the research questions, the questionnaire 
(Annexure B) comprised of two sections: Parts A and B.  
Part A contained variables aimed at ensuring that the participating franchisors 
possessed the necessary knowledge, experience, and qualifications required to add 
value to the study by controlling for franchising age, experience, size, and sector 
differences.  
Part B consisted of 36 items on a 7 point Likert-type scale (1=strongly agree – 
7=strongly disagree randomly placed on the questionnaire representing items 
measuring the study’s seven constructs of interest, that is, structural, contextual, and 
strategic factors, OO and OA, growth, competitiveness and survival of franchise 
systems. 
The web-based questionnaire was the most cost effective and practical method 
considering that most franchisors operate in high technology environments where 
they are in daily use of electronic equipment that serve as payment, security, and 
communication methods using their smartphones and laptop computers. 
In addition, as opposed to telephonic or personal interviews with a relatively 
large number of franchisors expected to participate in the study, the researcher 
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believed that the electronic method would facilitate a better response rate and the 
speedy completion and return of the questionnaire.  
This hinged on the consideration that most businesspeople appear to respond 
quickly to electronic messages such as text and email messages using smartphones, 
tablets, and laptops.  
Furthermore, the advent of electronic platforms in the form of websites and 
social media such as Twitter, Whatsup and Facebook provided a practical solution as 
nearly all the major franchisors in most sectors of interest host websites that they use 
for monitoring customer experiences and marketing their brands and products to 
potential customers, investors, funders and franchisees (Dixon and Quinn, 2004).  
A perusal of these websites showed that most franchisors in this country 
provided their physical addresses, telephone and fax numbers and email addresses 
but for some unknown reasons, only the physical addresses and telephone numbers 
for their franchisees are provided.  
Preliminary interviews with franchise experts indicated that time constraints, 
competitive pressures and sensitive questions may weaken the ability of most 
franchisors to participate in detailed and involved quantitative techniques such as 
structured and unstructured interviews, as these would limit their option to opt out 
once the interviews had begun.  
As evidenced by fewer than ten franchising studies at master’s and doctoral 
level listed in the National Research Foundation (NRF) database, the dearth of 
franchising research in this country and the unavailability of suitable measures that 
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could be adapted from prior empirical studies on the subject matter under 
investigation necessitated the researcher to use constructs found in the literature and 
discussions with franchising experts to develop measures contained in the survey 
instrument.  
In addition, this research vacuum necessitated careful and thoughtful planning 
of the research process to enhance participation which resulted in most of the usual 
steps to improve participation being taken which included providing a cover letter 
to accompany the questionnaire with the aim of assuring the potential respondents 
of the confidentiality of their personal or company details and making repeated 
phone calls to encourage them to participate in the survey.  
Furthermore, the researcher also assured the respondents of the importance of 
the research to them and the industry, and the free availability of the final report for 
perusal by them and other interested parties at the management library of the 
University of the Witwatersrand and on the theses and dissertations databases on 
completion of the study.  
 Analytical methods 
The following sections briefly describe the analytical methods used in the thesis. 
As shown in Section 5.2, the core of the quantitative study involves complex 
dependence relationships between multiple constructs, including mediation between 
independent variable constructs in section 5.2.3 opportunism constructs in section 
5.2.2 and multiple dependent constructs in section 5.2.1.  
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In addition, as discussed in Section 6.4.2, each of these major constructs is 
measured with multiple survey items reflecting multiple sub-dimensions. This 
design reflects latent variable modelling. 
Given that each survey item is measured on a 1 to 7 point scale, which many 
methodologists believe is at least semi-continuous (Churchill, 1979), correlational-
type studies are appropriate. 
Given the complex path structure with latent modelling, the core analytical 
technique of the quantitative study is structural equation modelling (Kline, 2011). 
The study supplements SEM with other correlational-type techniques such as factor, 
regression and canonical analyses where appropriate.  
6.6.1 Descriptive statistics on franchisor activity 
As the values of skew-ness and kurtosis are minimal, this permitted the use of the 
maximum likelihood procedures. Most importantly, the researcher computed the 
Cronbach (1951) alpha to measure internal consistency, that is, the extent to which 
the individual items that constitute a test correlate with one another or with the test 
total, with a cut-off point of .70 being generally regarded as an acceptable an 
indicator of the reliability of the variables.  
As shown in Annexure E, though the questionnaire used in this study achieved 
a Cronbach alpha at least .70 for the instrument as a whole, but not for some of its 
sub-scales, some methodologists reject the use of the Cronbach alpha where the 
survey instrument consists of multiple sub-scales which tend to result in deflated 
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Cronbach alpha statistics (SAS, 2012) as was the case in this study, with the result 
that this statistic is not used in the study. 
6.6.2 Methods for establishing construct reliability and validity 
Given the problems with the Cronbach relating mainly to the existence of fewer 
constructs per item, and that the quantity methodology used in this study involves 
latent variables each measured through multiple sub-items, it is first necessary to 
investigate empirical construct reliability and validity, as well as aggregate sub-
items into final construct scores. 
As per usual practice, the following methods are employed.  
Factor analysis. Given that the research designed the study with specific sub-
dimensions of constructs in mind each linked to survey items, confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) would usually be the approach for investigating factor structure. As 
explained in the results section below, CFA proved problematic due to statistical 
considerations (Heywood cases arose), as a result of which exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA) was used as a final approach. The EFA yielded the following 
construct reliability and validity indicators: 
Kaiser’s measure of sampling adequacy (MSA). The MSA is a summary of how 
small the partial correlations are relative to the ordinary correlations and used to 
determine face or content validity (Churchill, 1979).  
As values greater than 0.8 are good as opposed to values less than 0.5 require 
remedial action by deleting the offending variables or by including, other variables 
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related to the offenders, the study’s acceptable MSA of 0.68 indicates face or content 
validity for the constructs used in this study. 
Bartlett’s chi-square. According to SAS (2012), the Bartlett’s chi square test 
determines the statistical significance of the factor model by considering the Chi-
square, df, and Prob for H: No common factors and H (SAS, 2010).  
Factors retained are sufficient to explain the correlations. The H test for no 
common Factors is equivalent to Bartlett’s test of sphericity. The notation 
Prob>chi**2 means "the probability under the null research questions of obtaining a 
greater statistic than that observed."  
The chi-square value is displayed with and without Bartlett’s correction and 
was found to be acceptable at 0.000 and this can be interpreted as providing further 
evidence of face or content validity.  
Akaike’s Information Criterion. Akaike’s (1973) information criterion (AIC) 
provide general criterion for estimating the best number of parameters to include in 
a model when maximum likelihood estimation is used.  
The number of factors that yields the smallest value of AIC is best. Like the chi-
square test, AIC tends to include measures that are statistically significant but 
inconsequential for practical purposes.  
The low AIC criterion obtained in this study is acceptable and when compared 
to the low Schwarz’s Bayesian Criterion value (shown below), both values were 
considered to provide convergent validity. 
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Schwarz’s Bayesian Criterion. Schwarz’s Bayesian Criterion (SBC) (Schwarz, 1978) 
is another criterion, similar to AIC, for determining the best number of parameters 
with the number of measures that yields the smallest value of SBC is considered 
best. 
SBC seems to be less inclined to include trivial measures than either AIC or the 
chi-square test. Accordingly, the acceptable low SBC and AIC criteria obtained in 
this study provides convergent validity. 
Tucker and Lewis’s Reliability Coefficient. Though a Tucker and Lewis (1973) 
coefficient of 0.5 and above is usually desirable as it indicates reliability, given the 
population and sampling issues discussed above, a Tucker and Lewis’s Reliability 
Coefficient of 0.4 obtained in this study was considered acceptable as providing 
further evidence of convergent validity to the study. 
Low correlations between different factors. In line with Churchill (1979), the 
relatively high and salient factor loadings of the different items onto the seven 
different factors that were determined by factor analysis suggest that the items 
measured different variables that underlay the different constructs.  
Accordingly, these strong and marginal statistically significant factor-variable 
relationships and the low correlations between these combinations provide evidence 
of discriminant validity among the factors. 
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6.6.3 Methods for investigating relationships between constructs 
Having established the reliability and validity of the constructs, the study 
employs the following methods to study relationships between the constructs in 
terms of the hypotheses: 
- Correlations between construct scores: 
- Regression analysis 
- Canonical analysis 
- Structural equation path modelling between construct scores. 
 Pre-testing of the research instruments 
The pre-testing of the questionnaire and interview statements took place 
among 12 franchising experts consisting of attorneys, consultants, and academics 
prior to its dispatch to potential respondents.  
This aimed at ensuring that the questionnaire and the semi-structured 
interview statements contained items that are simple and understandable to 
minimise interpretation errors and not to hinder or frustrate participation of the 
respondents.  
The pretesting of the research instruments aimed at improving the 
reliability of these instruments by ensuring that they measured what they 
purported to measure.  
Most of the pre-tested franchising experts indicated that both the 
questionnaire and interview statements were fit for purpose. 
252 
 Summary 
Chapter 6 discussed the research methodology used to conduct the quantitative 
study among franchisors. The chapter described and justified the methods used in 
the quantitative study of franchisors. It also discussed the population and sampling 
issues involved in the study before it examined the measures and hypotheses used to 
address the research questions, the data collection and analysis methods. 
Having also discussed the pre-testing the research instruments, the next 
chapter presents and discusses the results of the quantitative study. 
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Chapter 7 Results and discussion - 
Quantitative study 
 Introduction 
Chapter 6 discussed the research methodology used to conduct the quantitative 
study among franchisors. Following this introduction, in line with the approach 
adopted in this study thus far, to a large extent the remaining sections of the chapter 
presents and discusses the results of the quantitative component of the study 
derived from the statistical analysis of questionnaire data obtained using purposive 
sampling method from the South Africa’s 111 purposefully sampled franchisors 
represented by their senior representatives such as chief executive officers, franchise 
directors or managers mainly using SEM on SAS (For reasons explained mostly in 
section 6.1 above, Chapters 8 and 9 present and discuss the results of the qualitative 
part of the study conducted among franchisees). 
After this introduction, section 7.2 discusses the assessment of construct 
reliability and validity. Section 7.3 discusses the relationship between the constructs 
and testing of hypotheses. Section 7.4 discusses the results of the quantitative study. 
Section 7.5 summarises the chapter 
 Franchisor sample profile 
The final franchisor sample profile appears on Table 7-1 below. 
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Table 7-1: Franchisor respondent profile  
Item Number Percentage 
1. No. of franchised outlets   
300 36 32.4  
200 32 28.8  
100 21 18.9  
50 22 19.8  
Total 111 100 
   
2.  No. of stores opened in the past 5 yrs   
30 x  
   
3. No. of store closed in the past 5 yrs   
20 x  
   
4. No. of stores bought back in the past 5 yrs   
10 x  
   
5. Reason for store closures   
Terminated x  
Non-renewal x  
Bad location x  
Relocated   
Weak franchisee x  
Lease expired   
   
6. Reason for store buy back   
Terminated   
Non-renewal x  
Death   
Bankruptcy   
Incapacity x  
Profit   
Source: Developed for the study 
Table 7.1 shows certain expected characteristics such as the 50% of the sampled 
franchisors operating in the fast food, restaurants and groceries sector in the sample, 
30% of those formed some 25 years ago started franchising a few years after their 
formation and that the largest franchise system consisted of some 300 outlets while 
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the smallest 50. The demographics of the franchisors in Table 7-1 is similar to those 
found in other studies such as du Toit (2003).  
In addition, this breakdown seems to suggest that the study drew respondents 
from the relevant population and that the sample is relatively representative.  
This is in light of the similarities between the profile of franchise systems shown 
on Table 3-1 which was based on data obtained from sources such as the 
www.whichfranchise.co.za, www.safw.co.za and www.fasa.co.za. 
This breakdown shed some light on some of the important characteristics of the 
size of the self-reported final franchisor sample.  
For instance, the breakdown shows that the largest franchise systems consisted 
of some 300 outlets and the smallest 50.  
The breakdown also shows that in the past 5 years the surveyed franchise 
systems opened 30, closed down 20 and bought back 10 outlets which suggests that 
on average, not much growth has taken taking place in the past years. 
As such this stunted growth reflects the possible effects of the unfavourable 
economic conditions prevailing in the country which can be seen in the high 
unemployment and poverty levels.  
In addition, these figures also show signs of franchisee distress or failure in the 
form of closed or terminated outlets due to financial or contractual problems that 
may result in the buying or taking back of such outlets by franchisors.  
However, as suggested by the Hoy (1994), it is often difficult to determine 
objectively whether a franchised outlet has failed as franchisors have a tendency to 
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buy or take back outlets from failing franchisees and converting them into coming 
stores or selling them on to other franchisees without any advertising.  
According to Hoy, franchisors take back outlets to protect the image and 
reputation of the franchise system, as closed outlets to generate negative publicity 
for the franchise system that may discourage existing franchisees from renewing or 
extending their franchise contracts or seeking additional units within the franchise 
system.  
Similarly, failed outlets tend to discourage aspirant franchisees and other 
investors from investing their money and effort in particular franchise systems that 
may also attract the attention of public authorities. 
Later, the discussion chapter extends analysis of these company profiles in 
discussions regarding the challenges and prospects facing franchising in terms of the 
need to transform and grow the industry through initiatives such as BBBEE, AA and 
the study’s proposed Franchising Charter.  
The next section discusses tests for reliability and validity of the constructs 
since, as discussed previously, these are measured using multi-item scales. 
 Construct reliability and validity 
Typically, the major approach to investigating construct validity and reliability 
is factor analysis (Kline, 2011).  
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7.3.1 Initial confirmatory factor analyses 
Initially, as explained in the analytical techniques section 6.6, confirmatory 
factor analysis was attempted as the technique for investigating factor structure. 
However, substantial Heywood cases arose in these CFA models that led to 
impossible solutions. 
The researcher attempted multiple solutions to this problem, including the 
parcelling the items. As noted by various SEM theorists, many solutions require 
parcelling of items where fewer constructs per constructs were used. 
Therefore, instead of abandoning an investigation of factor structure, the 
researcher attempted a solution using exploratory factor analysis (EFA) techniques. 
Therefore, the next section discusses the outcomes of the EFA process. 
7.3.2 Exploratory factor analysis 
Exploratory factor analysis (EFA), unlike CFA, allows each manifest variable to 
have an association with each latent variable. This approach seems feasible in the 
current study, since many of the variables may indeed reflect to a small extent other 
issues – for instance, a growth factor like opening of new stores may predominantly 
reflect growth but also be reflective of competitiveness.  
The important investigation in EFA is whether items satisfactorily load on one 
factor to a far greater extent than others, or conversely that each item loads strongly 
on one factor and no more than weakly on others.  
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Thereafter, if satisfactory factors are found individual sub-items may be 
aggregated into overall factor scores. 
The study conducted three factor analysis models for the predictor, 
opportunism and outcomes variables. As described in the previous section, the 
predictor and outcomes suggested a three factor solution with three sub-items each, 
and the opportunism model indicated a two factor solution with three sub-items 
each.  
Each factor model was analysed using principal axis factoring (priors equal to 
squared multiple correlations), with a Promax rotation utilising a CVMIN pre-
rotation routine. Analyses of scree plots and eigenvalues suggests a three factor 
solution for the predictor and outcomes models respectively, each of which is in line 
with expected loadings of items on factors, and a two factor model for opportunism 
items that also lines up with expectation. 
Table 7-2 shows the overall fit statistics for each the three models, noting that 
because this is principal axis factoring the proportion of variance explained can and 
does exceed 1. 
Table 7-2: Fit statistics for factor analysis models 
Factor model Proportion of variance explained Factors returned 
Predictors 1.05 3 
Opportunism 1.50 2 
Outcomes 1.11 3 
Source: Extracted from SAS (2010) 
Notes: Because this is principal axis factor analysis, it is possible for the proportion of variance explained to 
exceed 1. Overall average KMA scores exceed .65 for pooled analyses 
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Table 7-3 shows the rotated factor pattern for the predictor variables. As can be 
seen and with the exception of factor 2, three items were returned for the factors 1 
and 3 and 4 factors for factor 2 in line with expectations. 
Table 7-3: Rotated factor pattern for predictors 
Sub-dimension 
Factor1 
(Contextual factors) 
Factor2 
(Structural factors) 
Factor3 
(Strategic factors) 
Lack of regulation .78   
Lack of legislation .65   
Competition .55   
Information  .77  
Bargaining power  .38  
Contracting  .37  
Hostages  .62  
Financial assistance   .56 
Joint ventures   .43 
Dependence   .39 
Source: Extracted from SAS (2010) 
Notes. ‘Competition’ refers to competitive pressures, ‘information’ refers to information asymmetry, 
‘contracting’ refers to incomplete contracting 
 
Table 7-4 shows the rotated factor pattern for the outcomes variables. As can be 
seen, three items were returned for each factor. 
Table 7-4: Rotated factor pattern for outcomes 
Sub-dimension Factor1  
(Competitiveness) 
Factor2 
(Growth) 
Factor3  
(Survival) 
Differentiation .65   
Cost leadership .60   
Exits .50   
Multi-unit ownership  .64  
Renewal of contracts  .59  
New franchisees  .47  
Store closures   .65 
Focus   .63 
Buy backs   .37 
Source: Extracted from SAS (2010) 
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Table 7-5 shows the rotated factor pattern for the opportunism variables 
indicating the retention of two factors with three items each. These loadings were as 
expected in that the buying back of stores by franchisors, provision of non-exclusive 
territories to franchisees and the imposition of restraint of trade on franchisees 
constituted some of the most common opportunistic actions franchisors take against 
franchisees.  
Similarly, tying agreements, shorter contract terms and RPM indicate 
opportunistic orientations among franchisors as these represent methods franchisors 
use to extract extraneous financial benefits from franchisees. 
Table 7-5: Rotated factor pattern for opportunism 
Sub-dimension  Factor1 
(Opportunistic actions) 
Factor2  
(Opportunistic orientations) 
Store buy back .63  
Non-exclusive territories  .56  
Restraint of trade .36  
Tying agreements  .36 
Shorter contract terms  .34 
Resale price maintenance  .33 
Source: Extracted from SAS (2010) 
Having established factor structure through the above EFAs, the researcher 
therefore aggregated factors through averaging to maintain scale meaning. This 
provides scores for each of the final constructs. 
As contemporary methodology theory does not advocate using Cronbach 
alphas for as few items as three or four or instruments with multiple sub-scale items, 
which is what the final factors contain, this thesis does not analyse this statistic. 
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 Relationships between constructs and hypotheses testing 
Having established factor structure and aggregated to final constructs, the 
following sections proceed to empirically test the critical inter-construct 
relationships that allows for the assessment of the hypotheses.  
As discussed in the summary of analytical methods in section 6.3.3 above, this 
thesis approaches the analysis of inter-construct relationships through correlation-
based methods, including factor and regression analyses and canonical analyses and 
SEM. 
7.4.1 Inter-construct correlations and descriptive statistics 
The means, standard deviations and correlations of the major constructs appear 
in Table 7-6 below.  
Table 7-6: Inter-Construct Correlations and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Structure 4.36 1.17 1.00 
      
Context 4.91 1.46  -.30*** 1.00      
Strategy 3.42 1.01   .07*   .20** 1.00     
OA 4.59 1.26   .01*   .30***   .32*** 1.00    
OO 4.40   .94   .27**   .18*   .24**   .36*** 1.00   
Growth 5.08 1.14  -.43***   .47***   .42***   .64***   .23** 1.00  
Competitive 4.32 1.07  -.53***   .44***   .24**   .40***   .05*   .81 1.00 
Survival 4.40 1.32  -.33***   .65***   .03*   .46***   .25***   .69    .52 
Source: Extracted from SAS (2010) 
Notes. “M” and “SD” refers to mean and standard deviation, respectively. 
 p = 0 - .01=***; p = .01 - .05**; p = .05 - .1* 
 
The correlations range from .25 to .81 suggests that multicollinearity in the data 
that allowed its further use in the study is probably not problematic.  
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Correlations do suggest some interrelatedness of the constructs. Contextual 
factors seem to correlate with most of the other variables. Considering the sub-
dimensions of this construct, that is, lack of legislation, lack of regulation and 
competitive pressures, contextual factors appear to influence the functioning of 
various aspects of the franchise model under investigation. 
It is makes sense for this construct to play such an influential role in franchising 
in this country’s considering the implications of legislation and regulations such as 
the Constitution Act, the Competition Act and the Consumer Protection Act which 
were passed in the past years which have an impact on the franchise relationship..  
The important piece of legislation which has far reaching implications on 
franchising in particular and society in general is the Constitution which guarantees 
the freedoms of and rights of individuals and corporations. 
Quite unexpectedly, opportunistic actions seems to be strongly correlated with 
most of the dependent variables which suggests that opportunism creates growth, 
competitiveness and survival opportunities for franchise systems under the present 
market conditions which may be related to changing consumer profile and lifestyle 
following the growth of the black middle class in this country and the rest of the 
continent. 
The next two section focus on the use of regression and canonical analyses to 
preliminarily analyse the direct relationship between the predictor and outcome 
variables. The section thereafter uses structural equation modelling to examine the 
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impact of mediation on the relationship between the predictor and outcome 
variables as suggested by the study’s three-pronged model. 
A. Regression analysis 
The objective of this part of the study was to use quantitative methods to 
examine the relationship between the independent and intervening variables, that is, 
structural, contextual and strategic factors, OO and OA and the dependent variables, 
that is, growth, competitiveness and survival of franchise systems described in 
section 5.2 above.  
As a precursor to the use of the more robust canonical analysis and structural 
equation modelling to preliminarily and finally test the study’s hypotheses 
discussed in section 1.2, respectively, regression analysis was used to test the 
relationship between the predictor variables represented by structural, contextual 
and strategic factors and OO; and dependent variables represented by OA and the 
growth, competitiveness and survival of franchise systems. 
Table 7-7 through Table 7-11 show the results of the regression analysis 
conducted on SAS (2010) to examine the model fit, influence and diagnostics tests 
with the full reports contained in Annexure E. 
i). Model 1 
Table 7-7 shows that the model 1’s regression equation is significant at .05 level 
with an F statistic of 10.23. In addition, the model shows that the predictor variables, 
that is, structural, contextual and strategic factors accounted for 58 per cent of the 
dependant variable’s variation, that is, OO among franchisors.  
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Similarly, the influence and diagnostics tests such as the Cook’s D, Rstudent 
and the residual statistics indicate an acceptable model with no indications of 
outliers or observations with large influences on the dependent variable. These 
results provide strong relationship between structural, contextual and strategic 
factors and OO among franchisors. 
Table 7-7: Regression Model 1 OO=f(Structural, contextual and strategic factors) 
Variable Estimate Standard 
error 
t value Pr>[t] Standard 
estimate 
Variable 
inference 
Intercept -3.776 .050 -.00 1.000 0 0 
Structural factors .243 .062 3.93 .000 .351 1.098 
Contextual factors .224 .062 3.72 .000 .339 1.138 
Strategic factors .230 .073 3.25 .002 .283 1.044 
Source: Extracted from SAS (2010) 
Multiple regression = .53; R = .22; Adj R = 21 F = 10.23; df = 1; Sum of squares = 17.7; Mean square = 42.7 
ii). Model 2 
Table 7-8 shows the results of Model 2. These results show that the model’s 
regression equation is significant at .05 level with an F value of 10.64. On the other 
hand, the predictor variables namely, structural, contextual and strategic factors 
accounted for a mere 28 per cent of the dependant variable’s variation, that is, OA 
among franchisors. 
Similarly, the influence and diagnostics tests such as the Cook’s D, Rstudent 
and the residual statistics indicate an acceptable model with no indications of 
outliers or observations with large influences on the dependent variable. Therefore, 
model 2 provided moderate support for relationship between structural, contextual 
and strategic factors and OO and OA among franchisors. 
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Table 7-8: Regression model 2 OA = f(Structural, contextual and strategic and OO) 
Variable Estimate Standard 
error 
t 
value 
Pr>[t] Standard 
estimate 
Variable 
inference 
Intercept -3.58E-17 .060 -0.00 1.00 0 0 
Structural factors .022 .079 .28 .780 .026 1.256 
Contextual factors .282 .079 3.62 .000 .338 1.286 
Strategic factors .344 .091 3.84 .000 .37 1.145 
OO .267 .118 2.29 .024 .213 1.284 
Source: Extracted from SAS (2010) 
Multiple regression = .63; R = .31; Adj R = 28; F = 10.64; df = 1; Sum of squares = 17.7; Mean square = 42.7 
iii). Model 3 
Table 7-9 shows the results for Model 3. These results show that model 3’s 
regression equation is highly significant at .05 level with an F statistic of 50.89. In 
addition, Table 7-9 also shows that the predictor variables, that is, structural, 
contextual and strategic factors account for 59 per cent of the dependant variable’s 
variation, namely, growth of franchise systems.  
Similarly the influence and diagnostics tests such as the Cook’s D, Rstudent and 
the residual statistics indicate an acceptable model with no indications of outliers or 
observations with large influences on the dependent variable. Therefore, model 3 
provided strong support for the relationship between structural, contextual and 
strategic factors and the growth of franchise systems. 
Table 7-9: Regression Model 3 Growth = f(Structural, contextual and strategic factors) 
Variable Estimate Standard 
error 
t value Pr>[t] Standard 
estimate 
Variable 
inference 
Intercept 1.217 .053 .00 1.0000 0.000 0.000 
Structural factors -.333 .066 -5.05 <.0001 -.328 1.099 
Contextual factors .468 .065 7.21 <.0001 .477 1.138 
Strategic factors .644 .076 8.49 <.0001 .530 1.044 
Source: Extracted from SAS (2010) 
Multiple regression = .56; R = .59; Adj R = .58; F = 50.89; df = 1; Sum of squares = 17.7; Mean square = 42.7 
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iv). Model 4 
Table 7-10 shows the results for Model 4. These results show that, with an F 
statistic of 33.29, the model’s regression equation is highly significant at .05 level. 
Similarly, the model shows that the predictor variables represented by structural, 
contextual and strategic factors accounted for 47 per cent of the dependant variable’s 
variation, that is, competitiveness of franchise systems.  
In addition, the influence and diagnostics tests such as the Cook’s D, Rstudent 
and the residual statistics indicate an acceptable model with no indications of 
outliers or observations with large influences on the dependent variable. These 
results indicates a strong relationship between structural, contextual and strategic 
factors and the competitiveness of franchise systems. 
Table 7-10: Regression Model 4 Competitiveness = f(Structural, contextual and 
strategic factors) 
Variable Estimate Standard 
error 
t value Pr>[t] Standard 
estimate 
Variable 
inference 
Intercept 4.805 .49 9.71 <.0001 0.00 0.00 
Structural factors .512 .067 7.76 <.0001 .565 1.098 
Contextual factors .084 .054 1.56 .1212 .115 1.093 
Strategic factors .399 .074 5.37 <.0001 .375 1.010 
Source: Extracted from SAS (2010) 
Multiple regression = .78; R = .45; Adj R = 47; F = 33.29; df = 1; Sum of squares = 17.7; Mean square = 42.7 
v). Model 5 
Table 7-11 shows the results for Model 5. An F statistic of 31.94 suggests that the 
model’s regression equation is significant at .05 level. In addition, the predictor 
variables represented by structural, contextual and strategic factors accounted for 46 
per cent of the dependant variable’s variation, that is, survival of franchise systems.  
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Similarly, the influence and diagnostics tests such as the Cook’s D, Rstudent 
and the residual statistics indicate an acceptable model with no indications of 
outliers or observations with large influences on the dependent variable. Hence, 
model 5 provides evidence of a strong relationship between structural, contextual 
and strategic factors and the survival of franchise systems. 
Table 7-11: Regression Model 5 Survival=f(Structural, contextual and strategic factors) 
Variable Estimate Standard 
error 
t value Pr>[t] Standard 
estimate 
Variable 
inference 
Intercept 1.543 .718 2.15 .0339 0 0 
Structural factors .006 .098 .05 .962 .004 1.098 
Contextual factors .470 .079 6.4 <.0001 .516 1.093 
Strategic factors .157 .109 1.46 .1474 .120 1.010 
Source: Extracted from SAS (2010) 
Multiple regression = .59; R = .48; Adj R = 46; F = 31.94; df = 1; Sum of squares = 17.7; Mean square = 42.7 
The next section focuses on canonical correlation analysis or canonical analysis 
used to further analyse the survey data. 
B. Canonical analysis results  
The responses of 111 franchisors to the study’s 24 variables contained in the 7 
point Likert scaled (1 = strongly agree and 7 = strongly disagree) questionnaire were 
cross tabulated and subjected to canonical analysis on the SAS statistical package 
(SAS, 2012).  
Primarily, canonical analysis was used in a supporting role or a preliminary 
step towards determining support or rejection for its seven hypotheses through 
structural equation modelling (discussed in the next section) to examine the 
perceptions of franchisors on the relationship between OO and OA on the growth, 
competitiveness, and survival of franchise systems.  
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As stated above, as the SEM tests the whole model with emphasis on examining 
the effect of mediation on the relationship between the predictor and outcome 
variables the tests form the basis of the final interpretation and discussion of the 
results of the study. 
More formally, canonical analysis tested the hypotheses that the first canonical 
correlations or variates and all the others are zero in respect of each of the seven sets 
of independent and dependent variables used to address the research questions by 
examining the model fit of the canonical correlations, the statistical and practical 
significance of the canonical relationships.  
Examining the model fit of the canonical correlations between the variables 
involved assessing the magnitude and directional signs of statistics such as the 
canonical functions, F statistics and multivariate significance tests, that is, Wilks’ 
lambda, Pillai’s trace, Hotellings’s trace and Roy’s gcr.  
In addition, the relative importance of the canonical weights, canonical 
loadings, and canonical cross loadings tabulated on Table 7-12 through Table 7-18 
were also used to determine and interpret the significant canonical relationships as 
preliminary examinations of the hypotheses the results of which were compared and 
subjugated to structural equation modelling path analyses test results where the two 
tests results conflicted each other for reasons stated above.  
i). Hypothesis 1 – Structural factors and OO 
Canonical functions. Hypothesis 1 posited that a positive relationship existed 
between structural factors and OO among franchisors. Table 7-12 shows canonical 
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correlations analysis results of the three structural factors variables, that is, 
information asymmetry, incomplete contracting and transactions specific assets as 
independent or predictor variables and the three OO variables, that is, resale price 
maintenance, non-exclusive territories and shorter contract terms as the dependent 
or criterion variables which are discussed in section 5.1.1 above, used to 
preliminarily test hypothesis 1.  
Statistical and practical significance. Table 7-12 shows the data yielded three 
canonical functions with three pairs of linear composites. The first canonical function 
contains an acceptable significant pair of linear composites of 0.49, a second has a 
marginally significant pair of 0.43, and the last insignificant pair of near zero. The 
magnitude of the first pair of linear composite representing the size of the canonical 
correlations between the first set of dependent and independent variables indicates 
its practical significance.  
This provides support for the identification and interpretation of the first 
canonical function. Secondly, considering the F statistic of 6.33, the probability level 
of 0.0001 is statistically significant at alpha = .05. 
This suggests the rejection of the null hypothesis that the first canonical function 
and the other two are zero. Thirdly, the multivariate test statistics represented by 
Wilk’s lambda, Pillai’s Trace, Hotelling-Lawley Trace and Roy’s Greatest Root also 
show the statistical significance of the first canonical function at the alpha = .05 level.  
Interpreting the canonical weights, loadings and cross loadings. Table 7-12 shows 
significant contribution to the first canonical function’s canonical weights, canonical 
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loadings and cross loadings of the predictor variable set, that is, structural factors 
dimension represented by hostages, incomplete contracting and transactions specific 
assets and criterion variable set, that is, OO dimension represented by non-exclusive 
territories.  
Hypothesis 1 test results. Therefore, together with the statistical and practical 
significance indicating an acceptable model fit testing hypothesis 1, the evidence 
presented in Table 7-12 provides support for the hypothesised positive relationship 
between structural factors and OO among franchisors.  
Table 7-12: Results of canonical analysis relating structural factors and OO 
Canonical 
function 
Canonical 
correlation 
Square 
canonical 
correlation 
Eigen 
value 
Wilk’s 
lambda 
Den 
df 
F statistic Significance 
1 .60 .36 .57 .42 275.45 8.96 <.0001 
2 .45 .31 .26  210 8.39 <.0001 
3  .18 .21  106  <.0001 
    
Predictor set – Structural dimensions Canonical 
weights 
Canonical 
loadings 
Canonical 
cross 
loadings 
Hostages .53 .26 .16 
Transactions specific assets .06 .14 .09 
Incomplete contracting .59 .50 .30 
Information asymmetry .96 .-98 .35 
    
Criterion set – OO dimensions Canonical 
weights 
 
Canonical 
cross 
loadings 
Canonical 
weights 
Resale price maintenance .03 .24 .10 
Shorter contract terms .21 .21 .30 
Non-exclusive territories -.91 .98 .59 
        
  Canonical correlation coefficient = .60   
  Canonical root eigenvalue =.57   
  F statistic = 8.96   
  df = Canonical correlations = 12   
Source: Extracted from SAS (2010) 
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ii). Hypothesis 2 – Contextual factors and OO 
Canonical functions. Hypothesis 2 posited that the existence of a positive 
relationship between contextual factors and OO among franchisors. Table 7-13 
shows canonical correlations analysis results of the three contextual factors variables, 
that is, lack of regulation, lack of legislation and competitiveness as independent or 
predictor variables and the three OO variables, that is, non-exclusive territories, 
shorter contract terns and no arbitration clauses as the dependent or criterion 
variables discussed in section 5.1.1 above, that preliminarily tested hypothesis 2.  
Statistical and practical significance. Table 7-13 shows the various statistical tests 
for the canonical analysis on the SAS statistical package. Firstly, the data yielded 
three canonical functions with three pairs of linear composites. The first canonical 
function contains an acceptable significant pair of linear composites of 0.53, a second 
has a marginally significant pair of 0.37, and the last insignificant pair of near zero.  
The magnitude of the first pair of linear composite representing the size of the 
canonical correlations between the first set of dependent and independent variables 
indicates its practical significance. This provides support for the identification and 
interpretation of the first canonical function.  
Secondly, considering the F statistic of 6.30, the probability level of 0.0001 is 
statistically significant at alpha = .05. This suggests the rejection of the null 
hypothesis that the first canonical function and the other two are zero. Thirdly, the 
multivariate test statistics represented by Wilk’s lambda, Pillai’s Trace, Hotelling-
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Lawley Trace and Roy’s Greatest Root also show the statistical significance of the 
first canonical function at the alpha .05 level.  
Interpreting the canonical function or variate. Table 7-13 shows a substantive 
interpretation of the results indicating that lack of legislation and lack of regulation 
contributed significantly to the canonical weights and canonical loadings of the 
contextual factors dimension and to the cross loadings of the OO dimension of the 
first canonical variate.  
Hypothesis 2 test results. The statistical and practical significance indicating an 
acceptable model fit testing hypothesis 2 provide supporting preliminary evidence 
for the hypothesised positive relationship between contextual factors and OO among 
franchisors. 
Table 7-13: Results of canonical analysis relating contextual factors with OO  
Canonical 
function 
Canonical 
correlation 
Square 
canonical 
correlation 
Eigen 
value 
Wilk’s 
lambda 
Den 
df 
F statistic Significance 
1 .53 .28 .40 .614 255.69 6.30 <.0001 
2 .37 .13 .15  212 4.21 <.0003 
3 .10 .01 .01  107 .98 <.3253 
    
Predictor set – Contextual factors 
dimensions 
Canonical 
weights 
Canonical 
loadings 
Canonical 
cross 
loadings 
Lack of legislation .73 .95 .51 
Lack of regulation .36 .38 .47 
Competitive pressures -.07 .47 -.23 
    
    
Criterion set – OO dimensions Canonical 
weights 
 
Canonical 
cross 
loadings 
Canonical 
weights 
Resale price maintenance .84 .88 .47 
Shorter contract terms .15 .38 .20 
Non-exclusive territories .43 .47 .25 
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  Canonical correlation coefficient = .53   
  Canonical root eigenvalue =.34   
  F statistic = 6.30   
  df = Canonical correlations = 255.69   
Source: Extracted from SAS (2010) 
 
iii). Hypothesis 3 – Strategic factors and OO 
Canonical functions. Hypothesis 3 posited the existence of a positive relationship 
between strategic factors and OO among franchisors. Table 7-14 shows canonical 
correlations analysis results of the three strategic factors variables, that is, financial 
assistance, joint ventures and competitive pressures as independent or predictor 
variables and the three OO variables under statements, that is, non-exclusive 
territories, shorter contract terns and no arbitration clauses as the dependent or 
criterion variables discussed in section 5.1.1 above to test hypothesis 3.  
Statistical and practical significance. As shown on Table 7-14, the data produced 
three canonical functions with three pairs of linear composites. The first canonical 
function contains an acceptable significant pair of linear composites of 0.53, a second 
has a marginally significant pair of 0.37, and the last insignificant pair of near zero. 
The size of the first pair of linear composite representing the size of the canonical 
correlations between the first set of dependent and independent variables indicates 
its practical significance.  
This provides support for the identification and interpretation of the first 
canonical function. Secondly, the F statistic of 6.13 shows that the probability level of 
0.0001 is statistically significant at alpha = .05. This suggests the rejection of the null 
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hypothesis that the first canonical function and the other two are zero. Thirdly, the 
multivariate test statistics represented by Wilk’s lambda, Pillai’s Trace, Hotelling-
Lawley Trace and Roy’s Greatest Root also show the statistical significance of the 
first canonical function at the alpha .05 level.  
Interpreting the canonical function or variate. Table 7-14 indicates that the 
provision of financial assistance to franchisees by franchisors and joint ventures 
between franchisors and franchisees contributed significantly to the canonical 
weights and canonical loadings of the strategic factors dimension and to the cross 
loadings of the OO dimension of the first canonical variate.  
Hypothesis 3 test results. Therefore, together with the statistical and practical 
significance indicating an acceptable model fit testing hypothesis 3, Table 7-14 
presents preliminary evidence that supports the hypothesised positive relationship 
between strategic factors and OO among franchisors. 
Table 7-14: Results of canonical analysis relating strategic factors with OO 
Canonical 
function 
Canonical 
correlation 
Square 
canonical 
correlation 
Eigen 
value 
Wilk’s 
lambda 
Den 
df 
F statistic Significance 
1 .49 .24 .31 .67 522.69 5.03 <.0001 
2 .34 .11 .13 .89 212 3.32 <.0116 
3 .03 .00  .10 107 0.12 <.7316 
Predictor set – Strategic factors dimensions Canonical 
weights 
Canonical 
loadings 
Canonical 
cross 
loadings 
Financial assistance .88 .95 .47 
Joint ventures .29 .49 .24 
Competitive pressures -.12 -.13 .-06 
    
Criterion set – OO dimensions Canonical 
weights 
 
Canonical 
cross 
loadings 
Canonical 
weights 
Resale price maintenance .51 .70 .35 
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Shorter contract terms .50 .48 .24 
Non-exclusive territories .63 .06 .30 
        
  Canonical correlation coefficient = .49   
  Canonical root eigenvalue =.32   
  F statistic = 5.03   
  df = Canonical correlations = 255.69   
Source: Extracted from SAS (2010) 
 
Research question 2  
This research question sought to determine whether there was any relationship 
between OO and OA among franchisors. 
iv). Hypothesis 4 – OO and OA 
Canonical functions. Hypothesis 4 posited the existence of a positive relationship 
existed between OO and OA among franchisors. Table 7-15 shows canonical 
correlations analysis results of the three OO variables under statements, that is non-
exclusive territories, shorter contract terns and no arbitration clauses as independent 
or predictor variables and the three OO variables under statements, that is, store buy 
back, resale restrictions and termination at will as the dependent or criterion 
variables also discussed in section 5.1.1 above that tested hypothesis 4.  
Statistical and practical significance. Table 7-15 shows the data yielded three 
canonical functions with three pairs of linear composites. The first canonical function 
contains an acceptable significant pair of linear composites of 0.49, a second and 
third significant pairs of 0.34, and near zero, respectively. The size of the first pair of 
linear composite representing the size of the canonical correlations between the first 
set of dependent and independent variables indicates its practical significance.  
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This provides support for the identification and interpretation of the first 
canonical function. Secondly, considering the F statistic of 5.03, the probability level 
of 0.0001 is statistically significant at alpha = .05. This suggests the rejection of the 
null hypothesis that the first canonical function and the other two are zero.  
Thirdly, the multivariate test statistics represented by Wilk’s lambda, Pillai’s 
Trace, Hotelling-Lawley Trace and Roy’s Greatest Root also show the statistical 
significance of the first canonical function at the alpha .05 level.  
Interpreting the canonical function or variate. Table 7-15 shows that weighted sum 
of non-exclusive territories and shorter term contracts contributed significantly to 
the canonical weights and canonical loadings of the OO dimension and to the cross 
loadings of the OA dimension of the first canonical variate.  
Hypothesis 4 test results. Therefore, together with the statistical and practical 
significance indicating an acceptable model fit testing hypothesis 4, this evidence 
provides support for the hypothesised positive relationship between OO and OA 
among franchisors.  
Table 7-15: Results of canonical analysis relating OO with OA 
Canonical 
function 
Canonical 
correlation 
Square 
canonical 
correlation 
Eigen 
value 
Wilk’s 
lambda 
Den 
df 
F statistic Significance 
1 .52 .28 .38 .66 255.69 5.22 <.0001 
2 .29 .08 .09 .91 212 2.42 <.0494 
3 .03 .00 .00 .10 107 .010 <.0751 
    
Predictor set – OO dimensions Canonical 
weights 
Canonical 
loadings 
Canonical 
cross 
loadings 
Resale price maintenance .20 .06 .03 
Shorter contract terms -.42 -.72 .19 
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Non-exclusive territories .79 .87 -.40 
    
Criterion set – OA dimensions Canonical 
weights 
 
Canonical 
cross 
loadings 
Canonical 
weights 
Store buy back .57 .45 .23 
Resale restrictions .38 .36 .19 
Termination at will -.81 -.75 .-40 
 
  Canonical correlation coefficient = .52   
  Canonical root eigenvalue =.38   
  F statistic = 5.22   
  df = Canonical correlations = 255.69   
Source: Extracted from SAS (2010) 
 
Research question 3 (Hypothesis 5 – 7) 
Through three hypotheses, research question three examined the relationship 
between OA and the growth, competitiveness and survival of franchise systems. 
v). Hypothesis 5 – OA and the growth of franchise systems 
Canonical functions. Hypothesis 5 postulated that a positive relationship existed 
between growth and OA among franchisors. Table 7-16 shows canonical correlations 
analysis results of the three growth variables under statements, that is, store buy 
back, resale restrictions and termination at will as independent or predictor variables 
and the three growth variables, that is, new franchisees, renewal of franchise 
contracts and multi-unit ownership as the dependent or criterion variables analysed 
to test hypothesis 5.  
Statistical and practical significance. Table 7-16 shows that the first canonical 
function contains a significant pair of linear composites of 0.57, and a second and 
third insignificant pair of 0.20 and near zero. 3. This leaves only the first pair of 
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linear composite as practically significant for allowing its identification and 
interpretation of the first canonical variates. Secondly, considering the F statistic of 
6.17, the probability level of 0.0001 is statistically significant at alpha = .05. 
This suggests the rejection of the null hypothesis that the first canonical function 
and the other two are zero. Thirdly, the multivariate test statistics represented by 
Wilk’s lambda, Pillai’s Trace, Hotelling-Lawley Trace and Roy’s Greatest Root also 
show the statistical significance of the first canonical function at the alpha .05 level.  
Interpreting the canonical function or variate. Table 7-16 indicates that lack of 
arbitration clauses in franchise contracts contributed significantly to the canonical 
weights and canonical loadings of the growth dimension and to the cross loadings of 
the OA dimension of the first canonical variate.  
Hypothesis 5 test results. Therefore, together with the statistical and practical 
significance indicating an acceptable model fit testing hypothesis 5, this evidence 
provides support for the hypothesised positive relationship between growth and OA 
among franchisors. 
Table 7-16: Results of canonical analysis relating OA with growth  
Canonical 
function 
Canonical 
correlation 
Square 
canonical 
correlation 
Eigen 
value 
Wilk’s 
lambda 
Den 
df 
F statistic Significance 
1 .59 .34 .52 255.69 .62 6.17 <.0001 
2 .20 .04 .04 212  1.53 <.1953 
3 .12 .01 .02 107  1.66 <.2000 
    
Predictor set – OA dimensions Canonical 
weights 
Canonical 
loadings 
Canonical 
cross 
loadings 
Store buy back .84 .90 .52 
Resale restrictions .-32 -.39 .-23 
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Termination at will .30 .41 .24 
    
Criterion set – Growth dimensions Canonical 
weights 
 
Canonical 
cross 
loadings 
Canonical 
weights 
Multi-unit ownership .59 .81 .48 
Renewal of franchise contracts -.17 .38 .02 
Non-exclusive territories .60 .86 .51 
        
  Canonical correlation coefficient = .59   
  Canonical root eigenvalue =.52   
  F statistic = 6.17   
  df = Canonical correlations = 25.69   
Source: Extracted from SAS (2010) 
 
vi). Hypothesis 6 – OA and the competitiveness of franchise systems 
Canonical functions. Hypothesis 6 posited that a positive relationship existed 
between OA and the competitiveness of franchise systems among franchisors. Table 
7-17 shows canonical correlations analysis results of the three competitiveness 
variables, that is, cost leadership, product differentiation and focus as independent 
or predictor variables and the three OA variables under statements, that is, store buy 
back, resale restrictions and termination at will as the dependent or criterion 
variables analysed to test hypothesis 6.  
Statistical and practical significance. Table 7-17 shows the three canonical 
functions with three pairs of linear composites for this canonical relationship. The 
first canonical function contains a marginally significant pair of linear composites of 
0.38, a second and a third insignificant pair of r composites of 0.26 and near zero 
which indicates the limited practical significance of the canonical relationship. 
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Secondly, considering the F statistic of 2.80, the probability level of 0.0001 is 
statistically significant at alpha = .05. This suggests the rejection of the null 
hypothesis that the first canonical function and the other two are zero. Thirdly, the 
multivariate test statistics represented by Wilk’s lambda, Pillai’s Trace, Hotelling-
Lawley Trace and Roy’s Greatest Root also show the statistical significance of the 
first canonical function at the alpha .05 level.  
Interpreting the canonical function or variate. Table 7-17 shows that termination of 
franchise contracts and store take or buy back of franchised outlets by franchisors 
and contributed significantly to the canonical weights and canonical loadings of the 
competitiveness dimension and to the cross loadings of the OA dimension of the 
first canonical variate.  
Hypothesis 6 test results. Therefore, together with the statistical and practical 
significance indicating an acceptable model fit testing hypothesis 6, this evidence 
provides support for the hypothesised negative relationship between OA and 
competitiveness of franchise systems. 
Table 7-17: Results of canonical analysis relating OA with competitiveness  
Canonical 
function 
Canonical 
correlation 
Square 
canonical 
correlation 
Eigen 
value 
Wilk’s 
lambda 
Den 
df 
F statistic Significance 
1 .36 .15 .80 .80 255.69 2.86 <.0038 
2 .26 .07 .07   1.85 <.1196 
3 .01 .00 .00   0.01 <.9068 
Predictor set – OA dimensions Canonical 
weights 
Canonical 
loadings 
Canonical 
cross 
loadings 
Store buy back .58 .68 .26 
Resale restrictions -.39 -.45 .17 
Termination at will .64 .70 .27 
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Criterion set – Competitiveness dimensions Canonical 
weights 
 
Canonical 
cross 
loadings 
Canonical 
weights 
Differentiation -.37 -.05 .02 
Focus .93 .93 .36 
Cost leadership .17 .37 .07 
        
  Canonical correlation coefficient = .36   
  Canonical root eigenvalue =.80   
  F statistic = 2.86   
  df = Canonical correlations = 255.69   
Source: Extracted from SAS (2010) 
 
vii). Hypothesis 7 – OA and the survival of franchise systems 
Canonical functions. Hypothesis 7 posited that a positive relationship existed 
between OA and the survival of franchise systems. Table 7-18 shows canonical 
correlations analysis results of the three OA variables under statements, that is store 
buy back, resale restrictions and termination at will as independent or predictor 
variables and the three survival variables under statements disruptions, store 
closures and exits as the dependent or criterion variables analysed to test hypothesis 
7.  
Statistical and practical significance. Table 7-18 shows three canonical functions 
with three pairs of linear composites. The first canonical function contains a 
marginally significant pair of linear composites of 0.31 and insignificant second and 
third pairs. The small magnitude of the first pair of linear composite representing the 
size of the canonical correlations between the first set of dependent and independent 
variables indicates its limited practical significance.  
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Similarly, the F statistic of 1.66 against the larger probability level of 0.098 
statistically insignificant at alpha = .05. This suggests the failure to reject the null 
hypothesis that the first canonical function and the other two are zero. Thirdly, the 
larger multivariate test statistics represented by Wilk’s lambda, Pillai’s Trace, 
Hotelling-Lawley Trace and Roy’s Greatest Root also show the statistical 
insignificance of the first canonical function at the alpha .05 level.  
Interpreting the canonical function or variate. Table 7-18 indicates that store buy or 
take backs and termination of franchise contracts by franchisors contributed 
significantly to the canonical weights and canonical loadings of the OA dimension 
and to the cross loadings of the survival dimension of the first canonical variate.  
Hypothesis 7 test results. Therefore, together with the statistical and practical 
significance indicating an acceptable model fit testing hypothesis 7, this evidence 
provides lack of support for the hypothesised negative relationship between OA and 
the survival of franchise systems. 
Table 7-18: Results of canonical analysis relating OA with survival  
Canonical 
function 
Canonical 
correlation 
Square 
canonical 
correlation 
Eigen 
value 
Wilk’s 
lambda 
Den 
df 
F statistic Significance 
1 .31 .10 .11 .87 255.69 1.66 <.0982 
2 .17 .03 .03  212 .97 <.4260 
3 .08 .01 .01  107 .75 <.3877 
    
Predictor set – OA dimensions Canonical 
weights 
Canonical 
loadings 
Canonical 
cross 
loadings 
Store buy back .51 .60 .19 
Resale restrictions .70 -.75 .23 
Termination at will .37 .46 .14 
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Criterion set – Survival dimensions Canonical 
weights 
 
Canonical 
cross 
loadings 
Canonical 
weights 
Exits .65 .80 .25 
Disruptions .50 .77 .24 
Store closures .07 .-27 -.08 
        
  Canonical correlation coefficient = .31   
  Canonical root eigenvalue =.11   
  F statistic = 1.66   
  df = Canonical correlations = 255.69   
Source: Extracted from SAS (2010) 
 
The canonical analyses presented above examined the relationship between the 
sub-dimensions of two constructs at a time, for example structural factors and 
opportunistic orientations. The next section discusses the structural equation 
modelling path analysis which examined the aggregate relationships between the 
sub-dimensions of the all the constructs in the entire franchising model under 
investigation. 
C.  Structural equation modelling: final model 
As this is a doctoral thesis requiring a thorough testing of the constructs in the 
franchising model under investigation and the need to demonstrate the inter-
relationships between all the constructs with each other in one model, structural 
equation modelling (SEM) was used to examine the study’s research questions by 
assessing the fit between the theoretical and empirical models to test its seven 
hypotheses and therefore the SEM results were given primacy over both the 
regression and canonical analysis results.  
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i). Structural and measurement models.  
In structural equation modelling, it is customary to translate the verbal model 
into a mathematical model consisting of two parts: a structural model and a 
measurement model (Anderson, 1987). The structural model is the conceptual model 
shown on Figure 1. It specifies the hypothesised causal relationships among the latent 
variables while the measurement model shown on Figure 4: Initial SEM model 
describes the relationship between the latent or unobserved variables (that is, 
hypothetical constructs) and the observed variables.  
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Figure 4: Initial SEM model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Developed for the study  
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Table 7-19 below describes the legends of the initial SEM model shown on Figure 4: 
Initial SEM model which consists of 7 latent variables marked F1 through F7 to 
represent the study’s seven endogenous variables, that is, structural, contextual and 
strategic factors, OO and OA and growth, competitiveness and survival. The model 
also shows the study’s 36 manifest variables marked V1a-V1f, V2a-V2c, V3a-V3c, 
V4a-Vh, V5a-V5e, V6a–V6c and V7a-V7e representing the exogenous variables. In 
the main, the model suggests direct effects between the latent variables with OO and 
OA as intervening or mediating variables.  
Table 7-19: Legends of the initial model 
Level Construct Sub-dimension Labels Sub-
hypotheses 
Dependent 
variables 
Growth (H5) New franchisees V14 H5a 
Renewal of 
contracts 
V20 H5b 
Multi-unit 
ownership 
V12 H5c 
Conversions 
 
V7 H5d 
Competitiveness (H6) Cost leadership V13 H6a 
Differentiation V6 H6b 
Focus V18 H6c 
Innovation 
 
V5 H6d 
Survival (H7) Disruptions V26 H7a 
Exits V11 H7b 
Closures V30 H7c 
Buy backs V19 H7d 
Litigation 
 
V32 H7e 
Intervening 
variables 
Opportunistic 
orientations (H4) 
Non-exclusive 
territories 
V35 H4a 
No arbitration 
clause 
V28 H4b 
Resale price 
maintenance 
V29 H4c 
Tying agreements V34 H4d 
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Shorter contract 
terms 
V25 H4e 
Fixed term 
contracts 
V33 H4f 
Opportunistic actions 
(H4) 
Store buy or take 
back  
V15 H4g 
Resale restrictions V17 H4h 
Termination at will V16 H4i 
Restraint of trade 
 
V27 H4j 
Independent 
variables 
Structural factors (H1) Transactions 
specific assets  
V22 H1a 
Hostages  V8 H1b 
Incomplete 
contracting  
V24 H1c 
Information 
asymmetry   
V31 H1d 
Bargaining power V36 H1e 
Dependence 
 
V21 H1f 
Contextual factors 
(H2) 
Lack of regulation V9 H2a 
Lack of legislation V2 H2b 
Competitive 
pressures 
V23 H2c 
 
Strategic factors (H3) Joint ventures V3 H3a 
Financial assistance V1 H3b 
Lease Control V11 H3c 
Source: Developed for the study 
 
ii). Chi square test.  
The model yielded a chi-square is 9.5 with 5 degrees of freedom and p-value of 
0.09 at 5% significance level. These insignificant figures show no statistical support 
for rejecting the study’s SEM model. However, given the limitation of the chi square 
to determining statistical significance of models because of its sensitive to sample 
size (Tanaka, 1987), the goodness-of-fit measures also assessed the model fit. 
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iii). Fit indices.  
SAS produces three sets of fit indices with different measures which assess 
different model aspects. These are the absolute, incremental and parsimony indices. 
Briefly stated, these indices differ in respect of their composition and as such they 
are useful in giving in different perspectives of the model. For example, the absolute 
fit measures only focus on the model at hand whilst the parsimony fit index 
compares the model under scrutiny to the baseline or null model. Of these measures, 
the absolute measures are the most commonly used and received attention in this 
study. However, the measures of the other fit indices are mentioned for the sake of 
completeness. 
The absolute fit indices are fit measures that interpret them without referring to 
any baseline model. These indices do not adjust for model parsimony and always 
favour models with a large number of parameters. The chi-square test statistic is the 
best-known absolute index in this category, which in this study is 9.42 with an 
insignificant a p-value of 0.05, which is larger than the conventional value.  
From the statistical hypothesis testing point of view, it is not plausible or 
desirable to reject this model. The Z-test of Wilson and Hilferty is also insignificant at 
1.65, which echoes the result of the chi-square test. Other absolute indices also 
deserve attention. The SRMR of 0.00 and Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) of .97 also 
indicates good model fit when taking into account the conventional values of 0.05 
and .90, respectively. 
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Parsimony fit indices. These indices take the parsimony of the model into account. 
These indices adjust the model fit by the degrees of freedom (or the number of the 
parameters) of the model in certain ways. The advantage of these indices is that 
merely increasing the number of parameters in the model might not necessarily lead 
better model fit measures. These fit indices penalise models with large numbers of 
parameters. There is no universal way to interpret all these indices. However, for the 
relatively well-known Adjusted GFI of 0.81, smaller AIC of 73, CAIC of 192, SBC of 
160, McDonald of 0.99 and RMSEA estimate of 0.11 all indicate a very good model fit.  
Last, the incremental fit indices are computed based on comparing the target 
model fit against the fit of a baseline model, which is usually the so-called 
uncorrelatedness model where all manifest variables are assumed not to be 
correlated. This is the baseline model that PROC CALIS uses.  
The baseline model fit statistic appears under the Modeling Info category of the 
same fit summary table. Various incremental fit indices exist. In the fit summary 
table, there are six of such fit indices. Large values for these indices are desirable. The 
rule of thumb suggests that values larger than .90 for these indices indicate 
acceptable model fit.  
In this study, most of incremental indices, that is, BCI of 0.98, Bentler-Bonnett 
NFI of 0.97, Bentler NNI of 0.89 and Bentler N Delta 2 of 0.98 show that the 
hypothesised model fits well. There is no consensus as to which fit index is the best 
to judge model fit.  
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Probably, with artificial data and model, all fit indices can be defective in some 
aspects of measuring model fit. Conventional wisdom is to look at all fit indices and 
determine whether the majority of them are close to the desirable ranges of values. In 
this study, almost all fit indices are good, and so it is safe to conclude that the model 
fits well.  
LM multipliers. An assessment of the LM statistics also indicates the absence of 
highly significant chi squares with the result that no new paths need to be added 
considering that the above chi square and fit indices suggested that the model fit is 
good.  
Wald statistics. The Wald statistics also showed no highly insignificant chi 
squares which indicated a need to remove some paths from the model without 
damaging the overall model fit. 
Residuals. None of the model’s residuals were above 2 which further indicated a 
good model fit.  
iv). Measurement model and hypotheses testing.  
Table 7-20 summarises the results of the measurement model shown on Fig 3 
which display the paths indicating the loadings of the standardised parameter, 
standard error, and t-values of the manifest variables for the SEM model.  
The process of testing the hypotheses involved determining the statistical 
significance of the parameter estimates by examining the magnitude of these values 
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and comparing the t values with the critical value of a standardized normal variate, 
that is, the -table.  
Therefore, estimates with parameter estimates larger than 0.1, error estimates 
smaller than 0.5 and t values greater than 1.96 were significant at alpha =.05. As 
shown on Table 7-20 below, variables and hypotheses passed the significance test by 
having t-values greater than 1.96. These results show support for 5 hypotheses.  
Table 7-20: Summary of hypotheses test results based on SEM paths 
Path  Parameter 
estimate 
Standard 
error 
t value Hypotheses 
test results 
Structural factors OO 0.18 0.10 1.98 Supported 
Contextual factors OO 0.11 0.10 1.33 Unsupported 
Structural factors OA 0.25 0.10 2.81 Supported 
Structural factors Competitiveness 0.31 0.10 4.00 Supported 
Structural factors Growth 0.03 0.10 -0.31 Unsupported 
Structural factors Survival 0.49 0.10 7.06 Supported 
Contextual factors OA 0.58 0.10 -8.86 Supported 
Contextual factors Competitiveness 0.41 0.10 -6.77 Supported 
Contextual factors Growth 0.05 0.10 0.64 Unsupported 
Contextual factors Survival 0.09 0.10 1.17 Unsupported 
Strategic factors OA 0.06 0.10 0.97 Unsupported 
Strategic factors Competitiveness 0.40 0.10 4.92 Supported 
Strategic factors Growth 0.33 0.10 4.18 Supported 
Strategic factors Survival 0.20 0.10 3.14 Supported 
OO Growth 0.06 0.10 0.70 Unsupported 
OO Competitiveness 0.03 0.10 0.38 Unsupported 
OO Survival 0.03 0.10 0.46 Unsupported 
OA Growth 0.32 0.10 -4.14 Supported 
OA Competitiveness 0.09 0.10 1.11 Unsupported 
OA Survival 0.61 0.10 9.80 Supported 
Source: Extracted from SAS (2010) 
p = 0.05 significance level 
 
Table 7-20 above shows a number of paths that supported the data and five of 
the study’s seven hypotheses as discussed in the next section. 
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v). Final path diagram.  
Based on the paths shown in Table 7-20 above, Fig 5 shows the study’s final 
path diagram. Briefly stated, the lack of association between opportunistic 
orientations and opportunistic actions highlights the unexpected differences between 
the initial and the final model which may suggest the similarity between the sub-
dimensions of the opportunism constructs. 
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Figure 5: Final path diagram 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Extracted from SAS (2010) 
λ = 9.5; DF= 5; GFI; p = 0.900; SRMR = 0.002; RMSEA = 0.111; GFI = .97; BCI = .98; = BBNFI = .97; Bentler NNI = .89; 
AIC = 73; CAIC = 192; SBC = 160 
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vi). Reliability and Validity.  
One of the advantages of using latent variable analysis in SEM is the possibility 
to assess the reliability and validity of the variables of the study (Hatcher, 1994). 
Apart from the EFA construct reliability and validity reported in section 6.2.2 above, 
SAS performs convergent validity and discriminant validity using a multitrait, 
multimethod (MTMM) approach to validation (Campbell and Fiske, 1959) that 
assesses multiple constructs using more than one assessment method.  
Accordingly, convergent validity is demonstrated when different instruments 
are used to measure the same construct, and the scores from these different 
instruments are strongly correlated.  
In most cases, factor loading t-values of measures were used to determine 
convergent validity. On the other hand, discriminant validity obtains where different 
sub-scales of the instrument are used to measure different constructs, and the 
correlations between measures of these constructs are relatively weak. 
Evidence of discriminant validity exists where the variance extracted for each 
measure exceeds the respective correlation estimate between factors (Fornell and 
Lacker, 1981).  
Similarly, the variance-extracted statistic estimates the proportion of variance 
explained by a construct compared to variance due to random measurement error. 
As such, Fornell and Lacker aver that this proves the convergent validity of a 
measure.  
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vii). SEM caveats.  
Given that SEM was used as the main technique for conducting the hypotheses 
tests, it is important to address some of the concerns relating to its usage and 
interpretation of its results. 
Briddle and Marlin (1987) caution against the misuse of SEM. First, this may 
result from employing the techniques incorrectly or misinterpreting the results and 
thus producing improper solutions by failing to take into account an important 
variable that can skew the results one way. 
The other problem is to confound confirmation of a theory with an acceptable fit 
as an acceptable fit does not necessarily confirm theory.  
Another possible problem is that while SEM is a powerful technique, its use 
particularly with the maximum likelihood estimation method requires compliance 
with strict assumptions such as the requirement for high-quality data in the form of 
conditioning statements on which inferences that must be true.  
This calls for the use of carefully developed measures which are based on sound 
theoretical constructs and this study attempted to achieve this goal by using 36 
measures which were based on a thorough literature review of articles which 
featured in high impact journals such as the Journal of Marketing, Journal of 
Retailing and the Journal of Business Venturing.  
In addition, SEM techniques using a large number of variables require that large 
samples to be available for analysis (Tanaka, 1987). As a benchmark, Tanaka suggests 
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a minimum size sample of 100 to be able to compute meaningful results using the 
maximum likelihood estimation method which this study exceeded.  
Similarly, SEM techniques generate latent variables from multiple indicators to 
minimize the error in the estimation of the latent variables. This manipulation yields 
higher regression coefficients and less error than when individual indicators were as 
was the case with canonical analysis.  
Given the effort invested in drafting and pre-testing the web-based 
questionnaire, the researcher anticipated that this would enhance participation in the 
study and would facilitate easy and rapid responses with a higher response rate of 
up to 44%.  
Briddle and Marlin (1987) also question the cost involved using SEM packages 
which they state are expensive and take up more computer memory than least 
square methods.  
Furthermore, Briddle and Marlin caution against the complexity of SEM 
procedures and user misunderstanding of their implications in the sense that these 
techniques are capable of generating meaningless information and that users may be 
tempted to use the options in their causal models without any justification in their 
research designs.  
In addition, Briddle and Marlin caution that as these techniques usually aim at 
producing the best fit to the data, they have the effect of changing the research 
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process into being inductive where no hypothesis is tested, no theory assessed, and 
no causal model is confirmed.  
Thus, among the many decisions made in using these technique was the 
intention or purpose of the exercise, that is, whether to test or generate a model. In 
this study, the intention was to test the model and therefore nothing suggests that 
the misapplication of the technique.  
In the main, the problem associated with the use SEM raised by the above 
scholars relate largely to its misinterpretation and misapplication and care was taken 
in this study to minimise these mishaps by paying special attention to the caveats 
which have been raised in the foregoing discussion.  
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Table 7-21: Effects decomposition of the integrated SEM model 
Cause Effect 
Endogenous variables 
Survival  Growth  Competitive  
Opportunistic 
Actions 
 
Opportunistic 
Opportunity 
B SE β  B SE β  B SE β  B SE β  B SE β 
Structure Direct .06 .09 .05  -.39*** .05 -.41***  -.53*** .07 -.58***  .11*** .09 .11***  .14*** .07 .18*** 
  Indirect -.05 .04 -.05  .07 .05 .07  .01 .02 .01  - - -  - - - 
  Total .01 .10 -  -.33*** .07 -.34***  -.52*** .07 -.57***  .11*** .09 .11***  .14*** .07 .18*** 
Context Direct .37*** .08 .40***  .05 .05 .06  .07 .06 .09  .27*** .07 .31***  -.16*** .06 -.26*** 
  Indirect .10** .04 .11***  .14*** .04 .18***  .02 .02 .02  - - -  - - - 
  Total .47*** .08 .52***  .19*** .06 .24***  .08 .05 .11***  .27*** .07 .31***  -.16*** .06 -.26*** 
Strategy Direct .08 .12 .06  .22*** .07 .20***  .35*** .08 .33***  .61*** .10 .49***  - - - 
  Indirect .06 .06 .05  .34*** .06 .30***  .05 .04 .05  - - -  - - - 
  Total .15 .10 .11***  .56*** .08 .49***  .40*** .07 .38***  .61*** .10 .49***  - - - 
OA 
  
  
Direct .11 .10 .10  .55*** .06 .61***  .08 .07 .09  - - -  - - - 
Indirect - - -  - - -  - - -  - - -  - - - 
Total .11 .10 .10  .55*** .06 .61***  .08 .07 .09  - - -  - - - 
OO 
  
  
Direct -.46*** .11 -.32***  .03 .07 .03  .03 .08 .03  - - -  - - - 
Indirect - - -  - - -  - - -  - - -  - - - 
Total -.46*** .11 -.32***  .03 .07 .03  .03 .08 .03  - - -  - - - 
Notes. B = unstandardized path coefficients, β = standardised path coefficients, SE = standard error.  *** = p 
< .01, ** = p < .05, ** = p < .10.    
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7.4.2 Comparative SEM models 
Four SEM models for the each of the dependant variables and one for the full model 
comprising all dependent variables appearing on Table 7-22 show the consistency of the 
model fits. 
Table 7-22: Comparative SEM models fit 
Model λ2 (df) SRMSR RMSEA CFI NNFI 
Growth .81 (2) .00 .00 
.00 (95% ucl) 
.12 (5% lcl) 
 
1.00 1.06 
Competiveness .81 (2) .01 .00 
.00 (95% ucl) 
.12 (5% lcl) 
 
1.00 1.11 
Survival .81 (2) .00 .00 (95% ucl) 
.12 (5% lcl) 
 
1.00 1.11 
Full model 9.52 (5) .23 .09 
.00 (95% ucl) 
.18 (5% lcl) 
.99 .92 
Source: Extracted from SAS (2010) 
 Discussion of the quantitative results  
This section presents a discussion of the results of the quantitative study 
conducted among franchisors to examine three research questions, that is, the 
relationship between structural, contextual, and strategic factors and OO, between 
OO and OA, and between OA and the growth, competitiveness, and survival of 
franchise systems.  
These results emanate from the statistical analyses using various procedures 
on SAS such as factor and regression analyses, canonical analysis and SEM 
conducted on 111 observations on the study’s variables (which were reduced 
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from 36 to 26 through factor analysis) used to address the above research 
questions by testing seven hypotheses.  
As discussed in section 7.4 above, the ensuing discussion focuses on the 
interpretation of the results of the hypotheses tests mainly based on the SEM 
results shown on Table 7-20 above, for the sake of completeness reference will also 
be made to the magnitude, fit indices and significance tests of the statistics 
generated by factor analysis (Table 7-3 through Table 7-5), regression analysis (Table 
7-7 through Table 7-11 and canonical analyses (Table 7-12 through Table 7-18). 
7.5.1 Discussion on research question 1 (Hypotheses 1–3) 
This section focuses on hypotheses 1 to 3 which tested research question 1 
by measuring the relationship between structural, contextual, and strategic 
factors and OO among franchisors.  
Hypothesis 1: Structural factors and OO.  
Hypothesis 1 postulated a positive relationship to exist between structural 
factors and OO among franchisors. Raw data and factor analysis identified three 
independent or predictor variables that is future profits, incomplete contracting 
and Information asymmetry with a significant t value of 3.93 p > 0.0002 at alpha = 
0.05 as the predictor in the regression model shown on Table 7-7 above in the 
regression model which presented relationship between structural factors and 
OO.  
Similarly, raw and factor analysis identified three dependent or criterion 
variable, that is,  non-exclusive territories, no arbitration clause and tying 
301 
agreements with a significant t value of 2.29 p > 0.0240 at alpha = 0.05 in the 
regression model shown on Table 7-7 above which presented the OO construct.  
An F statistic of 10.23 (p < .0002) between these sets of independent or 
predictor and dependent or criterion variables suggest the existence of a 
statistically significant relationship between structural factors and OO.  
Similarly, as shown in Table 7-12, canonical analysis and most importantly, 
Table 7 20 shows that SEM found a statistically significant relationship between 
structural factors and OO represented by a significant t value of 1.98 between 
these variables which suggests support for hypothesis 1 by indicating that 
structural factors lead to OO among franchisors.  
These results seems to confirm the view expressed by scholars such as Muris 
(1980), Williamson (1985) and Hadfield (1990) and others that the lure of future 
profits serves as a governance mechanism that controls opportunism among 
franchisees.  
In other words, these scholars suggest that franchisees are likely to adhere 
to their contractual obligations out of fear of losing future profits that flow from 
the execution of the franchise contract they have signed with their franchisors.  
Therefore, profits serve as an incentive or a self-enforcing mechanism 
(Klein, 2000) for contractual performance among franchisees that is the 
standpoint of agency theorists that is generally offered in research as one of 
three reasons for franchising, the others being resource constraints and 
transactions costs as was explained in Chapter 3 above.  
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However, as Brown (2000) argues that opportunism begets opportunism, 
the finding of this study on this issue suggests that what is proverbial “sauce for 
the goose if sauce for the gander” because the lure of future profits especially 
from a profitable franchised outlet is enough to entice a franchisor to act in an 
opportunistic manner against a particular franchisee.  
This is probably the reason why most franchisors insist on including a buy-
back clause or severe territorial restrictions in the franchise contracts they 
conclude with franchisees so that they can act opportunistically whenever a 
suitable moment arises in order to “appropriate the rents” Dnes (2003).  
For example, the on-going story involving the listed leading department 
store referred to a number of times above that is seeking to buy back its 
profitable franchised food outlets is a case in point.  
It would seem that the incentive among franchisors to buy back outlets is 
their actual or potential profitability so that they can run them as company 
stores or sell them on to other franchisees at higher profits as there could be no 
reason for buying back a failing store and closing it down.  
Brickley and Dark (1987) alluded to the tendency among franchisors to 
franchise outlets they are unwilling to assume the risk involved in setting up 
and operating such outlets that seems to change as soon as the outlet proves to 
be profitable.  
As discussed above, the pursuit for undeserved profits among franchisors 
with an OO survives the expiry, termination, or cancellation of the franchise 
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contract because most franchise contracts require departing franchisees to sell 
the businesses or any salvageable assets to them at prices determined by 
themselves (Udel, 1972).  
As is the case with the departmental store mentioned above, franchisors 
refuse to renew the franchise contracts of franchisees who sell their businesses to 
their franchisors and the sale of franchises to third parties are not be approved 
(Muris, 1980).  
This entails that the soon-to-be-ex-franchisee has no option but to sell the 
business or its assets to the franchisor at possibly low prices set by the latter as it 
has no market to dispose of the asset to.  
In addition, the restraint of trade clause found in most franchise contracts 
prohibits terminated or cancelled franchisees from converting their sites or put 
the assets of the business to similar or alternative use for a period stipulated in 
those franchise contracts, usually a year or two (Udel, 1972).  
By the end of the restraint period, the ex-franchisee would have lost the site 
or its goodwill because of non-usage and probably be saddled with damages 
because most lease agreements require the tenant to carry out a particular trade 
from the leased period or face cancellation of the lease and damages even by the 
franchisor where he is the property owner.  
At the end of either the short term fixed contract either because of the 
effusion of time or premature termination of the franchise contract, the 
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franchisee is forced to leave the franchise system it developed goodwill for in an 
area in that the franchisor was not prepared to risk its money, time and effort.  
This seems to force the franchisee to leave the franchise system with far less 
equity than it had brought into the franchise system or a negative balance sheet, 
especially if the initial loan is not fully repaid that the case in the event of an 
abrupt termination.  
The franchisee forfeits even the ability to exploit the local market 
knowledge it had spent money, time and effort acquiring while the franchisor 
retains the goodwill that the franchisee generated for the franchisor in the area 
and acquires the right to purchase the assets from the departed franchisee at 
drastically reduced prices and the right to lease to the site to another franchisee 
at a premium because of the associated goodwill. 
This confirms the view expressed by the researcher in Chapter 3 in terms of 
which he described OO as a zero sum game in the sense of it creating a “winner-
takes-it-all” scenario for the franchisor in this case. 
Hypothesis 2: Contextual factors and OO 
Hypothesis 2 postulated a positive relationship to exist between contextual 
factors and OO among franchisors. Raw data and factor analysis (Table 7-3) 
identified three independent or predictor variables, that is, lack of legislation, 
lack of regulation and competitive pressures which produced a statistically 
significant t value of 3.72 p > 0.0002 at alpha = 0.05 in the regression model 
shown on Table 7-7.  
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In addition, as shown on Table 7-13, canonical analysis also found a 
statistically significant relationship between contextual factors and OO which 
suggested the existence of a relationship between these variables.  
As it appears on Figure 5: Final path diagram, SEM confirmed these results 
by yielding a statistically significant results with a t value = 2.81 which 
suggested support for hypothesis 2 by indicating that contextual factors such as 
lack of legislation regulating the relationship between franchisors and 
franchisees encouraged OO among franchisors represented by the lack of 
exclusive territorial areas within which franchisees are allowed to trade freely 
without competing with sister outlets. 
V2. The government should regulate the franchising industry 
This expected negative response highlights the views expressed in the 
literature about the conduct of most franchisors vis-à-vis government 
intervention given that Mathewson and Winter (1985) found a decline in 
franchising in states that introduced anti-termination laws in a number of states 
in the United States.  
The widespread resentment of government involvement in the franchising revolves 
around perceived interference with the self-regulation that most franchise systems have 
grown exponentially under in most countries over the past 50 years.  
However, this spectacular growth has not been without casualties as can be 
seen from the increasing number of complaints and cases against franchisors 
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reported in the daily press and law reports and journals such as the Minnesota 
Law review, Michigan law report, Pennsylvania Law review.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, the main source of disagreement has been about 
the conclusion and implementation of certain franchise contracts, perceived to 
be one-sided in favour of franchisors.  
This stems largely from that most franchisors or their attorneys write their 
franchise contracts that as Hunt (1972) points out, “are sold, and not negotiated, 
like insurance policies on a take-it-or-leave-it-basis” (p74).  
According to Hunt, franchisees are required to adhere to some very 
restrictive clauses such as those requiring franchisees to charge certain pre-
determined prices and purchasing stocks from the so-called approved suppliers 
that resulted in the franchise contracts referred to as the “contracts of adhesion” 
(Hadfield, 1990).  
Hadfield refers to numerous cases in which franchisors deny their 
franchisees the opportunity to seek legal advice before signing the franchise 
contract, which takes place on presentation at the premises of the franchisor.  
Until recently, franchisees in this country could not even see the franchise 
contract before paying a non-refundable deposit that amounted to thousands of 
rand.  
In addition, franchisees also make other financial and emotional 
commitments that made it impossible for them to review, reflect, or withdraw 
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after signing the franchise contract that franchisees sign without obtaining legal 
advice.  
On the other hand, Porter and Renworth (1978) found that most franchising 
disputes often arose where franchisees sign franchise contracts without 
consulting attorneys.  
In addition, abundant evidence in the literature suggests that most 
franchise contracts are incomplete due to limited cognitive abilities of 
franchisors and franchisees; and the difficulties involved in predicting future 
changes due to market and technological factors (Williamson, 1985).  
Most franchisors, however, have continued to adopt a classical law 
interpretation of franchise contracts that has been criticised for focusing on the 
explicit terms while ignoring the implied terms of the franchise contract 
informed by the evolving social norms and values in which the franchise 
relationship is embedded (Granovettor, 1985).  
Adopting such an approach suggests an interpretation of the franchise 
contract in a manner that takes into account the “spirit” and not only the “letter” 
of the contract which would be as less adversarial as referring a dispute for 
arbitration or mediation instead of a court of law.  
Thus, the use of classical contract law could possibly have led to 
widespread terminations of franchise contracts on the grounds of the 
interpretation of vague and ambiguous clauses in terms of the letter of the law 
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or explicit meanings that have resulted in public outcries for legislative 
intervention.  
In this country, the CPA came into being inter alia, to level the franchising 
playing fields, with the results that new franchise contracts must comply with the Act 
with effect from 01 April 2011. Failure to do so would result in the terms of the Act 
taking precedence above any terms of the franchise contracts not amended by that 
date.  
Most importantly, the CPA requires the incorporation of RET principles in the 
interpretation of franchise contracts seen to be one-sided in favour of franchisors that 
drew them in respect of which; franchisees have little chance of success in the event of 
a dispute.  
Franchisors are able to use legal tricks to exploit the grey areas that they could 
build into franchise contract that as Williamson (1987) observed, were defective as 
they were incomplete.  
According to Williamson, franchise contracts were incomplete principally for 
because of the high transactions costs involved in drafting, negotiating and 
concluding a comprehensive franchise contract and that such franchise contracts are 
difficult to write because of the limited human cognitive abilities of franchisors and 
franchisees and their lawyers.  
In addition, unpredictable market conditions caused by customer and 
technological changes make it difficult to accurately predicting future market 
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contingencies that may require re-negotiating of franchise contracts to adapting them 
to the changed circumstances. 
However, while under the self-regulatory regime franchisors could almost write 
anything they liked in the franchise contract irrespective of how it disadvantages 
franchisees, under the newly enacted CPA franchise contracts are now required to 
comply with the Act in a number of respects discussed throughout this study. 
As Muris (1980) points out, allegations abounded that franchisors received 
kickbacks and dividends from companies listed as suppliers franchised outlets in the 
chain.  
Until recently, franchisors never accounted to the franchisees for such benefits 
that accrued to the franchise system from such “closed shop” arrangements which the 
approved supplies. 
The CPA requires now franchisors to disclose whether franchisors are 
shareholders in these companies, and whether they received any dividends or 
kickbacks and how franchisors distributed these benefits among the franchisees 
(Woker. 2012).  
Another provision of the CPA that has always been a source of disagreement 
between franchisors and franchisees is the handling of advertising fees that 
franchisees pay to franchisors (Justis and Judd, 1988).  
Disputes have involved on advertising policy with franchisors preferring 
national advertising that is cheaper because of scope while franchisees preferred local 
advertising tailored made for specific target market (Love, 1990; Sanderson, 1995).  
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Similarly, Porter and Rentworth (1978) found that sharing advertising expenses 
costs was one of the common and most frequent causes of tension and litigation in the 
franchise relationship.  
As was raised by a number of franchisees during the interviews conducted by 
the researcher, franchisees complained that they were not getting fair value for the 
advertising fees they paid to their franchisors (Tomzack; 1994; Shivelli and Banning, 
1997). 
There are allegations that franchisors misuse the advertising fund by allocating 
them to cover their other overheads such as salaries and bonuses (Hadfield, 1990). 
Generally, franchisors had a complete discretion as to how to spend these funds with 
the result that there were complaints that some franchisors were acting 
opportunistically by diverting these funds to pay the administrative expenses of the 
companies such as rent, fuel, salaries and bonuses (Muris, 1980).  
For this reason, Michael (2000) addressed these concerns in a study aptly entitled: 
“Do franchise chains advertise enough.” Michael found that franchisors tended to 
advertise less than their corporate counter-parts.  
Generally, franchisees complained during interviews reported in the next 
Chapter about inadequate or insufficient levels of advertising by their franchisors or 
the irrelevance or ineffective or infrequent advertising campaigns that did not take 
into account geographical differences.  
The CPA addresses some of these issues by requiring that a separate bank 
account be set for keeping the advertising or marketing fund into which advertising 
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fees paid by franchisees, keep proper accounts, and distribute audited financial 
statements among their franchisees every three months (Woker, 2012). 
Hypothesis 3: Strategic factors and OO or OA.  
Hypothesis 3 postulated a positive relationship to exist between strategic factors 
and OO among franchisors. Raw data and factor analysis identified three 
independent or predictor variables, that is, joint ventures, financial assistance and 
lease Control which achieved a statistically significant t value of 3.72 p > 0.0016 at 
alpha = 0.05 in the regression model shown on Table 7-7. This suggested that strategic 
factors predicted OO among franchisors.  
Similarly, Table 7-14 shows that canonical analysis found a statistically 
significant relationship between strategic factors and OO among franchisors. 
However, SEM found a strong statistically significant relationship between strategic 
factors and OA not OO, path coefficient = .271 and t value = 4.00.  
This suggests support for hypothesis 3 by indicating that strategic factors such as 
the provision of financial assistance to franchisees by franchisors led to OA such as 
the non-provision of exclusive trading areas among franchisors. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, franchisors usually extend financial assistance in the 
form of business loans, guarantees, and credit facilities to franchisees to enable them 
to own and operate franchised businesses.  
Such deals form part of the franchisor’s strategy to achieve rapid growth in new 
geographical areas or markets in which it seeks to expand and could soon be used by 
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franchisors in this country as part of their social responsibility or BBBEE programmes 
on the back of State, bank, or foreign agency funding or guarantees. 
To that end, the franchisor would normally sign the head lease that it subleases 
to its franchisee-partner with the result that an interlinked three-tier relationship 
involving the franchisor-franchisee, lender-borrower, and landlord-tenant elements 
with back-to-back agreements is established.  
Such an interlocked relationship stacks odds heavily in favour of the franchisor 
and give the franchisee little room to organise or streamline its business and financial 
affairs without falling foul of one or the other agreements with equally disastrous 
consequences.  
Thus, any disagreement between the parties on any of the issues covered by any 
of the tri-partite agreements can spell disaster for the franchisee such as the case 
where a franchisee may experience cash flow problems for one reason or another at 
different times cannot always succeed in rescheduling its commitments.  
Under these conditions, the franchisee virtually faces the same creditor on three 
or four fronts when taking into account the influence that franchisors have on the 
suppliers of consumables and raw materials used in the production system (Muris, 
1980).  
This gives the franchisee very limited financial leeway to conduct its business 
with the result that upon defaulting on any one of the agreements, the franchisee faces 
termination or cancellation of the rest of the stacked deal.  
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In addition, the unfairness of such deals lie in that while the parties share the 
upside that is the “bottom line” or profit that the business makes, the franchisor does 
not suffer the any losses simply because it can capitalise any losses and increase its 
stake in the business at the expense of the franchisee with the result that the 
franchisor can buy out the franchisee at a fraction of the market value of the business 
whenever it may decide to do so (Muris, 1980). 
Once again, the embattled franchisee forfeits whatever equity it may have 
invested in the business and sometimes faces damages on the cancelled lease and 
penalty interest on the foreclosed loan and so forth.  
Thus, joint ventures or any forms of financial assistance granted to franchisees by 
franchisors may turn out to be a poisoned chalice or straightjacket. This is because in 
such a “close-shop arrangement” that can be compared to “an arranged marriage,” 
the franchisee is at a considerable disadvantage from the start.  
Such arrangements place franchisees in a position where they cannot freely 
negotiate favourable terms as they would in an open market where prescribed legal 
requirements which may provide them with favourable loan terms and protection 
against over-zealous creditors.  
7.5.2 Discussion on research question 2 (Hypothesis 4) 
Hypothesis 4 postulated a positive relationship to exist between OO and OA 
among franchisors. 
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Hypothesis 4 – OO and OA among franchisors 
Raw data and factor analysis identified three independent or predictor variables, 
that is, resale price maintenance, non-exclusive territories and shorter contract term, 
achieved a significant t value of 2.29 and p > 0.0240 at alpha = 0.05 in the regression 
model shown on Table 7-8 above in the regression model presenting OO.  
Similarly, as shown in Table 7-8 raw data and factor analysis identified three 
dependent or criterion variables with a statistically significant t value of 3.39 p> 0.0012 
at alpha = 0.05 as a dependent variable presenting the OA construct.  
In addition, as shown on Table 7-15, canonical analysis found support the 
hypothesised relationship between OO and OA. 
However, SEM found no statistically significant or direct relationship between 
the OO – OA dimensions. This suggests lack of support for hypothesis 4 by indicating 
that OO such as the provision of non-exclusive territories to franchisees by franchisors 
do not lead to OA among franchisors such as the termination of franchise contracts by 
franchisors.  
Therefore, other than stating that the findings of the study suggests that OO and 
OA are unrelated; that they are in fact substitutes that serve as intervening variables 
between some of the dependent and independent variables, no further discussion of 
these findings is warranted. 
315 
7.5.3 Discussion on research question 3 (Hypotheses 5 – 7) 
Hypotheses 5 to 7 examined research question 3 to test the postulated negative 
relationship between OA as the independent variable and growth, competitiveness 
and survival as the dependent variables. 
Hypothesis 5: OA and the Growth of franchise systems  
Hypothesis 5 postulated a negative relationship to exist between OA and the 
growth of franchise systems. Raw data and factor analysis identified structural, 
contextual and strategic factors, that is, three independent or predictor variables as 
predictors of growth with a significant t values -5.05, 7.21 and 8.49 p > 0.001 for all 
independent variables at alpha = 0.05 in the regression model shown on Table 7-9. 
As shown on Table 7-16, canonical analysis also found a statistically significant 
between the above OA predictor variables and the growth variables. 
In addition, Table 7-20 shows that SEM found a highly statistically significant 
relationship between structural factors and growth of franchise systems at t value = -
4.14 and between strategic factors and the growth of franchise systems at t value = 
4.18.  
These unexpected results show new paths which, while not directly providing 
support for hypothesis 5 as originally envisaged, indicate that structural and strategic 
factors directly and not through the mediating or intervening variables, that is, OO or 
OA, contribute to the decline of franchise systems.  
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This response answers the research question 3 in the desired direction by 
suggesting a negative relationship between structural and strategic factors among 
franchisors and growth of franchise systems.  
As discussed in section 5.2.3, the presence of structural factors such as incomplete 
contracting, hostages and unequal bargaining power in the franchise relationship may 
encourage franchisors to take drastic measures against their franchisees for minor 
breaches in order to terminate or refuse to renew the franchise contracts of some 
outlets they may wish to buy back and own or on-sell to other franchisees at a profit. 
This was the case in the various court cases referred to Chapter 1 involving the 
Woolworths group after the company took a policy decision to buy back all their 
franchised outlets in in the last few years upon realising that the franchise model was 
highly profitable and it did not want to share profits with its franchisees.  
The company offered to buy back the outlets at a price it unilaterally determined 
and franchisees who refused to sell were confronted with notices of non-renewal of 
their franchise contracts despite the fact that some franchisees had options to extend 
their franchise contracts.  
Woker (2012) also decries a local fast food franchise which “rationalised”, a 
euphemism for closing down some 30 outlets costing the affected franchisees some 
R1.8 million per outlet in preparation for a planned listing and a BEE deal that never 
materialised ostensibly due to unfavourable market conditions.  
Furthermore, the reputational damage that results from the termination and non-
renewal of outlets and the closure of outlets creates a negative publicity for the 
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franchise system may discourage existing franchisees from renewing or extending 
their franchise contracts or seeking opportunities to acquire additional outlets within 
that franchise system.  
Similarly, potential franchisees or independent retailers may also be repelled 
from buying into the franchise system characterised by the frequent closure of 
existing outlets or acrimonious legal battles involving a particular franchise system 
and its franchisees.  
For example, the Woolworths saga received massive unfavourable coverage in 
the local press that possibly discouraged some potential franchisees and investors 
from taking up franchising. 
The public outcry against franchisors that has found its way into the local press 
and the courts of the land resulted in screaming headlines such as “Franchisees 
phased out at Woolworths” (The Star, Business Report, 3 September 2010), “Days of 
milk and honey are over”(City Press, 04 October 2010) and “Franchisee assisted” 
(Zungu, 15 June 2011).  
Thus, the existence of OO among franchisors in some franchise systems as 
suggested by this study appears to have a negative effect on the psychological climate 
(Strutto, Petton and Lumpkin, 1995) within the affected franchise relationships.  
As a result, there are unlikely to be prospects for growth within such franchise 
systems especially when bearing in mind that as most franchise systems are 
composed of more franchised outlets than company stores, the growth of franchise 
system hinges on the plans and actions of existing and potential franchisees.  
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Thus, if existing franchisees are unhappy and dissatisfied with the franchise 
system because of OO among their franchisors, such franchisees are unlikely to seek 
an extension or renewal of their franchise contracts or even seeking opportunities to 
acquire additional outlets within the franchise system.  
As Peterson and Dant (1990) suggests, most aspirant franchisees contact and 
interact with existing franchisees to look for inside information on the franchise 
system before they finalise their choice of a franchise system, disgruntled franchisees 
are unlikely to recommend or encourage aspirant franchisees to enter their particular 
franchise system.  
Similarly, an aspirant franchisee considering buying into a particular franchise 
system or converting its independent retail outlet is (Pebble and Hoffmann, 2003) 
likely to review or even withdraw from its plans once it notices the closure of a 
seemingly profitable outlet.  
Furthermore, newspaper reports featuring a story about a protracted dispute 
between a particular franchise system and any of its franchisees may also discourage 
potential franchisees from entering the industry (Muris, 1980).  
It is perhaps for this reason that some franchisors refrain from closing down 
outlets belonging to franchisees they may have de-franchised and elect to operate 
them as company stores until they appoint a new franchisee (Dnes, 1993).  
Franchisors normally adopt this practice to avoid the negative publicity that 
comes with the closing down of outlets, which has the potential to cause reputational 
damage to the franchise system (Hadfield, 1990).  
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However, it is doubtful whether the damage suffered can be reversed by 
awarding additional outlets to some well behaving franchisees (Blare and Lafontaine, 
2005) to bolster growth where more outlet closures are a rule rather than an exception.  
Hypothesis 6: OA and the competitiveness of franchise systems 
Hypothesis 6 postulated that negative relationship existed between OA and the 
competitiveness of franchise systems. Structural, contextual and strategic factors were 
used as the three independent or predictor variables with three dependent variables, 
that is, cost leadership, differentiation and focus representing the competitiveness 
construct yielded statistically significant results (t values: 7.76, 1.56 and 5.37 p > 
0.0001, 0.1212 and 0001 at alpha = 0.05) shown in the regression model shown on 
Table 7-10 above.  
In addition, Table 7-17 shows that canonical analysis found a statistically 
significant relationship between the OA variables and the competitiveness variables. 
On the other hand, Table 7-20 shows that SEM found direct (that is, not through 
OO and OA) and highly statistically significant relationship between structural factors 
and competitiveness at t value -8.86 and strategic factors and competitiveness at t 
value -4.18. 
In an indirect way, these findings suggest support for hypothesis 6 which posited 
that OA are negatively related to the competitiveness of franchise systems. This 
suggests that franchise systems capitalise from entering into joint ventures with 
franchisees, providing them with financial assistance and controlling the lease of the 
franchised outlets.  
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As discussed in Chapter 5, within the context of Porter (1985)’s competitiveness 
model, competitive franchise systems strive to achieve lower operating and marketing 
costs, focus and differentiation which TCE theory suggests opportunistic franchisors 
pursue at the expense of their franchisees. 
Firstly, reduced costs will arise not only because of their economies of scale 
through bulk and centralised purchasing, but also interest, dividends and kickbacks 
franchisors receive from their franchisees and suppliers (Muris, 1980). 
Franchisors who enter into joint ventures, grant loans and leases to their 
franchisees effectively also become creditors and landlords to them with the result 
that franchisors acquire additional rights in terms of the franchise contract. 
This entails that the franchisor can terminate the franchise contract not only on 
operational grounds such as failure to maintain hygiene standards on the business 
premises, but also once the franchisee defaults on its loan, dividend or rental 
obligations (Dnes, 1993). 
As such, the granting of financial assistance and leased premises to the 
franchisees renders them more vulnerable to opportunistic actions of their franchisors 
such as terminations of the franchise contract and eviction from leased premises and 
attachment and resale of their businesses without having to follow onerous 
foreclosure procedures (Hadfield, 1990). 
Ordinarily, a franchisee who defaults on a bank loan or rental repayment would 
have the option to make suitable arrangements with its creditors without their 
franchisors taking advantage of their plight or misfortune and invoke the termination 
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clause upon calling up the loan or cancelling the lease agreement with the distressed 
franchisee. 
As a result, prospective franchisees will avoid buying into a franchise system 
which insists on entering into joint ventures, providing loans and leases to 
franchisees. 
In addition, existing franchisees will refuse opportunities to acquire additional 
units from such franchisors for fear of losing their businesses to the franchisors for 
defaulting on loans, dividend or rental payments to the same creditor who is unlikely 
to enter into repayment arrangements with a struggling franchisee because of the 
huge sums of money that may be owed.  
Similarly, independent retailers may also refuse the temptation to convert their 
operations into franchised outlets because of the negative publicity which may follow 
the attachment of franchised outlets established through joint ventures, loans or 
leased premises provided by franchisors.  
By serving as creditors and landlords to franchisees, such roles may place 
additional undue stress on the franchisors with the result that they may lose focus on 
the core business which involves developing and maintaining its relationship with 
their franchisees through improved performance and satisfaction with the franchise 
offering. 
In addition, franchisors involved in financial or rental disputes with their 
franchisees may not realise the benefit arising from the local market knowledge that 
their franchisees possess which they may lose out on by being unable to utilise the 
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creativity and innovativeness of their franchisees to differentiate their franchises from 
their competitors (Minkler, 1990; Bradach, 1997) 
According to these scholars, because of their proximity to their customers, 
franchisees acquire better insight into and knowledge of customer needs and habits, 
tastes and lifestyle changes which can enable them to make an important contribution 
into the product development, pricing and marketing strategies of the franchise 
system. 
Hypothesis 7 – OA and survival 
Hypothesis 7 postulated a negative relationship to exist between OA and the 
survival of franchise systems with structural, contextual and strategic factors being 
used as the three independent or predictor variables with four dependent variables, 
that is, disruptions, exits, store closures, and buy backs representing the survival 
construct to yield statistically significant results (t values: 6.04 p > 0.0001 at alpha = 
0.05) only between structural factors and the survival as shown in the regression 
model shown on Table 7-11 above.  
On the other hand, Table 7-18, canonical analysis also found a statistically 
significant relationship between the OA variables and the survival variables.  
However, Table 7-20 shows that SEM found a direct and highly statistically 
significant relationship between contextual factors and survival at t value = -4.92 and 
OO and survival at t value = -4.14.  
The findings that contextual factors such as the lack of regulation and legislation 
and competitive pressures are directly (and not through intervening variables, that is 
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OO and OA) and negatively related to survival of franchise systems through the 
franchisees leaving the franchise system, store closures, disruptions and store buy 
backs by franchisors, were unexpected. 
These findings underlines the important narrative which states that because of 
the self-regulation of the franchise industry in this country, there is an absence of 
appropriate dispute mechanisms which can help resolve disputes between franchisors 
and franchisees cheaply, quickly and fairly (Woker, 2012). 
Within this context, disputes between franchisors and franchisees often lead to 
the termination of franchise relationship by franchisors through the cancellation or 
non-renewal of the franchise contract (Mathewson and Winter, 1985; Tuunanen and 
Torikka, 2001). 
This invariably results in financial losses, bankruptcy and hardships to the 
franchisees, their families, staff and creditors who lose their income, investments and 
jobs following the closure of the franchised outlet (Hunt, 1977). 
As discussed in Chapters 1, 3 and 5 of this study, the plight of the franchisees 
who are the weaker party in the franchise relationship lies in the hands of their more 
stronger, powerful and well-resourced franchisors. 
This is because self-regulation of the industry under FASA is inadequately 
equipped in terms of resources and power to resolve franchising disputes as it is a 
voluntary organisation with no statutory power to force franchisors and franchisees 
to submit to its authority (Woker, 2009; 2012). 
324 
In addition, because of its apparent dominance by franchisors who appoint its 
board and management and pay for its expenses through membership and 
advertising fees, FASA is generally perceived to be biased against franchisees and 
cannot therefore not fairly adjudicate disputes between franchisors and franchisees. 
Therefore, a need exists for specific legislation and regulation to address the 
relationship between franchisors and franchisees which has unique features that 
ordinary common law may not adequately deal with (Woker, 2009; 2012). 
The need for legislation is also premised on the adversarial nature and the cost of 
litigation which tends to favour franchisors in that most franchisees cannot afford the 
protracted and costly legal battles it would take to challenge them in court (Drahozal 
and Hylton, 2003). 
In addition, Udel (1972) also found that very few franchise contracts made 
provision for the arbitration or mediation of disputes between franchisors and 
franchisees which forces the parties to litigate their disputes.  
The use of the courts is an adversarial process that usually results in the 
disintegration of the franchise relationship which may lead the courts into dissolving 
the franchise relationship that tends to deteriorate even further because of the 
litigation process (Drahozal and Hylton, 2003). 
Therefore, in line with Drahozal and Hylton, the preferred usage of the courts to 
settle franchising dispute among franchisors suggest OO among them because, unlike 
the courts, the usage of arbitration or mediation to iron out franchising disputes tends 
to be more reconciliatory and can result in an amicable resolution of a dispute.  
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As a result, high litigation costs and reputational damage that can result from the 
negative publicity that normally surrounds litigated disputes between franchisors and 
franchisees can lead to the closure of stores, disrupted business activities (Muris, 
1980). 
In addition, the negative publicity that court cases attract has the potential to 
harden attitudes as parties vie for the moral high ground which can harm the 
franchise system by alienating prospective franchisees (Drahozal and Hylton, 2003). 
According to these scholars, financial institutions may be unwilling to expose 
themselves to high-risk franchise systems with a history of incessant legal battles 
which present the risk of franchisee failure because of the possible terminations at will 
and disruption of the activities of their franchised businesses.  
Store closures usually occur because of the termination of the franchise contract 
by the franchisors for a myriad of reasons some of which may be opportunistic 
through the “capricious termination clause” which grants franchisors the so-called 
“termination-at-will” right to terminate franchise contracts even for minor breaches of 
an explicit term of the franchise contract (Hunt and Nevin, 1975).  
Udel (1972) found that more than 67% of franchise contracts he examined have a 
clause used by most franchisors to terminate their franchise contracts with franchisees 
and the closure of outlets. 
As discussed above, the closure, disruption or buying back of franchised outlets 
may generate negative publicity that has the potential to harm the image of the 
franchising system because existing franchisees are unlikely to renew or extend their 
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franchise contracts or seek or accepts opportunities to acquire additional units within 
the franchise system (Hadfield, 1990).  
The frequent closure, disruption or buying back of franchised outlets may also 
repel prospective franchisees and their funders away from a particular franchise 
system as they result in huge social and economic upheavals that often lead to 
financial and job losses that often befall the franchisees, their creditors, staff and 
families (Hunt, 1977).  
Lenders such as banks and credit guarantors and creditors such as suppliers of 
stock, premises, and equipment also suffer losses because of the closure, disruption or 
buying back of franchised outlets and this has the potential to undermine their 
confidence in the franchise system with the result that they may decide to abandon 
the sector to look for more secure business opportunities elsewhere.  
Hence, the passing of the CPA in this country with far-reaching implications for 
the franchising industry which came into effect on 01 October 2011 aimed at 
regulating the franchise relationship between franchisors and franchisees (Woker, 
2012).  
Under the CPA, franchise contracts are now required to comply with the Act in a 
number of respects discussed throughout this study such as granting franchisees a 10-
day “cooling off” period within which they can withdraw from a franchise contract 
without forfeiting any deposit they may have paid to their potential franchisors 
(Woker, 2012).  
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As Muris (1980) points out, allegations abounded that franchisors received 
kickbacks and dividends from companies listed as suppliers franchised outlets in the 
chain which until recently franchisors never accounted to the franchisees for such 
benefits that accrued to the franchise system from such “closed shop” arrangements. 
The CPA requires franchisors to disclose whether franchisors are shareholders in 
the companies that they appoint to supply products and services to their franchisees 
and whether they received any dividends or kickbacks from such companies and how 
franchisors distributed these benefits among the franchisees (Woker, 2012).  
According to Woker, another important issue which the CPA addresses that has 
always been a source of disagreement between franchisors and franchisees is the 
handling of advertising fees that franchisees pay to franchisors. 
Disputes have involved on advertising policy with franchisors preferring 
national advertising that is cheaper because of scope while franchisees preferred local 
advertising tailored made for specific target market (Love, 1990; Sanderson, 1995). 
Similarly, Porter and Rentworth (1978) found that sharing advertising expenses 
costs was one of the common and most frequent causes of tension and litigation in the 
franchise relationship.  
As was raised by a number of franchisees during the interviews conducted by 
the researcher, franchisees complained that they were not getting fair value for the 
advertising fees they paid to their franchisors (Tomzack; 1994; Shivelli and Banning, 
1997).  
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There are allegations that franchisors misuse the advertising fund by allocating 
them to cover their other overheads such as salaries and bonuses (Hadfield, 1990).  
According to Muris (1980), franchisors had a complete discretion as to how to 
spend these funds with the result that there were complaints that some franchisors 
were acting opportunistically by diverting these funds to pay the administrative 
expenses of the companies such as rent, fuel, salaries and bonuses. 
Michael (2000) addressed these concerns in a study aptly entitled: “Do franchise 
chains advertise enough.” Michael found that franchisors tended to advertise less 
than their corporate counter-parts.  
Generally, franchisees complained during interviews reported in the next section 
about inadequate or insufficient levels of advertising by their franchisors or the 
irrelevance or ineffective or infrequent advertising campaigns that did not take into 
account geographical differences. 
The CPA addresses some of these issues by requiring that a separate bank 
account be set for keeping the advertising or marketing fund into which advertising 
fees paid by franchisees, keep proper accounts, and distribute audited financial 
statements among their franchisees every three months (Woker, 2012). 
 Summary 
This chapter discussed the quantitative methods used in the study involving the 
design of the survey instrument and statistical techniques and procedures, that is, 
factor, regression and canonical analyses and SEM to produce the study’s quantitative 
329 
results based on questionnaire data gathered, analysed, and validated among a 
purposeful sample comprising 111 franchisors nationwide. 
The study models produced relatively good and acceptable model fit and results 
which indicated marginal to strong support for some of the hypotheses that 
addressed its three research questions.  
The next Chapter discusses the research methodology of the qualitative part of 
the study conducted among franchisees. 
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Chapter 8 Research methodology - 
Qualitative study  
 Introduction 
Chapter 6 and 7 presented and discussed the quantitative methods and results of 
the study conducted among franchisors on the effects of OO and OA on franchise 
systems. For reasons explains in section 1.2.4, this and the next chapter present and 
discuss the qualitative methods and results of the study conducted among franchisees 
on the same issues as the quantitative study conducted among franchisors.  
After this introduction, section 8.2 describes and justifies the qualitative methods 
used. Section 8.3 discusses the population and sampling issues and strategies. Section 
8.4 explains the use of interviews as the data collection methods in the study. Section 
8.5 presents the measures and propositions developed to address the research 
questions. Section 8.6 discusses the pre-testing of the interview statements among 
franchising experts. Section 8.7 discusses content analysis as the data analysis method 
used in the study. Section 8.8 concludes the chapter. 
 The qualitative design  
This part of the study used qualitative methods, that is, purposeful sampling, 
interviews and content analysis to source, analyse and validate data obtained from 
franchisees to examining the research questions using the study’s seven propositions 
discussed in section 1.2 above.  
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In addition, several studies have also used the qualitative methods to examine 
various franchising phenomena such as the use of franchising as a small business 
development strategy (Kirby and Watson, 1999), growth strategy (Watson, 2008) and 
market and partner selection processes (Doherty, 2009). 
In the main, qualitative methods were used as part of the adopted concurrent 
mixed research methods research strategy explained in Chapter 1. Briefly, this 
strategy involved the use of different data sources and collection methods, data 
analysis and validation methods to conduct the study (Creswell, 2003). 
This strategy helped to improve the quality of the study and address some of the 
study’s theoretical, methodological, and practical issues and challenges (Ritchie and 
Lewis, 2005).  
 Population and sampling issues and strategies 
This section addresses the composition of the population and sample of 
franchisees for this study. 
8.3.1 Franchisee population 
This population comprised all the country’s franchisees in various sectors of the 
franchising industry such as fast food, restaurant and groceries, automative, oil and 
petroleum products, personal, business and homecare services. 
However, because of the general lack of official franchising information, facts 
and statistics in this country, as referred to in previous chapters, it is difficult to 
accurately describe the demographics of the franchisee population in terms of the 
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number of persons, age, race, gender, educational qualifications, business experience, 
location and so on.  
This information could have been useful in the profiling of franchisees with the 
view to gaining relatively easy access and a better understanding of decision-making 
process among them on matters such as the motivations or reasons for existing and 
potential franchises to enter, leave or expand their franchise businesses. These issues 
play an important in this study as they underlie or inform the measures and 
constructs forming the bedrock of its variables, research questions and propositions.  
The availability of demographic information about franchisees could also have 
been helpful in segmenting the population and composing samples for this study to 
ensure that appropriate respondents are selected who have the necessary depth and 
breadth in terms of knowledge, experience and ability to provide rich and relevant 
information.  
However, Gordon (2010) estimates that the country has a total population of 
almost 30 000 franchisees in all nine provinces from whom it was decided to 
constitute a subpopulation comprising Gauteng-based franchisees with at least 3 
years’ experience from any sector.  
This researcher believed that such franchisees met the minimum criteria were 
used in similar previous studies in terms of age, race, education marital status, 
business and or franchising experience and so on (e.g. Edens et. al, 1976; 
Morrison,1996).  
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On the other hand, Edens et al (1976) found that most franchisees in the United 
States were urban, middle-aged, married white males with undergraduate 
qualifications and a few years non-franchising business experience. Interestingly, the 
respondents to the interviews conducted for this study matched this profile of 
franchisees.  
8.3.2 Sampling frame 
In light of the foregoing population issues, it was also challenging to derive a 
sample frame from which to draw a representative or informative sample of 
franchisees. The absence of existing lists of franchisees because of the lack of detailed 
franchisor records, administrative records or published lists on the telephone 
directory, yellow pages, websites of franchisors or service providers was equally 
unhelpful.  
The websites of most franchisors only provide telephone numbers and physical 
addresses of franchisees and no email addresses or fax numbers. These issues made it 
practically implausible and cost ineffective to communicate directly and quickly with 
franchisees or to send questionnaires to them because most of them could not be 
found on their telephone numbers for a variety of reasons.  
As a result, the lists of franchisees published on the websites of franchisors were 
used to painstakingly set up appointments with franchisees that could be contacted 
and agreed to be interviewed. For these reasons, most of these franchisees were based 
in Johannesburg where the researcher lives and works with the result that only a 
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limited number of franchisees could be reached using the limited financial resources 
and time available.  
However, this was done not at the expense of obtaining useful information as 
qualitative research such as interviews sometimes involves smaller and purposeful 
samples which are data rich (Ritchie and Lewis, 2005; Patton, 2006).  
8.3.3 Sample designing and choice  
Having decided on the sample frame, the next task involved choosing the actual 
sample. Given the decision to conduct interviews with potential respondents for the 
reasons outlined in the preceding sub-section, in line with Ritchie and Lewis (2005), 
less robust, non-statistically representative and non-probability sampling methods 
that is purposive sampling was used to choose the sample make-up.  
This involved selecting a sample that merely resembled characteristics of the 
population where the chance of selection of each element is unknown. According to 
Ritchie and Lewis, qualitative methods have been developed for this purpose and 
possess features designed to suit small-scale, in-depth studies of some phenomenon 
such as the present sought to do.  
The qualitative part of the study conducted among franchisees was exploratory 
because it formed part of the study which arguably was among the first to be 
conducted on a conceptualisation of a relatively new construct, that is, OO, with the 
result that information-richness of informants and not sample size or statistical 
representation was the main priority. The study’s purposeful sample consisted of 30 
franchisees which was based on the recommendation of Creswell (1998) among other 
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scholars who suggest that larger numbers of respondents do not necessarily yield 
better results in qualitative studies  
The next step of purposeful sampling strategy involved identifying and 
including franchisees who met a particular primary selection criterion into the 
sample. These were the first three franchisees on the combined brand lists of fast food, 
groceries and restaurants, automative, fuel and petroleum, business services (such as 
telecommunications, insurance, bookkeeping and so on) and personal and home 
services such as educational, cleaning, gardening and so on, in the northern, eastern, 
western and southern suburbs of Johannesburg most of whom belonged to the 
franchise systems who participated in the qualitative part of the study.  
As discussed in section 1.2.4 above, this formed part of the triangulation of the 
study by examining the same research questions among two different respondent 
groups and using two different research methods and instruments. In addition, 
franchisees with at least 3 years franchising experience and ownership of one outlet 
currently with the intention to acquire more or those with, two or more outlet 
constituted the study’s sample of 30 franchisees.  
In line with Ritchie and Lewis (2005), the researcher believed that the selected 
franchisees possessed the information, experience and knowledge required to address 
the research questions. Similarly, as most franchisors having their head-offices in 
Johannesburg, the researcher also believed that the proximity of these franchisees to 
their franchisors provided them with deep insights and understandings of the issues 
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concerning the research questions on account of their regular interaction and contact 
with their franchisors.  
Consequently, as Johannesburg is generally regarded as the biggest and most 
vibrant and sophisticated economic city in the country and on the continent, 
franchisees based in the city appeared to be suitable key informants for the study.  
For example, one of the constructs – the Last Years of the Franchise Contract, 
required insight into the experience of a franchisee whose contract was about to 
expire and therefore this excluded new franchisees. In addition, secondary criteria 
were used to select the sample and these included demographic factors such as age, 
race, gender, marital status, educational background, business experience that were 
used in previous studies to profile sampled franchisees as these were believed to 
provide a rich context within which the behaviour and perceptions of sampled 
franchisees could be understood or interpreted.  
8.3.4 Designing a sample quota and sample matrix 
After selecting the location of the study subpopulation, the sample frame, a 
sampling method and criteria, the next task was to design a sample quota and matrix. 
These items gave a diagrammatical representation of the selection criteria and the 
number of sample units that comprised the sample. The matrix consisted of horizontal 
and vertical cells that contained a breakdown of primary selection criteria alongside 
the allocated quota of sample units that is, interviewed 30 Johannesburg-based 
franchisees.  
337 
The purpose of compiling a sampling matrix amounted to drawing up a plan 
that would ensure that the investigation was carried out in a meaningful and goal-
directed manner. In line with Ritchie and Lewis (2005) this meant that the purposive 
sample designed for the study would achieve the desired objectives of the enquiry as 
this was necessary to obtain sample elements or units that resembled or bore the 
characteristics of the study population (and not the kind of statistical representation 
that qualitative studies strive for); and diversity within that representation, the so-
called breadth and depth configuration or composition of the sample.  
This entailed the selection of franchisees based on the broad characteristics of the 
population of franchisees in South Africa. To this end, use was made of Gordon 
(2010)’s characterisation of the franchisees as a guide, and not as a definitive road 
map.  
Briefly, the sample matrix designed for this study is summarised in Annexure C. 
The matrix shows the primary purposeful sample selection criteria of the 
subpopulation consisted of franchisees in the main sectors of the business, that is, 
food and restaurants, fuel and petroleum, business services for example, 
telecommunications, insurance, bookkeeping and so on, and personal and home 
services for example, educational, cleaning, gardening and so on.  
As discussed above, the purposive selection criteria included primary measures 
such as franchising experience, multi-unit ownership, and membership of franchisee 
associations among the 30 Johannesburg-based franchisees. In addition, secondary 
criteria comprising mostly of demographic factors such as race, gender, marital status, 
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educational and business experience that were considered as the qualities of the 
population elements that addressed the research questions by providing the required 
breadth and depth of information.  
 Interviews as a data gathering method 
This section discusses the use of interviews to gather data among a purposeful 
sample of 30 Johannesburg-based franchisees from a wide spectrum of restaurants, 
fast food and groceries, automotive and petroleum products, personal, business and 
home care services. 
8.4.1 Introduction 
Silverman (2006) and Myers (2009) categorise interviews into three: structured, 
semi-structured, and structured interviews. According to these scholars, structured 
interviews based on a pre-determined set and order or sequence of statements 
covering specific issues the researcher wished to canvass during the course of the 
interview over a set time limit agreed to between the researcher and the interview.  
Myers (2009) opines that structured interviews are intended to “ensure consistency 
across multiple interviews” (p122) and to eliminate the need to improvise as the 
interview proceeds over a pre-specified period that removes the researcher’s role to 
improvise and ask probing or follows up questions to seek clarity and more 
information.  
Furthermore, Myers cautions that such interviews require careful planning 
beforehand to ensure that all issues are included in the list of questions to be asked. 
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However, one of the main benefits of structured interviews is their usefulness during 
telephone interviews.  
On the other hand, Myers states that unstructured interviews are the opposite of 
structured interviews and that they require few if any pre-determined questions and 
may not have a pre-set time limit. The challenge with unstructured interviews is that 
the researcher must be prepared to think on his feet and be prepared and able 
improvise as soon as the interviewee has finished answering a particular question.  
On other hand, semi-structured interviews are a combination of structured and 
unstructured interviews, which allows the use of pre-formulated questions without 
requiring a strict adherence to a specific sequence of questions or time limits. Thus, 
semi-structured interviews enable the interviewer to use his initiative and ask follow 
up questions as the interview progresses.  
As the contact details of most franchisees were difficult to find on printed and 
electronic platforms such as the websites of their franchisors, telephone directory, or 
yellow pages, the researcher took the decision to conduct semi-structured interviews 
among a purposeful sample of 30 Johannesburg-based franchisees that he could 
secure appointments with during his unscheduled door-to-door visits.  
8.4.2 Reasons for the choice of semi-structured interviewing.  
Bradach (1997) suggests that a large number of franchising studies use structured 
or semi-structured interviews as a research methodology. For that reason and the fact 
that as this part of the study focused on addressing the research questions among 
franchisees, the semi-structured interviewing method was considered appropriate for 
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the study because it provided a wide scope for contextual, exploratory, and evaluative 
examinations (Ritchie and Lewis, 2005) of the issues relating to the research questions.  
Furthermore, these scholars suggest that it would have been very difficult, 
tedious and cost ineffective to try to obtain the required data from franchisees using 
naturally occurring data.  
Based on the positivistic outlook of this study, no other method would have been 
more suitable than semi-structured interviewing which as described above, allowed 
for the simultaneous use of pre-determined questions and follow up open ended 
questions. 
Similarly, this method provided the depth and breadth of coverage of the 
research issues that the researcher needed to interrogate the participants on a face-to-
face basis.  
In addition, Silverman (2006) points out that most qualitative research studies 
use the interview method primarily because of their cost effectiveness in saving time 
and other resources.  
On the other hand, Aaker, Kumar and Day (2007) poignantly observe that semi-
structured interviews are popular among researchers because of the following 
reasons: 
More quality. Unlike in focus groups, one-on-one interviews can avoid responses 
influenced by other people. Interviewers may ask respondents directly and find out 
their personal thoughts on the product. This avoids “group think” and enhances the 
quality of the information.  
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More quantity. Researchers can obtain twice the amount of information per 
respondent in structured interviews, where the interviewer speaks at most to 20 per 
cent of the time, as in a typical 10-member focus group. 
More depth. Structured interviews capture all the relevance and salience of the 
qualitative information of focus groups. The researcher can tape and transcribe every 
word the respondent speaks use it in multiple ways. Well-designed surveys can go 
beyond surface answers and produce a rich database of interviews to produce analyst 
report, identify broad themes, understands the ranges and depths of reactions. 
More representation. Semi-structured interviews allow a much more 
representative approach as the researcher can carefully select represent respondents 
to represent the marketplace as accurately as possible 
More efficiency. The researcher can interview participants via a 15-45 minutes 
phone conversation. Incentives of food and money in focus groups are not necessary 
for semi-structured interviews. 
More value. One-on-one interviews can double or triple the number of minutes 
that the respondent is talking, and that is the true goal of research: understanding 
your consumer better.  
In the main, the foregoing considerations fundamentally accounted for the choice 
of this method of enquiry for this part of study in that they fulfilled the minimum 
needs of both the research and the researcher alike. Furthermore, given the positivistic 
approach to the study, as Silverman (2006) indicates, qualitative research makes it 
possible  
342 
“to access directly what happens in the world, that is, to examine what 
people actually do in real life rather than asking them to comment upon it” 
(p 113).  
 
8.4.3 Ethical and legal issues 
The sensitivity of the issues canvassed during the interviews also required 
personal discussions with franchisees in situations where the researcher could 
guarantee the confidentiality and anonymity of the franchisees especially when taking 
into account that most franchisees have confidentiality clauses in their franchise 
contracts that require them to obtain the franchisor’s consent prior to engaging in 
discussions about the franchise system with third parties (Dnes, 1993).  
However, legal advice informally obtained by the researcher indicated that as 
franchisees enjoyed freedom of speech, association, and exchange of information 
under the country’s constitution, the interviews with the franchisees did not require 
the franchisor’s consent as the exercise of their constitutional rights by franchisees 
ranked above their contractual obligations.  
As in the case of franchisors, the researcher undertook to protect the privacy of 
the franchisees by not disclosing their personal or corporate identities in the final 
report and the interviews were arranged on the basis that the information required 
had much to do with the franchisee’s views on the research questions and not on 
aspects of their franchise contracts per se the bad-mouthing or spying on their 
franchisors.  
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The next sub-section focuses on the theoretical assumptions underlying semi-
structured interviews conducted among a purposeful sample of franchisees. 
8.4.4 Theoretical assumptions of semi-structured interview data 
Having selected the interview as the data collection method, an important 
question concerned the value attached to the data obtained during interviews with 
franchisees (Silverman, 2006).  
This scholar suggests that it is vitally important to understanding various ways 
of generating and analysing data during the interview, as this helps with the 
assessment of the reliability and validity of the gathered data.  
To this end, Silverman suggests three theoretical perspectives depicted on Table 8-1 of 
which one, that is, positivism, was used in this study for the reasons provided below.  
Table 8-1: Three interview perspectives 
Perspective  Nature of data Methods Verification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Positivism 
Facts about 
behaviour and 
attitudes i.e. 
franchisee OO 
Biographical and 
statement facts 
Checks and 
balances needed to 
verify facts 
Random 
samples 
Standardised 
questions 
Tabulations 
Cross 
checking 
Further 
enquiry 
Measure
ment 
 
 
Emotionalism 
 
Genuine 
experiences 
 
Unstructured, 
open ended 
interviews 
 
Further 
enquiry 
 
 
 
 
Constructivism 
 
 
 
Mutually 
constructed 
 
Any interview 
between any 
interested 
parties  
 
Further 
enquiry 
 
Source: Adapted from Silverman (2006) 
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To briefly elaborate on these perspectives, within positivism interview data has 
the potential to describe reliable and valid measures for addressing the researching 
questions regardless of the research setting.  
The researcher achieved this by the random selection of a sample of franchisees 
interviewed with the help of structured statements with multiple-choice answers 
were tabulated as the interview progressed. 
Secondly, emotionalism interviews involve viewing sessions of franchisees 
constructing their social world with the aim of generating genuine facts and views 
about their experiences on the research questions. To achieve this goal, this study had 
to use unstructured, open-ended interviews which were considered inappropriate 
given the specific research issues under investigation.  
On the other hand, constructivism does not restrict itself to the use of interviews 
between the researcher and franchisees to construct meaning on the research 
questions but also considers discussions between other interested parties with a 
common interest as a research tool.  
8.4.5 The interview process 
In line with Patton (2006), the conducting of the positivistic interviews in this 
study involved random purposeful samples, semi-structured interviews comprising 
fixed-choice and open-ended statements was a 3 stage process that consisted of the 
planning, execution and evaluation or analysis phases that followed each other 
consecutively  
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Pre-interview stage. This planning stage aimed at ensuring that rich data was 
obtained from franchisees, that is, informative data on the research questions in an 
interview through direct answers to specific research questions from the researcher 
and where necessary, respondents had to explain some of their answers.  
In this study, obtaining rich data albeit from a smaller sample was as important 
as having a representative sample in a qualitative study (Ritchie and Lewis, 2005). 
Therefore, in planning for the interviews, a number of steps were taken with the aim 
of ensuring that rich data was obtained and tape-recorded.  
Firstly, a thorough review of the literature conducted helped determine existing 
theories relating to the research questions which complemented a series of open-
ended and unstructured exploratory interviews conducted with a number franchising 
experts such as attorneys, consultants and current and past franchisees on the 
relevant research issues.  
The views and opinions of past franchisees received particular attention as they 
were expected to give more honest and candid views than their active counter-parts 
as existing franchisees who could be seeking to expand their outlets or renewing their 
franchise contracts could be loath to express some radical and critical views on the 
weaknesses of the franchise system.  
In most cases, such franchisees may even be bound by confidentiality clauses of 
their franchise contracts not to comment on issues that pertain to their businesses 
(Dnes, 1993).  
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After collecting and collating all the expert views and ideas from the above 
sources, a structured interview guide with open-ended statements was prepared in 
order to guide the interviews and the collection and analysis of the data. As in the 
case of the quantitative part of the study, the research questions formed the basis of 
the interviews.  
In addition, as the principle of standardisation forms the bedrock of most 
franchise systems (Kaufmann and Eroglu, 1999), it made sense to partly use 
standardised questions to gather data from the franchisees.  
According to these scholars, standardisation ensured that all the outlets 
belonging to a particular franchise system offered the same products, at the same 
price, in the same quantities, and from similar premises and so on.  
On the other hand, as most franchise contracts bind franchisees to secrecy 
through confidentiality clauses (Dnes, 1993), it was necessary to offer assurances to 
the franchisees concerned and to excuse the sceptical ones from participating in the 
study.  
As discussed below, the researcher randomly visited the prospective respondent 
franchisees at their businesses in the western areas of Johannesburg closer to where he 
lived and made appointments with the staff of the franchisees.  
In line with Bailey (1994), the preparations involved scheduling and confirming 
the interview appointments on site or later by telephone and providing the 
respondents or their assistants with the reasons for, the amount of time required as 
well as the confidentiality of the interviews and drawing up of an interview timetable. 
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The appointments were held at a mutually convenient time on the premises of the 
respondents.  
Interview stage. As depicted on Table 8-2, Ritchie and Lewis (2005) discuss the 
steps involved in conducting a research interview that were followed in this study 
which aimed at removing the interviewee from his or her normal daily social frame of 
mind and placing him into a deep thinking and creative mind-set in order to tap into 
his information and belief system.  
Table 8-2: The interview stage 
Stage Activities 
Arrival 
During this stage: 
- The interviewer arrived on the participant’s premises 
- The researcher eased the participant into the interview 
- The relationship between the researcher and the participant was 
established 
- The researcher made conversation but not about the interview 
- Once the participant seemed comfortable, the interview began 
Introducing 
the 
research 
- The researcher introduced the research topic  
- The researcher explained the nature and purpose of the 
interview 
- The researcher affirmed the confidentiality of the interview and 
sought permission to record the interview 
- The researcher switched on the tape 
Beginning 
the 
interview 
- The researcher began by collecting contextual information e.g. 
biographical data 
- Informal questions were asked as not being pre-determined 
- Interview question were then posed 
- Follow up questions were asked to probe the participant’s 
responses 
- The researcher assessed the replies and adjusts his questioning 
style accordingly  
During the 
interview 
- The researcher guided the participant through key themes 
- Each subject was explored in-depth with a series of iterative 
follow ups and probes 
- The participants were working at a deeper, more focused level 
than normal 
- discovering ideas, thoughts and feelings 
- The researcher asked questions that sought breadth and depth 
coverage of the research issues 
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Ending the 
interview 
- The researcher signalled the approach of the end of the 
interview 
- The researcher checked if the participants had nothing more to 
discuss and that all their questions and concerns have been 
addressed 
- The researcher packed his bags, switched off the tape recorder 
Source: Adapted from Richie and Lewis (2005) 
Post-interview stage. On completion of the interview, the researcher thanked the 
participant warmly and stated how the information obtained during the interview 
will make an invaluable contribution to the research. The researcher reiterated the 
assurance of confidentiality given at the beginning of the interview.  
In moving away from the interview, the researcher engaged in casual talk with 
the participants and listened carefully to what the participants said and assessed the 
need to restart the interview to deal with any new ideas or facts that the participants 
may wish to discuss with the researcher.  
Thereafter, the researcher took leave of the participant to pursue his next 
interview and finally to transcribe and begin analysing the data. Annexure D presents 
a summary of the statements used to conduct the interview. 
 Franchisee constructs and measures in the model 
This section highlights the constructs and measure discussed in section 5.3 above 
which were developed and mostly adapted for this study from previous studies and 
formed the basis of the semi-structured interviews conducted with franchisees to 
gather data needed to test the research questions.  
These measures consisting of three items each appear on Table 8-3 through Table 
8-15 and franchisee responses to each item were tallied to indicate the importance or 
otherwise of each measure to the respondents as discussed in section 8.6.2 below.  
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8.5.1 Measure 1: Structural factors as antecedents of OO among franchisees 
(Proposition 1) 
Three sets of sub-propositions, that is, head-office to staff ratio, incomplete 
contracting and multi-unit ownership contained statements which measured 
proposition 1. 
A. Head-office staff to franchisee ratio and OO.  
The statements shown on Table 8-3 below measured relationship exists between 
the number of head office field staff and franchisee lapses or deviations from 
operating standards and procedures. 
Table 8-3: Measurement of headoffice staff to franchisee ratio 
1. Head-office staff conduct few and infrequent inspection visits 
2. Inspectors usually spend an adequate amount of time during their visits  
3. Regular store visits help to improve outlet performances 
Source: Adapted from Shane and Spell (1998); Carney and Gedajlovic (1991); Lafointane (1992) 
 
B. Incomplete Contracts 
The statements shown on Table 8-4 below measured the relationship between the 
incompleteness of franchise contracts and exploitation of gaps in the franchise 
contract by franchisees. 
Table 8-4: Measurement of Incomplete Contracts 
4. Franchise contracts do not always cover aspects all the franchise relationship  
5. At times franchise contracts fail to protect the interests of the parties 
6. It is possible for franchisees to use the franchise contract to their own advantage  
Source: Adapted from Williamson (1979, 1981, 1987); Muris (1980); Hadfield, (1990);  
Klein, 1995; Dnes (2000, 2002); Kidwell et al., (2007).  
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C. Multi-unit ownership  
Table 8-5 contains statements which proposed to measure relationship between 
multiple unit ownership by franchisees and retaliatory behaviour by disgruntled 
franchisees. 
Table 8-5: Measurement of Multi-unit Ownership 
7. Multi-unit franchisees have more bargaining power than single-unit franchisees 
8. Franchisors are inclined to be more considerate towards multi-unit franchisees 
than to single-unit franchisees 
9. Multi-unit franchisees are entitled to “favours” from their franchisors because of 
their high contribution to success of the franchise system 
Source: Adapted from Kaufmann and Dant (1996); Dant and Gundlach (1999); Shane (2001) 
 
8.5.2 Measure 2: Contextual factors as antecedents of OO among franchisees 
(Proposition 2) 
Three set of statements under sub-dimensions of membership of franchisee 
associations, lack of legislation and regulation and last years of the franchise contract 
examined the relationship between contextual factors and OO among franchisees. 
A. Membership of Franchisee Associations 
The statements shown on Table 8-6 below propose to measure the relationship 
between the absence of formalised franchisee associations and uncooperative 
franchisees. 
Table 8-6: Measurement for Membership of Franchisee Associations 
10. Franchise systems should allow and sponsor franchisee associations  
11. Franchisee Associations are needed to advance the cause of franchisees 
12. Some franchisees often abuse their membership of franchisee associations 
Source: Adapted from Shane and Spleen (1988); Dandridge and Falbe (1995); Leblebici and Shalley (1996); 
Combs et al. (2004) 
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B. Lack of Franchise Legislation and Regulation 
The statements which proposed to measure relationship between the lack of 
franchise regulation and an OO among franchisees appear on Table 8-7.  
Table 8-7: Measurement of Lack of Legislation and Regulation  
13. FASA should be granted legal powers to discipline errant franchisors and 
franchisees 
14. There is a need for stringent franchise-specific laws 
15. Franchising disputes should be handled by FASA only 
Source: Emerson (1978); Brickley et al. (1991); Storholm and Scheuding (1994); Shane and Foo (1999) 
 
C. Last Years of the Franchise Contract 
For some obscure reasons, Penrose’s (1959) promising franchise life cycle theory 
has not succeeded in stimulating much debate among scholars. However, there can be 
little doubt that the franchise relationship remains the same throughout the contract 
period.  
The most challenging period could be the last years of the franchise contract that 
Muris (1980) refers to as “the last period” effect. The statements depicted on Table 8-8 
proposed to measure the relationship between the crossroad phase of the franchise 
relationship and non-compliance with franchise standards and procedures by 
franchisees. 
Table 8-8: Measurement of the Last Years of the Franchise Contract  
16. It is much easier to operate a franchised outlet in the last years of the franchise 
contract  
17. The last years of the franchise contract are the most profitable for franchisees 
18. Franchisees are more cooperative towards the last years of franchise contract 
Source: Adapted from: Muris (1980); Dant and Gundlach (1998); Dnes (2003) 
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8.5.3 Measure 3: Strategic factors as antecedents of OO among franchisees 
(Proposition 3) 
Three sets of statements on brand value, geographic dispersion and local market 
knowledge proposed to measure the relationship between strategic factors and OO.  
A. Brand Value 
Table 8-9 shows the statements which proposed to measure the relationship 
between a strong brand and an inclination among franchisees to free ride on the 
franchisor’s brand. 
Table 8-9: Measurement for Brand Value  
19. A strong brand offers many advantages to franchisees 
20. Most franchisees prefer to be associated with a strong brand 
21. It is easy for franchisees to make money from a strong brand  
Source: Adapted from Klein (1980); Klein and Leffler (1981); Peterson and Dant (1990); Kaufmann 
and Stanworth, 1995; Combs and Ketchen, 2004. 
 
 
B. Geographic Dispersion 
Table 8-10 contains the statements which proposed to measure relationship 
between the locations of franchised outlets and franchisee tendencies of non-
compliance with franchise standard operating procedures and processes. 
Table 8-10: Measurement for Geographic dispersion  
22. Most franchised outlets are situated far away from the franchisor’s head-office  
23. Franchisees prefer outlets that are located far away from the franchisor’s head-
office 
24. Franchised stores that are located near the franchisor’s head-office receive more 
inspections than usual 
Source: Adapted from Brickely and Dark (1987); Norton, 1988; Kaufmann and Dant (1998); 
Castriogiovanni and Justis (1998); Combs and Ketchen, 2003) 
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C. Local market knowledge  
Table 8-11 contains statements which proposed to measure the relationship 
between the franchise business strategy and the uncoordinated use of the franchisee's 
local market knowledge. 
Table 8-11: Measurement for Local Market Knowledge  
25. Franchisors value the local market knowledge that franchisees possess  
26. Franchisees use their local market knowledge to their own advantage 
27. Once-off customers present less problems to franchisees  
Source: Adapted from Caves and Murphy (1976); Brickely and Dark (1987); Norton (1988); Minkler, 1990; 
Bradach (1997); Combs et al., 2004 
 
8.5.4 Measure 4: Opportunism among franchisees (Proposition 4) 
Hadfield (1990) lists a number of ways in that franchisee acts that indicate a 
manifestation of OO within the conceptualisation of the construct in this study. The 
literature shows that some franchisees engage in undesirable behaviour at one time or 
another with the aim of increasing their wealth at the expense of the franchise system 
or their fellow-franchisees. Franchisees that are likely to engage in these forms of 
behaviour may display certain tendencies that franchisors need to heed. 
Therefore, the statements consolidating the issues into two categories, that is, 
failure to account for sales and to maintain quality standards discussed in this section 
and shown on Table 8-12 proposed to measure the relationship between franchisees 
who fail to account for sales and maintain quality standards and OA among 
franchisees. 
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Table 8-12: Measurement for opportunistic actions among franchisees 
28. Franchisees deserve higher returns than their normal business activities can 
provide 
29. It is too much to ask franchisees to comply with all franchise rules and 
regulations 
30. Franchisees should be allowed to ignore some rules in order to maximize their 
returns 
Source: Adapted from Muris (1980); Hadfield (1990); Dnes (2003) 
8.5.5 Measure 5: Growth (Proposition 5) 
A number of statements examined the relationship between OA and the growth 
of franchise systems among franchisees represented by new franchisees entering into 
the system, renewal of franchise contracts by existing franchisees, franchisees seeking 
multi-unit ownership opportunities and conversion of independent stores into 
franchised outlets 
In a consolidated fashion, the statements shown on  Table 8-13 which proposed 
to measure proposition 5.  
Table 8-13: Measurement for Growth  
31. It is sometimes not possible or desirable for franchisees to comply with 
franchise rules  
32. It often does not pay for franchisees to adhere to operating standards 
33. Sites for new stores are usually allocated to the “blue-eyed” franchisees of 
franchisors 
Source: Adapted from: Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1969); Hoffmann and Preble (1983); Shane (1996) 
 
8.5.6 Measure 6: Competitiveness (Proposition 6) 
The statements shown on Table 8-14 proposed to measure the relationship 
between opportunistic actions of franchisees and the competitiveness of franchise 
systems. 
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Table 8-14: Measurement for Competitiveness  
34. Brand building is not the responsibility of franchisees 
35. At some point in the franchise relationship, most franchisees feel discouraged 
from providing ideas that may help to improve the franchise offering 
36. Franchisees are sometimes of the view that they are not getting full value for the 
advertising fees they pay to their franchisors  
Source: Adapted from Lillis et al (1976); Kaufmann and Rangan (1990); Bradach (1997);  
Litz and Stewart (1998); Sorenson and Sorenson (2001); Combs and Ketchen (2003) 
 
8.5.7 Measure 7: Survival (Proposition 7) 
The statements shown on Table 8-15 proposed to measure the relationship 
between the opportunistic actions of franchisees and the survival of franchise 
systems. 
Table 8-15: Measurement for Survival  
37. Franchisees usually expect their franchise contracts not to be extended or 
renewed  
38. Because of the conflictual relationship, disputes between franchisors and 
franchisees are unavoidable 
39. Stores closures and take-backs are not helpful in resolving some franchising 
disputes 
Source: Adapted from Castrogiovanni et al. (1993); Kaufmann and Dant (1996); Stanworth et al. (1998); 
Lafontaine and Shaw (1998); Shane and Azoulay (2000). 
Having presented statements representing the measures of the different 
propositions, the next section focuses on the use of content analysis to analyse the 
interview data gathered from franchisees. 
 Content analysis as the data analysis method  
This study uses content analysis to examine the data gathered from 30 Johannesburg-
based franchisees to examine the propositions that addressed the research questions. 
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8.6.1 Content analysis: Its meaning and application in this study  
Given the many different definitions of content analysis, Neuendorf (2002) 
provides the most useful in this study. He defines content analysis as: 
 
“a summarizing, qualitative analysis of messages that relies on the scientific 
method (including attention to objectivity, inter-subjectivity, a priori 
design, reliability, generalisability and research questions testing) and is not 
limited as to the types of variables that may be measured or the context in 
that the messages are created or presented” (p.10)  
 
According to Krippendoff (1980 and 2004), content analysis is used in both 
quantitative and qualitative studies. As this chapter focuses on qualitative studies, 
only the relevant aspects of content analysis are discussed. 
Generally, qualitative studies invoke content analysis to analyse any kind of 
communication content such as speeches, written text, interviews, images and so on 
from which keywords are counted and frequencies, categorized and classified. This 
study followed this procedure upon conducting the interviews with the franchisees. 
In line with the framework proposed by Silverman (2006), the analysis of 
interview data hinged on the epistemological assumptions adopted in the study. In 
this regard, Silverman identified three assumptions: positivism, emotionalism, and 
constructivism, which prescribed specific research tasks and obligations outlined on 
Table 8-1 above.  
357 
As discussed above in this section, positivism, the theoretical platform for this 
study, assumes that interview data should yield cold, real life facts about the social 
phenomenon under investigation that is, the effects of OO and OA on franchise 
systems.  
Accordingly, Silverman’s framework suggests the use of random samples, 
standardised questions, and tabulations to analyse the interview was in line with the 
positivistic paradigm outlined above.  
Firstly, the semi-structured interviews conducted in line with a research protocol 
for naturalistic examinations required generating data that was independent of the 
research setting, the researcher or the interviewee, that is, franchisees.  
Though using these guidelines can be criticised for their lack of flexibility and 
ignoring the dialogue that takes place between the interviewer and interviewees, 
positivist scholars believe this is necessary to ensure the reliability of the instrument 
and thus achieve the benefit of accurate measurement that is difficult to obtain from 
other instruments especially unstructured and open-ended questions.  
The latter are open to subjective interpretation and as such may be difficult 
compare among a number of respondents, are time consuming and can be more 
difficult to analyse than structured questions.  
As a point of departure, the conducting of the content analysis on the interview 
data aimed at producing knowledge that addressed the study’s three research 
questions discussed in section in 1.2.1 above. 
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The design of the structured statements and schedule used in this study aimed at 
facilitating the content analysis of the interview data. The schedule or grid items 
consisted of manifest and latent factors that represented explicit and implicit facts, 
beliefs, perceptions that underpinned the behaviour of franchisees and the effects of 
OO and OA on the performance of franchise systems, respectively.  
As discussed in the next sub-section, the schedule or grid consisted of an 
expanded nine theoretical constructs or measures, which in turn, comprised 3 
manifest variables or items each that amounts to 39 items to which each of the 
participants responded.  
8.6.2 Content analysis: coding and interpretation used in this study 
As this thesis uses content analysis to analyse and interpret the interview data, it 
is important to briefly explain its use. To start with, content analysis requires the 
coding of data in order to determine categories or themes into which they may be 
classified on the basis of theoretical evidence (Brenner, 1981; Kvale, 1986; Lincoln and 
Cuba, 2000).  
In line with Krippendorf (2004), propositions testing involved finding, 
aggregating and interpreting common responses among the respondent franchisees to 
the closed and open - ended statements during the interviews to indicate support for 
the research questions or otherwise. 
Thus, based on literature review, the items shown on Table 8-16 below and 
contained in the interview guide (Annexure D) represent the theoretical constructs 
that proposed to measure the motivators of franchisee OO, the relationship between 
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OO and OA, and between OA among franchisees and on the growth, 
competitiveness, and survival of franchise systems.  
Table 8-16: Summary of qualitative measures 
Measures/Constructs and sub-dimensions 
Number of items 
Growth 3 
Competitiveness 3 
Survival 3 
Opportunistic actions among franchisees  
Structural factors  
Head-office staff to franchisee ratio 3 
Incomplete contracts 3 
Multi-unit ownership 3 
Contextual factors  
Membership of Franchisee Associations 3 
The Last Years of the Franchise Contract 3 
Lack of franchise regulation 3 
Strategic factors  
Brand value 3 
Geographic dispersion 3 
Local market knowledge 3 
Total 39 
Source: Developed for this study 
 
As indicated in Table 8-17 below, the coding used in the study amounted to the 
researcher placing a tick or a cross to signify the interviewee’s agreement or 
disagreement with the statement, as the case may be.  
At the end of the interviews, the interviewer or coder simply had to count each 
interviewee’s tick and crosses for each item and work out the percentage score for that 
item among all the interviewees to determine support for or against the statement or 
proposition. 
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Table 8-17: Content analysis scoring system used in this study  
Statement Number 
(yes) 
Total 
achievable 
% Results 
Franchisees deserve higher 
returns than their normal 
business activities can 
provide 
15 20 75 Supported 
Source: Developed for the study 
For example, a situation in which 15 out of 20 respondents place ticks next to 
item 1 of measure 1 indicates support for the relevant statement as it would have 
received 75% support from the respondents.  
To test each proposition, the researcher added the scores obtained after tallying 
the number of responses to each of the sub - propositions that is, 3 items measuring 
each construct; and the total thereof divided by the total number of achievable 
responses for all 3 constructs combined and multiplied by 100 to obtain a percentage 
score for that proposition.  
A percentage score of 50 or more indicates support for the construct. For 
example, for sub- proposition 1, the 3 statements on 3 items receiving ordinal scores of 
11, 13, and 15 out of 20 possible responses.  
These added individual responses give us 39, divided by 90, that is, the total 
possible number of responses achievable and multiplied 100 to get a percentage score 
of 65% for that proposition.  
As this number is greater than 50%, this indicates support for the proposition. 
This coding and scoring system applies to the rest of the measures and items on each 
item and proposition.  
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 Summary 
This chapter discussed the qualitative methods such as population and sampling 
strategies and issues, the interviews and content analysis used to gather, analyse, 
validate and evaluate interview data obtained from a purposeful sample of 30 
Johannesburg-based franchisees from a broad spectrum of products and services in 
South Africa on the effects of OO and OA on franchise systems. 
The next chapter presents and discusses results of the qualitative study. 
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Chapter 9 Results and discussion – 
Qualitative study  
 Introduction 
Chapter 8 discussed the research methodology for the qualitative study. This 
chapter presents and discusses the results of the qualitative study conducted among 
30 purposefully sampled Johannesburg-based franchisees using data obtained from 
semi-structured interviews. Following this introduction, section 9.2 presents the 
breakdown of the characteristics of the sampled franchisees. Sections 9.3 and 9.4 
present and discuss on the results of the qualitative study. Sections 9.5 and 9.6 deal 
with the validation and assessment of possible bias in the methods and results of the 
qualitative study. Section 9.7 discuss the study’s triangulation strategy followed by a 
summary of the chapter. 
 Breakdown of interviewed franchisees 
Table 9-1 presents a summary of the demographic profile of the interviewed 
franchisees. 
Table 9-1: Breakdown of interviewed franchisees  
Item Number % 
Sector 
Food and Restaurant 13 43.33 
Fuel and Petroleum 6 20.00 
Business Services 8 26.67 
Personal and Home Care 3 10.00 
Total 30 100.00 
Biographical information (Average) 
Age 40 yrs 
Race White 
363 
Gender Male 
Marital status Married 
Education Grade 12 
Business experience 10 yrs 
Franchising experience 8 yrs 
Franchisee Association membership No 
Single or Multi-unit ownership Single-unit ownership 
Source: Developed for the study  
 
As depicted on Table 9-1 above, the profile of the interviewed franchisees 
consisted mostly of fast food operators of an average age of 40 years, Grade 12 
education, married, white male with 10 years business experience and 8 years 
franchising experience as a single-unit owners who are not members of any franchisee 
association. 
This profile is in line with that of an earlier study by du Toit (2003) and is similar 
to ones found in most franchising studies in the US and the UK. By way of 
preliminary comments, it must be pointed out that this profile reflects the skewed 
ownership of wealth that the post-apartheid government is trying to reverse through 
its political instruments such as the AA, SME development, and BBBEE.  
Yet, there are still no clear or specific strategies developed to transform the 
franchising industry. This is despite media statements by FASA and other role players 
about the role that franchising can play in drawing black entrepreneurs into the 
mainstream of the economy.  
It is clear that very little is being done by FASA, franchisors or the authorities to 
enforce or implement government policies referred to above to ensure that more black 
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entrepreneurs are encouraged to enter and remain in the franchising sector as 
franchisors and franchisees.  
As argued in the next chapter, such initiatives are necessary not only to 
transform the sector, but also to help create job opportunities in the communities from 
that black entrepreneurs originate. These communities suffer from high employment 
and poverty levels but have low skill levels that franchising appears to be ideally 
suited. This is mainly because of franchising being a turnkey or “ready-to-go” 
exercise, operated on a repetitive basis to produce and distribute goods and services 
to vastly dispersed geographical areas. 
 Results of the interviews and testing of propositions 
The results obtained from the interviews conducted among the 30 purposeful 
sample of franchisees mentioned in the preceding section that show strong support 
for all but two of the 39 statements on the seven themes used to examine the study’s 
propositions. 
As shown on Table 9-2 through Table 9-14 below, this section summarises the 
results of the examination of the research questions through the testing of seven 
propositions. In the ensuing discussion, for analytical and interpretation purposes the 
responses of the interviewed franchisees to the study measures or statements are 
categorised into three. 
First, common comments representing the views expressed by most of the 
interviewed franchisees on the closed ended questions are processed as discussed in 
section 7.7.2 above and second, common responses to specific open-ended statements 
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or measures are italicised and lastly, open-ended responses to specific responses 
made by some of individual franchisees on specific statements or measures are both 
italicised and indented. 
9.3.1 Research question 1 (Propositions 1-3) 
Research question 1 sought to determine whether there was a relationship 
between structural, contextual, and strategic factors and OO among franchisees. To 
this end, the study set three propositions 1–3 testing research question 1. 
A. Testing of proposition no 1: The relationship between structural factors 
and OO 
Several sub- propositions representing the sub-dimensions of the structural 
factors construct tested its relationship with opportunistic orientations.  
i). Head-office Staff to Franchisee Ratio and OO.  
As reflected in the statements on Table 8-3 above, based mainly on Shane and 
Spell (1998) this sub-proposition suggested a negative relationship between head 
office field staff to franchisee ratio and the frequent occurrences of franchisee 
deviations from operating standards and procedures. As shown on Table 9-2 below, 
this construct received strong support at 82%. 
  
366 
Table 9-2: Test results for Headoffice Staff to Franchisee Ratio  
Statements 
Number 
(yes) 
Total 
achievable 
% 
Result 
Head-office staff conduct 
few and infrequent 
inspection visits 25 30 83 Supported 
Inspectors usually spend 
adequate amounts of 
time during their visits 26 30 87 Supported 
Regular store visits help 
to improve outlet 
performances 23 30 77 Supported 
Total 74 90 82 Supported 
Source: Adapted from Brickley and Dark (1987); Shane and Spell (1998); Minkler (1990) 
As discussed in section 8.5.1 above, the head-office staff to franchisee ratio refers 
to the number of field workers or quality controllers employed by the franchisor to 
monitor and enforce compliance with franchise rules, regulations and procedures 
expressed as a percentage of the total number of franchisees within the franchise 
system.  
As all three statements 1-3 used to measure the relationship between head office 
to staff ratio and OO received a strong support of 82%, it seems for plausible for 
franchisors to match the number of field workers or quality controllers to the 
percentage of the number of franchisees.  
To this end, information such as the perceived level of free riding within the 
franchise system, the total number and the geographical dispersion of franchise 
outlets within franchise systems seem to influence the appointment of field workers 
by franchisors.  
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The importance of having an adequate number of well-trained and highly 
qualified and knowledgeable field workers cannot be over-emphasised. According 
one interviewee, this team of officials:  
 
serves as the franchisor’s ears and eyes  
 
Another franchisee opined that: 
 
the word of these people (field workers) goes in as far as most franchisors are 
concerned,  
 
as most franchisors rely on the reports and observations of their field workers 
(Brickley and Dark, 1987). 
In addition, these scholars highlight the importance of the field workers by 
suggesting that most franchise systems have far more franchised outlets than 
company-owned stores. However, one franchisor informed the researcher that: 
 
his field workers also conducted regular inspections on the company stores and 
compiled reports used by the franchisor to improve service quality and so on. 
 
Further responses of the franchisees to the statements measuring the head-office 
staff-to-franchisee ratio and explanations related thereto follow below. 
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Statement 1. 
Head-office staff conducts regular and frequent inspection visits.  
Although most the interviewed franchisees supported this statement at 82% 
indicating that franchisors were committing resources to the franchise system, most 
franchisees complained about the quality of the inspections in the sense that most of 
them stated that the field workers did not add any value to their businesses.  
The commitment of franchisors plays a critical role in the success of the franchise 
system as it ensures that franchisees comply with their contractual obligations (Muris, 
1980). 
This serves as some kind of insurance policy that the franchisors monitor the 
maintenance of quality standards and cheating by franchisees is discouraged to 
protect the reputation of the brand and he integrity of the franchise system. However, 
one interviewed franchisee complained that: 
 
the field workers arrived with a checklist and started ticking off a whole range of 
things off the list and left without making any useful inputs that the franchisees 
could be put to good use.  
 
It would seem that these field workers were carrying out their duties in 
accordance with the instructions of their employers as most of them never changed 
their approach.  
Another franchisee moaned about: 
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the high staff turnover rate among the field workers of their franchise systems 
which indicated low job satisfaction.  
 
This could perhaps explain the frustration and exasperation of most franchisees 
with the mundane inspections carried out by these field workers. On the other hand, 
another franchisee complained about: 
 
the rate at which these field workers were rotated that made it cumbersome for it to 
explain its business to a different official all the time.  
 
Another franchisee commented about the: 
 
high rate of job-hopping among field workers across different franchise systems 
that spread confusion, gossip, and rumour.  
 
Therefore, it would appear that franchisees were concerned about the limited 
knowledge and skills of the relatively inexperienced field workers which may have 
arisen from the inability of these field workers to carry out their duties expertly, with 
the result that some experienced franchisees could either manipulate these officials 
into not reporting their misconduct to the franchisor.  
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Statement 2. 
Inspectors usually spend enough time during store visits. 
This statement aimed at determining whether there were enough field workers 
within the franchise system as this could affect their performance. This could result in 
the field workers spending less time at any outlet, which could create opportunities 
for OO among franchisees.  
As this statement received strong support of 83%, it confirmed the view held by 
scholars such as Shane and Spleen (1998) that there should be a higher field worker-
franchisee ratio in order to minimize or curb the development of franchisee OO and 
vice versa.  
However, sensible and valid as they are, the complaints expressed by most 
franchisees regarding the quality of the inspections are a matter that deserves the 
attention of the given the important role that the store visits and inspections play in 
enforcing franchise rules, procedures, and regulations (Brickley and Dark, 1987).  
The expenses that franchisors incur to ensure that the store visits and inspections 
take place evince the significance of these activities such that where these expenses 
exceed the benefit of monitoring, franchisors resort to vertical integration which 
results in the decline of franchising (Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1979; Hadfield, 
1990).  
Statement 3. 
Regular store visits help to improve outlet performances.  
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Having received such strong support of 77%, this statement indicates the high 
expectations that franchisees have of the inspections. However, most franchisees felt 
that they would have supported the statement even more had it read that regular store 
visits should help to improve outlet performances. Most franchisees seem to suggest that 
they would welcome the inspections with open arms if they felt that such inspections were 
adding value to their businesses.  
It was not clear from their responses whether some of the franchisees resented 
the idea of having field workers visiting their outlets, as this would have made it 
difficult for them to free ride on the franchisor’s brand. However, as discussed above, 
the complaint about lack of skilled and knowledgeable inspectors poses a serious 
threat to the reputation of franchise systems, which may also lead to vertical 
integration.  
However, one franchisee succinctly stated that: 
 
you know some times we need what you call a kick up the backside here. Every now 
and again and they sort of come in and just make sure that you are portioning 
correctly again, you know that you are using the right amount of spices because we 
do a lot of in-house cooking. So make sure you are using the right gramage of spices 
and the right equipment and things like that. So it very good because a lot of the 
times you know we forget and we get a little comfortable and you know we forget 
maybe to put a little of this or a little bit of that or, so yes it’s very important. 
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ii). Incomplete Contracts and OO.  
The statements on Table 8-4 above postulated a positive relationship between the 
incompleteness of franchise contracts and the exploitation of gaps in the franchise 
contract by franchisees. Overall, the proposition received strong support at 68%. The 
results of the test on this sub- proposition appear on Table 9-3 below, as follows: 
Table 9-3: Test results on Incomplete Contracts  
Statements 
Number 
(yes) 
Total 
achievable 
% 
Result 
Franchise contracts form 
the foundation of the 
relationship between 
franchisors and 
franchisees 30 30 100 Supported 
Some aspects of the 
franchise relationship are 
not found in the franchise 
contract 15 30 50 Supported 
Franchise contracts 
protect the interests of 
both parties equally 16 30 53 Supported 
Total 61 90 68 Supported 
Source: Adapted from Williamson (1979, 1981, 1983); Klein (1993); Dnes (2002)  
Chapters 4 and 5 discussed the uniqueness, complexity, and complicated nature 
of franchise contracts in detail. Suffice to mention that the contradiction of two main 
issues that involve franchise contracts: their incompleteness and position as the so-
called “contract of adhesion” exacerbated some difficulties involved.  
One of the difficulties is that this is not a legal thesis, and therefore, it was not 
possible to deal with some of the principles that underlie contracts. In addition, as 
various scholars have pointed out, like most other contracts, franchise contracts are 
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incomplete contracts because they do not spell out some critical aspects of the 
franchise relationship.  
Furthermore, the literature suggests that franchise contracts are one-sided 
because franchisors or their attorneys write them in their own favour. As another 
franchisee complained, he signed the franchise contract without an opportunity to 
consult his attorney with the purpose of making an input.  
TCE scholars (Williamson, 1987; Muris, 1980; Hadfield, 1990 and Dnes, 2000) 
accounted for the incompleteness of the franchise contracts on the need for franchise 
systems to adjust to changing market conditions. For this reason, legislation is 
required to ensure the protection of the franchisees in the event of the franchisor 
deciding to change franchise contract terms midstream (Woker, 2012).  
The CPA is trying to address this issue as both old and new franchise contracts 
are required to comply with this Act, with effect from 01 April 2011. It must be noted 
though that the Act opened a six month “window” for old franchise contracts to 
comply with the Act.  
Statement 5. 
Franchise contracts form the foundation of the relationship between franchisors and 
franchisees.  
Despite all the interviewed franchisees supporting this statement, most of them 
perceived it to represent the interests of their franchisors. These franchisees did not seem 
to appreciate or understand that franchise contracts granted rights or privileges and 
not only imposed duties and obligations on them. The literature explains this 
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anomaly in terms of the one-sidedness (Hunt, 1977), the restrictive and prescriptive 
clauses (Porter and Renworth, 1978) of franchise contracts described as the contracts 
of “adhesion” (Hadfield, 1990).  
In addition, Udel (1972) found that most franchise contracts imposed far less 
duties and obligations on franchisors than on franchisees, some of which survive the 
expiry or cancellation of the franchise contracts.  
For example, most franchise contracts have the so-called “covenant not to 
compete” or the restraint of trade clause debarring franchisees from establishing a 
business that competes with the franchisor in the same premises or area for a certain 
period upon the cancellation or termination. It is noteworthy that no such obligations 
bind franchisors as this illustrates the inequality or one-sidedness of franchise 
contracts.  
This accounts for the perceptions and feeling of apathy or disconnect that 
franchisees have towards franchise contracts. Franchisors do not negotiate, but like 
insurance policies, sell franchise contracts to their franchisees on a “take-it-or live” 
basis (Hunt, 1977).  
On the other hand, Porter and Renworth (1978) found that most franchisees are 
not afforded the opportunity to consult an attorney prior to signing the franchise 
contract and that this often leads to disputes and litigation. For this reason, the CPA 
requires grants aspirant franchisees a 10 day cooling off period after signing the 
franchise contract.  
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This aims at allowing time and space for potential franchisees to consult his 
attorney or other advisors without incurring any penalties should they decide to 
withdraw or cancel the franchise contract.  
Perhaps it is important to state that franchise contracts merely provide the legal 
basis or foundation of the franchise relationship and that its social aspects merit 
attention. As argued by Granovettor (1985), one of the flaws of franchise contracts and 
the relationships they underpin lies in their under-socialisation. This criticism 
addresses the little recognition accorded to the social relations or context in which the 
franchise relationship resides.  
Ouchi (1980) refers to the “clans” formed or established through social 
interaction and exchanges to govern relationships within markets or bureaucracies. 
This highlights the role played by social norms and values such as trust, commitment, 
and cooperation, which develop between and within organisations such as franchise 
systems over time, as governance mechanisms for regulate relationships.  
The socialising of franchise relationships in terms of the RET is important 
because of its potential to augment franchise contracts. As alluded to in Chapter 4 
above, scholars such as Williamson (1985), Hadfield (1990) and Klein (2000) point to 
franchise contract as being “incomplete” contracts.  
Generally, the inability of franchise contracts to make provision for all future 
contingencies caused by market and technological changes. Berkowitz (2007) also 
raises the complexity of the franchise relationship as another factor exposing the 
limitations of franchise contracts. This arises from the difficulties involved in 
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specifying some of the obligations of franchisors and franchisees in explicit terms in 
the franchise contract (Williamson, 1979; 1985).  
For example, it is difficult to state in unambiguous terms the requirement for 
franchisees to maintain premises in hygienic conditions. Therefore, as argued by most 
scholars (Dywer et al., 1997; Gundlach and Murphy, 1999; Achrol and Gundlach, 
1999), it seems plausible that social relations should support franchise contracts.  
Statement 6.  
Some aspects of the franchise relationship are not found in the franchise contract. 
Despite best endeavours to explain the phrase, most franchisees could not 
comprehend the meaning of “incomplete contracts.” This is understandable given that 
none of the interviewed franchisees had a legal background and most probably, as 
stated above, the franchisor did not give the franchisees or their legal representative the 
opportunity to check the franchise contract. This explains the marginal support of 50% 
that this statement received from the interviewed franchisees.  
However, one franchisee highlighted the difficulties that incomplete franchise 
contracts present by alluding to:  
 
grey areas, it’s because, you know, that book is either designed on or it’s written as 
a business that is not even open, but it’s a showroom or it’s run as an operating 
business.  As an operating business you’ve got to understand that there’s things, 
there’s going to be [indiscernible] there because they’ve made a big [indiscernible]. 
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They can’t keep cleaning that, there’s nothing wrong with it. Health department is 
happy with it, so there is, I would call it ‘grey areas’ with regards to that. 
 
Otherwise, the response would probably have been different. For instance, in 
matured markets such as the US, Canada and Australia, there are case records that 
show that both franchisors and franchisees have clashed in court over the 
interpretation of the implicit contract terms.  
In other words, the cases have often required the reading of some meaning into 
the franchise contracts by presiding officers in order to provide a meaningful and 
purposeful interpretation of a contract where it has been shown not have been explicit 
(Muris, 1980), which is the approach to the interpretation of franchise contracts that 
RET scholars such as Macneil (1974) recommend.  
That means that the principles of the true intention of the parties, good faith and 
others that fall outside the scope of this research used as key criteria for interpreting 
vague contract clauses. Otherwise, as suggested in the literature, the importance of 
the question was to address situations where franchisees believed that their contracts 
were incomplete as this would lead them into seeking opportunities to exploit 
whatever gaps they could find in those contracts and this is likely to result in an 
increase in the level of OO among franchisees.  
This may be the case among franchisors who may delay taking appropriate steps 
to amend their franchise contracts to meet the requirements of the CPA with effect 
from 01 April 2011. 
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Statement 7. 
Franchise contracts protect the interests of both parties equally.  
Given the abundant anecdotal evidence that appears in the daily press and other 
publications, the researcher expected no support for this statement, which received 
marginal support among the interviewed franchisees. As described by the scholarly 
work discussed above, most franchisees complained that their franchise contracts were 
one-sided in favour of their franchisors.  
Most franchisees stated that this was because franchisors or their attorneys wrote the 
franchise contracts; and that the contracts were a one size fit all contract” that every 
franchisee was required to sign, warts, and all. In addition, franchisees signed these contracts 
in the premises of the franchisors or his attorney, without legal representation, and witnessed 
to by the franchisor or its attorneys’ staff. 
One particular franchisee indicated that: 
 
the cover page and header of each page of the franchise contract bore the franchisors 
logo! 
 
It is therefore not surprising that this statement received a lukewarm response. 
This is despite the franchise contract being such an important document as it 
contained the legal rights and obligations of franchisors and franchisees.  
However, because the issues surrounding the signing of franchise contracts, it 
appears that franchisees lack a sense of ownership of these documents, or that 
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franchisors design these contracts to achieve this goal. This attitude towards 
franchisees is common not only among franchisors, but among scholars as well.  
But one franchisee disagreed with his colleagues and stated that: 
 
it (franchise contract) protects both interests. It covers me and it covers them 
because if they don’t come and help me out when I need them then I can use that 
contract against them as well.  So it’s good for both. 
 
In Chapter 3, the study provides examples illustrating how the bulk of the 
franchising literature addresses issues largely from the franchisor’s perspective. For 
example, while the agency and resource scarcity theories describe franchising in terms 
of the benefits to franchisors that is, managerial, financial, and informational 
resources; the literature hardly mentions that franchisees actually provide those 
resources.  
To encourage franchisees to take ownership of franchise contracts, as in the case 
of mortgage bonds, it may be necessary for the parties to appoint independent 
attorneys to draw up the contracts. This will ensure that the contracts cater for the 
interests of both parties by addressing the issues raised in this section. In this way, 
franchisees will forcefully address the clauses that require them to carry out their 
obligations. 
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iii). Multi-unit ownership and OO.  
The statements on Table 8-5 forming part of proposition 1 suggest that a positive 
relationship between multiple unit ownership by franchisees and OO among 
franchisees. As depicted on Table 9-4 below, overall this sub- proposition received no 
support at 49%, mainly because of statement 9 not receiving any support. 
Table 9-4: Test Results on Multi-unit Ownership  
Statements 
Number 
(yes) 
Total 
achievable 
% 
Result 
Franchisors pay more 
respect to multi-unit 
franchisees than to single 
unit owners  19 30 63 Supported 
Multi-unit franchisees 
contribute more to the 
franchise system than 
single unit franchisees 17 30 57 Supported 
Multi-unit franchisees 
deserve more “favours” 
than single unit 
franchises 8 30 27 Unsupported 
Total 44 90 49 Unsupported 
Source: Adapted from (Kaufmann and Dant, 1996; Dant and Gundlach, 1999; Shane, 2001) 
 
As discussed in section 8.5.1 above, multi-unit ownership refers to the practice 
where a franchisee may be licenced to operate two or more outlets within the same 
franchise chain. Various studies (Kauffmann and Dant, 1996; Dant and Gundlach, 
1999; Shane, 2001) examined the reasons for both franchisors and franchisees engage 
in this practice.  
However, this proposition sought to examine the effect of this practice on the 
relationship between franchisors and franchisees. Generally, multiunit ownership 
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requires an individual franchisee to spread him or herself in managing, controlling, or 
operating several outlets simultaneously.  
This often results in franchisees creating “mini-chains” within the franchise 
system and experiencing the same agency problems facing franchisors by having to 
appoint store managers to operate franchised stores (Bradach, 1997). One of these 
problems is that multi-owning franchisees must appoint managers to run some if not 
all the outlets that belong to the multi-franchisee.  
As stated in Chapter 3, agency theorists describe the problems that managers 
present to the franchise system, that is, adverse selection and the moral hazard. 
On the one hand, adverse selection relates to the possibility that appointed store 
managers may misrepresent their skills and abilities to their employers with the result 
that they may not be able to perform their duties properly or optimally.  
Similarly, as store managers are salaried employees, they may lack the 
motivation and enthusiasm that franchisees may have because of being claimants to 
the residual, namely, franchisees are entitled to a share of the profits of an outlet 
whilst store manager are not even where they may receive bonuses.  
These problems may result in the outlets of the multi-unit owner not being able 
to meet the operating standards laid down in the franchise handbook. Faced with 
these difficulties, the multi-unit owning franchisee may find itself at loggerheads with 
the franchisor with whom up to that point the relationship has been excellent as 
probably evidenced by the decision to award licences to operate additional outlets.  
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These problems may not easily be resolved by sacking and appointing new 
managers as the agency theory suggests these may be long-term problem that are 
inherent in the multi-unit ownership model. However, Krueger (1991) found that 
franchised stores operated by franchisees tended to outperform manager-run 
company stores. Though this suggests that multi-unit ownership of outlets benefits 
the franchise system, as the ensuing discussion will show, there may be problems 
associated with this practice. 
Statement 7.  
Franchisors pay more respect to multi-unit franchisees than to single unit owners.  
This statement received strong support of 63% among the interviewed 
franchisees. Franchisors create multi-unit franchisees by allowing successful 
franchisees to acquire and establish a series of outlets. However, as briefly indicated 
above, multi-unit ownership presents the same agency problem facing franchisors 
(Kauffmann and Dant, 1996).  
Generally, multi-unit owners themselves become “mini-franchisors” by having to 
appoint managers to run some of their outlets (Bradach, 1997). The response to 
statement 7 suggests that as multi-unit outlets enjoy the respect of the franchisors, 
they receive less tight supervision or monitoring than single-unit franchisees.  
This may lead to under-performance or the lowering of quality standards 
because of shirking and the adverse selection of store managers. As result, franchisors 
may face the challenge or embarrassment of having to discipline these multi-unit 
franchisees, whom they created, handpicked, and groomed into “mini-franchisors” 
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perhaps in an endeavour to reward good behaviour and to use them as role models 
for the rest of their franchisees.  
This also raises the question whether multi-unit ownership strengthens the 
position of such franchisees vis-a-vis the franchisors. In other words, the question is 
whether the franchisor can afford to alienate multi-unit franchisees by taking drastic 
actions against them.  
Furthermore, multi-unit ownership questions whether the franchisor can risk 
exposing its brand to reputational damage that may result from having to close down 
one or several multi-unit franchisees, simultaneously. Though these questions require 
further investigation by future researchers, support for this statement suggests, in the 
words of one franchisee:  
 
multi-unit ownership places a chip on the shoulder of the concerned franchisees.  
 
Statement 8  
Multi-unit franchisees contribute more to the franchise system than single unit 
franchisees.  
Like statement 7, this statement received marginal support of 57%. This response 
suggests that some of the franchisees feel that multi-unit franchisees earn their stripes by 
growing the franchise system over the years. In particular, one franchisee lauded:  
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the financial contribution that multi-unit franchisees make to the franchise system 
in the form of the pro rata royalties and advertising fees paid and stock purchases. 
 
These contributions enable the franchise system to build the brand and to earn 
bulk discounts that ideally benefit the franchise system as a whole. One franchisee 
stated that: 
 
because of their status, multi-unit franchisees believe that they can get away with 
murder because their contribution keeps the franchise system alive.  
 
This illustrates the undesirable effects of multi-unit ownership, which 
franchisors may embark upon in an endeavour to encourage good behaviour among 
their franchisees.  
This behaviour is similar to the question posed by Dandridge and Falbe (1995) on 
whether the formation of franchisee associations within franchise systems can lead to 
a shift in the balance of power. While this may not be the desired goal, franchisors 
need to be aware of this possible outcome and to find ways of dealing with this 
challenge. 
As one franchisee commented thus:  
Yes, look, when you own more than one, you do get a little bit of a better treatment, 
but you know what, it’s not really so, but in some, I’ve been with a few franchises in 
some, you know the guys who maybe do the bigger turnovers, they get a bit of a more 
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of a smile, so to speak then the guys that don’t. If you own four stores or one store, 
yes, but in a lot of the franchises I mean now we are very much a family and it’s 
important that you take care of family. 
Statement 9. 
Multi-unit franchisees deserve more “favours” than single unit franchises. 
Despite being complimentary towards their multi-unit owning colleagues in 
terms of statement 8, the interviewed franchises did not support the view that multi-
unit franchisees deserve more “favours” than they do. As an explanation, one 
franchisee stated that: 
 
multi-unit franchisees only make a pro rata contribution to the financial success of 
the franchise system and that this alone did not entitle them to have more 
privileges.  
 
Another franchisee commented that: 
 
franchisors should subject multi-unit franchisees to the same trials and 
tribulations that single-unit owners face for their indiscretions.  
 
As one franchisee commented: 
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in terms of producing the guy with one store that’s really pumping and really 
busy, sometimes his a lot more hands on then the guy that’s got four stores. You 
know the guy with the one store is concentrating on his store and his 
concentrating on how to make his store better. Whereas the guy who has got 4 
stores he’s got to run from the one store to the other. 
 
This response suggests that multi-unit franchisees should enjoy the same 
rewards and suffer any sanctions as the single franchisees. 
B. Testing of proposition no 2: Contextual factors and OO 
A number of sub- propositions represented the sub-dimensions of the contextual 
factors construct tested its relationship with opportunistic orientations. 
i). Membership of Franchisee Associations and OO.  
As depicted on Table 8-6 above, three statements measured the relationship 
between membership of franchisee association and OO among franchisees. Table 9-5 
below shows that there was overall strong support of 74% for the predicted positive 
relationship between the absence of formalised and independent franchisee 
associations and uncooperative franchisees.  
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Table 9-5: Test Results on Membership of Franchisee Associations  
Statements 
Number 
(yes) 
Total 
achievable 
% 
Result 
Franchisors should allow 
and sponsor Franchisee 
Associations  27 30 90 Supported 
Franchisee Associations 
play a major role in 
promoting the interests of 
franchisees 25 30 83 Supported 
Most franchisees would 
like to join Franchisee 
Associations  15 30 50 Supported 
Total 67 90 74 Supported 
Source: Adapted from Dandridge and Falbe (1995); Leblebici and Shalley, 1996; Shane and Spleen (1998); Comb 
et al 2005 
 
A small number of scholars have expressed their views on Franchisee 
Associations have suggested their use as communications mechanisms between 
franchisors and franchisees for exchanging ideas and information.  
Baucus et al (1996) had found that communication had enhanced co-operation 
between franchisors and franchisees while Clarkin and Rosa (1986) had found that 
better communication within the franchise system had increased the willingness of 
franchisees to remain within the franchise system.  
Statement 10. 
Franchisors should allow and sponsor Franchisee Associations.  
Though 92% of the interviewed franchisees supported this statement, the general 
comment was that Franchisee Associations did not exist in their franchise systems and 
those franchisees were not members out of fear of victimisation. However, those who 
were members of such bodies regarded Franchisee Associations as protection against 
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franchisor power. These comments suggest that, support for the franchise associations 
motivated by OO who felt that the associations could defend them better than the 
courts. 
As suggested by Hunt (1977), this could because the court would take long to 
grant them relief, if any, at the end of a bitter, costly, and drawn out legal battle that 
they can least afford as opposed to their well-resourced opponents. A number of 
scholars (Clarkin and Rosa, 1986; Baucus et al., 1996; Dandridge and Falbe, 1995; 
Chiou et al., 2004) suggest that improved communication help ensure that franchisees 
remain within the franchise system.  
The interviewed franchisees think that communication makes it possible for 
franchisees to air their grievances, wishes, and aspirations. These scholars believe that 
franchisee associations can play a major role in improving relationships between 
franchisors and franchisees.  
Through regular meetings and discussions between, one franchisee believed that: 
 
the parties, ideas can be exchanged which not only address issues of mutual 
concern, but also provide a forum for designing innovative and attractive product, 
pricing, and marketing strategies. 
 
Another franchisee stated that:  
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franchisee associations can also serve as a peer-review mechanism through which 
franchisees can benchmark their own behaviour and activities against their 
colleagues.  
 
And yet another franchisee felt that:  
 
a formalised structure of this nature can help provide platforms for generating 
ideas and communicating strategies aimed at improving profitability and 
competitiveness.  
 
Another franchisee thought that: 
 
the absence of structures such as franchisee associations leaves the door wide open 
for conjecture, rumour, and gossip. 
 
In addition, one franchisee justified the need to stronger ties among franchisees 
thus: 
 
Yes, because you know what there’s a lot of times we maybe forget to order an extra 
dough or an extra box of chees or whatever and you just phone your next door mate 
and say hey listen buddy, borrow me something, sure and you make mistakes like 
that sometimes and it’s important to know that you have colleagues that you rely 
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on too. You can’t always go to Head Office, and this is where the once a month and 
the getting together is so important, because when we do get together we eat 
together, we have coffee together, you know, we have a cold drink together…  
 
However, contrary to the advocate of solidarity among franchisees in terms of 
the fledging identity theory propounded by scholars such as Lawrence and Benjamin 
(2010) there have also been suggestions for the use of Franchisee Associations as 
guilds or unions for challenging the autocratic, corrupt, and secretive practices of 
franchisors wherever these existed.  
This school of thought appears to have drawn some inspiration from the work of 
Galbraith (1967) in trying to implement his countervailing power argument that 
sought to galvanise or mobilize powerless retailers such as franchisees to challenge 
the hegemonic tendencies of powerful suppliers such as franchisors.  
For example, one franchisee stated that: 
 
some franchisees have questioned the discounts and any kickbacks that franchisors 
ostensibly received from suppliers, the advertising budgets and dividends paid in 
respect of shares that some franchisors may hold in the companies listed as 
approved suppliers to the franchise system.  
 
This appears to have led to a dichotomy of views between support for and 
opposition to these councils. As the former could consist of franchisees seeking 
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peaceful co-existence, the latter could comprise franchisees who may believe in 
misusing the strength of the numbers that Franchisee Associations may represent to 
fight their hopeless causes. Similarly, there may be franchisors that behave like 
“union-bashers” and try to crush any form of organization that franchisees may try to 
establish within their franchise systems.  
This may be despite such action being unconstitutional as it could infringe on the 
franchisees’ right to freedom of association. The prospect that the countervailing 
power as propounded by Galbraith (1967) may to represent to the franchise system in 
the form of a franchise association could trouble-some franchisors. The option would 
be for franchisors to be proactive and open the door to a properly constituted 
independent franchisee associations through which they could engage their 
franchisees and thrash out matters of common interest (Lawrence and Kaufmann, 
2011).  
In addition, the establishment of franchisee associations across sectors of the 
industry can even be more useful to harmonise the triadic franchisee-franchisee-
franchisor relationships. 
Statement 11. 
Franchisee Associations play a major role in promoting the interests of franchisees.  
The 83% support for this statement and comments made during the interviews 
suggest that the most franchisees regarded Franchisee Associations in a union-like 
fashion and another referred to it as shop floor democracy. One franchisee opined 
that franchisee associations:  
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were one way of dealing with and challenging the unfair and one-sided franchise 
contracts that favoured their principals.  
 
Another franchisee comment was that:  
 
Franchisee Associations belonged to the franchisees just as the franchise 
association, namely FASA belonged to the franchisors.  
Another franchisee commented that: 
 
as franchisors sponsored and controlled FASA, it served the interests of the 
franchisors.  
 
The response to this statement displayed a belligerent attitude among the 
franchisees.  
One franchisee thought that: 
 
the franchisee association can help them discipline their franchisor and get him to 
back down or mend his ways.  
 
And yet another franchisee also thought that: 
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the franchise association will fight for them or rescue them from their struggles 
with the franchisor.  
 
Such an attitude could lead some franchisees into reneging on their contractual 
obligations. Franchisees need to understand that it is one thing to fight franchisor 
injustices with or without the help of the franchise association, but that it is quite 
another to deliberately infringe on franchise rules with the hope that the franchise 
association or courts will still intervene.  
Franchisee associations must ensure that their members keep their side of the 
bargain, because no one is likely to succeed where a franchisee who blatantly 
disregards his contractual obligations. Therefore, the franchise association or the court 
as the case may be, is only able to intervene to the extent that the franchisee’s hands 
are clean.  
Dandridge and Falbe (1995) alluded to this aspect when describing the role of 
franchisee associations within franchise relationships. The common interests of the 
franchisees do not translate into engaging in opportunistic actions as this attracts 
punitive sanctions in terms of not only the franchise contract, but also the common 
law of contracts in most countries.  
Franchisors have rights and responsibility to protect their interests, and those of 
their other franchisees against the reckless actions of some franchisees. Failure to do 
so could cause financial ruin to themselves and their franchisees, and reputational 
damage to franchising as a business model.  
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However, this task does not licence franchisors to ride roughshod over their 
franchisees. Franchisors also have a duty to observe due process in protecting the 
interests of the franchise systems. In line with the RET, compliance with the law, 
especially the CPA, and the development of social norms and values of acceptable 
behaviour within franchise systems, may help ensure effective enforcement of 
socialised franchise contracts. 
Statement 12. 
Most franchisees would like to join Franchisee Associations.  
Given the overwhelming support received by statements 10 and 11, it came as a 
surprise to the researcher that this statement did not receive support. One franchisee 
indicated that: 
 
the lack of support for this statement arises from the fear of victimisation by 
franchisors that franchisees have of joining franchisee associations.  
 
In support of this response, another franchisee stated that:  
 
most franchise systems forbade their franchisees from belonging to franchisee 
associations. 
 
In addition, the confidentiality clause in franchise contracts forbade franchisees 
from discussing their turnovers or other contractual matters with another person 
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(Dnes, 1993). As discussed in detail under statements 10 and 11 above, however, 
franchises could not join franchisee associations for ulterior motives.  
Similarly, contractual stipulations that forbid freedom of speech and association 
among franchisees are unlawful as they infringe on the constitutional rights of 
franchisees. As a result, the CPA excludes these stipulations because they are absent 
from section 7 of the Act.  
In addition, section 2 of the Act clearly states that any practice, contract, or 
conduct, which infringes on any constitutional or legal rights of individuals, is 
unlawful. However, one franchisee commented thus: 
 
on the hypocrisy of his franchisor by pointing out at how he found it strange that 
his franchisor was so against his franchisees being members of a franchisee 
association while the franchisor was a member of FASA.  
 
With the history of political oppression, suppression, and confrontation in this 
country, it is not surprising that most franchisors did not, at least until recently, 
practice or tolerate democratic tendencies. The banning of political parties and trade 
unions, and the concomitant lack of free political and trade union activity, infiltrated 
many aspects of life in this country.  
Therefore, just as the Labour Relations Act paved the way for the recognition of 
worker rights in this country, the passing of the CPA is a step in the right direction.  
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As discussed under statements 10 and 11 above, franchisee associations can help 
improve franchisor-franchisee relationships. Hence, franchisors should not only allow 
or encourage franchisees to form or affiliate to these bodies, they should go and step 
further to form and join franchise associations across sectors.  
While this will not resolve the provocative question Little (1970) poses on who 
should lead the franchise relationship, these bodies can develop into franchise 
chambers such as the CCMA. These structures hear, mediate, and arbitrate labour 
between employers and employees in this country.  
Most commentators agree that the CCMA’s have proved to be cheaper and 
effective dispute resolution mechanisms than the courts. The establishment of similar 
bodies can play a major role in resolving disputes between franchisors and 
franchisees.  
In addition, as franchisee associations can establish Codes of Good Conduct for 
their members to comply with or face exclusion or isolation. This will not only 
improve franchisor-franchisee relationships, but may also improve the reputation and 
image of franchise industry.  
As a result, the industry may be able to attract more players such as franchisors, 
franchisees and other investors and this may help to grow the business and realise its 
potential for creating jobs and wealth, promoting small businesses, and transforming 
the economy. 
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ii). Lack of franchise legislation and regulation and OO.  
As the statements on Table 8-7 above show, this sub-proposition postulated a 
positive relationship between lack of franchise regulation and an OO among 
franchisees. At 69%, the results shown on Table 9-6 below suggests strong support this 
proposition, and strong support for statement 15 even though statement did not 
receive any support. 
Table 9-6: Test results on Lack of Legislation and Regulation 
Statements 
Number 
(yes) 
Total 
achievable 
% 
Result 
FASA should be granted 
legal powers to discipline 
errant franchisors and 
franchisees 24 30 80 Supported 
There is a need for 
stringent franchise-
specific laws 25 30 83 Supported 
Franchising disputes 
should be handled by 
FASA only 13 30 43 Unsupported 
Total 62 90 69 Supported 
Source: Developed for the study 
Like in most countries, the franchising industry in this country is self-regulating 
under FASA, a voluntary association dominated and sponsored by franchisors. As a 
non-statutory body, FASA lacks the legal capacity to compel franchisors and 
franchisees to become its members and as such cannot discipline or impose legal 
sanctions on anyone.  
As explained in most parts of this study, because of its dependence on 
franchisors for its human, financial and logistical resources, FASA is highly 
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compromised to serve any meaningful purpose in the resolution of disputes between 
franchisors and franchisees, as it is not an independent and objective organisation.  
Coupled with the lack of franchise-specific legislation in most countries 
including South Africa, this study suggests that this regulatory vacuum creates 
loopholes for opportunistic behaviour within franchise systems. This proposition 
tested this relationship and found strong support for it among the sampled 
franchisees. 
Statement 13 
FASA deserves legal powers to discipline errant franchisors and franchisees 
This statement received overwhelming support of 83% among the interviewed 
franchisees. While it was not immediately clear whether this response arose from the 
recent coming into effect of the CPA that introduced some drastic changes into the 
franchising arena, it became clear that these developments had raised the expectations 
and hopes for a better future among most franchisees.  
This is understandable considering that the franchising industry, like the rest of 
the South African society, has been characterised by the unequal distribution of 
power and resources along racial and class lines. Most franchisees expressed the view 
that FASA, the body under whose auspices the self-regulating franchising industry 
operates, is a toothless bulldog.  
This is because FASA does not have any statutory power to discipline any of its 
member and non-member franchisors and franchisees. In addition, most franchisees 
regard FASA as an old boys club that only existed to serve the interests of the franchisors. 
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This is because most franchisees stated that they had yet to hear of any franchisor 
suspended or expelled from FASA.  
One of the franchisees referred to: 
 
FASA’s deafening silence about complaints against some franchisors that appeared 
in the daily press.  
 
Another franchisee complained that: 
 
apart from a handful of seminars advertised in some of the newspapers, FASA 
provided very little useful and insightful information about the rights and duties of 
the franchisors and franchisees.  
 
Another franchisee more scathingly stated that: 
 
FASA poster means nothing to me, that membership means nothing to me, it’s just 
so that they could put it on the bottom of here, that says, oh FASA. That’s all it says. 
 
One franchisee opined that his perception of FASA was that: 
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it was a franchisor organisation because franchisors appoint or elect most of the 
organisation’s office bearers at the organisation’s publicly unadvertised annual 
conference attended almost exclusively by franchisors.  
 
This probably accounted for one franchisee’s assertion that: 
 
FASA did not seriously take complaints made against franchisors.  
 
Thus, most franchisees stated, they did not know that they were members of FASA, 
which they in fact were simple because their franchisors’ were members of that 
organisation. As a result, these franchisees felt that they could not complain to FASA, as 
they did not consider themselves its members; and thus its Code of Good Business Ethics did 
not bind them. In any event, most of the franchisees indicated, and correctly so, that 
because of FASA’s domination by franchisors, they did not consider FASA to be in a 
position to serve as a neutral or impartial arbiter of franchising disputes.  
As one franchisee put it: 
 
most franchisors to pretend not to be active FASA members with the intention of 
discouraging their franchisees from directing any of their complaints to that 
organisation.  
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Most disconcertingly, the researcher’s written request to give FASA a right of 
reply on some of these allegations, did not even elicit the courtesy of an 
acknowledgement of receipt from the organisation. Therefore, the views of the 
franchisees endorsing their support for this statement suggest the need for an 
independent and impartial statutory body to regulate the industry and to hear 
franchising disputes.  
This is because the prevailing unequal bargaining power between franchisors 
and franchisees allows franchisors to dominate the franchise relationship in a country 
in which the principle of equality to foundational to its founding values that are 
enshrined in its constitution.  
As discussed under the preceding proposition, franchisors control most aspects 
of the franchise relationship; especially the writing of the franchise contract which 
serves as the heartbeat of the franchise relationship. Therefore, the passing of 
franchise-specific legislation and regulations, which most franchisors surveyed in this 
study oppose, can help level the playing fields.  
The CPA is a good start, but more work still lies ahead and should culminate in 
the establishment of the office of the Franchise Ombudsperson to adjudicate on 
franchise disputes in a fair, faster, and cheaper manner. This approach differs from 
the use of the courts, which because of the costs and delays involved appear to favour 
the financially strong party; namely franchisors.  
The passing of legislation and regulations may stabilise the franchise relationship 
in the same manner that labour legislation appears to have helped normalise the 
402 
employer-employee relationship in this country through the Labour Relations Act 65 
of 1995.  
For example, this Act created specialist alternative dispute resolution mechanism 
such as the CCMA’s, which proved to be effective in resolving labour disputes fairly, 
quickly and cheaply. This is because the CCMA’s facilitate a conciliation, mediation 
and arbitration of labour disputes in a less hostile and adversarial atmosphere than is 
the case in the courts.  
In addition, the CCMA’s provide for far less legalities than the courts and this 
avoids unnecessary costs and delays caused by legal manipulations of the court 
processes. Drahozal and Hylton’s (2003) proposed use of mediation and arbitration in 
franchising can generate similar benefits. This can result in the release of much 
needed resources away from protracted and costly legal battles into improving the 
business. 
Statement 14  
There is a need for stringent franchise-specific laws 
Contrary to the response of franchisors to a similar question; namely, statement 
23 on the franchisor’s questionnaire that formed part of the quantitative study, this 
statement received one of the highest levels of support of 83% among franchisees. 
This suggested that a disconcerting and deepening gap in franchisor-franchisee 
outlook. While most of the franchisees seemed to be pleased with the introduction of 
the CPA, they felt that the Act did not address all the issues that affected the franchising 
industry.  
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Most of them expressed the view that the CPA was too broad in that it was trying to 
be everything to everyone. This is probably because the Act aimed at protecting 
consumers in all sectors of the economy by including franchisees as consumers and 
franchisors as suppliers. In addition, one franchisee felt that: 
 
because of the growing importance of the franchising industry as an economic 
institution, the billions of rands that it generated and the thousands of job and 
wealth opportunities it created, there was a definite need for franchise-specific laws 
that would pay special attention to the issues and challenges facing the industry.  
 
Some of the issues that concerned franchisees include the dreaded termination and 
other restrictive clauses found in most franchise contracts that they believed favoured their 
franchisors. Most franchisees felt that they needed specific franchise laws that would 
protect them against their powerful franchisors in the same manner that labour laws protect 
workers.  
The need for legislative protection among franchisees appear to be grounded in 
the literature (Williamson 1975, 1985, 1993; Muris, 1980 and Hadfield, 1990) that 
suggests that franchise system require franchisees to invest in idiosyncratic assets.  
These physical and intellectual assets such as machinery, equipment and fittings, 
skills, experience, and knowledge are highly specific to a particular franchise system.  
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These scholars point to the risk of expropriation of these assets through the OA 
of franchisors through the termination or non-renewal of fixed term short franchise 
contracts, the buy-back clause, territorial encroachment and so on. 
For example, the quantitative part of this study found that franchisors with OO 
are inclined to grant short term fixed franchise contracts to their franchisees so that 
they can exercise their contractual rights by, for example, buying the business or assets of 
the erstwhile franchisee at rock bottom prices upon the termination, cancellation or expiry 
of the franchise contract.  
This is because most franchisors enjoy the right of first refusal that entitles them 
to the preferential or pre-emptive right to buy a franchised outlet on sale or its assets 
at the end of the term of such an outlet’s franchise contract. In addition, by invoking 
the clause of the franchise contract, franchisors are able to influence the price at which 
an out-of-contract franchisee must sell or dispose of its assets to the franchisor or any 
other franchisee. Such a price usually excludes the goodwill of the business, which 
normally accrues to the franchise systems.  
This takes away the franchisee’s investment in market discovery (Klick et al., 
2007) or local market knowledge in an area in which the franchisor was not prepared 
to invest its own money and time (Minkler, 1997) which illustrates the “cocked gun” 
approach to franchising by some franchisors to allow franchisees to establish an outlet 
and then to dispossess them of their investment in the franchise system for some 
dubious or inconsequential reasons. 
Statement 15 
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FASA should handle all franchising disputes 
The lukewarm response of 43% to this statement suggests higher levels of 
uncertainty or confusion among franchisees. On the one hand, this response may 
indicate the concerns that franchisees have about the neutrality, impartiality, or 
objectivity of FASA in resolving franchising disputes, and their desire for a 
specialized and independent dispute resolution mechanism on the other. As 
expressed by some of the franchisees, the current dispute resolution mechanisms appear to 
favour their franchisors.  
This is because, as discussed under statements 13 and 14 above, most franchisees 
regard FASA as the “lapdog of the franchisors.” This is because franchisors elect or 
appoint most of FASA’s office bearers (FASA usually does not publicly advertise its 
annual conferences attended mostly by franchisors) and pay most of its overheads 
through their annual subscription and advertising fees.  
Instead of relying on FASA to resolve disputes, one particular franchisee stated 
that: 
 
Yes, you know what you will always have a niggle here and there, but we always sit 
down and sort it out. That’s why fights has never worked in our group, that’s why 
I was, when you asked me about fights, ok, you yes… but that has never worked in 
our group because we have always, always had an open door policy, where my door’s 
open and his door is open and the boys have come here many a time and hey are you 
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okay, is everything alright. And I’ve had a problem their door has always been open 
to me as well and we have always worked it out over a cup of coffee. 
 
Expressing the dangers involved in litigation, one franchisee opined: 
 
Are you really going to get into such a problem where you are going to need 
courts, really? I mean, out of the relationship, yes, you know that’s really 
relationship gone man. I think, your relations will be nearly gone just by going to 
FASA and then still going to court then you might as well sell your shop and go 
get into another franchise that maybe they’ve got different rules or whatever 
because every Franchise does have its own rules of course. 
 
In addition these sentiments, alternative dispute resolution through FASA can 
avoid the country’s over-worked courts which also have to contend with the dilatory 
tactics used by expensive counsel franchisors employ to help drag out the cases ad 
infinitum to financially strangle the franchisee to the point where it capitulates and 
withdraws the matter due to lack of funding.  
For this reason, most franchisees expressed support the need for the establishment of 
a statutory body such as the CCMA. As discussed above, CCMA’s were formed in terms 
of the Labour Act of 1965 as amended, to try and settle all labour disputes between 
employers, and their employees in impartial, less adversarial but cost effective 
platforms.  
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The CCMA’s are staffed by specialised and focused professionals who over the 
past few years have developed institutional capacity and resources such as case law, 
procedures, and processes that are readily accessible to any of the concerned parties.  
One franchisee expressed disappointment that: 
 
despite large amounts of money invested and many people dependent of the 
franchising industry for the livelihoods, there is no specialised institution that can 
deal with the industry’s disputes expeditiously and cost-effectively.  
 
On the other hand, while most of the surveyed franchisors also appeared to 
support the usage of dispute resolution mechanisms other than the courts, this 
seemed to be a case of paying lip service to the idea.  
As Udel (1972) observed, very few franchise contracts made provision for the 
referral of disputes to arbitration. Instead, most franchise contracts require the high 
court to settle disputes between the parties. This seems to suit franchisors with an OO 
because of the high litigation costs, the protracted and adversarial nature of the 
courts, which the literature suggests are often not fully equipped to deal with the 
complexity of a franchise relationship.  
In addition, Drahozal and Hylton (2003) suggest that the courts have a tendency 
to focus on the “letter of the contract” in interpreting contracts; and this may ignore 
the norms, customs, and values of the franchise relationship. In addition, the courts 
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also emphasise the “freedom to contract” principle, which holds that contract terms 
are binding on the parties until a costly litigation proves otherwise.  
Furthermore, these scholars point out that the courts are notorious for their 
reluctance to enforce contracts where the underlying relationship between the parties 
appears to have broken down irretrievably. This may result in a court confirming the 
termination of a franchise relationship by the franchisor even where there are no legal 
grounds for doing so, but for the irretrievable breakdown in the underlying 
relationship. 
However, one franchisee expressed support for in-house dispute resolution by 
stating that: 
 
Of course, of course. You know lets work it in house. See what we can do. You know 
if you can’t come to an agreement or solution, well maybe get an outside opinion, 
but then your relationship is strained, rather sit down and work it out the differences 
in house.  Just like your worker, you know, rather sit him down in the office and say 
look, how was it, what happened, why did you do it like that. 
 
iii). The Last Years on Franchise Contract and OO.  
There results of the testing of the statements shown on Table 8-8 above which 
predicted a positive relationship between the maturity and decline phases of the 
franchise contract and non-compliance with franchise standards and procedures by 
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franchisees appear on Table 9.7 below. These results show strong overall support for 
the predicted relationship at 77%, as follows: 
Table 9-7: Test Results on the Last Years of the Franchise Contract  
Statements 
Number 
(yes) 
Total 
achievable 
% 
Result 
Franchise relationships 
usually do not change 
much over the years 26 30 87 Supported 
There is more stability 
and cohesion in 
established franchise 
systems than in new ones 28 30 93 Supported 
The last years of the 
franchise relationship are 
the most enjoyable 15 30 50 Supported 
Total 69 90 77 Supported 
Source: Adapted from Muris (1980); Dant and Gundlach (1998) 
 
 
Statement 16  
Franchise relationships usually do not change much over the years. 
This statement received 87% support among the franchisees. Clearly, most of the 
franchisees felt the relationship with franchisors has remained the same over the years, whilst 
two franchisees observed contrasting changes. One franchisee reported:  
 
a sea change in the improvement of its relationship with the franchisor and 
attributed this to his role as chairperson of the franchise council recognised and 
sponsored by the franchisor.  
 
Another franchisee of a cleaning service franchise commented about: 
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a worsening of the relationship that led it to surrendering shop keys to the franchisor, 
and when refused, the franchisee started engaging in opportunistic behaviour by 
taking some laundry home to avoid declaring the income from the service. 
 
Blut, et al (2010) describe the last years of the franchise contract that is, the 
maturity phase as the crossroads phase. During these stages, the franchisee no longer 
shows commitment or loyalty to the franchise relationship and seeks to derive as 
much gain for him as he can regardless of the effects his actions have on the franchise 
system.  
This behaviour fits Williamson’s (1975) definition of opportunism as “self-
interest seeking with guile” (p47). Once the franchise relationship reaches these 
stages, it may be prudent for the franchisor to terminate the franchise contract 
immediately to prevent a disenchanted franchisee from inflicting harm on the 
franchise system. 
Statement 17  
There is more stability and cohesion in established franchise systems than in new ones. 
This statement received a massive support of 93%. This perhaps signified the 
concern and apprehension that franchisees have with newly established franchised systems that 
could turn out to be quick money schemes for the franchisors concerned. Within the context 
of newly established franchise systems, the comment from the franchisees was that 
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because of the high risk involved it may be wise to make hay whilst the sun shines that clearly 
illustrates OO among the concerned franchisees.  
For this reason, it may be useful for a future study to examine the effects of OO 
on failed newly established franchised systems. This is could be the result of the 
various early warnings systems that established franchise systems have that are able 
to detect OO among franchisees beforehand or where any level of franchisee OO may 
have escaped these factors, then tried and tested coping mechanisms could swing into 
action.  
Statement 18 
The last years of the franchise relationship are the most enjoyable. 
This statement received marginal support at 50% of the franchisees who seemed 
intrigued by the question. This is because the one half had considered the last few 
years to be the most difficult and anxious years as that was the time the franchisor could 
decide not to extend an expiring franchise contract.  
Clearly, this group had hopes for a continuation of the relationship because of the 
need to protect their bread and butter. Most probably, this group of franchisees tried to 
fulfil or honour their contractual obligations.  
However, one franchisee indicated that: 
 
because the renewal of the franchise contract is often at the discretion of the 
franchisor even where the franchisee has that option, good behaviour does not 
guarantee automatic renewal or extension.  
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This is because the renewal or extension of franchise contracts is often subject to 
conditions such as payment of a renewal or extension fee by the franchisee, 
willingness of the franchisor to continue to enter into a new franchise contract with 
the franchisee, and that the franchisee must be in good standing.  
Though the first condition can be a simple contractual matter, in the sense that 
the contract may explicitly state the fee involved, the other two issues are open to 
opportunistic exploitation by the franchisor. For example, as in the Woolworths, case 
discussed in Chapter 4, in line with Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1969), a franchisor willing to 
buy or take back a profitable outlet from a franchisee, may refuse to renew or extend a 
franchise contract.  
Such a franchisor may justify its actions on “contractual” grounds that may allow 
him to buy or take back the outlet. However, such grounds are dubious because most 
franchisors claim the goodwill of franchised outlets (Muris, 1980) with the result that 
the franchisor buys back the outlet at rock-bottom prices because of the exclusion of 
goodwill.  
Therefore, the franchisor virtually determines the price at which it buys back the 
outlet from the franchisee. Similarly, most franchisors have the final say on the issue 
of franchisees in “good standing” for the purposes of renewing or extending the 
franchise contract (Muris 1980).  
This is because most franchise contracts fail to define “good standing.” 
Consequently, a franchisee with several breach letters for a myriad of minor reasons, 
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the franchisor may declare them persona non grata. This uncertainty and anxiety may 
drive some franchisees into a state of disenchantment and disillusionment with the 
franchise system.  
Upon realising that theirs is a “no-win” situation, such franchisees may decide 
not to seek a renewal or extension start engaging in opportunistic behaviour or 
actions, in the words of one such franchisee:  
 
to make hay while the sun shines.  
 
This seems to be a case of opportunism begetting opportunism (Brown et. al. 
2000) as these franchisees embark upon retaliatory actions towards their franchisors. 
As a result, disenchanted franchisees may find the last years of the contract enjoyable 
because of a lack of commitment to and fear of termination from the franchise system.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, this may embolden some franchisees to start cutting 
corners and under declaring sales in order to generate as much revenue and profits as 
they can in the remaining years of the franchise contract. For one such cleaning 
service franchisee with a contract terminable by 30-day notice, and whose business 
was on the market, and another: 
 
contemplating the life in the hereafter, 
 
the last years of the franchise contract filled them with a sense of de ja vu.  
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One franchisee, believing that because it had gained some invaluable local 
market knowledge, expressed the feeling that it was looking forward to setting up its 
own businesses in the same industry in order to:  
 
teach their ex-franchisor a thing or two  
 
through direct competition.  
Frazer (2005) reported limited success for ex-franchisees who competed head on 
with their ex-franchisors. Therefore, the last years of a franchise contract represent a 
difficult period for both franchisors and franchisees. In the absence of research on the 
so-called “evergreen” franchise contracts, that is, franchise contracts with no expiry 
date, which are uncommon, it would be important for future research to examine the 
effects of such contracts on franchise systems. 
C. Testing of proposition 3 – Strategic factors and OO 
This proposition postulated that a positive relationship existed between strategic 
factors and OO among franchisees. The three sub-dimensions or sub- propositions 
used to measure this proposition included brand value, geographic dispersion, and 
local market knowledge. 
i). Brand value.  
This sub-proposition or sub-construct postulated a positive relationship between 
a strong brand and an inclination among franchisees to free ride on the brand. As 
shown on Table 8-9 above, statements 19-21 measured the responses of franchisees to 
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this sub-proposition. Table 9 8 depicts the overwhelming support for the sub-
proposition at 98%, as follows: 
Table 9-8: Test Results on Brand Value  
Statements 
Number 
(yes) 
Total 
achievable % Results 
A strong brand offers 
many advantages to 
franchisees 29 30 97 Supported 
Most franchisees prefer 
to be associated with a 
strong brand 30 30 100 Supported 
It is easier for franchisees 
to make money from a 
strong brand 29 30 97 Supported 
Total 88 90 98 Supported 
Source: Adapted from Brickley and Dark (1987); Klein and Saft (1985); Bradach (1998) 
At 98%, the results of these interviews suggest a very strong relationship 
between a strong brand and OO among franchisees. The reasons for this strong 
association suggest that the strength of the franchising system resides in its brand.  
Studies (e.g. Brickley and Dark, 1987; Klein and Saft, 1985; Bradach, 1998) show 
that franchisors devote considerable amounts of time, energy, and money building 
the brand around which they mould their “tried and tested” business method. 
According these scholars, the brand represents the quality of a franchise system 
through the ambiance, logo, and décor that distinguishes rival or competing offerings 
at the market place.  
For example the difference between chicken fast food chain KFC and 
humburgher kings McDonalds is not that the former sells chicken products and the 
latter humburghers, but the Colonel Sanders head and the golden capital M insignia 
that represent these two competing brands. In a similar vein, most scholars (Knight, 
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1986; Petersen and Dant, 1990; Lafontaine and Kauffman, 1992) found that a strong 
brand serves as a major attraction to most franchisees.  
This suggests that a strong brand may be vulnerable to opportunistic franchisees 
who decide to enter franchising with an ulterior motive to free ride on the brand to 
increase their profitability. Such franchisees may take that risk because it is difficult 
for franchisors and customers to detect cheating behaviour.  
In addition, franchisees may free ride on the brand to retaliate against a franchise 
system they feel does not reward them adequately. At 97%, the very strong response 
to statement 28 stating that franchisees deserve higher returns than their normal business 
activities can provide bears testimony to this possibility.  
These sentiments may also arise from that until the passing of the CPA in this 
country recently, franchisees were not privy to any bulk-buying discounts, kickbacks 
or price-breaks their franchisors received from the approved suppliers. Similarly, 
franchisors had carte blanche on the use of advertising revenue paid to them by their 
franchisees. In this regard, franchisees expressed their strong views when only 35% 
supported the statement 36 suggesting that franchisees were getting fair value for the 
advertising fees they paid to the franchisors.  
In addition, free riding among franchisees on the brand could arise by a desire 
among franchisees to make hay whilst the sun shines. This is because most franchisors 
offer short-term franchise contracts to their franchisees (as expressed in statement 28 
of the questionnaire: longer-term contract make it difficult for franchisors to deal with 
market changes).  
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This may create problems for some franchisees as they may require a longer 
period over which to earn a return on their investment in the physical and human 
assets associated with a particular franchise system. Most scholars (Williamson (1979; 
Klein, 1995; Hadfield, 1990) point to this conflict between short term franchise 
contracts franchisors offer, and the investment in long term assets franchisees make 
into the franchise system.  
Similarly, as Brown et al (2000) argue that opportunism begets opportunism, the 
ability of most franchisors to terminate franchise contracts especially for opportunistic 
reasons (as indicated by support statement 20 in the questionnaire), may also 
encourage free riding among some franchisees.  
Statement 19 
A strong brand offers many advantages to franchisees 
Statement 20  
Most franchisees prefer to be associated with a strong brand 
Statement 21  
It is easier for franchisees to make money from a strong brand 
Because of their close relatedness as measures of the relationship between a 
strong brand and an OO among franchisees, and all three statements having obtained 
100% support from the interviewed franchisees, this section discusses the results of 
statements 19-21 sequentially.  
Firstly, statement 19 suggested that a strong brand offers many advantages to 
franchisees. Knight (1996) found that most franchisees expressed the importance of a 
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strong brand in the decision of choosing a franchise system. Most importantly, Knight 
also showed that the decision on brand choice preceded the decision whether or not 
to take up franchising among most franchisees. This is because of the power that the 
brand seems to represent in delivering customers and returns to potential franchisees.  
The brand appears to represent the visible part of the franchise offering and the 
stronger the brand the better the prospects of success seem to be for most aspirant and 
existing franchisees. These benefits emanate from the bulk purchasing of ingredients, 
raw materials and other services such as advertising, training, and product 
development flowing from the economies of scale and competitive advantages that 
strong brands normally generate.  
However, it would appear that a strong brand soon becomes the casualty of its 
own success. This seems to occur when franchisees decide to enter the franchise 
system in order to exploit the power of the brand for their own benefit, especially 
considering the short term and in some cases, non-renewal franchise contracts offered 
to them. Another franchisor opportunistic practice with the potential to yield 
franchisee opportunism strongly supported by franchisors is statement 33 of the 
questionnaire.  
This statement suggested that granting of non-exclusive territories to franchisees 
allows franchisors the flexibility to add new outlets in particulars areas.  
This may ordinarily appear to be a strategic lever franchisors may rely on in case 
of need, other scholars have pointed to its misuse to punish recalcitrant franchisees 
(Klein, 1995; Hadfield, 1990; Kalnins, 2004). Such a practice usually results in the 
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franchisor establishing a competing outlet operated by the franchisor or another 
franchisee in close proximity to an existing outlet.  
This may result in the erosion of the existing franchisee’s profitability and sales 
while benefitting the franchisor through additional royalties derived from the new 
outlet. Such franchisees probably realise that because of the strength of a particular brand, 
they can offer less than satisfactory levels of service with impunity.  
Chapter 5 lists a number of ways in that franchisees can show a tendency to cheat 
on the franchise system. In the main, these methods involve withholding information 
and effort in order to derive financial benefits that they do not intend to share with 
their franchisors. It would seem that franchisees bent on misusing the brand of the 
franchise system do so by withholding effort (Klick et al., 2007).  
This became clear during the interviews where comments in this regard largely 
revolved around franchisee failure to adhere or follow standard operating procedure 
regarding procurement, preparation, staffing, and maintenance of buildings and 
equipment.  
Examples of these short cuts include failure to recruit, train and remunerate 
adequate levels of staff necessary operate a particular store size or meeting certain 
customer requirements or expectations, the use of cheap inputs and an inability to 
service machinery and equipment at regular intervals (Muris, 1980).  
This behaviour is in line with statement 19 suggesting that most franchisees prefer 
to be associated with a strong brand. This is not only because of the benefits of economies 
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of scale and competitive advantages generated by being associated with a strong 
brand, but a desire to free ride on the brand.  
Williamson (1975 ; 1985; Brickley and Dark (1987) suggests that such behaviour is 
rewarding, at least in the short term, as the franchisees concerned are able to realise 
cost savings by cutting corners without bearing the full costs of such malpractices, 
and in the process, increase their profitability. Such franchisees believe that because of 
the hype surrounding the success story of a particular franchise system, they believe 
that minor deviations and breaches can escape franchisor and customer scrutiny.  
These franchisees entertain the feeling that because franchisors with strong 
brands are likely to focus their attention achieving higher targets and more success. 
This would require the franchise system to grow rapidly, be more competitive and 
profitable than their rivals. As a result, franchisees believe that they could get away with 
the small things that do not matter too much or cannot be easily notice by the franchisors at 
least in the short term.  
These franchisees believe that they can carry on with these malpractices until 
cautioned or their contracts expired. By that time, they hope to have accumulated enough 
money, local market, or product knowledge they can use to set up competing businesses in 
the same sector or in others. The non-renewal of the franchise contracts will not 
concern such franchisees.  
These franchisees are not interested in becoming multi-unit owners, as they 
believe, in the words of one particular franchisee: one unit is presenting them with 
enough headaches already. This particular franchisee expressed the view that becoming a 
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multi-unit owner can result in efficiencies arising from the franchisee spreading him too 
thinly and losing control of his businesses. Franchise systems need to find ways of 
identifying and turning these negative feelings and sentiments of their franchisees 
into sources of positive drive and energy.  
Commenting on this issue, one franchisee stated that: 
 
Well, if everybody did whatever they wanted to do you wouldn’t really have a good 
brand would you and it’s really a common knowledge. If this guy’s wants to skimp 
on the cheese and this guy’s wants to skimp on the dough, and this one wants to 
skimp on the food portioning, you don’t get regularity so you go to the one shop here 
in the one area and get a nice pizza and you go to the other one and get a not so good 
pizza, then all of a sudden its ag you know what I had a good one there but a crap 
one there, so it destroys the brand. Its common knowledge. 
 
For example, Bradach (1997) and Sorenson and Sorenson (2001) suggests that 
franchisors and franchisees can learn from each other with the aim of improving the 
innovativeness of the franchise system. 
Similarly, Strutton et al (1995) suggest the importance of cultivating a healthy 
psychological climate within a franchise system to achieve superior performance. This 
however, does not entail condoning opportunistic behaviour among franchisees, as 
this jeopardises the interests of the franchisors and innocent franchisees.  
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ii). Geographic dispersion and OO.  
As shown on Table 8-10 above, statements 22-24 measured responses to this 
sub-proposition which postulated a positive relationship between the widespread 
location of franchised outlets and franchisee non-compliance with franchise standard 
operating procedures and processes. Overall, this sub- proposition received good 
support at 59%, with a very strong support for statement 23 and a lack of support for 
statement 24. Table 9-9 shows the results of the test on the sub-proposition, as follows: 
Table 9-9: Test Results on Geographic Dispersion  
Statements 
Number 
(yes) 
Total 
achievable 
% 
Result 
Most franchised outlets 
are situated far from the 
franchisor’s head-office  19 30 63 Supported 
It is better for a 
franchised outlet to be 
located far away from the 
franchisor’s head-office 19 30 63 Supported 
Franchised stores that are 
located near the 
franchisor’s head-office 
receive more inspections 
than usual  15 30 50 Supported 
Total 53 90 59 Supported 
Source: Adapted from Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1969); Brickely and Dark (1987); Minkler (1990) 
 
 
Statements 22-24 measured the postulated positive relationship between 
geographic dispersion of franchised outlets and OO among franchisees. There was 
strong support for this proposition at 59%. This indicated a strong association 
between the two variables. Geographic dispersion has to do with the distribution of 
franchised outlets across different areas, regions, and even parts of the world. 
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The need for rapid expansion among franchise systems include the pursuit of 
critical mass distribution of products and services to generate and sustain the 
economies of scale on which the franchising business model depends.  
The literature (e.g. Brickley and Dark, 1987; Norton, 1988; Minkler, 1990) shows 
that through many units distributed across various areas, regions and parts of the 
world, franchises are able to pool resources. These enable them to acquire efficiencies 
in the procurement of products such as the machinery, equipment, raw materials and 
ingredients, and services such as advertising, accounting systems and information 
technology.  
These resources deliver the franchise offering at competitive prices throughout 
the supply chain. But these scholars point out that the spread of outlets presents 
unique challenges the owners of the franchise system as most of the outlets are owned 
by multi-unit owners and serial unit owners who themselves employ managers to run 
these outlets that creates “mini chains” within the chain (Bradach, 1997).  
A key aspect of franchising is the monitoring of the activities of franchise outlets 
to ensure that they comply with the standard set by the franchisor in order to main 
the quality of the products and services offered at those outlets. To this end, 
franchisors employ quality controllers or inspectors charged with the responsibility of 
visiting the outlets to perform monitoring and enforcement duties.  
Statement 23 
Most franchised outlets are situated far from the franchisor’s head-office. 
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The literature (Brickley and Dark, 1987; Norton, 1988; Minkler, 1990) suggests 
that most franchised outlets exist far from the franchisor’s head office and abroad in 
cases of well-known global brands such as KFC, McDonalds, and Hertz. Regional and 
area offices perform the monitoring of franchisee performance and the enforcement of 
franchise rules. 
However, in most cases, these scholars argue that the increase in the number of 
geographically dispersed outlets has presented serious challenges to franchise 
systems. This is because some franchisees take advantage of the situation and withhold 
information and effort as discussed in Chapter 4 in order to engage in activities 
intended to generate additional financial benefits for themselves that they do not declare or 
share with their franchisors.  
Most of the interviewees supported the view that the distance between the 
franchisor’s head offices and the outlets created opportunities for mischief based on 
the “out-of- sight-out of-mind” principle. It would seem these franchisees believed they 
enjoyed a higher degree of pseudo independence and self-control by being located far 
from the franchisor’s head office. 
Statement 23. 
It is better for a franchised outlet to be located far away from the franchisor’s head-office. 
This statement received an overwhelming support of 63% among the interviewed 
franchisees. As supported by scholars such as Minkler,(1990), Carney and Gedajlovc 
(1991); Combs and Ketchen (2003), these franchisees believed that they had space and 
time to imprint their style and character on the franchise system in their areas.  
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Franchisees believed that that they had better local market knowledge that enabled 
them to offer a better service to the customers in their areas by tweaking and adapting some 
aspects of the franchise system here and there. It would appear that these franchisees 
enjoyed some psychological space that they seem to believe allowed them to improvise 
and adapt the franchise system to suit their markets.  
Statement 24  
Franchised stores located near the franchisor’s head-office receive more inspections than 
usual. 
It is strange that this statement received weak support at 40% as this suggests a 
desire among franchisees to be located close to the franchisor’s head office could 
indicate an intention to avoid more and frequent inspections from representatives of the 
franchisors. Such officials could hop- in- and- out of the franchised outlets to check 
things out regularly, as this would be cost effective.  
However, it would seem the sampled franchisees got things right because the 
literature suggests that most franchisors are located in the big and economically vibrant 
cities. Minkler (1990) suggests franchisors establish company stores in these areas as 
they have lower monitor costs. 
Possibly the sampled franchisees were aware of the fact that it is not easy to get a 
site close to the franchisor’s head office any way or that there were no sites as these 
would have been taken up by the franchisors already or reserved for them.  
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On the other hand, it is questionable whether franchisors would like to take a 
chance and establish a franchised outlet close-by, and risk running battles with a franchisee 
who possibly cannot cope with the franchisor breathing down its neck now and then.  
A number of studies (Brickley and Dark, 1987; Norton, 1988; Kauffmann and 
Dant, 1998) suggest that most franchisors reserve the rights to establish company 
owned stores nearer to their head offices as training centres and laboratories where 
new product concepts and ideas experimented with and new equipment tested before 
spreading out to the different franchised outlets.  
According to these scholars, company stores are also located near the head office 
to facilitate control of those stores by franchisors and to allow the local market 
knowledge principle to work for the franchisor in the same manner, as franchised 
outlets seem to provide to the franchisees. 
On the other hand, Minkler (1990) has explained the simultaneous existence of 
company and franchised stores in the same area on the need for franchisors to learn 
from franchisees about customer preferences with the view to taking over the 
franchised outlets and establishing company stores in similar areas.  
Contrary to Brickley and Dark (1987), this suggests franchisor incentives to 
establish outlets near their head-offices. Though this practice provides search cost 
savings, it also has the added benefit of reduced monitoring costs; it does not remove 
the opportunism risk associated with geographically dispersed outlets, especially 
where the region is large (Minkler, 1990).  
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However, lack of support for statement 6 suggests that franchisees in 
geographically dispersed areas are still subject to franchisor control because of regular 
store visits despite the high costs involved in setting up regional offices in those area 
or commuting staff, which also shows the commitment of franchisors to maintain 
quality standards and protect the reputation of their brands. 
In addition, as does the revenue stream incentive (Klein, 1996), the risk of 
termination should remain a potent self-reinforcing mechanism (Klein, 1991) even to 
franchisees in geographically dispersed areas. Therefore, the location of franchised 
outlets far from their head-office does not necessarily give their owners carte blanche to 
engage in opportunistic behaviour.  
iii). Local Market Knowledge and OO.  
The statements shown on Table 8-11 above examined the postulated positive 
relationship between the franchisee’s local market knowledge and OO. Very high 
scores received both individually and collectively for these statements 25-27 show 
very strong support for this proposition at 83%. Table 9-10 presents the results of the 
test on the sub- proposition, as follows: 
Table 9-10: Test Results on Local Market Knowledge  
Statements 
Number 
(yes) 
Total 
achievable 
% 
Result 
Franchisors are unable to 
dispense with the local 
market knowledge that 
franchisees possess  24 30 80 Supported 
Franchisees must use 
their local market 
knowledge to their own 
advantage 30 30 
10
0 Supported 
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Franchisees are not being 
adequately or fairly 
rewarded for their local 
market knowledge 21 30 70 Supported 
Total 75 90 83 Supported 
Source: Adapted from Brickley and Dark (1987); Minkler (1990 and 1992); Bradach (1997) 
 
The overwhelming support of 83% that the three statements 7-9 measuring this 
sub-proposition received from the interviewees strongly suggest that franchisees believe 
that they are in charge in their areas. As the preceding section indicated, it is difficult for 
franchisees to find sites closer to the franchisor’s head office.  
At any rate, responses to statement 9 suggested that franchisees expressed 
preference to be located far away from the franchisor’s head office. In most cases, 
franchisors prefer to franchise outlets located far from their head offices as this 
minimized their financial and control risks.  
On the other hand, Brickley and Dark (1987) and Minkler (1990 and 1992) suggest 
that franchisees prefer to take up sites closer to where they live and work, in areas 
removed from the cities located near franchisor’s head offices. This is probably 
because franchisees believe that they have local market knowledge that enables them 
to implement the franchisor’s strategy better than the franchisor can do.  
It would also seem these franchisees believe that because of proximity to their 
markets, they would be able to exert control over their outlets and have a better 
understand of local customer needs. In addition, the agency theory seem to support 
the view franchisees are better suited to run franchised outlets instead of store 
managers because they are claimants to the residue, that is, profit sharing with the 
franchisor.  
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Statement 25 
Franchisors are unable to dispense with the local market knowledge that franchisees 
possess.  
This statement received very high support of 80% among the interviewee 
franchisees. At least at face value, there appears to be unanimity of minds between 
franchisors and franchisees about the competency of franchisees to operate franchised 
outlets.  
This is in line with Brickley and Dark (1987) that franchisors appoint franchisees 
who agree to risk their money and invest in franchise systems to establish outlets in 
their own areas. It would also appear that franchisors believe franchisees possess the 
zeal and ambition to own outlets in their areas.  
This explains franchisor investment through training and product development 
to match franchisee capital and intellectual investment in the business. However, it 
appears the consensus ends just there because over time, some franchisees start 
believing and trusting their own gut-feel and instincts too much.  
Once franchisees seem to become too content with their ability to service their 
markets, one franchisee stated that: 
 
they begin to question the very existence of the franchisor. Suddenly, the 
franchisor becomes irrelevant in their minds and they start questioning the need to 
pay royalties; and to comply with the operating standards laid down in the 
franchisor’s handbook; and to procure supplies from the approved suppliers.  
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Generally, these franchisees believe as they have sufficient local market knowledge, 
that they are therefore well equipped and better positioned to provide for the needs of the 
customers in their own areas on their own and that the franchisor no longer has a role to 
play in their businesses.  
Similarly, since Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1969), franchisees owning profitable outlets 
have faced the prospect of losing their businesses to franchisors because of the 
buyback policy built into most franchise contracts. 
In some cases, territorial and transfer restrictions and the termination clause have 
served this purpose in disguise as evidenced by the strong support for statements 15, 
33 and 20 among the franchisors surveyed for the quantitative part of this study. 
Once again, this raises the spectre of dog-eat-dog that seems to characterise the 
franchise relationship because of the tendency among franchisors and franchisees to 
engage in opportunistic actions against each other.  
Strangely, much of the franchising literature has acquiesced to these 
malpractices, especially the Oxenfeldt and Kelly proposition (Woker, 2012). Despite 
its unfairness, unreasonableness and unlawfulness in most mature constitutional 
democracies such as the US and Europe, to this day, the buy-back of franchised 
outlets seems acceptable as a “natural progression” in franchising philosophy.  
This probably underscores the severely limited number of studies on franchisor 
abuses in the literature despite a plethora of cases heard in the US and European 
courts over the years. Though this has resulted in legislative mechanisms in some 
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states including South Africa, the franchisors in most countries including this one, still 
oppose legislation and regulation intended to level the playing fields, possibly 
because of self-interest. For instance, franchisors in this study overwhelmingly 
rejected statement 2 of the questionnaire addressing this issue. 
Statement 26  
Franchisees must use their local market knowledge to their own advantage. 
For these foregoing reasons, most of the interviewed franchisees have difficulty 
paying the royalties and listening to the advice offered by the franchisor’s representatives. 
They believe that they must use their local market knowledge to their own financial 
advantage as they and not the franchisor, work hard and long hours and are therefore 
entitled to the fruits of their labour.  
However, because of the franchise contract franchisees are bound to pay 
royalties, which they do grudgingly. In retaliation, franchisees responses suggest that 
believe they have to find ways and means of rewarding themselves. This probably explains 
their decision to engage in OA despite the obvious risk of termination once detected. 
It would appear franchisees take this decision in retaliation to opportunistic actions 
by franchisors.  
As suggested by Brown et al. (2000), opportunism seems to beget opportunism as 
instances such as the opportunistic termination of franchise contracts in pursuit of the 
buy-back clause. Similarly, as stated above, the imposition of territorial and transfer 
restrictions and provision of short term and non-renewable contract terms on 
franchisees seems to push them over the limit.  
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The dominant use of the stick approach in the industry calls for new ethos to 
replace the winner-takes-all mentality with the researcher’s “live and let live approach 
aimed at a win-win scenario. Briefly, the “live and let live approach proposes the 
levelling of the franchising playing fields through a reversal of most of the above 
franchisor practices. This is because self-regulation is not working, as does the 
resistance to legislation and regulation evident in the franchisor response to statement 
23 of the questionnaire.  
Similarly, the failure of franchise systems to award shares or stakes to franchisees 
in the parent holding company does not help matters. In addition, as Muris (1980) 
argues, the failure of franchise systems to account for kickbacks, discounts and any 
dividends received from suppliers; and the failure to account for the advertising fund 
could provide an excuse for franchisees to engage in opportunistic behaviour. 
Perhaps this is the rationale behind the passing of the CPA in this country, which 
franchisor response to statement 23 opposes. 
Statement 27  
Franchisees are not being adequately or fairly rewarded for their local market knowledge. 
This is one of a few statements in the study to have received 100% among all the 
interviewed franchisees supported this statement. This highlights deep-seated 
feelings among franchisees suggesting that despite playing such an important role in 
franchising, franchisees seem to feel that franchisors and scholars alike do not 
appreciate their efforts.  
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This is ostensibly because apart from the appointment of some of as multi-unit 
owners (Kauffmann and Dant, 1996; Dant and Gundlach, 1999; Shane, 2006) 
franchisees received very little rewards for their efforts. For example, as discussed 
above, most franchise systems do not offer shares in the holding company to their 
franchisees.  
In addition, until the recent passing of the CPA, most franchisors did not account 
for the discount, kickbacks, or dividends they received from the approved suppliers 
from whom franchisees in a particular franchise system are required to source their 
supplies.  
Furthermore, most franchisors use the stick approach that offer short-term, non-
renewal franchise contracts, restricted geographical trading areas and so on, where 
better contract terms in terms of the researcher live and let live philosophy could serve 
as positive rewards or incentives to well-behaving franchisees.  
While some franchisees pointed out their franchise systems offered prizes and 
gifts for best performing outlets in the forms of free holiday trips and the like, most 
franchisees felt this was inadequate and far in-between. This is because there are so many 
franchisees who feel they deserve these rewards while there is only a handful that the 
franchisors are able to dish out at any one time that leaves most of them frustrated. 
9.3.2 Research question 2 (Proposition 2) 
Research question 2 sought to test the relationship between opportunistic 
orientations and opportunistic actions among franchisees. 
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A. Testing of proposition 4 - The relationship between OO and OA 
To test this proposition, the statements shown on Table 8-12 above were tested to 
determine whether there was a relationship between OO and OA among franchisees. 
As depicted on Table 9-11 below, responses to each of the three statements marked 
28-30 below that measured this item indicate overwhelming support for the 
proposition with a high collective score of 73%. 
Table 9-11: Test Results on opportunistic actions among franchisees 
Statements 
Number 
(yes) 
Total 
achievable 
% 
Result 
Franchisees deserve higher 
returns than their normal 
business activities can 
provide 26 30 87 Supported 
It is too much to ask 
franchisees to comply with 
all franchise rules and 
regulations at all times 17 30 57 Supported 
Franchisees sometimes 
ignore some rules in order 
to maximize their returns 23 30 77 Supported 
Total 66 90 73 Supported 
Source: Developed for the study 
These results also provide an overwhelmingly positive answer to research 
question 2 that examined the relationship between OO and OA among franchisees. 
Proposition 4 found strong support for the relationship between an OO and OA 
among franchisees as measured by statements 28-30 of the interview guide at 73 %.  
This proposition formed an important part of the research because it tested 
research question 2. In addition, to borrow a phrase from quantitative research, 
together with OO, OA among franchisees were the predictor variable in the study.  
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However, as this was an exploratory study given that very few studies 
conducted on this phenomenon, no measures existed on this variable. To that end, the 
theoretical foundations of OO discussed in Chapter 4 centred on the opportunism 
construct defined by Williamson (1987 and 1988) as “self-interest seeking with guile” 
(p47), proved useful.  
Statement 28. 
Franchisees deserve higher returns than their normal business activities can provide.  
At a support level of 87%, the support for this statement came as no surprise 
when the responses to the statements both individually and collectively indicated strong 
support for the first proposition that there was a high level of OO among the sampled 
franchisees. A close examination of the response to each statement will illuminate 
more information and facts for the rationale that belied this support.  
The purpose of this statement was to determine whether franchisees were 
satisfied with the returns obtained from operating the franchised outlet. As most of the 
interviewees informed the researcher that their franchised outlets were profitable, this was 
overwhelming supported that is, 87% of the interviewees for the first statement.  
However, it appeared that despite and perhaps paradoxically, because of the 
profitability of their outlets, franchisees had long-run concerns of franchisor OO that 
alluded to in Chapter 5. It appears franchisees feared that the success of their outlets 
could attract the interest of their franchisors. Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1969) predicted 
that franchisors are likely to buy back profitable outlets from their franchisees 
whenever it suited the franchisors.  
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These fears became reality in 2010 for Woolworth food franchisees when the 
company announced its offer to buy back all their franchised outlets at prices 
determined by the company. Furthermore, Woolworths announced that it would not 
renew franchise contracts of franchisees rejecting the franchisor’s buy back offer.  
The concern among most of the Woolworth franchises was that they were not 
receiving fair market value or compensation for their businesses; and the local market 
knowledge they have acquired in a business located in areas in which the franchisor was not 
prepared to risk its own investment.  
The risk argument suggests that franchisors avoid the financial risk involved in 
operating the business in certain markets or territories by franchising the outlet. A similar 
response surfaced in franchisor responses to statement 22 of the questionnaire dealt 
with in Chapters 6 and 7 of this study.  
Paradoxically, as per statement 39 on the interview guide used to interview 
franchisees in this study, franchisees supported the taking or buying back of stores by 
franchisors as helpful in resolving some franchising disputes. 
It would appear other concerns gave rise for the franchisee support for the first 
statement. These include the termination clause, the restraint of trade clause, 
restricted store re-sale or transfer clause and similar clauses in the franchise contract.  
Therefore, by stating that they are entitled to higher returns than their normal business 
activities was providing, franchisees in the present were inadvertently admitting to their 
own OO. They were expressing a desire or an inclination to extract financial value from 
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conducting their franchised outlet by methods or means other than those that form part of their 
normal business activities.  
Clearly, this refers to the issues raised in Chapter 5 representing the 
manifestation of franchisee OO. These include the failure by franchisees to properly 
account for sales (for example by under-declaring sales), failure to maintain operating 
standards (for example by purchasing cheaper raw materials), and sourcing 
ingredients from third party or unapproved suppliers. These activities pertain to the 
withholding information or effort with the view to generating additional income that 
franchisees will hide away from the franchisor.  
However, a deviant case of an interviewee franchisee who did not agree with the 
statement suggested that a franchisee who complied with franchise regulations at all 
times at any rate obtained higher returns from the normal activities associated with 
conducting his business. To the respondent in question, “higher returns” were not 
mutually exclusive with the normal business activities; and this response was at odds 
with that of the other respondents who supported this statement.  
Statement 29.  
It is too much to ask franchisees to comply with all franchise rules and regulations at all 
times.  
Similarly, a scrutiny of responses to the second statement shows support for the 
first proposition at 77%. By supporting this statement, franchisees were admitting to 
an OO for a number of reasons. Firstly, franchisees accept the obligation to comply with all 
franchise standards, rules, and regulations at all times upon entering into the franchise 
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relationship. By so doing, franchisees accepted the financial and other implications that 
underlie these obligations.  
One franchisee expressed his practical difficulties in adhering to franchise rules 
and regulations at all times by stating that: 
 
It’s not that it’s a written rule, it’s just the risk [indiscernible] things [indiscernible] 
no it’s fine, but for the next one to be [indiscernible] but there’s no dough lying 
around [indiscernible] it must now be kept clear. If another one comes in, in ten 
minutes’ time then why must I worry. I think if anything it’s audited level of 
knowledge in regards to also running this type of business.  The auditors, if they’ve 
had training of what to look out for, [indiscernible] broken and they tell me this, this, 
and whatever, make sure it’s nice and clean and whatever. 
 
As a result, during the interviews, it came out clearly that 77% of the respondents 
felt that they could not commit to what would ordinarily amount to compliance with the basic 
terms of their contractual obligations. The reasons for non-compliance are not hard to 
fathom as these clearly relate to the financial implications involved as explained 
above. Brickley and Dark (1987) point out at franchisees pursuing cost savings arising 
from OA.  
As part of the franchise system, such franchisees hope to free ride on the reputation of 
the franchise system by using cheap raw materials or ingredients. These franchisees 
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recognise that they will sustain their businesses because of the strong brand represented by 
their franchise system.  
Brickley and Dark suggest that such franchisees do not bear the full cost of any 
backlash that may result from disillusioned and dissatisfied customers walking away from the 
franchise system; and that this tendency is common among the so-called highway 
franchisees. This is because the outlets of the se franchisees cater mainly for transient 
customers that are, moving customers who are unlikely to return to the particular 
outlet he may not have received a pleasant experience.  
Statement 30  
Franchisees sometimes ignore some rules in order to maximize their returns. 
While the so-called self-enforcing theory (Dnes, 1979) suggests that, future 
revenue generated by operating the franchised outlet should serve as a disincentive 
for non-compliance with franchise rules and regulations, researchers are baffled with 
continued non-compliance among franchisees. At 77%, this statement received quite a 
high support among the sampled franchisees.  
The marginal utility theory appeared to explain this conundrum in terms of 
which franchisees who choose not to comply with franchise rules and regulations, it 
means that the extra benefit associated with non-compliance should be higher than 
the extra benefit derived from the last chunk of revenue obtained from operating the 
franchised business.  
According to one franchisee:  
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Again, not in my case. I’ve never had issue with them. Generally as I’ve seen with 
other previous experiences with other Franchises. There is always an issue where 
that they, a Franchisee doesn’t like a certain way a Franchisor is doing it, something 
or a product that’s being supplied from Head Office. Franchisee doesn’t like that 
product and he will look for it elsewhere and then the Franchisor will be like, “hang 
on you have to buy this product from me”. Things like that. People do funny things 
in the Franchise industry.  Franchisees will outsource certain items that you have 
to get from Head Office, they will shop around, they look for other things. 
 
Therefore, it would seem that the incentive to cheat by breaking some franchising 
rules is far more rewarding to some of the responding franchisees than the sanctions 
associated with the breach of the franchise contract or incentives aimed at 
discouraging cheating behaviour.  
There is an array of governance mechanisms used by franchisors against errant 
franchisees. These methods and strategies are discussed extensively in the literature 
and include the use of power (French and Raven, 1959), incentives (Anderson, 1988), 
self-reinforcement (Dnes, 1993) and hostages (Williamson, 1987).  
However, of these methods and strategies, it would seem French and Raven’s 
classical 5 bases of power model consisting of legitimate, reward, coercive, referent 
and expert power has been used extensively by franchisors who have been are able 
built them into the franchise contract to perform various enforcement tasks. 
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For instance, in outlining the “top-down” disciplinary regime the franchise 
contract would state that a franchisee breaching the contract by infringing on some 
rules for the first time would receive a warning letter in terms of that the franchisor 
would be exercising referent power by referring to the obligations of the parties under 
the franchise contract.  
Normally, such a letter would include a demand for remedial action taken by the 
franchisee within a given time period failing that some element of coercive power 
such as cancellation or termination of the franchise contract in the form of sanctions 
taken against the franchisee by the franchisor.  
In a manner that succinctly displays the one-sidedness of most franchise 
contracts that often escapes even the purview of scholars, the disciplinary protocols 
are top-down in the sense that the entire process assumes that the culprit will in all 
cases be the franchisee and the victim, the franchisor.  
There are “no bottom-up” disciplinary processes in in the franchise contract, 
which franchisees can take against the franchisor in the event of a suspected breach by 
the latter. In all likelihood, a disgruntled franchisee would have to seek outside help 
to enforce its rights in terms of the contract.  
Thus, unlike the “cordial letter” that a franchisor can ordinarily address to a 
franchisee, a franchisee has no such option and has to get its attorney to commence 
legal action that is essentially adversarial and only serves to indicate irreversible 
deterioration in the level of the franchise relationship.  
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This possibly explains the inappropriateness or failure of the various governance 
mechanisms mentioned above to deter cheating in the franchise relationship. It would 
appear that this gets out of control the moment once the relationship reaches “rock-
bottom” at that point none of the available methods and strategies seems to work in 
enforcing compliance with franchise rules.  
This issue seems to lend support to the issues examined under the statements 13-
16 which dealt with the Last Years of the Franchise Contracts theme.  
This theme was borrowed from Muris’ (1980) so-called the “last days” syndrome 
which can be illustrated by one particular franchisee’s behaviour. The franchisee in 
question was so disgruntled and disillusioned with its franchise system that she 
reported: 
 
having surrendered the shop keys to the franchisor and being prepared to walk 
away with nothing instead of trying to transfer or sell the business to a third party.  
 
Therefore, it came as no surprise that this particular franchisee and another 
responded in the positive to statement 18 in the structure interview questions by 
stating that they did not expect the franchisor to extend or renew their franchise contract.  
Such franchisees excuse themselves from honouring franchise rules. The first 
mentioned franchisee admitted to engaging in opportunist behaviour:  
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by doing some of the cleaning franchise’s laundry at its home and not declaring the 
revenue to the franchisor. 
 
Generally, an aura of I do not care attitude seemed to reverberate among most 
sampled franchisees when discussing the tendency to break some franchise rules with no 
guilt feelings. It would seem this group of franchisees had decided that they were on 
their way out of the franchise system.  
This is either because they thought, they had caused damage to the brand by their 
OA; and that their franchise contracts were on the verge of expiring with no prospect of 
the franchisor renewing it. In addition, that such franchisees may have had enough of the 
franchise system, which they would not seek renewal or extension or even abandon their 
option to renew.  
One such franchisee commented that: 
 
it had come to the realisation that it had accumulated so much (local market) 
knowledge,  
 
an aspect examined by statement 10, that its customers often asked for its personal 
name to put on the cheque instead of the franchisor’s brand. That particular franchisee 
expressed the view that: 
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its business would not suffer in the event of a severance of the franchise 
relationship as it derived very little value from the franchise system after 19 years 
in the business.  
 
This franchisee stated that she engaged in OA by: 
 
sourcing supplies from competing suppliers who was not on the franchisor’s list of 
approved suppliers. 
Fortunately, the franchisor imposed a fine on this franchisee and did not have the 
dagger of termination dangling above its head. This franchisee justified its 
opportunistic behaviour on the: 
 
un-competitiveness of its franchisors in terms of aggressive pricing and stock 
unavailability.  
 
This point confirms or triangulates albeit obliquely, an issue canvassed in the 
structured questionnaire addressed to franchisors regarding the study of 
opportunism among franchisors. It related to the taking or buying back of franchised 
stores from failing or incompetent franchisees, because of the need for franchise systems to be 
competitive.  
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9.3.3 Research question 3 (Propositions 5-7)  
The last research question sought to determine whether there was a relationship 
between OA among franchisees and the growth, competitiveness, and survival of 
franchise systems. 
A. Testing of proposition no 5 - OA and the growth of franchise systems.  
The results of the testing of the statements shown on Table 8-13 ap1pear on Table 
9-12 below. These results indicate that the proposed negative relationship between 
growth of franchise systems and OA among franchisees received overwhelming 
support at 80%. 
Table 9-12: Test Results on the growth of franchise systems  
Statements 
Number 
(yes) 
Total 
achievable 
% 
Result 
It is desirable and 
advantageous for 
franchisees to comply 
with franchise rules at all 
times  27 30 90 Supported 
Most franchisees aim at 
owning more units in 
future  25 30 83 Supported 
Franchisees play no part 
in the growth of the 
franchise system 20 30 67 Supported 
Total 72 90 80 Supported 
Source: Developed for the study 
The growth of the franchise system is important as it generated the economies of 
scale needed to sustain the franchise system. The study used a net increase in the 
number of franchised outlets over time as measure of growth. The literature shows 
that franchised outlets usually comprise more than two thirds of the franchise system.  
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As discussed in Chapter 3 above, received knowledge has explained the use of 
franchisees to run franchised outlets in terms of the agency and resource constraint 
theories. Briefly, the agency theory suggested that franchisees are more likely to be 
more motivated than store managers to operate the outlets are.  
On the other hand, the resource scarcity theory suggested that franchisees 
provided the intellectual and financial capital that the owners of franchise systems 
needed for the rapid expansion of their business concepts or strategies. Over the 
years, there have been debates in the literature about a combination of the two 
approaches and the importance of theories such as TCE in explaining various aspects 
of the franchise relationship.  
Nevertheless, franchisees have always played a central role in the growth of 
franchise systems as can be seen from the exponential increase in the number of 
franchised outlets in most countries. As discussed in Chapter 3, some concerns raised 
in the literature and practice relating to the tendency among some franchisees to 
behave in an opportunistic manner threatens the growth of franchise systems. 
Therefore, this sub-proposition aimed at assessing the extent to those franchisees 
believed some of their tendencies to behave opportunistically could affect the growth 
of franchise systems. 
Statement 31 
It is desirable and advantageous for franchisees to comply with franchise rules at all 
times.  
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This statement received overwhelming support of 90%. As explained in Chapter 
5, OA among franchisees normally falls into two categories: withholding of 
information, effort, and non-compliance with franchise rules. Statement no 28 focused 
on the latter.  
This is because compliance with the franchise rules does not ensures that the 
franchise system remains intact, but is also used by franchisors as a yard stick to 
award additional outlets to existing franchisees as a strategy to grow the franchise 
system. Therefore, to the extent that franchisees are willing and able to comply with 
the rules, it is possible to predict the growth of franchise systems.  
However, studies such as Kauffmann and Dant (1996), Dant and Gundlach (1998) 
and Shane (2001) show that multi-unit ownership of outlets by franchisees is very 
common in most franchise systems. The reasons for the use of existing franchisees to 
grow the franchise system revolve mainly around to minimize selection costs as the 
franchisor already know these franchisees; and the franchisees are familiar with the 
franchise system.  
Therefore, recruiting existing franchisees is not only a case of the devil you know is 
better than the one you don’t, growing franchise systems by allocating additional units 
to existing also provides opportunities for franchisees to improve the profitability 
through economies of scale in their businesses and this helps to increase their wealth.  
Therefore, the overwhelming support for this statement suggests awareness 
among the interviewed franchisees that compliance with franchise rules is important 
for the growth of the franchise system and vice versa. 
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Statement 32. 
Most franchisees aim at owning more units in future. 
This statement also received overwhelming support of 83% among the 
franchisees as an indication of their understanding of the need for the growth of the 
franchise system and their role and benefits in this process. The sampled franchisees 
appeared to understand that owning additional units is to their own advantage as it 
meant that their own businesses were growing and that this translated into money 
going into their pockets.  
As one franchisee put it: 
 
Well, I mean, you know speaking from my side here, I am very good friends with the 
owners of the Franchise. The one guy I’ve known for over 20 years, so, you know, 
it’s basically just a phone call, just to say hey guys you know, I’m looking for another 
store. Where there’s a new mall and then they will go there for me and say ok look 
how about this, and they would discuss the rental and this and where and what and 
how and then it’s okay it’s going to cost so much, either we go forward or we don’t 
go forward and if it’s a store that wants to open near you, you’d have first choice. So 
if there…. 
 
Statement 33. 
Franchisees play no part in the growth of the franchise system.  
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The 67% response of the franchisees to this negatively worded statement was 
negative, clearly indicating that franchisees believed they played an important role in 
the growth of the franchise system. Franchisees play this role not only by acquiring 
additional units, but also by renewing or extending their contracts when these expire 
at the end of their contracts and by helping to attract and recruit new franchisees into 
the franchise system.  
Lafontaine (1992) suggests that most aspirant franchisees make it their business 
to solicit the views of existing franchisees before deciding whether to buy into a 
franchise system. However, this understanding of their role in the growth of franchise 
systems seems to be at odds with their responses to statements 28 to 30 that seemed to 
suggest OO among them. 
Once again, the work of Festinger comes into play here as there appears to some 
inconsistency between the thought processes and the actions of these franchisees. On 
the one hand, their responses seem to suggest that they believe it is important to 
comply with franchise rules in order to grow the franchise system whilst at the same 
time their behaviour indicates the opposite. 
B. Testing of proposition no 6 – OA and the competitiveness of franchise 
systems 
Table 8-14 above contains the statements which measured this proposition. As 
shown on Table 9-13 below, there was strong support of 66% for the proposition 
suggesting a negative relationship between the competitiveness of the franchise 
system and OA among franchisees, as follows: 
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Table 9-13: Test Results on the Competitiveness of Franchise Systems  
 
Statements 
Number 
(yes) 
Total 
achievable 
% 
Result 
Brand building is not the 
responsibility of 
franchisees 16 30 53 Supported 
Most franchisees feel 
encouraged to provide 
ideas that may help to 
improve the franchise 
system 27 30 90 Supported 
Franchisees are getting 
fair value for the 
advertising fees they pay 
to their franchisors  16 30 53 Supported 
Total 59 90 66 Supported 
Source: Adapted from Porter (1985), Brickley and Dark (1987), Bradach (1997), Sorenson and Sorenson (1987), 
Minkler (1990), Michael (2000) 
This proposition posited negative relationship between the competitiveness of 
the franchise system and OA among franchisees. The measures for this proposition, 
that is, statements 34–36, yielded mixed support. The issues examined by this 
proposition revolved around the role of the franchisees in building of the brand, their 
willingness, and ability to contribute ideas and information that could help build the 
competitiveness of the franchise system and their attitude towards the advertising 
fees that that pay to the franchisor.  
Like growth, the competitiveness of the franchise system is critically important. 
This is because franchise systems need to be competitive in order to continue to 
satisfy the wants, needs, and aspirations of their current and future customers. To this 
end, franchise systems need to ensure that they attract customers by offering them a 
unique and lasting experience through quality products and services that meet their 
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price expectations and use suitable messages that inform them about the availability 
of these offerings from attractive and conveniently located facilities and so on. 
Statement 34. 
Brand building is not the responsibility of franchisees.  
Though this statement received significant support at 53%, this was rather below 
expectations considering the overwhelming support that statement no 34 to 36 
received in respect of the perceived importance of the brand among them.  
Perhaps this has to do with the misunderstanding that most of these franchisees 
have that by paying the advertising fees to the franchisors in the form of between 2 
and 6% of their monthly sales, the responsibility to build the brand shifted to their 
franchisors.  
This line of thought could also be reflective of fact that those franchisees played 
no role whatsoever in the development of the advertising strategy of their franchise 
system. Generally, it is not possible for the franchisor to involve each franchisee in the 
planning and execution of the advertising strategy.  
However, scholars such as Bradach (1997) and Sorenson and Sorenson (2001) 
suggest how and why it is important for franchisors to find ways and means to 
accommodate the views of most franchisees in designing and executing advertising 
strategy and to learn from their franchisees (In fact, the next statement dealt with this 
aspect) especially when considering that, generally speaking, franchised outlets are 
more profitable than company stores (Minkler, 1990).  
However, one franchisee opined that: 
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You know and when I make suggestions they listen to them, if I’ve make fifteen 
suggestions and not one of them have come through, they loved all of them, they liked 
all the ideas, in two years not one of them has come through. They don’t care. 
 
In addition, as part of their brand building responsibility, most franchisees are 
not only required to pay the advertising fees, which in itself confirms their 
responsibility in this process, they are also required to spend between 1 and 3% of 
their monthly sales on local advertising (Dnes, 1993).  
One particular franchisee succinctly commented thus: 
 
it was its responsibility to build its franchisors brand in its area by upholding 
and keeping the franchisor’s brand in high regard, 
 
while another franchisee explained the role of franchisees in building the brand 
of the franchise systems by referring to the impact of the reckless of a franchisee on 
the entire chain thus: 
 
Yes, imagine you go to somewhere and then you have a very bad experience. You are 
going to think hang on, but then it’s all going to be like this. 
 
Similarly, another franchisee stated that: 
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they (franchised stores) all look the same, the same menus, the same brand and the 
person, especially a first time customer, they come in they don’t know what your 
stuff is supposed to be like, the quality, how it really is and then they go through a 
bad store and then they have this and they are like hang on this is gross. They are 
not going to go to another one. Let’s say they move to a different area and they will 
see the same Franchise, they are not going to go there, because their first time 
experience was not great. Would you go and waste money to try it again? 
 
Statement 35. 
Most franchisees feel encouraged to provide ideas that may help to improve the franchise 
system.  
This statement received overwhelming support of 90% among the interviewed 
franchisees. It would seem that most franchise systems have various mechanisms that 
they use for collecting inputs from their franchisees for developing new advertising 
material and products.  
According to one franchisee, these methods included: 
 
suggestions boxes, in-house competitions, and feedback provided through in-house 
websites, newsletters, and communication between the field workers and the 
franchisees, road shows or annual national, regional or meetings between the 
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representatives of the franchisor and the franchisees and franchisor-appointed 
franchise council meetings used for this purpose.  
 
Chiou et al., (2004) found that open communication between franchisors and 
franchisees did not only serve improve relationships, but also helped generate ideas 
that could be used to improve the competitiveness of the franchising system through 
the introduction of innovative products and strategies.  
This is because franchisees who feel encouraged to contribute ideas are able to 
feed through their local market knowledge to the franchisor who is the in a position to 
collect, collate and synergise the information from the different franchisees in the 
different areas and markets to inform its strategies. 
Statement 36. 
Franchisees are getting fair value for the advertising fees they pay to their franchisors.  
Surprisingly, most of the franchisees supported this statement at 53% despite the 
generally negative sentiments expressed in the media and the literature. This included 
the franchisees from some major franchisors with a reputation for running interesting 
and regular print, billboard, and electronic advertisements such as television, radio, 
Internet and so on.  
The general complaint was that the advertisements did not speak to the customers of 
each franchisee within the franchise system. This showed that different strategies are 
required to meet the advertising needs of the different sub-markets found within the 
same franchise system.  
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However, most importantly, most franchisees also felt that their franchisors were 
not spending enough money on advertising. This complaint represented an age-old 
franchising conundrum addressed in an aptly captioned paper by Michael (2000): Do 
franchises advertise enough? Michael’s findings concur with the complaints raised by 
the interviewed franchisees in this study.  
In fact, Muris (1980) raises the problem of franchisors misallocating advertising 
fees to pay for the franchisor’s administration expenses as an example of franchisor 
opportunism. This is because at least until the passing of the CPA in this country, 
franchisors had carte blanche control of the advertising revenue and budget.  
There was no mechanism for getting franchisors to account to the franchisees for 
the millions of rand paid to them in lieu of advertising fees. The CPA has changed all 
that by requiring among other things that the advertising fees paid into a separate 
trust account from that all advertising expenses paid and that this account audited 
and made available for inspection by any franchisee on request. 
C. Testing of proposition no 7 – OA and the survival the franchise systems 
Table 9-14 depicts of the results of the testing of the statements shown on Table 8-
15 above which sought to measure the relationship between the survival of franchise 
systems and OA among franchisors. These results show strong support of 73% for the 
proposition, as follows: 
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Table 9-14: Test Results on the Survival of Franchise Systems  
Statements 
Number 
(yes) 
Total 
achievable 
% 
Result 
Franchisees usually 
expect their franchise 
contracts to be extended 
or renewed beyond the 
initial period  24 30 80 Supported 
Disputes between 
franchisors and 
franchisees are 
unavoidable  18 30 60 Supported 
Stores closures and take-
backs are helpful in 
resolving some 
franchising disputes 24 30 80 Supported 
Total 66 90 73 Supported 
Source: Muris (1980); Brickley and Dark (1987); Hadfield (1990) 
This proposition postulated that a negative relationship existed between the 
survival of franchise systems and OA among franchisees. The interview respondent 
supported statements 37 to 39 used to measure this proposition. There can be little 
doubt that survival is the challenge that faces most franchise systems in the face 
changing market conditions in most countries especially South Africa.  
For example, the entry of foreign brands such as McDonalds in the local fast food 
market and Europcar in the care hire market probably had an effect on the market 
share of the local companies; and this is likely to grow and spread to other product 
segments. While this scenario presents opportunities for choice and cheaper prices 
among consumers, franchise systems have to find ways and means of retaining and 
protecting their market share and profitability.  
The other challenge that threatens the long-term survival of franchise system 
globally is the unemployment rate that has a negative effect of consumer demand 
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because of the decade long recession that appears far from bottoming out. The 
political/legal situation arising from the passing of the CPA in this country also 
presents immense challenges for the franchising sector. For instance, the CPA requires 
franchise contracts amended, re-negotiated, and re-signed with franchisees by 01 
April 2011.  
This entails high legal expenses for the re-drafting of franchise contracts that 
must be borne by franchisors alone that due to dwindling sales and profit margins 
and increasing input costs they may find difficulty in recovering from franchisees by 
increasing the 2–7% administration fees they impose on them.  
Franchisors may also face legal battles on the duration of the revised franchise 
contracts as the law requires new contract to have been signed by 01 April 2011 failing 
that such contracts will not become invalid or void, but voidable on account of being 
unlawful.  
Udel (1972) found that most franchise contracts have a “severance clause” that 
states that an invalid clause does not affect the rest of the contract, the CPA attacks the 
contract as a whole. Thus, franchisees with OO may use this opportunity to demand 
an extension and may refuse to sign the revised contract unless and until franchisors 
meet their demands. 
On the other hand, franchisors caught up in this trap may not be able to rely on 
the defective contracts to act against such un-cooperative franchisees. Such 
franchisees may use the principles such as the need for good faith, fair business 
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practices, and conscionability between franchisors and franchisees enshrined in the 
Act to launch legal battles against their franchisors.  
Such battles may carry on for a few more years until they decide to abandon their 
claims and walk away from the franchise system should it prove to be a fruitless or 
too costly for them to keep the matter in the courts of law.  
Statement 37.  
Franchisees usually expect the extension or renewal of their franchise contracts 
Invariably, 80% of the franchisees supported this statement and expressed the 
need, in the words of one franchisee to protect their bread and butter.  
In support of this statement, one franchisee stated that: 
 
I think so, because if I am going to sit here and work for your brand and make it 
better, then why shouldn’t, it’s not something that I am going to go and beg for.  It’s 
something that you go and say if I need to renew it then I will sign then I’ll sign the 
paper. It’s like a process, like getting the lease; this is a big story, in inverted commas 
as well. 
 
Ordinarily, these franchisees would comply with franchise rules and regulations, 
as this would be in their best interest. However, counterbalancing the responses of 
franchisees to statements 1 to 3, and this one, clearly illustrates Prof Festinger’s theory 
of cognitive dissonance referred to above. 
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The thought processes of these franchisees appear to be inconsistent with their 
actions as they expect their franchise contracts to be renewed yet they show an 
inclination to behave in an opportunistic manner that could threaten the renewal of 
franchise contracts.  
An explanation that can be provided for this inconsistency is that as Williamson 
(1987) argued, it is human nature for franchisees to behave in an opportunistic fashion 
whenever they believes it was opportune for them to do so, and whenever this 
yielded some rewards for them.  
Statement 38. 
Disputes between franchisors and franchisees are unavoidable. 
This statement received strong support of 60% as most of the franchisees seemed 
to believe that the question missed the point given the many issues of that the parties 
can disagree so rather the question should have been how the parties resolve their disputes 
amicably as failure to do so harms the image of the business. To this end, franchisees 
indicated that, a three warning letter system was in use in most franchise systems usually 
followed by drastic action.  
This included termination of the franchise contract by either cancellation or non-
renewal even where an option to renew exists, as renewal is contingent upon the franchisee 
being in good standing at the time of the renewal. It would seem this elaborate system is 
based on the desire to resolve disputes amicably, and not, in the words of one 
particular franchisee: 
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to go for the “jugular” rather too quickly.  
 
However, as established by Udel (1972), the lack of mediation and arbitration 
clauses in most franchise contracts reflects the cognitive dissonance that has been 
discussed in the preceding sections, this time on the part of the franchisors.  
Statement 39. 
Store closures and take-backs are helpful in resolving some franchising disputes. 
While 80% franchisees supported this statement, most of them questioned its 
desirability as a dispute resolution mechanism. This is because most franchisees felt 
that ailing franchisees needed support until they are able to find their feet again to stand on 
their own.  
Only thereafter could franchisors take drastic measures against the franchisees. 
These include cancellation or termination gives the franchising industry the bad reputation it 
is fast gaining in the eyes of the South African public. One franchisee pointed out that: 
 
in order to protect the image of reputation of their brands, some franchisors usually 
took back stores from incompetent or failing franchisees to rehabilitate them before 
hand them over to other franchisees.  
 
More specifically, one franchisee stated that:  
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They didn’t just say “Oh, hang on you’re not a Franchise anymore”. They did steps 
trying to do the things properly and then they just, (inaudible) they haven’t resolved 
the issue and they still carried on doing what they are doing. So they said “Hang on, 
if you carry on doing what you’re doing, then you are not part of us”. So they took 
away the brand and they are doing whatever they’re doing. 
 
However, one franchisee criticised this strategy by pointing out that: 
 
some outlets get recycled among franchisees without the franchisors conducting a 
thorough viability of the site concerned to determine the probably causes of the site 
to fail and that often, the reason why a particular outlet failed is usually not disclosed 
to subsequent franchisees. 
 
One franchisee alleged that: 
 
foremost in the franchisor’s mind is to keep the outlet in a particular site open 
regardless of whether such a site is viable or not.  
 
Another franchisee made the point that:  
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while it may be in their own best interests to remove some bad guys from the 
franchise system to protect their investments, this should be done as humanly as 
possible and as a last resort. 
 
Similarly, another franchisee expressed the hurt that store closures bring to his 
ilk by stating that: 
 
so my argument is, I know the woman that owns that, and I’m very upset that 
she’s gone bust… very upset for her, that she lost a lot of money, but my argument 
is, why is that shop there in the first place. 
 
 Summary of the propositions test results 
The results of the testing of the propositions based on the constructs and some of 
their most important sub-dimensions are summarised on Table 9-15 below, as follows: 
Table 9-15: Summary of the propositions results  
Construct Sub-dimension % Results 
Growth  80 Supported 
Competitiveness  66 Supported 
Survival  73 Supported 
Opportunistic 
actions 
 73 Supported 
Structural factors Head-office staff to franchisee ratio 82 Supported 
 Incomplete contracting 68 Supported 
 Multiple unit-ownership 49 Unsupported 
Contextual factors Membership of Franchisee 
Associations 
74 Supported 
 Lack of regulation and legislation 69 Supported 
 Last years of the franchise contract 77 Supported 
Strategic factors Brand value 98 Supported 
 Geographic dispersion 59 Supported 
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 Local market knowledge 83 Supported 
Source: Developed for the study 
Table 9-15 shows that the data supported nearly all the study’s propositions. The 
next section discusses the methods used to validate the data 
 Validation of the qualitative interviews: issues and processes 
Semi-structured interviews in respect of exploratory qualitative studies such as 
this one involve personal observations that are subject to individual perceptions and 
judgments which most scholars aver are difficult to measure statistically (Ritchie and 
Lewis, 2005).  
However, despite the above methodological issues, a number of alternative 
research techniques that rely less on statistical analysis suggested by scholars such as 
Bailey (1994), Ritchie and Lewis (2005) and Patton (2006) validated the methods and 
data obtained from the purposeful sample used in this study.  
Enhancing the quality and credibility of the study. Within Richie and Lewis (2005)’s 
framework, rather than assessing the reliability that is, the ability of one study to 
repeat or replicate by another study’s results, this part focused on the equivalent of 
reliability as it is understood in qualitative studies, that is, transferability, and 
confirmability of results.  
Similarly, instead of assessing validity, “credibility and defensibility” assessed 
the extent to which the data was relevant to the subject matter under investigation.  
This aimed at ensuring that the data, methods, and findings of a study are 
“sustainable” and “well grounded” to meet the requirements of a qualitative study 
outlined above.  
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Most of these approaches use concepts such as credibility, transferability, 
dependability, confirmability and others interchangeably as substitutes for the factors 
of reliability and validity, a strategy that paradoxically facilitates methodological 
triangulation as suggested by Denzin (1970).  
A similar approach adopted in this study revolved around Patton’s (2006) 3-
phase framework to enhance the quality and credibility of the study. The first batch of 
strategies aims at assessing the rigour of methods used in the study and includes 
generating and assessing rival conclusions, negative cases, triangulation, review by 
inquiry participants, and audience review.  
The second lot addresses the question of the credibility of the researcher. In this 
regard, issues examined include the researcher’s professional background, interest in 
the study, investigator effects, or biases, intellectual rigour.  
The last one deals with the issue of the researcher’s philosophical belief in 
qualitative investigations as determined by his “appreciation of the naturalistic 
inquiry, qualitative methods, inductive analysis, purposeful sampling, and holistic 
thinking” (p553). The ensuing discusses the application of these techniques in this 
study. 
Generating and assessing rival conclusions. The purpose of this exercise is to counter 
claims and suspicion of bias having informed the findings of the researcher that have 
taken place unconsciously, inadvertently or even intentionally. One way of dealing 
with this problem is to be proactive, intellectual honesty and openly disclosing one’s 
predispositions upfront and thereby declaring any biases explicitly.  
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By offering alternative explanations for the phenomena under investigation, the 
investigator made a clean break with his stereotypes by showing evidence of 
objectivity having taken the intellectual trouble and inconvenience to consider 
alternatives. To do this, data was organised in themes that could lead to unexpected 
results or findings and other logical approaches to the handling of the data that could 
lead to different conclusions, respectively in search for the best fit.  
Negative or deviant cases. Searching for cases that negate or challenge existing 
stereotypes, approaches, or thinking created avenues for new thought processes that 
could unveil new patterns and trends to introduce new dimensions to the study.  
The process involved in identifying and exploring negative or deviant cases is 
iterative and involves trial and error until the examination of several such cases. The 
size of such cases is immaterial, as emphasis was devoted to the analysis of 
identifiable items that defy the norm.  
In this study, three ex-franchisees, two known and one not known personally to 
the researcher whose franchise contracts were not renewed at their own instance or 
that of franchisors were considered to negative or deviant cases were interviewed by 
telephone. In the main, these individuals corroborated most of the findings of the 
study although their views were more radical than those of existing franchisees were.  
This reaction was anticipated given the findings by Frazier (1997) in an 
Australian study that found that most ex-franchisees tend to be disgruntled and 
disparaging towards their ex-franchisors especially where their franchise contracts 
were terminated prematurely. 
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Design checks: Keeping methods and data in context. Patton (2006) identified three 
possible limitations that might arise from sampling mistakes that may affect the 
quality of the data or the findings of the study. These relate to limitations in the 
significance of study that may arise from observed situations, times of observations 
and people who are sampled to participate in the study.  
The importance of understanding this strategy is that in qualitative studies, the 
findings of a sample are not intended to be generalised to a population, but are 
merely used to highlight the purpose and limitations of the sample studied (Ritchie 
and Lewis, 2005).  
High quality lessons learnt. This aspect forms an important caveat applied in 
qualitative research by applying or adapting the results of the study to other 
situations. In dealing with this issue, instead of recommending the generalising the 
findings to other settings, this study states the learned lessons as principles of practice 
that may be adapted to suit the context of situations in which they may be applied.  
Lessons may be transplantable or transferable to other contexts only where such 
lessons have received triangulated support from a multiple of sources and types of 
learning. 
Assessing the credibility of the researcher. In what may be described as some form of 
intellectual honesty, Patton (2006) suggests that it is significant for the researcher to 
give an account of his personal involvement or interest in his investigation that may 
have affected the data collection, analysis, or interpretation of the findings in a 
positive or negative way. This has the potential to enhance or detract from the value 
467 
of the study depending on how the researcher’s background has enhanced or 
detracted from data gathering and analysis.  
Investigator effects. Patton (2006) discusses four reportable factors involving the 
effect of the presence of the researcher in the research scene that enhances the 
credibility of the finding of a study. These include the reactions of participants to the 
researcher’s presence; changes in the research team or field workers; the researcher’s 
predispositions; biases and selective perceptions and the researcher’s incompetence.  
Given the researcher’s experience as a franchisee, the respondents may have been 
more forthright than otherwise with the result that the findings of the study may be 
beyond doubt or unquestionable.  
Naturalistic inquiry. This explains the researcher’s decision to conduct a real-life 
investigation of phenomenon under study, that is, under franchisee OO and OA by 
way of interviews and not through experimental or other methods underlie his 
epistemological and ontological stances.  
The study took the view that franchisee OO and OA exists as a social reality; and 
that it is examinable and objectively measurable with the use of techniques such as 
semi-structured interviews and content analysis described in the above sections. 
Qualitative methods. In planning the research design for the study, the researcher 
realised that the best way to obtain better insights and understanding of the views, 
beliefs, and perceptions of franchisees on an exploratory topic would be through a 
qualitative study which provided deeper and complex issues defied examination.  
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This was despite conducting the quantitative study to examine the same 
phenomenon among franchisors, as explained in Chapter 6. As suggested by Ritchie 
and Lewis (2005), quantitative methods supplemented the qualitative inquiry by 
examining the research questions among franchisees. 
Inductive analysis. The use of the hypothetico-deductive approach on the 
quantitative study intended to test the research questions among franchisors. The 
purpose of inductive analysis in the examination of franchisee OO and OA was to 
discover patters, themes, and categories compared with the canonical correlations 
factors loadings identified in the in the study.  
This is in line with Patton’s (2006) supposition that the inductive analysis 
involved in qualitative analysis can be very useful when developing a code book for 
content analysis as was the case in this study.  
Purposeful sampling. The use of purposeful sampling in this study has enabled the 
researcher to try to extract information-rich data from a sample by having to think 
carefully and strategically in order to determine the criteria that delivered a sample 
consisting of franchisees with the necessary experience, knowledge, and information 
that addressed the research questions.  
The researcher decided that against the use of ordinary random sample methods 
that could have yielded a more representative sample than an informative sample, as 
is normally required in qualitative studies. For example, the sample used in this study 
consisted of franchisees with a minimum 3 years’ experience which was considered a 
key selection characteristic which displayed the qualities sought in an ideal franchisee 
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respondent capable of understanding the various study constructs and sub-
dimensions.  
Holistic thinking. This skilful exercise requires taking a broad view of the research 
setting in order to consider a wide range of factors that affected the research problem. 
To this end, the use of qualitative research to triangulate the quantitative methods in 
this study was an attempt to address the research questions not only from the point of 
view of different sources of data, that is, franchisors and franchisees, but also from 
different theoretical and methodological perspectives. The objective was to achieve a 
rounded view of the phenomena under study, that is, the effects of OO and OA on 
franchise systems. 
The next section discusses an assessment of possible bias in the methods and 
results of the qualitative study. 
 Assessment of bias 
The use of the interview method carried the risk of bias which could emanate 
from the interviewer’s misunderstanding of the respondent’s answers or his mistaken 
recording of such an answer (Bailey, 1994). Most importantly, Bailey also states that 
bias can arise from “the respondent’s reaction to the interviewer’s sex, race, social 
class age, dress physical appearance, or accent” (p175).  
Ordinarily, these social or demographic factors could have introduced bias 
during the interviews, the researcher expected bias to arise from the sensitivity of the 
subject matter that involved examining the franchise relationship which revolves 
around an unequal distribution of power between franchisors and franchisees.  
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For instance, scholars such as Hunt (1977) and Dnes (1993) regard franchise 
contracts as being one-sided in favour of franchisors, while Udel (1972) alluded to the 
confidentiality clause that clearly undermines the franchisees’ constitutional right of 
freedom of speech and association. As was anticipated, some franchisees were 
reluctant to participate in the study out of fear of the consequences of breaching their 
franchise contracts.  
Similarly, the satisfactory response rate of 44% to the questionnaire survey 
suggested that franchisors were not particularly keen to participate in a study 
conducted by an independent researcher other than one they of FASA commissioned. 
In addition, the coming into effect of the CPA on 01 April 2011 with its far-reaching 
implications for the franchising industry appears to have had a negative effect on the 
participation of franchisors in this study.  
This explains the reluctance of most franchisors to provide the contact details of 
their franchisees to the researcher and this made it impossible to use the questionnaire 
to gather data from the franchisees 
On the other hand, researcher bias may have been factor in assessing franchisor 
OO and OA because of his background and experience as a franchisee of more than 10 
years standing. However, the positivistic approach adopted and the robustness of the 
measures used in this study could have a mitigating effect on the researcher’s 
personal views and perceptions towards franchisors.  
In this regard, the researcher developed the statements used as the research 
instruments after consultations with franchising experts and nearly all the measures 
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emanated from the literature. In addition, pre-tests conducted with the experts were 
found to be acceptable which indicated that the instruments had inter-rater reliability.  
The next section concludes the chapter. 
 Summary 
This chapter presented and discussed the qualitative results of the study 
obtained from examining interview data using content analyses to test seven 
propositions which addressed three research questions among franchisees. As in the 
case of the study among franchisors, the results indicated marginal to strong support 
for most of the propositions. The chapter also addressed various methods and 
strategies used to validate, assess possible bias in the methods and results of the 
qualitative study.  
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Chapter 10 Conclusions 
 Introduction 
Chapter 6 and 7 and 8 and 9 presented and discussed the research methodologies 
and results of the quantitative and qualitative parts of the study conducted among 
franchisors and franchisees using questionnaire and interview data analysed mainly 
using SEM on SAS and content analysis, respectively.  
In this concluding chapter which largely also serves to integrate the quantitative 
and qualitative parts of this study, section 10.2 summarises the study’s integrated 
findings and implications of its results. Section 10.3 discusses the study’s contribution 
to franchising research, practice, and policy. Section 10.4 focuses on possible areas of 
investigation by future researchers. 
 Conclusions of the study: integrated findings and implications 
This section presents a conclusion on findings and implications of the study’s 
quantitative and qualitative results testing questionnaire and interview data mainly 
using structural equation modelling and content analysis among franchisors and 
franchisees to examine three research questions using seven hypotheses and 
propositions which were presented and discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, 8 and 9, 
respectively.  
10.2.1 Conclusions on research question 1 (Hypotheses and propositions 1-3) 
Unlike in the case of franchisees where significant support was found for 
propositions 1 to 3 measuring the relationship between structural, contextual and 
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strategic factors and OO among franchisees, the expected support for most of the 
predicted relationships between these constructs measuring hypotheses 1 to 3 among 
franchisors did not occur.  
Rather, contextual and strategic factors were found to be directly related to OA 
and the growth and survival of franchise system and not through OO as postulated. 
These findings indicated situations in which contextual and strategic decisions such 
competitive pressures and the provision of financial assistance by franchisors to 
franchisees leading to the positive results that were not predicted by the model.  
These findings suggest that structural, contextual and strategic factors may create 
entrepreneurial orientations (EO) and not OO among franchise systems to pursue 
growth and survival through new franchisees taking up franchisees and existing ones 
extending their franchise contracts or taking up opportunities to own additional units 
within the franchise system.  
However, support for research question 1 among franchisees imply that 
franchisors and franchisees need to embrace the Act and to use it to develop new 
paradigms and attitudes for approaching and conducting their relationship with 
franchisees.  
In this vein, RET scholars such as Macneil (1974), Ouchi (1980) and Granovetter 
(1985) suggest the formation of social norms and values such as co-operation, trust, 
mutuality, information exchange, and solidarity to underpin the franchise 
relationship.  
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These norms and values could offer credible commitments and better protection 
for the contractual rights of the parties against each other’s opportunistic actions 
(Klein, 1993, 2000) than franchise contracts. The use of RET principles such as 
cooperation, trust, and mutuality could foster better ties between franchisors and 
franchisees by developing mutually agreed norms and values of acceptable 
behaviour.  
As Leblebici and Shalley (1996) argue, the use RET principles might encourage a 
departure from a neoclassical contract law approach that emphasises strict adherence 
to contract provisions to the exclusion of implicit understanding of such terms by the 
parties in resolving franchising disputes.  
As an example, the removal of the expiry or renewal date clause from franchise 
contracts to provide security of tenure especially to franchisees by removing the 
incentive to “make as much money as possible,” which may encourage OO among 
franchisees. 
Similarly, removing the expiry or renewal date clause should be considered with 
the view to discouraging opportunistic terminations or non-renewal of franchise 
contracts by franchisors and to embrace and implement the relevant clauses of the 
CPA in their franchise contracts. 
In addition, franchisors and franchisees should jointly engage the authorities 
through aggregated franchisee associations and franchise advisory councils to 
address issues in the CPA which are likely to impact negatively on the growth, 
competitiveness, and survival of franchise systems. 
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10.2.2 Conclusions on research question 2 (Hypothesis and proposition 4) 
The study found no support for hypothesis and research question 2 among 
franchisors while propositions 4 to 7 found strong support for this research question 
among franchisees. This suggests the existence of a positive relationship between OO 
and OA among franchisees which suggests support for Brown et al (2000)’s 
observation that opportunism begets opportunism.  
In addition, these findings support the allegations franchisors make against their 
franchisees regarding the failure to maintain quality standards by taking advantage of 
issues such as incomplete contracting and lack of monitoring and supervision 
capacity among franchisors.  
However, because of the harm that OO and OA among these parties visit upon 
the franchise system, the study suggests the need for them to adopt the so-called “live 
and let lives” strategies based on RET principles to seek win-win solutions for the 
franchise relationship by establishing psychological contracts (Schein, 1980; 1982) 
between franchisors and franchisees.  
The psychological contract between the parties should encourage the parties to 
build and maintain their relationship based on implicit rather than explicit terms of 
franchise contracts to deal with disputes that might arise between them. This implies 
applying non-legal rather than legal factors such as cooperation, trust, solidarity, 
mutuality, information exchange, flexibility as governance mechanisms in the 
franchise relationship. 
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Such an approach will make it possible for franchisors to quickly and painlessly 
adapt to the new legislative landscape under the CPA that requires them to amend 
their franchise contracts to give effect to the constitutional rights that franchisees are 
entitled to such as the right to fairness and dignity.  
To this end, franchisors need to ensure that both their conduct and franchise 
contracts at all times display fairness, reasonableness, conscionability, good faith and 
so on; and that franchisees recognise and respect the contractual rights of franchisors 
which are also enshrined in the constitution. 
10.2.3 Conclusions on research question 3 (Hypotheses and propositions 5-7) 
Thirdly, hypotheses 5 to 7 also produced mixed and unexpected results. The 
statistical support found for the unpredicted direct relationship between contextual 
factors and the survival and between strategic factors and the competitiveness of 
franchise systems and not through OO or OA can be interpreted as representing the 
support for hypotheses 6 and 7 and research questions 3 among franchisors.  
On the other hand, the qualitative study found strong support for propositions 5 
and 7 which also indicates important support for proposition 3 which suggests 
support for the predicted negative relationship between OA and the growth and 
survival of franchise systems and not for the relationship between OA and the 
competitiveness among franchisees.  
These findings suggest that the negative relationship between OA and the 
growth and survival of franchise system among franchisees arises from their 
reluctance to renew or extend their franchise contracts.  
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This could be the result of the high levels of tensions and conflict within the 
franchise relationship caused by the misaligned incentives between the parties such as 
the requirement for franchisees to invest in lifelong assets in return for short-term 
franchise contracts; and the right of franchisors to purchase such assets at the end of 
the contract term.  
Accordingly, the study suggests the need for franchisors to amend such practices 
by offering long-term franchise contracts to match the long-term investments 
franchisees make into the franchise system which will demonstrate RET values such 
as good faith, fairness, reasonableness and conscionability, which will make it 
possible for franchisors to achieve growth of their franchise systems by retaining 
existing franchisee, attracting new ones and existing franchisees expanding their 
operations.  
This study also found marginal statistically significant evidence of a negative 
relationship between OA and the competitiveness of franchise systems only among 
franchisors possibly relating to the cancellation or termination of franchise contracts 
by franchisors for non-performance reasons, lack of trust and confidence in 
franchisees by franchisors, and unwillingness to provide franchise contracts with 
favourable terms to franchisees.  
Therefore, in order for franchise systems to grow by attracting new franchisees 
and retaining new ones, they need to be competitive by offering favourable franchise 
contracts terms (Shane and Spleen, 1988) by using favourable franchise contract terms 
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such as longer and renewable contract terms, extended territorial zones, purchases of 
quality goods from non-approved suppliers and so forth.  
As predicted, the study found strong evidence of a negative relationship between 
OA and the survival of franchise systems among franchisees which suggests that the 
closure of outlets because of malpractices such as the “at-will” termination of 
franchise contracts threaten the survival of franchise systems because of the negative 
publicity and court battles that follow such decisions.  
As a result, the lack of secured tenure may force existing franchisees not to renew 
or extend their franchise contracts, seek or accept opportunities to acquire additional 
outlets and encourage aspirant franchisees to buy into the franchise system.  
Similarly, the unwillingness of franchisees to provide favourable franchise 
contract terms to franchisees may lead to an exodus of franchisees and this may 
discourage prospective franchisees from coming into the franchise system. 
 Contributions of the study 
This study contributes to existing theoretical and practical knowledge and 
application of franchising as a business model. It pays attention to existing concerns 
whilst raising a number of issues, practices and strategies requiring the consideration, 
debate and implementation by scholars, franchisors and franchisees, FASA and 
authorities such as politicians and policy makers, the NCC, the Competition 
Commission and the courts and so on. 
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10.3.1 Theoretical contributions 
Despite the wide acceptance in most disciplines of the opportunism-performance 
hypothesis developed mostly by Williamson (1975, 1979, 1983 and 1985) that sought 
to explain the governance of economic organizations such as franchise relationships, 
thus far few marketing or franchising studies have examined or tested this hypothesis 
or proposition in general and its consequences in particular.  
To this end, this study sought to contribute to existing knowledge by broadening 
the categories and testing the role of structural, contextual and strategic factors 
mainly identified by Williamson and others as antecedents of OO among franchisors 
and franchisees, the relationship between OO and OA as well as the impact of OA on 
the growth, competitiveness and survival of franchise systems.  
Accordingly, hypotheses and propositions 1 to 3 were developed, tested, and 
found structural, contextual, and strategic factors to be positively related to OO 
among franchisees and only between structural and strategic factors and OA among 
franchisors.  
Similarly, hypothesis and proposition 4 suggested that OO led to OA among 
franchisees but not among franchisors. On the other hand, hypotheses 5 to 7 also 
provided mixed support for the view that OA had a negative impact on growth, 
competitiveness, and survival of franchise systems.  
These findings imply that franchisors, franchisees and other stakeholders should 
debate and consider implementing various legal and non-legal mechanisms suggested 
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in this chapter to minimise the occurrence and effects of OO and OA on franchise 
relationships. 
In this vein, the study suggested incorporation of RET principles that emphasised 
the development and adoption of norms and values such as cooperation, trust, 
mutuality, solidarity, information sharing within franchised relationships into other 
governance mechanisms such as franchise contracts, legislation and franchisee 
association.  
By conceptualising the OO construct, this thesis study not only contributed to the 
lexicon of franchising research and thinking, but it also provided a new way of 
approaching, interpreting and understanding the opportunism problem within 
franchise relationships.  
This knowledge may be useful in areas such as the drafting, negotiating, and 
implementation of new franchise contracts in future by franchisors who must 
appreciate that compliance with both the letter and spirit of the CPA, the constitution 
and RET principles is in their own interest.  
As Woker (2012) argues, the Act requires franchisors and franchisees to conduct 
their relationship in a manner that shows good faith, fairness, reasonableness, 
conscionability, and fair dealing while the constitution makes far reaching demands 
on franchisors to water down the considerable power they enjoy under their franchise 
contracts to promote its foundational values of equality, freedom and dignity. 
Thus, the findings of this study require a review of some of the controversial and 
adversarial clauses such as the buy-back clause, non-renewal of contracts, shorter-
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term contracts found in most franchise contracts that may be in conflict with the RET 
principles or relational norms of the franchise relationship, spirit and letter of the CPA 
and the constitution.  
A key intellectual output of this study was the conceptualisation of the OO 
construct, the testing of the relationship between structural, contextual, and strategic 
factors and OO, OO and OA and OA on the growth, competitiveness, and survival of 
franchise systems.  
For this reason, the testing of seven hypotheses and propositions using SEM on 
the SAS statistical package and content analysis among franchisors and franchisees, 
respectively, contributed to the increasing application of quantitative and qualitative 
techniques and the generation of meaningful and credible knowledge in franchising 
research.  
In addition, the use of the mixed methods research strategy enriched the study 
by facilitating the triangulation of data sources and methodological approaches, the 
analysis and interpretation of data and the study’s findings. 
On the other hand, rather than the usual emphasis that prior studies placed on 
franchising as a means for achieving the objectives of franchisors for raising cheaper 
financial and human capital in pursuit of rapid expansion, this study sought to 
highlight the important role that franchisees can also play in the franchise relationship 
for the mutual harm or benefit of the parties within the context of RET as discussed 
particularly in Chapter 3 above.  
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As Elango and Fried (1997) argued, franchisees play an important role in the 
franchise relationship as they provide not only financial and human capital that 
franchisors need but also provide invaluable local market intelligence into the 
development of competitive and operational strategy of the franchise system.  
In addition, the use of TCE in this study suggests that unlike the agency and 
resource scarcity theories of franchising, franchising should be seen as a business 
strategy which can also be adopted by franchisees to realise economic efficiency or 
lower transactions costs through centralised and bulk buying of equipment, 
ingredients and services such as advertising, training and accounting systems.  
On the other hand, instead of relying largely or solely on traditional governance 
mechanisms such as franchise contracts and TSA’s (as discussed in Chapter 5) based 
on the researcher’s so-called “cocked gun” approach to safeguard their idiosyncratic 
investments in the franchise relationship and to mitigate or counter-balance the effects 
of opportunism, the study suggests the need for franchisors and franchisees to adopt 
the so-called “live and let live” approach to franchising by adopting RET-based norms 
such as use of cooperation, trust, mutuality, solidarity, information sharing and 
flexibility to establish psychological contracts between the parties.  
Having said that, one of the difficulties involved in conducting this study was 
the lack of testing of most measures in prior studies, which could have served as a 
guide for this study were it not for the dearth of research on the consequences of 
opportunism which is an important research area alongside franchise initiation, 
royalties and fees and control and management issues (Hawkins et al., 1995).  
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However, in line with Price (2000), the use of robust techniques supported by the 
complicated procedures found in SEM which produced good model fit on most of the 
indices and the development and testing of propositions indicates this study’s 
significant contribution to franchising research with the result that some of its 
measures could be adapted or replicated in future studies. 
According to Chen, Bollen, Paxton and Curran (2001) avoiding improper and 
non-convergent solutions suggests correct specifications of parameter estimates in the 
franchising model, use of an adequate sample size and other important statistical 
assumptions. The same principle applies to the methods referred to in Chapter 9 
which were applied to validate the qualitative results of this thesis. 
10.3.2 Practical contributions 
It is argued that this thesis provides aspirant and existing franchisors and 
franchisees and various other role players such as advisors, lenders, lawyers and 
policy makers with information or tools for assessing franchisors and franchisees with 
a significant degree of certainty before signing up, renewing or recommending a 
particular franchisor to a potential franchisee.  
On the other hand, studies by Hunt (1977) show the disastrous social and 
economic consequences of a bad franchise relationship which include huge financial 
losses and bankruptcy resulting from litigation, disruptions or closures of businesses 
caused by disputes and conflicts between franchisors and franchisees that often result 
in opportunistic acts such as the “at will” terminations of franchise contracts, 
encroachment upon franchisees territories, use of RPM and so on.  
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Having established the link between certain clauses found in some franchise 
contracts and OO, aspirant franchisees can use the findings of this study as “screening 
devices” to help them arrive at informed decisions and choices when assessing and 
selecting potential franchisors.  
Similarly, existing franchisees may use the findings of this study as an “early 
warning system” to revisit their franchise contracts with the aim identifying potential 
hiccups and to re-adjust their behaviour and improving their relationship with their 
franchisors. 
In addition, franchisors should consider these findings to amend their franchise 
contracts to remove controversial and adversarial clauses and to replace them with 
franchisee-friendly franchise contracts as a marketing tool to attract potential 
franchisees and lenders by for example subjecting their franchise contracts to the “OO 
test” suggested by hypotheses 1 to 3.  
In addition, the integrated use of the constructs of growth, competitiveness, and 
survival of franchise systems in the same study as proxies for measuring performance 
represents a significant contribution to knowledge where most previous studies have 
used financial criteria which require the use of financial information which is not 
readily accessible to researchers as most franchised businesses are small businesses 
and privately owned.  
Arguably, this study’s approach offers practical and objective performance 
measures into the franchising equation for testing the opportunism-performance 
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hypothesis which should help inform the decisions of key stakeholders such as 
franchisors, franchisees, lenders and the authorities.  
On the other hand, applying Porter’s (1985) generic competitive strategies to the 
franchise relationship within the study’s TCE - RET framework represents another 
academic contribution which is likely to re-energize franchisors into re-sharpening 
and re-focusing their strategies around the need to design franchise contracts as a tool 
for achieving the growth, competitiveness and survival of their franchise systems.  
As such franchise contracts that embrace the RET principles and emphasise trust, 
teamwork and cooperation within the franchise relationship have the potential to 
minimize disputes and conflicts and thereby reduce transactions costs of running a 
franchised business. 
Similarly, the findings of this study should provide helpful information to 
various franchising role players such as franchisors, franchisees, lenders, lawyers, and 
policy makers in advising their clients and making various business and policy 
decisions.  
For instance, a lender may use the findings of this study to assess a franchise 
contract with the view to determining the level of various forms of business and 
financial risks, that is, legal, regulatory, and failure risks involved in providing 
funding to a prospective franchisee who wants to buy a particular franchise.  
Furthermore, lawmakers may do the same in deciding whether to initiate, 
recommend or support adverse action against particular franchise systems or the 
industry as a whole following complaints or reports of malpractice as any judicial or 
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regulatory action taken against the industry undermines the confidence of the market 
and the investment community on the country. 
Therefore, this study sensitises franchisors to the need to distance their franchise 
contracts and franchise systems from OO and OA to avoid reputational damage to 
their franchise systems and financial losses that may result from any negative 
publicity which may be generated by media reports, public hearings and court cases.  
As a result, potential and existing franchisees may use the findings of this study 
to assess and possibly avoid entering or remaining within franchise systems with 
opportunistic tendencies which may jeopardise their investments in the franchise 
relationship through pre-mature termination of their franchise contracts.  
Similarly, these findings should also help franchisors to minimise their risk of 
making incorrect decisions of appointing wrong franchisees as multi-unit franchisees 
and reducing the transactions costs involved in monitoring the compliance of such 
franchisees with franchise rules and regulations as well as resolving disputes with 
such franchisees. 
10.3.3 Policy contributions 
Most significantly, as part of the researcher’s “live and let live” philosophy, the 
findings of this study will hopefully help the franchising community that is, 
franchisors, franchisees, lawyers, regulators law makers and so on, to align their 
franchise contracts and conduct to the Competition Act, CPA and the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa.  
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For instance, the application of the termination clause virtually “at will” clauses 
that is found nearly in all franchise contracts needs to be reconciled with section 22 of 
constitution which guarantees franchisees the right to choose and practice a trade, 
occupation or profession of his or her choice without any interference.  
Similarly, franchisors need to align their franchise contracts and practices with a 
number of legal principles such as good cause, good faith, fair dealing, reasonable 
expectations, and conscionability contained in sections 48 and 52 of the CPA for use in 
conducting the franchise relationship with their franchisees.  
In addition, the introduction of compulsory arbitration and mediation in 
franchise contracts by franchisors could signal an anti-OO strategy and a desire to 
resolve disputes cheaply and amicably.  
At a policy making level, the recommends establishment of institutional capacity 
in the form of independent and statutory institutions such as Franchise 
Ombudsperson with statutory powers similar to those of Pensions Ombudsperson, 
independent franchisee associations to replace undemocratic franchisor-appointed 
franchisee councils and operating along the lines of the bargaining councils, and the 
CCMA’s and bodies such as law societies, medical and nursing councils that must be 
used to resolve franchising disputes quickly, cheaply and amicably.  
Furthermore, the study lays a foundation for legislators and regulators to 
consider initiating public debates and consultations that may culminate in the passing 
of specific franchise legislation along the lines of the Robison-Patman and the 
Sherman Act in the USA which will provide more space for the application of legal 
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principles such as the good faith, fair dealing, reasonable expectations, conscionability 
and so on in the interpretation of franchise contracts and the conducting of the 
franchise relationship.  
In addition, the study recommends the aggressive promotion of BBBEE 
initiatives such as a Franchising Charter established in a consultative and transparent 
process as was done in the banking, building and construction and mining sectors 
and others which should spell out details of the industry’s transformation 
programmes aimed at bringing the previously marginalised section of the population 
into the industry. 
Such a Franchise Charter can be expected not only to introduce much-needed 
transformation in the sector, but will also contribute to the growth, competitiveness 
and survival of franchise systems through an anticipated increase and retention of 
franchisees and franchisors from the hitherto under-represented communities. 
Similarly, a Franchisee’s Rights Charter should be drawn up in conjunction with 
franchisees or independent franchisee associations to protect the rights of franchisees 
and to facilitate the laying and resolution of complaints against their franchisors. 
These processes are in line with the use of clans (Ouchi, 1980), psychological 
contracts (Schein, 1982) and embedding franchise contracts in social relations 
(Granovettor, 1985) as governance mechanisms in franchising by ensuring 
socialisation of the relationships.  
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 Recommendations for further study 
This study recommends further investigation by future researchers of a number 
of some important aspects of the franchise relationship.  
To start with, given the legislative and regulatory measures primarily arising 
from the implementation of the provisions of the Bill of Rights enshrined in the 
Constitution Act, the CPA and the Competition Act that have an impact on the 
franchising sector, mention can be made of the need for future studies to examine the 
effect of these new measures on the strategies and activities of franchisors and 
franchisees in this country.  
To this end, studies may need to determine the extent to which the new 
legislative and regulatory framework boosts or impedes the growth, competitiveness, 
and survival of franchise systems in this country and beyond its borders as some 
states in the US experienced a decline in franchising after the passing of the so-called 
anti-termination laws as franchisors relocated to other states that did not have those 
laws (Mathewson and Winter, 1985; Woker, 2012).  
However, as South Africa is a unitary and not a federal state, the laws of the 
country apply in every part within its borders with the result that franchisors that 
may be unhappy with the new laws and its regulations may not be able to continue 
with their malpractices. 
Therefore, future studies must assess the level of compliance with the new laws 
and regulations and the possible effects of such compliance on the growth, 
competitiveness, and survival of franchise systems in this country and beyond.  
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For instance, to the extent that franchisors decide to comply with the laws, 
studies may report an upsurge in franchising in this country because of entrepreneurs 
and investors feeling protected under the new legal dispensation.  
It may be important to determine whether the new legislative and regulatory 
environment could have led to a decline in franchising in this country due to some 
disgruntled franchisors having sought opportunities in the neighbouring countries in 
the region and beyond where such laws may not exist given the low tolerance for 
human rights in those countries political systems.  
This may possibly suggest that future studies may also need to investigate the 
status of franchising in the rest of Africa, especially the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) countries such as Angola, Zambia, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, and other regions.  
Similarly, in light of the recent decision by McDonalds to sell its master franchise 
licence to a South African businessperson after investing several million dollars nearly 
a decade ago, future studies may need to examine the impact of the new regulations 
on foreign direct investment by overseas franchisors into the country.  
The sell-off by McDonalds suggests that this leading and global company will 
not invest any of its own money in this country in the near future which raises the 
disconcerting possibility that other major global franchisors could emulate its 
example and disinvest or refrain from committing to new not investments in this 
country.  
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Another issue requiring investigation is the question of security of tenure for 
franchisees in light of the terminations and expiry clauses found in most franchise 
contracts which tend to favour franchisors which may encourage retaliatory 
opportunism among franchisees with the result it may be vitally necessary to 
investigate the effect of “evergreen” or everlasting franchise contracts on 
opportunism especially among franchisees. 
Within the context of the CPA, it may be unfair and unconscionable to offer 
shorter contract terms to franchisees making huge investments in expensive and 
highly specific physical and intellectual assets tied to a particular franchise system for 
short periods within which the franchisees may not be able to recoup their 
investments.  
In this vein, future studies may need to investigate the possible use and effect of 
some of the principles of the Marriage Act providing for the division of the joint 
marital estate or financial and material support between the spouses at the end of a 
marriage which may be adopted to regulate the termination of the franchise 
relationship to ease the economic hardships that often befall franchisees through the 
removal of the expiry and restraint of trade clauses from franchise contracts. 
On the other hand, as proposed by Lawrence and Kauffman (2011), future 
studies may also need to investigate the effect of the use of independent franchise 
associations within franchise systems to try to attenuate the incidence of opportunism 
among franchisors and franchisees as such bodies may develop norms and values 
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agreed upon between the parties as the “rules of engagement” which unlike most 
existing franchise contracts, will not be imposed on franchisees by franchisors.  
Lastly, in light of the findings of this study especially on the relationship between 
structural, contextual and strategic factors and the growth, competitiveness and 
survival of franchise systems, it may be useful to examine the relationship between 
EO and the growth, competitiveness and survival of franchise systems in greater 
detail.  
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Annexure A 
Cover letter addressed to Franchisors 
NT Makhubele  
P O Box 1335  
RUIMSIG  
1732 
 
By email 
 
The Chairman, Chief Executive or Franchise Director  
 
Dear Sir / Madam 
 
RE: COMPLETION OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
My name is Nathaniel Makhubele, a registered Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) degree student at the 
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, Wits Business School, that is situated at St Davids 
Road, Parktown, Johannesburg. 
 
As part of the requirements for the completion of the degree, I am required to conduct and complete a 
research project on a topic of my choice under the supervision of the university. I have decided to 
focus on various aspects of the franchise relationship with that I believe you are able to assist me. 
Accordingly, the researcher will greatly appreciate it if you could take time off your busy schedule to 
complete the attached questionnaire and return it to me at your earliest convenient time via the email 
link provided on the questionnaire. 
 
Kindly be assured that the researcher will treat information collected through this questionnaire as 
highly confidential with the result that the names of individuals, companies or brands participating in 
this project are not required. In addition, the researcher will use the obtained information only for the 
purposes of this project that on its successful completion, the university library will keep a copy of the 
final report at the above address where it will be available on loan to the public. 
 
I take this opportunity to thank you for your time.  
 
Yours faithfully 
 
 
 
Nathaniel Makhubele  
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Annexure B 
Questionnaire completed by Franchisors 
Part A 
Kindly place an “X” next to the clear boxes that best describe your franchise system  
Franchising 
sector 
Fast Food & 
Groceries 
Fuel & 
Petroleum 
Business 
Services 
Personal 
Services 
Home 
Care 
Services 
Year formed >30 yrs <25 yrs <20 yrs <15 yrs <10 yrs 
Year started 
franchising >30 yrs <25 yrs <20 yrs <15 yrs <10 yrs 
No. of 
franchised 
outlets 500 500 300 200 100 
No. of stores 
opened in the 
past 5 years 100 80 60 50 20 
No. of store 
closed in the 
past 5 years 35 30 25 20 15 
No. of stores 
bought back 
in the past 5 
years 25 20 15 10 5 
 Reason for 
store closures Terminated 
Non-
renewal 
Bad 
location Relocated 
Weak 
franchisee 
 
Part B 
Kindly encircle the number in the box that indicates the extent to that you agree or disagree with the 
following statements regarding the franchisor-franchisee relationship within your franchise system.  
 
Statement 
1 = Strongly agree  
7 = Strongly disagree 
1. It is good business practice for franchisors to give start-up financial 
assistance to some new franchisees 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Legislation is required to control the franchising industry 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. It is usually desirable for franchisors to enter into joint ventures with 
franchisees 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Franchisors derive no benefits from signing leases for premises occupied 
by their franchisees 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Franchisors believe that franchisees can and should influence important 
business decisions 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. A franchise contract granting favourable terms to franchisees is unlikely to 
provide a competitive advantage to the franchise system 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Because of franchising benefits, most independent retailers are inclined to 
convert their businesses into franchised outlets 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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8. Future profits play an insignificant role in ensuring that franchisees meet 
their contractual commitments 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. The government should not regulate the franchising industry 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. Most franchisees will drop quality standards whenever an opportunity 
avails itself 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. Franchisors often find it difficult to keep their franchisees happy and 
satisfied at all times   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. Most disgruntled franchisees are likely to seek or acquire additional 
outlets within the franchise system 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. Reduced levels of conflict within the franchise system have no effect on its 
operating and marketing costs 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. A good image and reputation is far more important for attracting new 
franchisees than a strong brand 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. Sometimes it is necessary for franchisors to buy back profitable stores from 
franchisees 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. Franchise contracts are terminated even in the event of franchisees 
committing minor breaches 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17. Franchisors have no need for strictly controlling the transfer or sale of 
franchised outlets 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18. Most franchise systems require higher levels of tension and conflict to 
achieve their goals 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
19. It is uncommon for franchisors to take back failing and non-performing 
outlets to operate them or for re-sale 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
20. Most franchisees are likely to renew their franchise contracts even if they 
are unhappy with the franchise system 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
21. Most franchise systems are not hugely dependent on franchisees for their 
success 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
22. The equipment that franchisees are required to purchase helps secure their 
commitment to the franchise system 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
23. Tough competition often drives franchisors into removing weak and 
incompetent franchisees from the franchise system  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
24. It is almost impractical for a franchise contract to encompass all aspects of 
the franchisor-franchisee relationship 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
25. Longer contract terms make it difficult for franchisors to deal with market 
changes   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
26. Disruptions within the franchise system rarely draw the attention of 
unaffected franchisees and the public 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
27. Ex-franchisees often succeed in competing unfairly with their erstwhile 
franchisors 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
28. Disputes between franchisors and franchisees are always  resolved 
through arbitration 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
29. Franchisees should be allowed to charge their own prices on all goods or 
products sold at their outlets 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
30. Store closures do not always harm the image and reputation of the 
franchise system 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
31. It is not a good idea for franchisors to share strategic information with 
franchisees 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
32. Litigation is considered to be unavoidable in most franchising disputes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
33. Franchisees are usually offered non-renewable fixed term contracts mostly 
due to the need to adapt to changing market conditions 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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34. Franchisees should be discouraged from sourcing supplies from non-
approved suppliers even if the quality and prices of such supplies is 
competitive 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
35. Granting non-exclusive trading areas to franchisees allows franchisors the 
flexibility to add new outlets in particular areas 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
36. The franchisor's business knowledge and expertise is always more 
important than the franchisees' knowledge of local market conditions 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Source: Developed for the study 
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Annexure C 
Franchisee sample matrix 
Sector Food and 
Restaurant 
Fuel and 
Petroleum 
Business 
Services 
Personal and 
Home Care  
Other 
Quota 1-5 1-5 1-5 1-5 1-5 
Age                
Race                
Gender                
Marital 
status 
               
Education                
Business 
Experience 
               
Franchising 
Experience 
               
Franchise 
Association 
membership 
               
Single or 
Multi-unit 
ownership 
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Annexure D 
Semi-structured franchisee interview statements  
Statement S T P R 
a) Head-office staff to franchisee ratio 
1. Head-office staff conduct few and infrequent inspection visits     
2. Inspectors usually spend adequate amounts of time during their visits      
3. Regular store visits help to improve outlet performances     
b) Incomplete contracts 
4. Franchise contracts form the foundation of the relationship between franchisors and 
franchisees     
5. Some aspects of the franchise relationship are not found in the franchise contract     
6. Franchise contracts protect the interests of both parties equally     
c) Multi-unit ownership 
7. Franchisors pay more respect to multi-unit franchisees than to single unit owners      
8. Multi-unit franchisees contribute more to the franchise system than single unit 
franchisees     
9. Multi-unit franchisees deserve more “favours” than single unit franchises     
d) Membership of Franchisee Associations 
10. Franchisors should allow and sponsor Franchisee Associations      
11. Franchisee Associations play a major role in promoting the interests of franchisees     
12. Most franchisees would like to join Franchisee Associations      
e) Lack of franchise regulation 
13. FASA should be granted legal powers to discipline errant franchisors and 
franchisees     
14. There is a need for stringent franchise-specific laws     
15. Franchising disputes should be handled by FASA only     
f) The last years of the franchise contract 
16. Franchise relationships usually do not change much over the years     
17. There is more stability and cohesion in established franchise systems than in new 
ones     
18. The last years of the franchise relationship are the most enjoyable     
g) Brand value 
19. A strong brand offers many advantages to franchisees     
20. Most franchisees prefer to be associated with a strong brand     
21. It is easier for franchisees to make money from a strong brand      
h) Geographic dispersion 
22. Most franchised outlets are situated far from the franchisor’s head-office      
23. It is better for a franchised outlet to be located far away from the franchisor’s head-
office     
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24. Franchised stores that are located near the franchisor’s head-office receive more 
inspections than usual      
i) Local area knowledge 
25. Franchisors are unable to dispense with the local market knowledge that franchisees 
possess      
26. Franchisees must use their local market knowledge to their own advantage     
27. Franchisees are not being adequately or fairly rewarded for their local market 
knowledge     
j) Opportunistic actions among franchisees 
28. Franchisees deserve higher returns than their normal business activities can provide     
29. It is too much to ask franchisees to comply with all franchise rules and regulations at 
all times     
30. Franchisees sometimes ignore some rules in order to maximize their returns      
k) Growth 
31. It is desirable and advantageous for franchisees to comply with franchise rules at all 
times      
32. Most franchisees aim at owning more units in future      
33. Franchisees play no part in the growth of the franchise system     
l) Competitiveness 
34. Brand building is not the responsibility of franchisees     
35. Most franchisees feel encouraged to provide ideas that may help to improve the 
franchise system     
36. Franchisees are getting fair value for the advertising fees they pay to their 
franchisors     
m) Survival 
37. Franchisees usually expect their franchise contracts to be extended or renewed 
beyond the initial period      
38. Disputes between franchisors and franchisees are unavoidable      
39. Stores closures and take-backs are helpful in  resolving some franchising disputes     
Developed for the study 
S = Score; T = Total; P = Percentage; R = Result 
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Annexure E 
Statistical reports 
The SAS System       
The CORR Procedure      
36 Variables V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10 V11 V12 V13 V14 V15 V16 V17 V18 V19 V20 V21 V22 V23 
V24 V25 V26 V27 V28 V29 V30 V31 V32 V33 V34 V35 V36  
Simple Statistics       
Variable N Mean Std Dev Sum Minimum Maximum Label 
V1 111           4.36            1.83  484           1.00            7.00  V1 
V2 111           4.07            2.18  452           1.00            7.00  V2 
V3 111           3.29            1.57  365           1.00            6.00  V3 
V4 111           2.60            1.22  289           1.00            7.00  V4 
V5 111           3.99            1.77  443           1.00            7.00  V5 
V6 111           3.84            1.44  426           1.00            6.00  V6 
V7 111           3.50            1.47  389           2.00            6.00  V7 
V8 111           3.85            1.90  427           1.00            7.00  V8 
V9 111           5.49            1.77  609           1.00            7.00  V9 
V10 111           3.13            1.39  347           1.00            6.00  V10 
V11 111           4.60            1.63  511           1.00            7.00  V11 
V12 111           4.60            1.58  511           2.00            7.00  V12 
V13 111           5.32            1.46  590           2.00            7.00  V13 
V14 111           5.63            1.72  625           1.00            7.00  V14 
V15 111           4.32            1.77  479           1.00            7.00  V15 
V16 111           5.19            1.53  576           2.00            7.00  V16 
V17 111           3.51            1.84  390           1.00            7.00  V17 
V18 111           4.68            1.70  519           1.00            7.00  V18 
V19 111           4.39            1.79  487           1.00            7.00  V19 
V20 111           5.00            1.36  555           1.00            7.00  V20 
V21 111           3.64            1.67  404           1.00            7.00  V21 
V22 111           3.44            1.40  382           1.00            7.00  V22 
V23 111           2.84            1.64  315           1.00            6.00  V23 
V24 111           4.29            1.62  476           2.00            7.00  V24 
V25 111           3.77            2.08  419           1.00            7.00  V25 
V26 111           4.50            1.70  500           2.00            7.00  V26 
V27 111           4.25            1.88  472           1.00            7.00  V27 
V28 111           4.14            1.48  460           1.00            7.00  V28 
V29 111           3.83            1.80  425           1.00            7.00  V29 
V30 111           4.14            1.84  460           1.00            7.00  V30 
V31 111           5.09            1.84  565           1.00            7.00  V31 
V32 111           3.63            1.97  403           1.00            7.00  V32 
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Cronbach Coefficient Alpha      
Variables Alpha       
Raw           0.70        
Standardized           0.71        
        
Cronbach Coefficient Alpha with Deleted Variable    
 Raw Variables Standardized Variables Label   
Variable Correlation Alpha Correlation Alpha    
 with Total  with Total     
V1           0.38            0.69            0.40            0.69  V1   
V2           0.39            0.68            0.38            0.70  V2   
V3           0.44            0.68            0.46            0.69  V3   
V4           0.36            0.69            0.38            0.70  V4   
V5          -0.18            0.72           -0.16            0.73  V5   
V6           0.17            0.70            0.18            0.71  V6   
V7           0.50            0.68            0.52            0.69  V7   
V8           0.30            0.69            0.31            0.70  V8   
V9           0.42            0.68            0.39            0.70  V9   
V10           0.10            0.70            0.10            0.71  V10   
V11           0.61            0.67            0.63            0.68  V11   
V12           0.66            0.67            0.67            0.68  V12   
V13           0.24            0.70            0.26            0.70  V13   
V14           0.61            0.67            0.60            0.68  V14   
V15           0.31            0.69            0.33            0.70  V15   
V16           0.62            0.67            0.62            0.68  V16   
V17          -0.11            0.72           -0.10            0.72  V17   
V18           0.29            0.69            0.28            0.70  V18   
V19           0.36            0.69            0.38            0.70  V19   
V20           0.27            0.70            0.27            0.70  V20   
V21          -0.11            0.72           -0.11            0.72  V21   
V22           0.32            0.69            0.31            0.70  V22   
V23          -0.21            0.72           -0.21            0.73  V23   
V24           0.02            0.71            0.03            0.72  V24   
V25           0.30            0.69            0.29            0.70  V25   
V26           0.13            0.70            0.13            0.71  V26   
V27           0.45            0.68            0.43            0.69  V27   
V28           0.03            0.71            0.05            0.72  V28   
V29           0.20            0.70            0.17            0.71  V29   
V30           0.37            0.69            0.33            0.70  V30   
V31          -0.05            0.72           -0.06            0.72  V31   
V32           0.21            0.70            0.18            0.71  V32   
V33           0.03            0.71            0.03            0.72  V33   
V34           0.01            0.71            0.01            0.72  V34   
V35          -0.45            0.74           -0.44            0.74  V35   
V36          -0.14            0.72           -0.15            0.73  V36   
528 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
DATA=RAW OUTCOME=OA REG
The REG Procedure
Model: MODEL1
Dependent Variable: OA
Number of Observations Read 111
Number of Observations Used 111
Sum of Mean
Squares Square
Model 4            61.51         15.38     14.34  <.0001 
Error 106         113.65           1.07 
Corrected Total 110         175.16 
Root MSE            1.04 R-Square           0.35 
Dependent Mean            4.59 Adj R-Sq           0.33 
Coeff Var         22.58 
Parameter Standard Standardized Variance
Estimate Error Estimate Inflation
Intercept 1              0.38           0.84        0.45       0.65                        -                 -   
Structural factors 1              0.11           0.09        1.18       0.24                   0.10          1.13 
Contextual factors 1              0.28           0.07        3.84       0.00                   0.32          1.17 
Strategic factors 1              0.61           0.10        6.21  <.0001                   0.49          1.01 
OO 1              0.06           0.11        0.57       0.57                   0.05          1.14 
Variable DF t Value Pr > |t|
Analysis of Variance
Source DF F Value Pr > F
Parameter Estimates
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DATA=RAW OUTCOME=OA REG 
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DATA=FACTORS OUTCOME=OA REG
The REG Procedure
Model: MODEL1
Dependent Variable: OA
Number of Observations Read 111
Number of Observations Used 111
Sum of Mean
Squares Square
Model 4            17.13           4.28     10.64  <.0001 
Error 106            42.67           0.40 
Corrected Total 110            59.80 
Root MSE            0.63 R-Square           0.29 
Dependent Mean -0.00         Adj R-Sq           0.26 
Coeff Var -1.24E+18
Parameter Standard Standardized Variance
Estimate Error Estimate Inflation
Intercept 1 -0.00                     0.06 -              1.00                        -                 -   
Structural factors 1              0.02           0.08        0.28       0.78                   0.03          1.25 
Contextual factors 1              0.28           0.08        3.62       0.00                   0.34          1.28 
Strategic factors 1              0.34           0.09        3.84       0.00                   0.34          1.15 
OO 1              0.27           0.12        2.29       0.02                   0.21          1.29 
Parameter Estimates
Variable DF t Value Pr > |t|
Analysis of Variance
Source DF F Value Pr > F
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DATA=FACTORS 
OUTCOME=GROWTH REG
The REG Procedure
Model: MODEL1
Dependent Variable: GROWTH
Number of Observations Read 111
Number of Observations Used 111
Sum of Mean
Squares Square
Model 3            48.29         16.10     50.89 <.0001
Error 107            33.84           0.32 
Corrected Total 110            82.13 
Root MSE           0.56 R-Square           0.59 
Dependent Mean 0.00          Adj R-Sq           0.58 
Coeff Var 3.99E+17
Parameter Standard Standardized Variance
Estimate Error Estimate Inflation
Intercept 1 0.00                       0.05            -         1.00                        -                 -   
Structural factors 1 -0.33                     0.07 -5.05      <.0001 -0.33                          1.10 
Contextual factors 1              0.47           0.06        7.21  <.0001                   0.48          1.14 
Strategic factors 1              0.64           0.08        8.49  <.0001                   0.54          1.04 
Parameter Estimates
Variable DF t Value Pr > |t|
Analysis of Variance
Source DF F Value Pr > F
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538 
DATA=FACTORS OUTCOME=OA REG 
 
The REG Procedure 
Model: MODEL1 
Dependent Variable: OA  
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DATA=RAW OUTCOME=OO REG 
 
The REG Procedure 
Model: MODEL1 
Dependent Variable: OO  
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DATA=FACTORS OUTCOME=OO REG 
 
The REG Procedure 
Model: MODEL1 
Dependent Variable: OO  
 
 
543 
 
 
 
  
544 
  
545 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
546 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
547 
 
 
 
 
  
DATA=FACTORS 
OUTCOME=GROWTH REG
The REG Procedure
Model: MODEL1
Dependent Variable: GROWTH
Number of Observations Read 111
Number of Observations Used 111
Sum of Mean
Squares Square
Model 3            48.29         16.10     50.89 <.0001
Error 107            33.84           0.32 
Corrected Total 110            82.13 
Root MSE           0.56 R-Square           0.59 
Dependent Mean 0.00          Adj R-Sq           0.58 
Coeff Var 3.99E+17
Parameter Standard Standardized Variance
Estimate Error Estimate Inflation
Intercept 1 0.00                       0.05            -         1.00                        -                 -   
Structural factors 1 -0.33                     0.07 -5.05      <.0001 -0.33                          1.10 
Contextual factors 1              0.47           0.06        7.21  <.0001                   0.48          1.14 
Strategic factors 1              0.64           0.08        8.49  <.0001                   0.54          1.04 
Parameter Estimates
Variable DF t Value Pr > |t|
Analysis of Variance
Source DF F Value Pr > F
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DATA=RAW 
OUTCOME=Competitiveness REG
The REG Procedure
Model: MODEL1
Dependent Variable: Competitiveness
Number of Observations Read 111
Number of Observations Used 111
Sum of Mean
Squares Square
Model 3            61.06         20.35     33.29 <.0001
Error 107            65.41           0.61 
Corrected Total 110         126.46 
Root MSE           0.78 R-Square           0.48 
Dependent Mean           4.32 Adj R-Sq           0.47 
Coeff Var         18.12 
Parameter Standard Standardized Variance
Estimate Error Estimate Inflation
Intercept 1              4.80           0.49        9.71  <.0001                        -                 -   
Structural factors 1 -0.52                     0.07 -7.76      <.0001 -0.57                          1.10 
Contextual factors 1              0.08           0.05        1.56       0.12                   0.11          1.09 
Strategic factors 1              0.40           0.07        5.37  <.0001                   0.38          1.01 
Source DF F Value Pr > F
Parameter Estimates
Variable DF t Value Pr > |t|
Analysis of Variance
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DATA=FACTORS 
OUTCOME=Competitiveness REG
The REG Procedure
Model: MODEL1
Dependent Variable: Competitiveness
Number of Observations Read 111
Number of Observations Used 111
Sum of Mean
Squares Square
Model 3            38.61         12.87     33.91  <.0001 
Error 107            40.62           0.38 
Corrected Total 110            79.23 
Root MSE           0.62 R-Square           0.49 
Dependent Mean 0.00          Adj R-Sq           0.47 
Coeff Var 5.13E+17
Parameter Standard Standardized Variance
Estimate Error Estimate Inflation
Intercept 1 0.00                       0.06            -         1.00                        -                 -   
Structural factors 1 -0.44                     0.07 -6.10      <.0001 -0.44                          1.10 
Contextual factors 1              0.37           0.07        5.16  <.0001                   0.38          1.14 
Strategic factors 1              0.42           0.08        5.00  <.0001                   0.35          1.04 
Variable DF t Value Pr > |t|
Analysis of Variance
Source DF F Value Pr > F
Parameter Estimates
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DATA=RAW OUTCOME=SURVIVAL 
REG
The REG Procedure
Model: MODEL1
Dependent Variable: SURVIVAL
Number of Observations Read 111
Number of Observations Used 111
Sum of Mean
Squares Square
Model                 3            55.04         18.35     14.24  <.0001 
Error            107         137.87           1.29 
Corrected Total            110         192.91 
Root MSE           1.14 R-Square           0.29 
Dependent Mean           4.40 Adj R-Sq           0.27 
Coeff Var         25.78 
Parameter Standard Standardized Variance
Estimate Error Estimate Inflation
Intercept 1              1.54           0.72        2.15       0.03                        -                 -   
Structural factors 1              0.00           0.10        0.05       0.96                   0.00          1.10 
Contextual factors 1              0.47           0.08        6.04  <.0001                   0.52          1.09 
Strategic factors 1              0.16           0.11        1.46       0.15                   0.12          1.01 
Parameter Estimates
Variable DF t Value Pr > |t|
Analysis of Variance
Source DF F Value Pr > F
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DATA=FACTORS 
OUTCOME=SURVIVAL REG
The REG Procedure
Model: MODEL1
Dependent Variable: SURVIVAL
Number of Observations Read 111
Number of Observations Used 111
Sum of Mean
Squares Square
Model 3            33.93         11.31 31.94 <.0001
Error 107            37.89           0.35 
Corrected Total 110            71.81 
Root MSE           0.60 R-Square           0.47 
Dependent Mean 0.00          Adj R-Sq           0.46 
Coeff Var 7.83E+17
Parameter Standard Standardized Variance
Estimate Error Estimate Inflation
Intercept 1 0.00             0.06 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Structural factors 1 -0.15           0.07 -2.09 0.04 -0.15 1.10
Contextual factors 1              0.59 0.07 8.55 <.0001 0.64 1.14
Strategic factors 1              0.19 0.08 2.33 0.02 0.17 1.04
Source DF F Value Pr > F
Parameter Estimates
Variable DF t Value Pr > |t|
Analysis of Variance
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Canonical Correlation  
The CANCORR Procedure 
Canonical Correlation Analysis 
 
  
Canonical 
Correlation   
Squared 
Canonical 
Correlation 
Eigenvalues of Inv(E)*H 
= CanRsq/(1-CanRsq) Test of H0: The canonical correlations in the current row and all that follow are zero 
Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Likelihood 
Ratio 
Approximate 
F Value Num DF Den DF Pr > F 
1 0.601565   0.361880 0.5671 0.3088 0.5460 0.5460 0.41802154 8.96 12 275.45 <.0001 
2 0.453080   0.205282 0.2583 0.0452 0.2487 0.7948 0.65508347 8.24 6 210 <.0001 
3 0.419170   0.175704 0.2132   0.2052 1.0000 0.82429644 11.30 2 106 <.0001 
 
Multivariate Statistics and F Approximations 
S=3 M=0 N=51 
Statistic Value F Value Num DF Den DF Pr > F 
Wilks' Lambda 0.41802154 8.96 12 275.45 <.0001 
Pillai's Trace 0.74286575 8.72 12 318 <.0001 
Hotelling-Lawley Trace 1.03856786 8.93 12 177.73 <.0001 
Roy's Greatest Root 0.56710457 15.03 4 106 <.0001 
NOTE: F Statistic for Roy's Greatest Root is an upper bound. 
 
 
 
 
  
Standardized Canonical Coefficients 
for the Structural factors 
  Structural factors1 Structural factors2 Structural factors3 
V8 0.5285 0.1963 -0.2602 
V22 0.0553 -0.9569 0.3952 
V24 0.5901 -0.3021 -0.5039 
V31 0.9628 0.4052 0.4559 
 
 
Standardized Canonical Coefficients 
for the Opportunistic orientations 
  Opportunistic orientations1 Opportunistic orientations2 Opportunistic orientations3 
V25 0.0246 0.2345 1.0696 
V28 0.2114 1.0872 0.1097 
V35 -0.9050 0.6141 0.3150 
 
 
 
 
Correlations Between the Structural 
factors and Their Canonical Variables 
  Structural factors1 Structural factors2 Structural factors3 
V8 0.2608 -0.2436 -0.5416 
V22 0.1411 -0.8721 0.4216 
V24 0.5010 -0.2521 -0.7250 
V31 0.5803 0.3383 0.7175 
 
Correlations Between the Opportunistic orientations and Their Canonical Variables 
  Opportunistic orientations1 Opportunistic orientations2 Opportunistic orientations3 
V25 0.2373 -0.1431 0.9608 
V28 0.5029 0.8418 -0.1961 
V35 -0.9810 0.1928 -0.0197 
 
Correlations Between the Opportunistic orientations and the Canonical Variables of the Structural factors 
  Structural factors1 Structural factors2 Structural factors3 
V25 0.1427 -0.0648 0.4028 
V28 0.3025 0.3814 -0.0822 
V35 -0.5902 0.0873 -0.0083 
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Canonical Correlation  
The CANCORR Procedure 
Canonical Correlation Analysis 
 
  
Canonical 
Correlation   
Squared 
Canonical 
Correlation 
Eigenvalues of Inv(E)*H 
= CanRsq/(1-CanRsq) 
Test of H0: The canonical correlations in the current row and 
all that follow are zero 
Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Likelihood 
Ratio 
Approximate 
F Value Num DF Den DF Pr > F 
1 0.533315   0.284425 0.3975 0.2430 0.7084 0.7084 0.61421078 6.30 9 255.69 <.0001 
2 0.365816   0.133822 0.1545 0.1454 0.2753 0.9837 0.85834556 4.21 4 212 0.0027 
3 0.095095   0.009043 0.0091   0.0163 1.0000 0.99095691 0.98 1 107 0.3253 
 
Multivariate Statistics and F Approximations 
S=3 M=-0.5 N=51.5 
Statistic Value F Value Num DF Den DF Pr > F 
Wilks' Lambda 0.61421078 6.30 9 255.69 <.0001 
Pillai's Trace 0.42728942 5.92 9 321 <.0001 
Hotelling-Lawley Trace 0.56109928 6.50 9 161.85 <.0001 
Roy's Greatest Root 0.39747721 14.18 3 107 <.0001 
NOTE: F Statistic for Roy's Greatest Root is an upper bound. 
 
 
 
 
 
Standardized Canonical Coefficients 
for the Contextual factors 
  Contextual factors1 Contextual factors2 Contextual factors3 
V2 0.7336 0.7513 -0.6071 
V9 0.3558 -0.4035 1.0743 
V23 -0.0694 0.9147 0.5748 
 
Standardized Canonical Coefficients 
for the Opportunistic orientations 
  Opportunistic orientations 1 Opportunistic orientations2 Opportunistic orientations3 
V16 0.8380 -0.1352 0.5696 
V25 0.1499 0.9475 -0.3771 
V29 0.4335 -0.5094 -0.7549 
 
 
 
 
 
Canonical Correlation  
The CANCORR Procedure 
Canonical Structure 
 
Correlations Between the Contextual 
factors and Their Canonical Variables 
  Contextual factors1 Contextual factors2 Contextual factors3 
V2 0.9480 0.2178 -0.2321 
V9 0.7705 -0.2962 0.5644 
V23 -0.4388 0.7837 0.4396 
 
Correlations Between the Opportunistic orientations and Their Canonical Variables 
  Opportunistic orientations 1 Opportunistic orientations 2 Opportunistic orientations 3 
V16 0.8800 0.0488 0.4724 
V25 0.3804 0.8531 -0.3572 
V29 0.4740 -0.3893 -0.7898 
 
Correlations Between the Contextual factors and the Canonical Variables of the Opportunistic orientations 
  Opportunistic orientations 1 Opportunistic orientations 2 Opportunistic orientations 3 
V2 0.5056 0.0797 -0.0221 
V9 0.4109 -0.1084 0.0537 
V23 -0.2340 0.2867 0.0418 
 
Correlations Between the Opportunistic orientations and the Canonical Variables of the Contextual factors 
  Contextual factors1 Contextual factors2 Contextual factors3 
V16 0.4693 0.0178 0.0449 
V25 0.2029 0.3121 -0.0340 
V29 0.2528 -0.1424 -0.0751 
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Canonical Correlation  
The CANCORR Procedure 
Canonical Correlation Analysis 
 
  
Canonical 
Correlation   
Squared 
Canonical 
Correlation 
Eigenvalues of Inv(E)*H 
= CanRsq/(1-CanRsq) 
Test of H0: The canonical correlations in the current row and 
all that follow are zero 
Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Likelihood 
Ratio 
Approximate 
F Value Num DF Den DF Pr > F 
1 0.533315   0.284425 0.3975 0.2430 0.7084 0.7084 0.61421078 6.30 9 255.69 <.0001 
2 0.365816   0.133822 0.1545 0.1454 0.2753 0.9837 0.85834556 4.21 4 212 0.0027 
3 0.095095   0.009043 0.0091   0.0163 1.0000 0.99095691 0.98 1 107 0.3253 
 
Multivariate Statistics and F Approximations 
S=3 M=-0.5 N=51.5 
Statistic Value F Value Num DF Den DF Pr > F 
Wilks' Lambda 0.61421078 6.30 9 255.69 <.0001 
Pillai's Trace 0.42728942 5.92 9 321 <.0001 
Hotelling-Lawley Trace 0.56109928 6.50 9 161.85 <.0001 
Roy's Greatest Root 0.39747721 14.18 3 107 <.0001 
NOTE: F Statistic for Roy's Greatest Root is an upper bound. 
 
 
 
 
 
Standardized Canonical Coefficients 
for the Contextual factors 
  Contextual factors1 Contextual factors2 Contextual factors3 
V2 0.7336 0.7513 -0.6071 
V9 0.3558 -0.4035 1.0743 
V23 -0.0694 0.9147 0.5748 
 
Standardized Canonical Coefficients 
for the Opportunistic orientations 
  Opportunistic orientations 1 Opportunistic orientations2 Opportunistic orientations3 
V16 0.8380 -0.1352 0.5696 
V25 0.1499 0.9475 -0.3771 
V29 0.4335 -0.5094 -0.7549 
 
 
 
 
 
Canonical Correlation  
The CANCORR Procedure 
Canonical Structure 
 
Correlations Between the Contextual 
factors and Their Canonical Variables 
  Contextual factors1 Contextual factors2 Contextual factors3 
V2 0.9480 0.2178 -0.2321 
V9 0.7705 -0.2962 0.5644 
V23 -0.4388 0.7837 0.4396 
 
Correlations Between the Opportunistic orientations and Their Canonical Variables 
  Opportunistic orientations 1 Opportunistic orientations 2 Opportunistic orientations 3 
V16 0.8800 0.0488 0.4724 
V25 0.3804 0.8531 -0.3572 
V29 0.4740 -0.3893 -0.7898 
 
Correlations Between the Contextual factors and the Canonical Variables of the Opportunistic orientations 
  Opportunistic orientations 1 Opportunistic orientations 2 Opportunistic orientations 3 
V2 0.5056 0.0797 -0.0221 
V9 0.4109 -0.1084 0.0537 
V23 -0.2340 0.2867 0.0418 
 
Correlations Between the Opportunistic orientations and the Canonical Variables of the Contextual factors 
  Contextual factors1 Contextual factors2 Contextual factors3 
V16 0.4693 0.0178 0.0449 
V25 0.2029 0.3121 -0.0340 
V29 0.2528 -0.1424 -0.0751 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Canonical Correlation  
Plots  
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Canonical Correlation  
The CANCORR Procedure 
Canonical Correlation Analysis 
 
  
Canonical 
Correlation   
Squared 
Canonical 
Correlation 
Eigenvalues of Inv(E)*H 
= CanRsq/(1-CanRsq) 
Test of H0: The canonical correlations in the current row and a
ll that follow are zero 
Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Likelihood 
Ratio 
Approximate 
F Value Num DF Den DF Pr > F 
1 0.490692   0.240779 0.3171 0.1892 0.7108 0.7108 0.67235715 5.03 9 255.69 <.0001 
2 0.336798   0.113433 0.1279 0.1268 0.2868 0.9975 0.88558812 3.32 4 212 0.0116 
3 0.033230   0.001104 0.0011   0.0025 1.0000 0.99889575 0.12 1 107 0.7316 
 
Multivariate Statistics and F Approximations 
S=3 M=-0.5 N=51.5 
Statistic Value F Value Num DF Den DF Pr > F 
Wilks' Lambda 0.67235715 5.03 9 255.69 <.0001 
Pillai's Trace 0.35531608 4.79 9 321 <.0001 
Hotelling-Lawley Trace 0.44619110 5.17 9 161.85 <.0001 
Roy's Greatest Root 0.31713944 11.31 3 107 <.0001 
NOTE: F Statistic for Roy's Greatest Root is an upper bound. 
 
 
 
 
Canonical Structure 
 
Correlations Between the Strategic 
factors and Their Canonical Variables 
  Strategic factors1 Strategic factors2 Strategic factors3 
V1 0.9486 -0.1190 0.2933 
V3 0.4888 0.6567 -0.5743 
V29 -0.1284 0.6828 0.7193 
 
 
Correlations Between the Opportunistic orientations and Their Canonical Variables 
  Opportunistic orientations1 Opportunistic orientations2 Opportunistic orientations3 
V16 0.7043 0.3654 -0.6087 
V25 0.4834 0.6369 0.6006 
V28 0.6183 -0.7857 0.0198 
 
Correlations Between the Strategic factors and the Canonical Variables of the Opportunistic orientations 
  Opportunistic orientations1 Opportunistic orientations2 Opportunistic orientations3 
V1 0.4655 -0.0401 0.0097 
V3 0.2398 0.2212 -0.0191 
V29 -0.0630 0.2300 0.0239 
 
Correlations Between the Opportunistic orientations and the Canonical Variables of the Strategic factors 
  Strategic factors1 Strategic factors2 Strategic factors3 
V16 0.3456 0.1231 -0.0202 
V25 0.2372 0.2145 0.0200 
V28 0.3034 -0.2646 0.0007 
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Canonical Correlation  
The CANCORR Procedure 
Canonical Correlation Analysis 
 
  
Canonical 
Correlation   
Squared 
Canonical 
Correlation 
Eigenvalues of Inv(E)*H 
= CanRsq/(1-CanRsq) 
Test of H0: The canonical correlations in the current row and 
all that follow are zero 
Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Likelihood 
Ratio 
Approximate 
F Value Num DF Den DF Pr > F 
1 0.524000   0.274576 0.3785 0.2860 0.8021 0.8021 0.66340209 5.22 9 255.69 <.0001 
2 0.290921   0.084635 0.0925 0.0915 0.1959 0.9980 0.91450198 2.42 4 212 0.0494 
3 0.030701   0.000943 0.0009   0.0020 1.0000 0.99905746 0.10 1 107 0.7513 
 
Multivariate Statistics and F Approximations 
S=3 M=-0.5 N=51.5 
Statistic Value F Value Num DF Den DF Pr > F 
Wilks' Lambda 0.66340209 5.22 9 255.69 <.0001 
Pillai's Trace 0.36015334 4.87 9 321 <.0001 
Hotelling-Lawley Trace 0.47190742 5.47 9 161.85 <.0001 
Roy's Greatest Root 0.37850330 13.50 3 107 <.0001 
NOTE: F Statistic for Roy's Greatest Root is an upper bound. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standardized Canonical Coefficients 
for the Opportunistic orientations 
  Opportunistic orientations1 Opportunistic orientations2 Opportunistic orientations3 
V25 0.2001 1.0710 -0.1122 
V28 -0.4205 0.5240 0.8873 
V35 0.7889 0.3581 0.7380 
 
 
Standardized Canonical Coefficients 
for the Opportunistic actions 
  Opportunistic actions1 Opportunistic actions2 Opportunistic actions3 
V15 0.5694 0.4947 0.6712 
V17 0.3756 0.6328 -0.6816 
V20 -0.8091 0.5970 0.0671 
 
 
 
 
Canonical Structure 
 
Correlations Between the Opportunistic orientations and Their Canonical Variables 
  Opportunistic orientations1 Opportunistic orientations2 Opportunistic orientations3 
V25 0.0595 0.8716 -0.4865 
V28 -0.7166 0.2038 0.6671 
V35 0.8706 -0.1125 0.4790 
 
Correlations Between the Opportunistic 
actions and Their Canonical Variables 
  Opportunistic actions1 Opportunistic actions2 Opportunistic actions3 
V15 0.4447 0.5208 0.7287 
V17 0.3638 0.5753 -0.7326 
V20 -0.7541 0.6336 0.1727 
 
Correlations Between the Opportunistic orientations and the Canonical Variables of the Opportunistic actions 
  Opportunistic actions1 Opportunistic actions2 Opportunistic actions3 
V25 0.0312 0.2536 -0.0149 
V28 -0.3755 0.0593 0.0205 
V35 0.4562 -0.0327 0.0147 
 
Correlations Between the Opportunistic actions and the Canonical Variables of the Opportunistic orientations 
  Opportunistic orientations1 Opportunistic orientations2 Opportunistic orientations3 
V15 0.2330 0.1515 0.0224 
V17 0.1906 0.1674 -0.0225 
V20 -0.3952 0.1843 0.0053 
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Canonical Correlation  
The CANCORR Procedure 
Canonical Correlation Analysis 
 
  
Canonical 
Correlation 
Squared 
Canonical 
Correlation 
Eigenvalues of Inv(E)*H 
= CanRsq/(1-CanRsq) 
Test of H0: The canonical correlations in the current row and 
all that follow are zero 
Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Likelihood 
Ratio 
Approximate 
F Value Num DF Den DF Pr > F 
1 0.586422 0.343890 0.5241 0.4819 0.9007 0.9007 0.61986565 6.17 9 255.69 <.0001 
2 0.201386 0.040557 0.0423 0.0267 0.0726 0.9733 0.94475918 1.53 4 212 0.1953 
3 0.123713 0.015305 0.0155   0.0267 1.0000 0.98469497 1.66 1 107 0.2000 
 
Multivariate Statistics and F Approximations 
S=3 M=-0.5 N=51.5 
Statistic Value F Value Num DF Den DF Pr > F 
Wilks' Lambda 0.61986565 6.17 9 255.69 <.0001 
Pillai's Trace 0.39975185 5.48 9 321 <.0001 
Hotelling-Lawley Trace 0.58194919 6.74 9 161.85 <.0001 
Roy's Greatest Root 0.52413540 18.69 3 107 <.0001 
NOTE: F Statistic for Roy's Greatest Root is an upper bound. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standardized Canonical Coefficients 
for the Opportunistic actions 
  Opportunistic actions1 Opportunistic actions2 Opportunistic actions3 
V15 0.8393 0.1448 0.5423 
V17 -0.3181 0.8683 0.3885 
V20 0.2977 0.5075 -0.8181 
 
Standardized Canonical Coefficients 
for the Growth 
  Growth1 Growth2 Growth3 
V12 0.5941 0.1015 -1.0377 
V13 -0.1681 0.9623 0.4332 
V14 0.6012 -0.1325 0.9553 
 
 
 
 
 
Canonical Structure 
 
Correlations Between the Opportunistic 
actions and Their Canonical Variables 
  Opportunistic actions1 Opportunistic actions2 Opportunistic actions3 
V15 0.8982 0.1431 0.4156 
V17 -0.3897 0.8394 0.3789 
V20 0.4104 0.4934 -0.7669 
 
Correlations Between the Growth 
and Their Canonical Variables 
  Growth1 Growth2 Growth3 
V12 0.8138 0.3507 -0.4635 
V13 0.0338 0.9926 0.1164 
V14 0.8686 -0.0691 0.4906 
 
Correlations Between the Opportunistic actions and the Canonical Variables of the Growth 
  Growth1 Growth2 Growth3 
V15 0.5267 0.0288 0.0514 
V17 -0.2285 0.1690 0.0469 
V20 0.2406 0.0994 -0.0949 
 
Correlations Between the Growth and the Canonical Variables of the Opportunistic actions 
  Opportunistic actions1 Opportunistic actions2 Opportunistic actions3 
V12 0.4772 0.0706 -0.0573 
V13 0.0198 0.1999 0.0144 
V14 0.5094 -0.0139 0.0607 
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Canonical Correlation  
The CANCORR Procedure 
Canonical Correlation Analysis 
 
  
Canonical 
Correlation   
Squared 
Canonical 
Correlation 
Eigenvalues of Inv(E)*H 
= CanRsq/(1-CanRsq) 
Test of H0: The canonical correlations in the current row 
and all that follow are zero 
Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Likelihood 
Ratio 
Approximate 
F Value Num DF Den DF Pr > F 
1 0.384591   0.147910 0.1736 0.1025 0.7091 0.7091 0.79543817 2.80 9 255.69 0.0038 
2 0.257615   0.066365 0.0711 0.0710 0.2904 0.9995 0.93351436 1.85 4 212 0.1196 
3 0.011347   0.000129 0.0001   0.0005 1.0000 0.99987125 0.01 1 107 0.9068 
 
Multivariate Statistics and F Approximations 
S=3 M=-0.5 N=51.5 
Statistic Value F Value Num DF Den DF Pr > F 
Wilks' Lambda 0.79543817 2.80 9 255.69 0.0038 
Pillai's Trace 0.21440427 2.75 9 321 0.0042 
Hotelling-Lawley Trace 0.24479672 2.84 9 161.85 0.0040 
Roy's Greatest Root 0.17358507 6.19 3 107 0.0006 
NOTE: F Statistic for Roy's Greatest Root is an upper bound. 
 
 
 
 
Standardized Canonical Coefficients 
for the Opportunistic actions 
  Opportunistic actions1 Opportunistic actions2 Opportunistic actions3 
V15 0.5768 0.7966 -0.2288 
V17 -0.3897 0.5768 0.7222 
V20 0.6163 -0.3991 0.6902 
 
Standardized Canonical Coefficients 
for the Competitiveness 
  Competitiveness1 Competitiveness2 Competitiveness3 
V6 -0.3742 0.4806 0.8559 
V11 1.0481 0.1844 -0.0441 
V18 0.0040 -0.8718 0.5189 
 
 
 
 
Canonical Structure 
 
Correlations Between the Opportunistic 
actions and Their Canonical Variables 
  Opportunistic actions1 Opportunistic actions2 Opportunistic actions3 
V15 0.6793 0.7067 -0.1979 
V17 -0.4538 0.5336 0.7137 
V20 0.6999 -0.3241 0.6365 
 
Correlations Between the Competitiveness 
and Their Canonical Variables 
  Competitiveness1 Competitiveness2 Competitiveness3 
V6 -0.0537 0.5106 0.8582 
V11 0.9343 0.1854 0.3044 
V18 0.1680 -0.8264 0.5375 
 
Correlations Between the Opportunistic actions and the Canonical Variables of the Competitiveness 
  Competitiveness1 Competitiveness2 Competitiveness3 
V15 0.2612 0.1821 -0.0022 
V17 -0.1745 0.1375 0.0081 
V20 0.2692 -0.0835 0.0072 
 
Correlations Between the Competitiveness and the Canonical Variables of the Opportunistic actions 
  Opportunistic actions1 Opportunistic actions2 Opportunistic actions3 
V6 -0.0207 0.1315 0.0097 
V11 0.3593 0.0478 0.0035 
V18 0.0646 -0.2129 0.0061 
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Canonical Correlation  
The CANCORR Procedure 
Canonical Correlation Analysis 
 
  
Canonical 
Correlation   
Squared 
Canonical 
Correlation 
Eigenvalues of Inv(E)*H 
= CanRsq/(1-CanRsq) 
Test of H0: The canonical correlations in the current r
ow and all that follow are zero 
Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Likelihood 
Ratio 
Approximat
e 
F Value Num DF Den DF Pr > F 
1 0.311799   0.097219 0.1077 0.0781 0.7461 0.7461 0.87068533 1.66 9 255.69 0.0982 
2 0.169619   0.028771 0.0296 0.0226 0.2052 0.9513 0.96444768 0.97 4 212 0.4260 
3 0.083562   0.006983 0.0070   0.0487 1.0000 0.99301737 0.75 1 107 0.3877 
 
Multivariate Statistics and F Approximations 
S=3 M=-0.5 N=51.5 
Statistic Value F Value Num DF Den DF Pr > F 
Wilks' Lambda 0.87068533 1.66 9 255.69 0.0982 
Pillai's Trace 0.13297191 1.65 9 321 0.0992 
Hotelling-Lawley Trace 0.14434256 1.67 9 161.85 0.0995 
Roy's Greatest Root 0.10768799 3.84 3 107 0.0118 
NOTE: F Statistic for Roy's Greatest Root is an upper bound. 
 
 
 
 
 
Standardized Canonical Coefficients 
for the Opportunistic actions 
  Opportunisctic actions1 Opportunisctic actions2 Opportunisctic actions3 
V15 0.5093 0.6225 -0.6104 
V17 -0.6994 0.7181 0.0351 
V20 0.3687 0.3560 0.8677 
 
 
Standardized Canonical Coefficients 
for the Survival 
  Survival1 Survival2 Survival3 
V4 0.6482 0.7721 0.2301 
V26 0.5964 -0.8621 0.1061 
V30 -0.0680 -0.1720 1.0090 
 
 
 
 
Canonical Structure 
 
Correlations Between the Opportunistic 
actions and Their Canonical Variables 
  Opportunisctic actions1 Opportunisctic actions2 Opportunisctic actions3 
V15 0.6043 0.6134 -0.5085 
V17 -0.7497 0.6601 0.0478 
V20 0.4555 0.4049 0.7929 
 
Correlations Between the Survival 
and Their Canonical Variables 
  Survival1 Survival2 Survival3 
V4 0.8039 0.5749 0.1522 
V26 0.7728 -0.6322 -0.0557 
V30 -0.2646 -0.0647 0.9622 
 
Correlations Between the Opportunistic actions and the Canonical Variables of the Survival 
  Survival1 Survival2 Survival3 
V15 0.1884 0.1040 -0.0425 
V17 -0.2337 0.1120 0.0040 
V20 0.1420 0.0687 0.0663 
 
Correlations Between the Survival and the Canonical Variables of the Opportunistic actions 
  Opportunisctic actions1 Opportunisctic actions2 Opportunisctic actions3 
V4 0.2507 0.0975 0.0127 
V26 0.2410 -0.1072 -0.0047 
V30 -0.0825 -0.0110 0.0804 
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The CALIS Procedure      
Covariance Structure Analysis 
Modelling Information      
Maximum Likelihood Estimation    
Data Set  WORK.RAW     
No Records Read  111        
No Records Used  111        
No of Observations  111        
Model Type  Path        
Analysis Covariances        
Variables in the Model          
Endogenous Manifest OO OA Competitiveness Growth Survival 
Exogenous Manifest Structural factors Contextual factors Strategic factors 
Number of Endogenous 
Variables  
5        
Number of Exogenous 
Variables  
3     
        
Descriptive Statistics       
Simple Statistics       
Variable Mean Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis  
Survival 4.4 1.32 -0.64 0.01  
Growth 5.08 1.14 -0.88 0.71  
Competitiveness 4.32 1.07 -0.2 -0.36  
Structural factors 4.36 1.17 -0.51 -0.31  
Contextual factors 4.91 1.46 -0.54 -0.44  
Strategic factors 3.42 1.01 1.09 1.47  
OA 4.59 1.26 -0.78 0.2  
OO 4.4 0.94 -0.16 0.45  
           
Mardia's Multivariate Kurtosis  -2.13    
Relative Multivariate Kurtosis  0.97    
Normalized Multivariate Kurtosis  -0.89    
Mardia Based Kappa (Browne, 1982) -0.03    
Mean Scaled Univariate Kurtosis  0.07    
Adj Mean Scaled Univariate Kurtosis  0.07    
Multivariate Mean Kappa  0.99    
Multivariate LS Kappa  0,24    
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The CALIS Procedure 
Optimization     
1. Observed Moments of Variables 
2. McDonald Method     
3. Two-Stage Least Squares     
Parameter Estimates      
N Parameter Estimate Gradient   
1 _Parm01 0.15 0.00   
2 _Parm02 0.11 0.00   
3 _Parm03 -0.16 0.00    
4 _Parm04 0.27 0.00    
5 _Parm05 -0.03 0.00    
6 _Parm06 0.61 0.00    
7 _Parm07 -0.53 0.00    
8 _Parm08 -0.39 0.00    
9 _Parm09 0.06 0.00    
10 _Parm10 0.07 0.00    
11 _Parm11 0.05 0.00    
12 _Parm12 0.37 0.00   
13 _Parm13 0.35 0.00   
14 _Parm14 0.22 0.00   
15 _Parm15 0.08 0.00   
16 _Parm16 0.03 0.00   
17 _Parm17 0.03 0.00   
18 _Parm18 -0.46 0.00   
19 _Parm19 0.08 0.00   
20 _Parm20 0.55 0.00   
21 _Parm21 0.11 0.00   
22 _Add01 1.38 0.00    
23 _Add02 2.12 0.00    
24 _Add03 1.02 0.00    
25 _Add04 1.09 0.00    
26 _Add05 0.4 0.00   
27 _Add06 0.59 0.00   
28 _Add07 1.04 0.00   
29 _Add08 0.77 0.00   
30 _Add09 -0.49 0.00   
31 _Add10 0.09 0.00   
32 _Add11 0.07 0.00   
Value of Objective Function = 0.086 
Convergence criterion satisfied. 
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The Calis Procedure 
Covariance Analysis 
Fit Summary 
         
Modelling Info          
Number of Observations   111    
Number of Variables  8    
Number of Moments  36    
Number of Parameters  32    
Number of Active Constraints 0    
Baseline Model Function Value 3.08    
Baseline Model Chi-Square 338.41    
Baseline Model Chi-Square DF 28    
Pr > Baseline Model Chi-Square  <.0001     
         
Absolute Index      
Fit Function 0.09    
Chi-Square 9.43    
Chi-Square DF 4    
Pr > Chi-Square 0.05    
Elliptic Corrected Chi-Square 9.68    
Pr > Elliptic Corr. Chi-Square 0.05    
Z-Test of Wilson & Hilferty 1.64    
Hoelter Critical N 111    
Root Mean Square Residual (RMR) 0.03    
Standardized RMR (SRMR) 0.02    
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) 0.98    
      
Parsimony Index      
Adjusted GFI (AGFI) 0.82    
Parsimonious GFI 0.14    
RMSEA Estimate 0.11    
RMSEA Lower 90% Confidence Limit 0    
RMSEA Upper 90% Confidence Limit 0.2    
Probability of Close Fit 0.11    
ECVI Estimate 0.72    
ECVI Lower 90% Confidence Limit 0.67       
ECVI Upper 90% Confidence Limit 0.84       
Akaike Information Criterion 73.43       
Bozdogan CAIC 192.13       
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 160.13       
McDonald Centrality 0.98       
Incremental Index           
Bentler Comparative Fit Index 0.98       
Bentler-Bonett NFI 0.97    
580 
Bentler-Bonett Non-normed Index 0.88    
Bollen Normed Index Rho1 0.81    
Bollen Non-normed Index Delta2 0.98    
James et al. Parsimonious NFI 0.14    
      
Standardized Results for PATH List 
Path     Parameter Est Std t Value 
          Error   
Structural factors        ===> OO _Parm01 0.18 0.10 1.98 
Structural factors        ===> OA _Parm02 0.11 0.10 1.33 
Contextual factors      ===> OO _Parm03 0.25 0.10 2.81 
Contextual factors      ===> OA _Parm04 0.31 0.10 4.00 
Strategic factors          ===> OO _Parm05 0.03 0.10 -0.31 
Strategic factors          ===> OA _Parm06 0.49 0.10 7.06 
Structural factors        ===> Competitiveness _Parm07 0.58 0.10 -8.86 
Structural factors        ===> Growth _Parm08 0.41 0.10 -6.77 
Structural factors        ===> Survival _Parm09 0.05 0.10 0.64 
Contextual factors      ===> Competitiveness _Parm10 0.09 0.10 1.17 
Contextual factors      ===> Growth _Parm11 0.06 0.10 0.97 
Contextual factors      ===> Survival _Parm12 0.40 0.10 4.92 
Strategic factors          ===> Competitiveness _Parm13 0.33 0.10 4.18 
Strategic factors          ===> Growth _Parm14 0.20 0.10 3.14 
Strategic factors          ===> Survival _Parm15 0.06 0.10 0.70 
OO                                ===> Competitiveness _Parm16 0.03 0.10 0.38 
OO                                ===> Growth _Parm17 0.03 0.10 0.46 
OO                                ===> Survival _Parm18 0.32 0.10 -4.14 
OA                                ===> Competitiveness _Parm19 0.09 0.10 1.11 
OA                                ===> Growth _Parm20 0.61 0.10 9.80 
OA                                ===> Survival _Parm21 0.10 0.10 1.09 
          
Standardized Results for Variance Parameters 
Variance Variable  Parameter Est Std t Value 
Type     Error  
Exogenous Structural factors _Add01 1   
 Contextual factors _Add02 1   
 Strategic factors _Add03 1   
Error Survival _Add04 0.62 0.1 8.5 
 Growth _Add05 0.31 0.1 6.3 
 Competitiveness _Add06 0.51 0.1 7.5 
 OA  _Add07 0.65 0.1 8.87 
 OO  _Add08 0.87 0.1 14.82 
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Standardized Results for Covariances Among Exogenous Variables 
Var1 Var2   Parameter Est Std t Value 
         Error  
Contextual factors Structural factors _Add09 0.28 0.1 3.24 
Strategic factors Structural factors _Add10 0.07 0.1 0.77 
Strategic factors Contextual factors _Add11 0.05 0.1 0.49 
       
Standardized Total Effects 
Effect / Std Error / t Value / p Value 
   
OA  
 
OO  
Contextual 
factors  
 Strategic 
factors  
Structural 
factors  
Competitiveness          0.09    0.03            0.11  0.38   
  0.08  0.07            0.07   0.07      0.06  
  1.11  0.38  1.59  5.56  0.57  
  0.27  0.71  0.11  <.0001  <.0001   
Growth  0.61  0.03         0.24  0.49    -0.34  
        0.06   0.06            0.07   0.07      0.07  
         9.80         0.46            3.33        7.50  -4.63  
    <.0001   0.64                   <.0001     <.0001   
OA                          -                0.31          0.49  0.11  
                0.08          0.07    0.08  
                4.00        7.06  1.33  
      <.0001     <.0001       0.18  
OO                  0.25   0.03  0.18  
               0.09          0.09      0.09  
               2.81          0.31      1.98  
                          0.76      0.05  
Survival         0.10            0.32             0.52          0.12          -    
        0.09            0.08            0.07          0.08      0.08  
         1.09            4.14           7.00          1.48      0.05  
         0.28    <.0001     <.0001           0.14      0.96  
          0.09            0.03            0.11          0.38   
Standardized Direct Effects 
Effect / Std Error / t Value / p Value       
  OA OO Contextual 
factors 
Strategic 
factors 
Structural 
factors 
Competitiveness  0.09 0.03 0.09 0.33 -0.58 
  0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 
  1.11 0.38 1.17 4.18 -8.86 
  0.27 0.71 0.24  <.0001   <.0001  
Growth  0.61 0.03 0.06 0.2 -0.41 
  0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
  9.8 0.46 0.97 3.14 -6.77 
   <.0001  0.64 0.33 0  <.0001  
582 
OA    0.31 0.49 0.11 
      0.08 0.07 0.08 
      4 7.06 1.33 
       <.0001   <.0001  0.18 
OO      0.25 -0.03 0.18 
      0.09 0.09 0.09 
      2.81 -0.31 1.98 
      0 0.76 0.05 
Survival  0.1 0.32 0.4 0.06 0.05 
  0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 
  1.09 4.14 4.92 0.7 0.64 
  0.28  <.0001   <.0001  0.48 0.52 
       
Standardized Indirect Effects 
Effect / Std Error / t Value / p Value        
  OA OO Contextual 
factors 
Strategic 
factors 
Structural 
factors 
Competitiveness    0.02 0.04 0.02 
      0.03 0.04 0.02 
      0.67 1.07 0.84 
    0.5 0.28 0.4 
Growth    0.18 0.3 0.07 
      0.05 0.05 0.05 
      3.41 5.69 1.35 
      0  <.0001  0.18 
OA         
OO      0.11 0.06 0.05 
Survival             -               -    0.05 0.05 0.04 
    2.5 1.07 1.34 
    0.01 0.28 0.18 
       
Stepwise Multivariate Wald Test 
Parm  Cumulative Statistics  Univariate Increment  
  Chi-
Square  
 DF   Pr > ChSq   ChSq  Pr > Chq 
_Parm05  0.09 1 0.76 0.09 0.76 
_Parm16  0.24 2 0.89 0.14 0.71 
_Parm17  0.45 3 0.93 0.21 0.64 
_Add11  0.69 4 0.95 0.24 0.63 
_Parm09  1.1 5 0.95 0.41 0.52 
_Parm15  1.61 6 0.95 0.51 0.48 
_Parm11  2.39 7 0.94 0.78 0.38 
_Add10  3.26 8 0.92 0.88 0.35 
_Parm19  4.49 9 0.88 1.23 0.27 
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_Parm02  6.25 10 0.79 1.76 0.19 
_Parm10  8.79 11 0.64 2.54 0.11 
_Parm21  12.08 12 0.44 3.29 0.07 
_Parm01  15.82 13 0.26 3.74 0.05 
       
Rank Order of the 10 Largest LM Stat for Path Relations 
To From LM Stat Pr > 
ChiSq 
 
Parm 
        Change 
Structural factors Strategic factors 7.05 0.01 -0.42 
Survival Growth 6.59 0.01 0.4 
Growth Survival  6.59 0.01 0.15 
Contextual factors Structural factors 5.36 0.02 0.25 
Contextual factors Strategic factors 3.89 0.05 1.04 
Survival Competitiveness 2.11 0.15 0.19 
Competitiveness Survival  2.11 0.15 0.1 
Strategic factors Structural factors 0.97 0.32 0.07 
OA Competitiveness 0.34 0.56 2.04 
OO OA 0.34 0.56 0.05 
Rank Order of the 4 Largest LM Stat for Error Variances and Covariances 
Error Error LM Stat Pr > 
ChiSq 
 
Parm 
of of   Change 
Survival Growth 6.59 0.01 0.16 
Survival Competitiveness 2.11 0.15 0.11 
OO OA 0.34 0.56 0.05 
Growth Competitiveness 0 0.97 0 
 
